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John J. Joughin and Simon Malpas
The new aestheticism: an introduction
The very notion of the ‘aesthetic’ could be said to have fallen victim to the success of
recent developments within literary theory. Undergraduates now pause before
rehearsing complacent aesthetic verities concerning truth, meaning and value, verities
that used to pass at one time for literary criticism. The rise of critical theory in disci-
plines across the humanities during the 1980s and 1990s has all but swept aesthetics
from the map – and, some would argue, rightly so. Critical theory, of whatever variety,
presented a fundamental challenge to the image of the old-style academic aesthete
sitting in his (and it was always his) ivory tower and handing down judgements about
the good and the bad in art and culture with a blissful disregard for the politics of his
pronouncements. Notions such as aesthetic independence, artistic genius, the cultu-
ral and historical universality of a text or work, and the humanist assumption of art’s
intrinsic spiritual value have been successfully challenged by successive investigations
into the historical and political bases of art’s material production and transmission.
Theories of textuality, subjectivity, ideology, class, race and gender have shown such
notions of universal human value to be without foundation, and even to act as repres-
sive means of safeguarding the beliefs and values of an elitist culture from challenge
or transformation. The upshot of this series of interventions has been the rapid expan-
sion of the canon, as well as a profound questioning of the very idea of canonicity.
Art’s relations to dominant ideologies have been exposed from a number of perspec-
tives, as well as its potential to challenge these ideologies. What has frequently been
lost in this process, however, is the sense of art’s specificity as an object of analysis –
or, more accurately, its specificity as an aesthetic phenomenon. In the rush to diag-
nose art’s contamination by politics and culture, theoretical analysis has tended always
to posit a prior order that grounds or determines a work’s aesthetic impact, whether
this is history, ideology or theories of subjectivity. The aesthetic is thus explicated in
other terms, with other criteria, and its singularity is effaced. Theoretical criticism is
in continual danger here of throwing out the aesthetic baby with the humanist bath-
water.
Yet, on theoretical grounds alone, the recent resistance to aesthetics remains puz-
zling, not least insofar as many of the theoretical advances of the last few years – the
focus on the reader’s role in the constitution of meaning, the possibility that texts are
open to a number of interpretations, the way in which literature troubles fixed defini-
tions of class, race, gender and sexuality, etc. – might themselves be brought together
under the general rubric of ‘the aesthetic function of literature’.Tied to actuality, in ways
that cannot be reduced to the empirical, aesthetic experience allows for the creation of
‘possible worlds’ as well as for critical experimentation. In a teaching situation (as
Thomas Docherty argues in his contribution to this volume) a reconceptualisation of
the aesthetic means making the most of an approach to ‘education’ which relies on an
openness to alterity, and developing a pedagogy that refuses to be prescribed by conven-
tional or a priori categories. That these concerns are already rehearsed by the unravell-
ing of metaphysical ‘givens’ undertaken by contemporary theory could lead one to the
conclusion that, if theory has changed the conditions of teaching, then it will also enable
us to develop a more rigorous, non-foundationalist approach to aesthetics: one which
avoids the pitfalls and reductive unities of an old-style aestheticism. In the process,
though, theory will also need to look to its philosophical beginnings in aesthetics.
Two years ago, when the original proposal for the current collection was first sent
out for review, an early anonymous reader voiced some concerns about the project’s
‘philosophical’ content. The specific cause for disquiet was that, while ‘several of the
contributors happen to work in literature departments’, the overall emphasis of the
volume was misdirected, and that, if the book was to get a green light at all, the editors
would at least ‘have to decide whether it’s about literature or philosophy’. This accu-
sation concerning a migration across disciplinary lines is a curious one, not least
insofar as some of the best literary criticism of recent years has been penned by phi-
losophers, while much of the work currently described as ‘continental philosophy’
now emerges from departments of literature. But the reader’s comments also serve to
remind us of the extent to which the dialogue which already exists between these two
subjects now needs to be made still more explicit. There are, after all, tensions to be
plotted here, as well as affinities.
In this respect of course there are other more tangible reasons why the anonymous
reader’s distinction between literature and philosophy seems a less than helpful one.
Maybe the best response – at least it was the one that we gave at the time – is to say
that aesthetics is the theoretical discourse which attempts to comprehend the literary.
This of course is an unsatisfactory shorthand, and we will return to problematise the
position below, yet, loosely speaking, the relation between literature and philosophy
could be said to be symbiotic, in that each would be deficient without consideration
by the other. In this respect, as Andrew Bowie has recently reminded us:
The rise of ‘literature’ and the rise of philosophical aesthetics – of a new philosophical
concern with understanding the nature of art – are inseparable phenomena, which are
vitally connected to changes in conceptions of truth in modern thought. . . . The need
to integrate the disciplines of literary study and philosophy in new ways is, I propose,
vital to the longer-term health of both disciplines. . . . Important work needs to be done
. . . in showing how issues which emerge in relation to literature are, when connected to
developments in contemporary philosophy, germane to issues concerning our self-
understanding which do potentially play an important role in engaging with virtually
any area of modern society.1
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Bowie’s case, that without ‘an orientation towards understanding the truth-potential
in art that is more than ideology, many of the most essential issues concerning the sig-
nificance of art cannot even be discussed’,2 is, we would like to argue, compelling. Art
is inextricably tied to the politics of contemporary culture, and has been throughout
modernity. Aesthetic specificity is not, however, entirely explicable, or graspable, in
terms of another conceptual scheme or genre of discourse. The singularity of the
work’s ‘art-ness’ escapes and all that often remains is the critical discourse itself, reas-
sured of its methodological approach and able to reassert its foundational principles.
In other words, perhaps the most basic tenet that we are trying to argue for is the equi-
primordiality of the aesthetic – that, although it is without doubt tied up with the
political, historical, ideological, etc., thinking it as other than determined by them,
and therefore reducible to them, opens a space for an artistic or literary specificity that
can radically transform its critical potential and position with regard to contemporary
culture. In the light of this, we want to put the case that it might be time for a new
aestheticism. This is not to argue that the critiques of aesthetics carried out under the
various banners of theory are wrong or misguided. Of course the unmasking of art’s
relation to ideology, historical and political context, self-identification, gender and
colonialism are immensely important for contemporary thought and politics. It is
impossible now to argue that aesthetics is anything other than thoroughly imbricated
with politics and culture. And this, without doubt, is an entirely good thing. None of
those involved in this book set out to present any sort of rearguard defence of, or case
for a return to, the notion of art as a universally and apolitically humanist activity pre-
sided over by a benign council of critical patriarchs. Rather it would be more accurate
to say that the appearance of The New Aestheticism coincides with a conjuncture that
is often termed ‘post-theoretical’ – both historically in the sense that in terms of his-
torical sequence it comes after the initial impact of theory, but also conceptually in
the sense that as ‘theory’ now enters a more reflective phase, there is an increased will-
ingness among cultural theorists and philosophers alike to consider ‘the philosophi-
cal origins of literary theory’.
Yet, in this respect, new aestheticism remains a troubled term and in current par-
lance it already comes loaded with the baggage of the ‘philistine controversy’ which
first emerged in an exchange that originally that took place in the New Left Review
during the mid-1990s. New aestheticism was identified there as a regressive tendency
which in its ‘pursuit of art and judgement’ focused on ‘ethical abstraction’ to the exclu-
sion of ‘the pleasures of the body and the problems of contemporary art’ – pleasures
and brutalities that philistinism was better placed to explore as the ‘definitional other’
or the spectre of aesthetics.3 Jay Bernstein and Andrew Bowie have by now made their
own response as participants in the original debate,4 but on reflection it is increasingly
apparent that the two formations share a good deal of common ground: each is cer-
tainly opposed to the rootless aesthetic contingencies of cultural studies or lit. crit.
postmodernism, and each registers an awareness of the constitutive antagonisms of
modern culture (a theme to which we return ourselves below); so that, for example,
one need only look at Jay Bernstein’s contribution to the current collection to locate
an aesthetic that is fully engaged with the contemporary brutalities of modern
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society.5 Meanwhile, the label new aestheticist remains an opportunist one insofar as
Bernstein himself only actually makes use of the term in passing during his introduc-
tion to The Fate of Art and only then to refer to the political project of German
Idealism and Romanticism,6 where the failure to reconcile art and politics remains a
notorious trouble spot for those who would forge an aesthetic critique of modernity.
In some ways the more rigorous term for this dilemma (and again it is one to which
we will return below) is post-aestheticism. If the current volume allows room for a
constructive difference of view on these and other issues, then it will partially have
served its purpose.
The essays collected here, then, reflect a mixture of currencies. There are indeed
new contributions from key players in the recent philistine controversy including
Bernstein and Bowie, and while it remains the case that the majority of contributors
happen to work in departments of literature or departments of philosophy rather than
the history of art, film or media studies, we hope that further contributions from prac-
titioners and theorists in other disciplines will follow. In an attempt to reassert the
importance of aesthetics to contemporary theory and criticism, our aim throughout
has been to offer a mix of established scholars from the first wave of theory whilst also
securing contributions from younger second- or third-generation theorists. The new
aestheticism does not claim to establish an orthodoxy; instead like any new constel-
lation it circles restlessly around the very concept it attempts to grasp, and in doing
so it lays open the field while remaining mindful of the need to attend to its own his-
torical position. In what’s left of the introduction we attempt a partial genealogy of
the new formation.
The anti-aesthetic
The high-water mark of anti-aestheticism arguably coincided with the emergence of
the so-called ‘culture wars’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s, wherein anxieties con-
cerning the erosion of the high culture/popular cultural divide gained considerable
publicity and became an industry in their own right, though mostly, it has to be said,
the preoccupation of media pundits rather than academics. A good deal of unhelpful
caricature of critical positions took place as a result, although actually, the attendant
irony was that while those in the press bemoaned the decline of traditional values, for
its part ‘cultural criticism’ had never been more self-consciously aware of its own com-
plicity in upholding the literary canon. From the outset it had been the concern of
materialist and political criticism to avoid the pitfalls of a transcendent critique – one
which uncritically assumed the validity of its own position – and as a consequence
critics working in the area of literary and cultural studies began to articulate a recur-
rent concern with positioning themselves simultaneously inside and outside the ‘lit-
erary’. Here, for example, is Tony Bennett, speaking directly to the problem:
There is no ready-made theoretical position outside aesthetic discourse which can
simply be taken up and occupied. Such a space requires a degree of fashioning; it must
be organised and, above all, won – won from the preponderant cultural weight of aes-
thetic conceptions of the literary. . . . As customary contrasts – between the ‘literary’ and
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the non-literary, for example – lose their purchase, it is now possible to see not merely
their edges but beyond their edges and, in realising the full implications of their histor-
icality, to glimpse the possibility of a situation in which they may no longer order and
organise the terms of literary production and reception. This is not merely to query the
effect of a category (‘literature’) but concerns its functioning within and across an array
of institutions and, accordingly, the challenge of organising positions – discursive and
institutional – which will be not just outside ‘literature’ but beyond it in the sense of
opening up new fields of knowledge and action.7
There can be no doubt that cultural critics are bound in certain ways to forms of aca-
demic hierarchy and as Bennett’s comments suggest the hegemony of literature
imposes constraints of its own, yet while his analysis usefully highlights some of the
dilemmas facing an attempted politicisation of an established institution, a number
of related issues still remain troublingly unresolved. Crucially, in calling for a refunc-
tioning of the institution of ‘literature’ by which ‘concepts and methods formed in
aesthetic discourse’ will be ‘re-assembled in new theoretical configurations’8 his anti-
aestheticist position is actually disingenuous insofar as it remains unwilling to think
through the fuller implications of its dialectical dependency on what it would other-
wise oppose. More seriously perhaps, in arguing that ‘such positions [discursive and
institutional] can be organised only by prising them away from aesthetic conceptions
of literature’9 Bennett also prevents any plausible account as to why one should be
engaged in the study of literature in the first place, much less moving beyond it. How,
one might ask, can such a transformation ‘operate’ if it fails to grasp the complexities
of the discourse it claims to re-‘fashion’?
One of the major limitations of the ideology critique of leftish criticism of the
1980s and 1990s is that in locating the aesthetic as a static or essentialist category or a
dead ‘cultural weight’, it then fails to account for the enduring specificities of litera-
ture’s cognitive significance. Such work falls short of a reconceptualisation of aesthetic
discourse and often refuses to engage in any reflective fashion with the particularity of
the work of art, much less the specificities of aesthetic experience.10 In attempting to
sever the aesthetic connection and in reducing literature to its determinants outside or
beyond literature, Bennett’s anti-aestheticism is committed to a ‘sociology of social
forms’11 where the emphasis falls on exposing the regulatory character of ‘cultural insti-
tutions’ and on the need to bridge the gap between ‘literature’ and everyday life.12 The
slippage implied here between art, literature and ‘lifeworld’ is certainly one which
some forms of affirmative postmodern cultural criticism have facilitated, and in recent
years ‘anti-aestheticism’ has itself, at times, almost become a unifying device for artic-
ulating the shared concerns of what is actually an eclectic basket of theoretical posi-
tions. Compare Hal Foster in the mid-1980s concluding his introduction to what was
to become a widely influential anthology of essays on postmodern culture:
‘Anti-aesthetic’ . . . signals that the very notion of the aesthetic, its network of ideas, is
in question here: the idea that aesthetic experience exists apart, without ‘purpose,’ all but
beyond history, or that art can now effect a world at once (inter)subjective, concrete and
universal – a symbolic totality. Like ‘postmodernism,’ then, ‘anti-aesthetic’ marks a cul-
tural position on the present: are categories afforded by the aesthetic still valid? (For
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example, is the model of subjective taste not threatened by mass mediation, or that of
universal vision by the rise of other cultures?) More locally, ‘anti-aesthetic’ also signals a
practice, cross-disciplinary in nature, that is sensitive to cultural forms engaged in a
politic (e.g., feminist art) or rooted in a vernacular – that is, to forms that deny the idea
of a privileged aesthetic realm.
The adventures of the aesthetic make up one of the great narratives of modernity:
from the time of its autonomy through art-for-art’s-sake to its status as a necessary neg-
ative category, a critique of the world as it is. It is this last moment (figured brilliantly
in the writings of Theodor Adorno) that is hard to relinquish: the notion of the aesthetic
as subversive, a critical interstice in an otherwise instrumental world. Now, however, we
have to consider that this aesthetic space too is eclipsed . . .13
Foster’s caricature of aesthetic autonomy aside, one needs to ask precisely what might
be at stake in his questioning of ‘the very notion of the aesthetic’. In common with
other ‘presentist’ articulations of cultural criticism Foster is willing to discard the aes-
thetic as an outmoded category, insofar as the question of art’s right to exist at a rela-
tive remove from social reality remains at odds with more immediately pressing and
‘practical’ concerns, yet clearly, a good deal hinges here on the terms by which this
integration of ‘art and empirical life’ is achieved.14 One of the chief characteristics of
the ‘avant gardism’ of recent cultural criticism lies in its willingness to welcome the
‘sublation of the difference between art and life’ and thus secure the comforting illu-
sion that art has been ‘eclipsed’ or come to an end;15 yet this consolation only succeeds
in betraying the extent to which art continues to attest to the divided condition of
culture itself.
While Foster is willing to concede the ‘brilliance’ of Adorno’s negative critique his
emphasis on overcoming the constraints of aesthetic formalism prevents any consid-
eration of the dynamic role that form plays in Adorno’s conceptualisation of the aes-
thetic. Crucially, Foster’s willingness to dispense with traditional aesthetic categories
forecloses on the possibility of a more rigorous engagement with the historical pro-
cesses by which such categories continue to be ‘critiqued and renewed’. In contrast,
and in his ‘defence of autonomous art as socially critical’, Adorno’s aesthetic theory
interrogates the extent to which cultural forms and the materials and techniques by
which they are transfigured are already riven by ‘the history sedimented within
them’.16 In this respect of course, as Adorno himself reminds us, the situation of the
new in art is hardly new, so that, speaking of the ‘hidden origins’ of the new Viennese
school he observes: ‘Things that are modern do not just sally forth in advance of their
time. They also recall things forgotten; they control anachronistic reserves which have
been left behind and which have not been exhausted by the rationality of eternal same-
ness.’17
For Adorno, then, the participation of works of art in history and the ‘determinate
critique that they execute on history through their form’18 necessarily needs to be con-
strued in relation to the unresolved contradictions of society itself, and in this respect
as Ewa Ziarek comments in her contribution to the current collection:
Adorno’s argument [in Aesthetic Theory] does not repeat the modernist ideology of for-
malism, but, on the contrary, treats form as a dynamic social category linked to new
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technologies, economic structures of exchange, social relations of production as well as
the intrinsic artistic forming of the always already historically shaped material.19
In his eagerness to assimilate art to its ‘restorative’ social function Foster’s non-
dialectical conceptualisation of aesthetic autonomy itself effectively fails to register
art’s own uncertainty concerning its ‘right to exist’. In doing so he then also effectively
surrenders the possibility of achieving a society free from domination.20 As Jay
Bernstein observes, whilst Adorno’s ‘aesthetic autonomy’ might come at a ‘high price’
(in terms of its present remove from society) this position nevertheless remains inte-
gral to its critical potential: ‘Only by sustaining its function of not now being socially
formative can art enact a form of resistance to the rationality assumptions governing
practice and be a place holder for what socially formative practice would be like.’21
For all their commitment to ‘practice’ and in their sensitivity to the local quotid-
ian, recent democratising trends in cultural criticism tend to be secured on affect alone,
so that, as Bernstein suggests: ‘postmodern practice alters the empirical world without
transforming it, its abstract affirmations belie the despair that sustains it’.22 The failure
of postmodern cultural theory to construe its emancipatory project in relation to aes-
thetics understood as ‘social epistemology’ means that, despite a tacit commitment to
the ethico-political, new forms of cultural analysis often remain outflanked in politi-
cal terms – unable to shape a response which engages in a properly reflective fashion
with the validity claims on which their own emancipatory discourse of social transfor-
mation is implicitly based. While Adorno’s scepticism concerning a socially formative
function for art might have become unfashionable, many of the debates within cultu-
ral studies concerning the dissolution of a traditional concept of the humanities are
still arguably unwittingly situated within the parameters of his diagnosis of the inabil-
ity of art to achieve reconciliation with ‘everyday life’. In fact, the yearning of cultural
theory to secure a breach against the ‘rationality assumptions’ of its own institutional
confinement is in every sense a traditional one. Yet, in its affirmation of a breach
between disciplines, contemporary cultural theory is often too quick to forget the
extent to which what Foster terms a ‘cross-disciplinary’ practice was always already a
feature of an aesthetic criticism itself.Certainly, the early precursors of literary and cul-
tural theory like Romantic philosophy, were, in any case, always hybrid assemblages
rather than ‘a unified discipline’.23
Somewhat paradoxically, then, as cultural theory has expanded its ‘critical prac-
tice’, its understanding of the philosophical and social determinants which govern its
practice has contracted in almost equal measure. More seriously of course, the failure
to construe a dialectical conception of aesthetic autonomy means that it is possible to
track an inadvertent convergence between the anti-aestheticism of recent cultural
theory and the complacency of the old-style aestheticism it would ostensibly seek to
displace, insofar as each is reliant on a formulation of the aesthetic that is derivative
of an ‘over-simplified Kantianism’,24 so that, as Isobel Armstrong remarks of recent
trends in cultural criticism:
The traditional definition [of the aesthetic] has not shifted much, whether it is
inflected as radical or conservative, undermined or confirmed. Neither radical critique
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nor conservative confidence works with the possibility that social and cultural change
over the last century might have changed or might change the category itself. Both in
its deconstruction and consecration the model of the aesthetic remains virtually the
same. And so the dialectics of left and right converge in an unspoken consensus that
is unable to engage with democratic readings.25
In relying on an overly reductive caricature of art as a ‘privileged realm’ which exists
at a non-cognitive remove beyond history, a ‘politically committed’ criticism is then
unable to account for the persistence of art in anything other than reductively pre-
scriptive and functionalist terms. Yet, if nothing else, the willingness of recent cultu-
ral theory to historicise and relativise a fixed or unified notion of art, itself indirectly
attests to the refusal of artworks to be exhausted by a continual process of appropria-
tion and counter-appropriation in an endless variety of contexts. Indeed, one could
say that the survival of literary texts over a period of time is less a product of their ‘time-
less’ significance and more directly related to their ability to sustain interpretations
which are often either contestable or politically opposed.26 There can be no doubt
that, in particular contexts at certain times, works of bourgeois culture have been util-
ised as an instrument of oppression and social control, but then, as Andrew Bowie
observes: ‘why would one bother to concern oneself with the well-known products of
Western culture, if it were not that they offer more than is apparent when their often
quite evident failings with regard to contemporary social, ethical and other assump-
tions are exposed?’27 Moreover, what type of surplus ‘knowledge’ might be at stake
here? As Bowie asks, ‘are those insights [revealing the complicity of “great works” in
securing “repressive discourses of race, gender, class, etc.”] therefore themselves super-
ior to what they unmask, offering a truth or revelation inaccessible to their object of
investigation?’28 For new aestheticists like Bowie, our understanding of the relation-
ship between art, truth and interpretation is not merely dependent on an openness to
the fact that literary texts transform meaning, but is also equally concerned with
asking how this revelation is to be construed.29 In this respect, an over-restrictively
functionalist account of the reductions and inequities of canon formation falls short
of a more reflective acknowledgement that the rise of literature is actually entwined
with a more complex intellectual legacy: one which raises pressing philosophical as
well as political questions to which we now need to turn.
Aesthetics and modernity
While the fraught relation between politics and art is as ancient as philosophy itself
– so that art manifests a dissident potential that Plato saw fit to expunge from his
ideal conception of the republic – the stakes are arguably raised still higher by art’s
ambivalent location within the philosophical project of modernity. It is no coinci-
dence that the aesthetic has remained irreducible within modernity, and thus has
appeared in a range of different guises always as a ‘surplus’ to the organising drive of
instrumental reason. The analysis of the aesthetic is inseparable from a thinking of
the complexities of philosophical and political modernity. Aesthetics emerged as an
object of enquiry during the same period in which modernity was provided with the
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systematic underpinnings that gave rise to it as a sense of the world, and has remained
inextricably tied up with many of modernity’s self-reflections, ambitions and prob-
lems. It follows that an adequate thinking of modernity requires an investigation of
the aesthetic and, reciprocally, the discussion of the impact of art and literature on
contemporary culture needs a way of situating this culture in relation to the history
of modern politics and philosophy.
Modernity develops from, and is closely linked with, the central progressive ambi-
tions of the Enlightenment and Reformation, aspiring in its turn to generate knowl-
edge and justice not from some metaphysical, historical or theological precondition
but rather from the resources of reason itself. According to Jürgen Habermas, ‘the
secular concept of modernity expresses the conviction that the future has already
begun: It is the epoch that lives for the future, that opens itself up to the novelty
of the future.’30 For modernity, then, reason becomes self-legislating and future-
orientated: giving itself the rules for its own development and systematically discard-
ing the beliefs and mystifications that had held it in check in the past. Modernity’s
central concepts thus derive from cognitive rationality, moral autonomy and the
power of social-political self-determination. Although the historical origin of moder-
nity is impossible to pin down as aspects of these defining philosophies occur in the
work of figures writing from the late Middle Ages onwards, its emergence as a self-
conscious discourse about the necessary interrelations of knowledge, morality, culture
and history can be more reliably located at the end of the eighteenth century in the
thought of German Idealism, and particularly the philosophies of Kant and Hegel
who systematically delimit and map out the architectonic of modern reason.31 In this
respect, Bernstein argues that:
With the coming of modernity – with the emergence of a disenchanted natural world
as projected by modern science, a political language of rights and equality, a secular
morality, a burgeoning sense of subjective consciousness, and autonomous art – the task
of philosophy became that of proving a wholly critical and radically self-reflective con-
ception of reason and rationality that would demonstrate the immanent ground for our
allegiance to these new ways of being in the world.32
Perhaps the most important accounts of this notion of modernity are those that are
developed from the work of Max Weber by contemporary writers such as Jürgen
Habermas, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard and Cornelius Castoriadis who,
despite their significant differences, share a sense of the internally differentiated nature
of modern existence. Weber characterises modernity in terms of the destruction of
metaphysical principles, first causes and religious worldviews in the work of eighteenth-
century Enlightenment philosophers, which came to a head in the writings of Kant.
He argues that modern experience has become separated into three spheres that are
autonomous from one another and only formally connected, and whose interaction has
become the site of intense theoretical, social and political debate. These spheres are,
very briefly, scientific truth, normative rightness and beauty, which correspond to the
philosophical disciplines of epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, and give rise to self-
sufficient forms of social practice: the sciences and technology, the law and morality,
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and modern art, literature and more general culture. These practical disciplines in turn
provide the ground for capitalist economy, bureaucratic administration and individual
self-identification. Each of these spheres is internally lawful (it is able to legislate for its
own constitution), and yet constantly impeaches upon, and is impeached upon by, the
others. In other words, the relation between the spheres is one of semi-autonomy and
troubled inter-implication, as forms of legislation coherent within a particular sphere
impinge upon those legislations occurring in another. Developments in knowledge and
technology require new forms of administration, for example, which may in turn
inspire different modes of cultural representation.
This notion of conflictual coexistence between the spheres is opened up for anal-
ysis by the relationship between the faculties of pure reason, practical reason and
judgement set out in Kant’s three Critiques, which Habermas sums up with particu-
lar clarity:
In Kant’s concept of a formal and internally differentiated reason there is sketched a
theory of modernity. This is characterised, on the one hand, by its renunciation of the
substantial rationality of inherited religious and metaphysical worldviews and, on the
other hand, by its reliance upon a procedural rationality, from which our justifiable
interpretations, be they pertinent to the field of objective knowledge, moral-practical
insight, or aesthetic judgement, borrow their claim to validity.33
In the absence of the ‘substantial rationality’ of a religious worldview, then, what
remains is a formal rationalism, a ‘procedural rationality’, which, in Kant in particu-
lar and modernity more generally, is internally differentiated.
Kant’s critical philosophy sets out to achieve two ends: to demonstrate the limita-
tions of reason by describing how its attempts to grasp the totality of objective
conditions dissolve into antinomy (particularly in the dogmatic thrust of pre-
Enlightenment philosophy and theology); and at the same time to redeem thought
and action by demonstrating the transcendental conditions of their possibility. In the
first two critiques, of pure reason (epistemology) and practical reason (ethics), a chasm
between truth and justice is opened. Between epistemology and ethics, Kant draws a
division that cannot be crossed. By arguing that knowledge is bound by the ‘limits of
experience’ which cannot be exceeded without falling prey to antinomy, he makes
room for a separate ethical realm in which human freedom rests upon a ‘categorical
imperative’ that is not reducible to knowledge because it is not generated by experi-
ence. The third critique, the Critique of Judgement in which Kant discusses aesthetics
and natural teleology, sets out explicitly to form a bridge between epistemology and
ethics. In the ‘Introduction’, Kant promises that reflective judgement will ‘make pos-
sible the transition from pure theoretical to pure practical lawfulness, from lawfulness
in terms of nature [knowledge] to the final purpose set out by the concept of freedom
[justice]’.34 In other words, the third critique aims to bring together the realms of epis-
temology and ethics, reconciling them in a system that will make possible a coherent
account of the subject’s place in the world. The almost universally acknowledged
failure of the third critique in this endeavour provides the philosophical premises for
the separation of the value spheres in modernity, and yet the thinking of aesthetics
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contained there provides a series of political and theoretical possibilities that have been
taken up in the writings of both the Frankfurt school and the post-phenomenologi-
cal arguments of thinkers such as Derrida, Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. In
fact it is Kant’s failure to reconcile epistemology, ethics and aesthetics in the third cri-
tique that opens a space for aesthetics within modernity which points towards the pos-
sibility of its having a transformative potential. As Bernstein argues:
if art is alienated from truth and goodness by being isolated into a separate sphere, then
that entails that ‘truth’ and ‘goodness’ are alienated, separated from themselves. Aesthetic
alienation, then, betokens truth’s and reason’s internal diremption and deformation. . . .
Art’s exclusion from first-order cognition and moral judgement is, then, a condition of
its ability to register (in a speaking silence) a second-order truth about first-order truth.35
Inadmissible to forms of criticism generated solely by pure or practical reason, art
comes to occupy its own semi-autonomous realm presided over for Kant by aesthetic
judgement. Although not telling the truth or being just in itself, art opens a space to
question and challenge the ‘first-order’ formulations of epistemology and ethics that
hold sway in the lifeworld. In other words, it is art’s very ‘alienation’ and ‘isolation’
that provides the grounds for its political and philosophical potential in modernity.
Throughout the myriad political, cultural and philosophical discourses that have
made up modernity, the term ‘aesthetics’ has retained the two key senses that emerge
in the Critique of Judgement. The restricted sense is that aesthetics is the study of
beauty in art and nature. More generally, though, it refers to the whole process of
human perception and sensation – ideas about the body, imagination and feeling. As
a particular discipline of enquiry it came into view during the eighteenth century with
the work of the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten, who posited the aes-
thetic as ‘minor knowledge’: sensation, affection and appetite (the lower powers) as
opposed to scientific or theological rationality (the higher faculties). The implication
of his arguments, however, is that these two powers are inextricably imbricated, and
it is this implication that is taken up by Kant and modernity.
It is with Kant that aesthetics takes on its distinctly modern trappings. According
to Hans-Georg Gadamer, aesthetics after the Critique of Judgement is
no longer a mere critique of taste in the sense that taste is the object of critical judgement
by an observer. It is a critique of critique; that is, it is concerned with the legitimacy of
such a critique in matters of taste. The issue is no longer merely empirical principles
which are supposed to justify a widespread and dominant taste – such as, for example,
in the old chestnut concerning the origin of differences in taste – but it is concerned with
a genuine a priori that, in itself, would totally justify the possibility of critique.36
In other words, because the ‘transcendental function that Kant ascribes to the aes-
thetic judgement is sufficient to distinguish it from conceptual knowledge’, aesthet-
ics comes to require an investigation into the a priori foundation of its legitimacy that
discusses it on its own terms rather than merely as an adjunct to empirical cognition.37
And, as Gary Banham’s chapter in this volume argues, the inter-implication of aes-
thetics in epistemology and ethics provides the means by which art can come to
engage with issues in the cognitive and moral orders of the lifeworld.
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The history of modernity is thus marked by a series of border conflicts between
the value spheres and between the institutions that are governed by them. In this state
of continual variance, the question of what the aesthetic is has invariably returned as
a pressing issue. For Hegel, Marx and Freud, as well as thinkers such as Schopenhauer,
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Arnold, Ruskin and Heidegger, the way in which the aes-
thetic is defined plays a key role in the development of a broader cultural-political
analysis and has determined their respective notions of the importance and influence
that are available to particular works of art or literature. Figures such as these, whose
arguments provide the groundwork for much contemporary theory, open up the com-
plexity and significance of the aesthetic for current cultural debates. Its anomalous
position, continually in danger of being closed down by forms of truth-only cogni-
tion, is the subject of the essays collected in this volume, each of which attempts to
work through a different aspect of our inheritance from modernity.
Post-aestheticism?
Where philosophy ceases literature must begin . . .38
In some part of course the ‘theory versus literature’ debates of recent years have unwit-
tingly shadowed the constitutive aporia of aesthetic theory itself, in that they indi-
rectly register the truth potential which distinguishes art from other kinds of cultural
production, but then fail to comprehend it, or at least comprehend it in under-
reflective terms.
Art or literature eludes philosophy insofar as it is not susceptible to paraphrase,
much less to systematic elaboration, yet the fact that art cannot be reduced to discur-
sive analysis should not tempt us to settle for the consolation of art construed as a
mere ‘escape’ from reality. If philosophy confines itself to propositional arguments
which attempt to posit art’s truth in relation to its empirical content or in terms of
art’s correspondence to an antecedent reality it then fails to confront the ways in which
art exceeds its excluded status. ‘Truth-only’ accounts of art which attempt to legiti-
mate art’s status as an autonomous realm and which hinge on a fact/value distinction
between the empirical and the transcendent cannot, by the same token, account for
the process by which, in detaching themselves from the empirical world, ‘artworks
bring forth another world, one opposed to the empirical world’.39 The transformative
cognitive potential of the aesthetic and its world-disclosing capacity mark the emer-
gence of art as an autonomous self-validating entity during modernity and make a
new type of truth possible, producing new means of expression and unleashing the
creative potential for new forms of social cognition. Yet even as aesthetic discourse
provides new concepts and tools of analysis with which to challenge existing concep-
tual frameworks, the categorical separation of ‘artistic truth’ from other kinds of phil-
osophical truth in modernity also presents a considerable dilemma for a modern
aesthetic criticism and those who attempt to theorise art, so that as Bernstein observes:
If art is taken as lying outside of truth and reason then if art speaks in its own voice it
does not speak truthfully or rationally; while if one defends art from within the confines
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of the language of truth-only cognition one belies the claim that art is more truthful than
truth-only cognition.40
In a nutshell, then, the problem, as David Wood incisively puts it, is that ‘poetic dis-
course may be able to say what philosophy can know it cannot’.41 In this sense, of
course, the very notion of ‘aesthetic theory’ is something of a contradiction in terms,
so that as Schlegel puts it: ‘What is called the philosophy of art usually lacks one of
two things: either the philosophy or the art.’42
It is in confronting this dilemma that as Bernstein argues more recent ‘post-
aestheticist’ philosophies of art like Adorno’s actually take art’s critical potential seri-
ously by ‘employ[ing] art to challenge truth-only cognition’, while also facing the
dilemma that ‘philosophy cannot say what is true without abandoning itself to that
which it seeks to criticise’.43 While Bernstein’s focus is on reading the post-aestheti-
cist philosophies of art in Kant, Heidegger, Derrida and Adorno it would be possible
to extend the implications of his thesis to recent currents of cultural criticism within
the humanities. In this respect of course the lack of certainty concerning art exem-
plified by the culturalist theory of the 1980s and 1990s was already itself unwittingly
‘post-aestheticist’, not merely in the weaker sense of having broken with a reductive
notion of aesthetic value or in consisting of postmodern anti-aestheticisms – but also
in the potentially stronger sense that, in its indefatigable opposition to the formal con-
straints of the aesthetic, cultural criticism continued to deploy the cognitive import
of the truth potential of the aesthetic against its own implication in disciplinary divi-
sion, embroiled within what deconstructionists might term the problem of closure.
Crucially, as Robert Burch notes:
To the extent that such a [post-aestheticist] strategy challenges the fixed dichotomies and
hierarchies upon which modern philosophy’s claim to purity depends, it also threatens
the firm distinction between the theory per se and its particular textual articulation. In
the event, philosophical texts and aesthetic discourse come closer to artworks, since they
will be bound to their determinate textuality or linguistic expression, as artworks are
bound to the determinate materials of their production.44
This certainly catches something of the stylistic register of recent theoretical work in
literary and cultural studies. Symptomatically, of course, cultural criticism at its best
has become painfully aware of its own deficiency so that, in recording the collapse
between ‘theory per se and its particular textual articulation’, much of the work bears
the mark of its own ruination, insofar as ambiguous faultlines, ruptures, fissures, crises
in representation and so on litter the corpus of cultural criticism during this period
and frequently provide the foci for its activity. Again of course, there is a paradox to
be remarked here, as, if in some respect the emergence of a ‘new aestheticism’ symp-
tomatises the exhaustion of theory, then the tropes and conceptual motifs of ‘theory’
which articulated this shortfall were themselves resolutely aestheticist. As a result, the
critical potential of the aesthetic has already proved crucially informative, not merely
in productively accommodating the discontents of lit.crit.’s insular dislocation in




The organisation of the current volume reflects something of this diversity and the
collection opens with a cluster of papers that share an investment in staking out new
positions for the aesthetic in contemporary culture and criticism. The polemical spirit
and currency of these debates is immediately apparent in Thomas Docherty’s opening
chapter, where, in opposing philistinism, past and present, he argues that the role of
aesthetic experience in education is to extend the possibility of thinking otherwise: a
form of critical thinking which remains ‘eventful’ insofar as it refuses to be prescribed
by predetermined categories. Docherty’s objection is to philistinism in all its forms,
and, as he demonstrates, this is as likely to include the ‘radical’ partisanship of theo-
rists who oppose bourgeois art as the reductive anti-intellectualism of traditional crit-
icism or the crude instrumentalism of contemporary education policy. In embracing
the unlimited particularity of aesthetic experience as constitutive of culture, he argues
that we need to g/host the unrealised possibility of the ‘other reading’ – as a potential
‘guest’ that should be accorded unconditional welcome or hospitality. Here, as with
Jonathan Dollimore’s contribution, the emphasis is on a form of unanticipated
opening within an otherwise familiar discourse. Dollimore offers us a genealogy of
aesthetic humanism that was always already internally riven: fascinated with the pos-
sibility of an aesthetic vision that contravenes its own imperative. In reconceiving the
aesthetic as dangerous knowledge, insofar as it tells us ‘there are things we should not
know’, the key issue becomes how we confront the unheimlich possibility of ‘a non-
human beauty whose power has something to do with its indifference to the human’.
The remaining three papers in this first section of the volume each offer us repo-
sitionings that are more directly engaged with contemporary literary-critical forma-
tions. Ewa Ziarek interrogates the recent history of feminist aesthetics and in a
post-culturalist reading which draws upon advances within post-colonialism and fem-
inism, including the theories of female masquerade and colonial mimicry of Joan
Riviere, Frantz Fanon and Homi Bhabha, she offers a reformulation of Adorno’s social
history of mimesis in the context of a ‘gendered and racial politics of modernity’. In
a reading which resonates powerfully with Docherty’s chapter Andrew Bowie reminds
us that theory’s suspicion of identificatory modes of thinking and its openness to oth-
erness, are themselves variants of the singularity of aesthetic experience. And in asking
‘What comes after art?’ he reminds us that any sense of the demise of great art is pre-
mature. Instead he invites us to consider ‘just how significant art may still be’, direct-
ing us to a ‘two-way relationship’: an ongoing dislocation between the listening/
viewing/reading subject, the forms of expression it encounters and the changed mode
of understanding of the work which it often produces in the process. This sense of
aesthetic ‘encounter’ is echoed in Simon Malpas’s chapter, where he argues that the
aesthetic can be located neither in the subject, as a form of psychological predilection
or ideological mystification, nor in the work itself as a historical or formal identifica-
tion, but rather as a ‘touch’ between subject and work, occurring in an instant that
cannot be subsumed under a concept or final definition. Working through Jean-Luc
Nancy’s notions of the inoperative community and Being singular plural, Malpas
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questions the contemporary political and philosophical implications of art in a culture
that is no longer capable of being thought according to modern conceptions of his-
torical progress or political emancipation.
While several of these concerns also resurface in the second section of the volume,
here the focus becomes more applied insofar as there is probably more by way of a
direct engagement with particular aesthetic categories in relation to specific readings
of given literary texts. Howard Caygill examines the movement between aisthesis as an
open moment of excess and ascesis as a moment of discipline and closure, a movement
that he characterises as ‘Alexandrian’ and also in some sense emblematic of the modern
aesthetic. His reading traces the disruptive potential of this complex allegorical
tension in the poetry of the Alexandrian modernists Ungaretti and Cavafy. In
‘Defending poetry, or is there an early modern aesthetic?’ Mark Robson invites us to
consider the possibility that an aesthetic understanding of poetry can be identified in
Sidney’s A Defence of Poetry, which presents art as already alienated, and therefore
capable of opening a space for critical reflection, before the Kantian delimitation of
rationality in his critical philosophy. The chapter concludes with the case that ‘prior
to the Kantian critical philosophy is not a happily unified realm in which aesthetics
might be observed in harmony with pure and practical reason’, but that ‘art as poetics,
even before the rise of aesthetics, was always already alienated’. In contrast John
Joughin reads the work of an early modern playwright in its subsequent historical con-
texts and offers us a theorisation of the phenomenon of Shakespearean adaptation as
a way of rethinking our critical encounter with those texts that are in some sense
‘exemplary’. In lending themselves to innovative forms of adaptation, Joughin argues
that exemplary works maintain an originary power and thus serve to extend the ways
in which we make sense of them. As the creation of the other, adaptation is without
motive, a relinquishment of self that is also a response to a provocation of the works’
own making. Joughin proceeds to theorise the open-endedness of exemplarity via
Kant’s discussion of genius as well as in relation to Shakespeare’s critic-adaptor
Hamlet.
The last two contributions in this section dwell on the forms of knowledge gener-
ated by an aesthetically aware critical practice. In ‘Critical knowledge, scientific
knowledge and the truth of literature’, Robert Eaglestone argues that a criticism that
pays attention to the aesthetic character of a work of art should conceive that work as
providing an opening of a world in which the empirical truths of science can be pro-
duced. Tracking Heidegger’s notion of truth as alethia, or unconcealment, Eaglestone
investigates the key critical notions of form, genre and identification and in doing so
develops a reading of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. In ‘Melancholy as form: towards an
archaeology of modernism’, Jay Bernstein’s focus is on what he terms the ‘dialectic of
spleen and ideal’ as they are presented in Adorno’s modernist philosophical aesthetics
and as a constitutive feature of modernism itself. In exploring the ‘collaborative antag-
onism’ between ‘forming-giving and decomposition’ Bernstein offers us an Adornian
inspired reading of Philip Roth’s American Pastoral, a novel which interrogates the fate
of American beauty, the history of that beauty and the ‘intrinsic meaning of its nor-
mativity’. Bernstein argues that Roth’s novel offers us nothing more nor less than an
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‘archaeology’ of American modernism as the bearer of a secular ideal insofar as ‘only
in what fails the ideal is the authentic hope of the ideal to be found.’
The volume closes with a series of reflections on the crossings and intermediations
of literature, philosophy and politics. In ‘Kant and the ends of criticism’ Gary Banham
expands upon his work in Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics to consider the importance
that Kant’s aesthetics might have for contemporary criticism. He begins by remind-
ing us that Kant discusses the aesthetic in all three critiques, and that its place in the
Critique of Judgement is as a precursor to the analysis of teleological judgement which
sets the scene for a thinking of culture as a self-legislating collective of subjects. From
this perspective, Banham argues that a Kantian criticism opens a space not just for
thinking art’s relation to history and politics but also for a self-reflective questioning
of that criticism’s historical implication in the culture its own reading seeks to create.
In ‘Including transformation: notes on the art of the contemporary’ Andrew Benjamin
focuses on the complex relationship that obtains between contemporary art and
politics. Arguing that an analysis of this relation requires a prior delimitation of the
meaning and nature of the contemporary, the chapter proposes the categories of
‘inclusion’ and ‘transformation’ as a key means of thinking through the issues.
According to Benjamin, the truth of the artwork lies in its capacity to bear conflicting
interpretations, which means that any criticism must be based on a decision that pro-
duces meanings for the work. Because the conflict between inclusion and transforma-
tion can never be resolved or simply posited as an opposition, the chapter argues that
art occupies a similar space to the refugee: the culture in which it arrives must trans-
form itself if the work is to be included, and the task of criticism is to negotiate the
politics of that movement. Finally, in a contribution that draws together two thinkers
who have featured in close proximity in several of the previous chapters Joanna Hodge
presents us with a provocative reconfiguration of the relationship between Adorno and
Heidegger. Hodge argues that focusing on historicality rather than authenticity pro-
vides the possibility of transforming the ways in which the relationships between aes-
thetics, politics and history have been thought in contemporary philosophy. Mediated
by Benjamin’s critique of a-historical notions of rationality, Adorno’s negative dialec-
tic and Heidegger’s Dasein are presented as ways of breaking with any notions of linear
temporal development and presence. From this reading of the two philosophers, the
chapter reworks the interrelations between aesthetics, politics and history in terms of
a ‘movement of ellipsis, a destabilised oscillation’ between these categories, as well as
between Adorno and Heidegger, as their reconfiguration opens a space in which one
might ‘contest the divided inheritance of Kant’s thinking of imagination and art’ with
a recasting of aesthetics.
Positions, readings, reflections? The structure of the book might, to some, have an
unfortunate resonance with those maps of teaching strategies so admired by educa-
tionalists. But this collection is not the basis of a teaching strategy or a ‘how to’
manual. More than anything else it aims to be exploratory, opening the space for
further discussion. The pieces included here do not add up to a coherent overall
account of the aesthetic or provide a tool kit for a new style of criticism. Rather they
16 The new aestheticism
form a constellation of approaches to art that, by taking seriously its imbrication with
knowledge and ethics, indicate its potential for opening a range of ways of thinking
culture. The collection is, thus, necessarily plural, as any work that takes the aesthetic
seriously must be. Recognising the specificity of the aesthetic requires a significant
shift in awareness of the possible modes and practices of critical enquiry, as well as a
reconfiguration of the place of criticism in relation to philosophy, politics and culture.
This collection is presented as a provocation to such a reconfiguration.
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Aesthetic education and the demise
of experience
The philistine is intolerant.1
love naturally hates old age and keeps his distance from it 2
In 1913, Walter Benjamin was a central figure alongside his teacher, Gustav Wyneken,
in the ‘German Youth Movement’, agitating for substantial reforms in the German
educational system and, beyond that, in German society. He placed one of his first
serious publications, an essay entitled ‘Experience’, in Der Anfang, the magazine of the
movement, as a contribution to the debates. In this essay, he points out that a society’s
elders have a bad habit of legitimising their views through recourse to their ‘experience’
(Erfahrung), their amassing of ‘felt life’, as we might call it, which is axiomatically
greater than that amassed by youth. Youth – like a contemporary emergent ‘mod-
ernism’ – claims to offer something new, something requiring synthetic and not merely
analytic judgement, in Kantian terms; but the old and established refuse to legitimise
such novelty, and resist it, in a pragmatic world-weary analysis whose purpose is to
assimilate the shocking to the normative and to contend that ‘experience’ will show
youth the error of their ways and the validity of the elders’ ways of thinking.3
Benjamin writes: ‘In our struggle for responsibility’ (by which he means something
like youth’s struggle for autonomy, for self-determination, or for the independence
needed to determine a new and different future), ‘we fight against someone who is
masked. The mask of the adult is called “experience”.’ He goes on:
But let us attempt to raise the mask. What has this adult experienced? What does he wish
to prove to us? This above all: he, too, was once young; he, too, wanted what we wanted;
he, too, refused to believe his parents, but life has taught him that they were right. Saying
this, he smiles in a superior fashion: this will also happen to us – in advance he devalues
the years we will live, making them into a time of sweet youthful pranks, of childish
rapture, before the long sobriety of serious life. Thus the well-meaning, the enlightened.4
The present living of the youth – Erlebnis – is effectively evacuated of content.
Youthful Erlebnis is denied substantive reality by this rhetorical manoeuvre practised
by the elders; for reality, being the amassing of experiences (Erfahrung) is what, by def-
inition, the youth has not yet attained.
Benjamin’s point, arising from this, is that such thinking is precisely what substan-
tiates and validates the philistinism of a culture whose terms are defined by the elders:
‘herein lies his secret: because he has never raised his eyes to the great and the mean-
ingful, the philistine has taken experience as his gospel’. Benjamin thus wants here to
stake a claim for something ‘other-than-experience’, something characterised in terms
of values or spirit, and, more precisely still, in terms of values or spirit that are in a
profound sense ‘modern’, youthful, up-to-date: ‘Why is life without meaning or
solace for the philistine? Because he knows experience and nothing else. Because he
himself is desolate and without spirit. And because he has no inner relationship to
anything other than the common and the always-already-out-of-date.’5 Benjamin’s
essay allows us to see that the effect of this, fundamentally, is to deny one kind of expe-
rience (Erlebnis: the content of the moment as it is lived in its intensity, the content of
Baudelaire’s ‘transient, evanescent’ moment; ‘felt life’) precisely as it validates another
(Erfahrung: the accrued mass of such moments, no longer in their lived actuality, but
rather in their general, abstract, total form: Baudelaire’s ‘eternal’ or ‘immutable’). As
he puts it in ‘The return of the flâneur’, in terms indebted to Baudelaire, ‘There is a
kind of experience that craves the unique, the sensational, and another kind that seeks
out eternal sameness’.6 The elders legitimise the triumph of the latter, yielding a
triumph of the sensible form of life over its sensual content; and the sense they give
to such form is, paradoxically, senselessness itself, philistine ‘meaninglessness’.7
Here is the kernel of Benjamin’s ‘modern’ thinking. He notes the contest between,
on one hand, the material content of a lived experience, transient if intense, and, on
the other hand, the abstract and unreal ideality of the form that such an experience
assumes when it is construed in terms of a ‘monument of unaging intellect’. The abso-
lute prioritisation of the latter is to be contested; and, in the present case, the aim is
not simply to rehabilitate the lived actuality of material existence as such, but rather
to claim that there is something valuable in the ‘other-than-experience’ constituted by
the German Youth Movement’s trajectory towards and into modernity, into a spirited
occasionalism, or a being ‘always-already-up-to-date’.
It is important to recall that for Benjamin, these elders were also ‘teachers’.
Benjamin saw education as being properly concerned with ‘the nurturing of the
natural development of humanity: culture’.8 It would follow that if actual experience
– the Jetztzeit – is denied, then culture is being denied; for culture is the activity of
becoming, the educational development (Bildung) of the human into her or his being,
and being requires that there be a content to the ‘now-time’, that there be substance
and legitimacy in Erlebnis.
It did not trouble Benjamin that his movement was rather an elite and not at all a
mass educational movement. In a letter to Wyneken, he writes: ‘we are always very
few, but we don’t really care about that’.9 My occasional references above to experi-
ence cast in terms of a ‘felt life’ have been intended to hint at an ostensibly unlikely
collocation of Benjamin with the later Leavis. Leavis famously celebrated the elite
(though not in the same terms as Benjamin), and resisted the idea of culture’s avail-
ability to the mass. Both men share a conviction that a serious aesthetic education
is necessary for resisting the advance of ‘philistinism’. Leavis, however, explicitly
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excluded the mass from culture, arguing that the elite was itself under threat from a
populist media (Northcliffe’s newspapers) whose very vulgarity was damaging the
existence of the ‘public sphere’ necessary for the maintenance of a literary civilisation.
Against this, more recently, leftist theory has followed rather a later Benjamin, and
has advanced the cause precisely of those ‘excluded’ from a supposedly ‘normative’ (if
‘elderly’) history of civilisation.10 The question now concerns the place of aesthetic
experience in education: the legitimacy of Erlebnis in the face of the authority of
Erfahrung. Another way of putting this: how youthful is culture? My contention is
that, in our time, aesthetic experience (like youth) is denied legitimacy by the elders
(the dominant ideology of education) in a society (ours) that celebrates and legitim-
ises a philistinism and vulgarity that deny human potential. This essay takes its stance
against such a predicament.
Experience into event
For long, aesthetic experience – that feeling that provokes me to say ‘I like this’ in my
encounter with art – has been disreputable. On one hand, it has been seen as the trivia
of subjectivity, a local irrelevance in the face of the abstract general truths about art
that can be derived from a reasoned response. In the eighteenth century, of course, aes-
thetics begins precisely from this contest between sense and sensibility; and reason is
proposed as that which will effectively regulate the senses, enabling thereby a mode of
criticism that is geared towards truth. On the other hand, however, experience is
making a return, in the recent ‘autobiographical turn’ in criticism. Such a turn is, of
course, the logical development of ‘partisan’ or committed criticism, in which the
critic is seen not as a specific individual, but as an individual whose ‘specificity’ derives,
paradoxically, from her ‘representativeness’ (as representative, exemplar, of a general-
ised class, gender, ‘race’, sexual orientation, and so on). My position here differs from
both these tendencies, and derives from a fundamental question: ‘Why are we so wary
of the particularity of a specific aesthetic experience?’ Such wariness is odd, if we see
culture precisely as something experienced, lived, by specific individuals and their
societies, rather than as something detached from human being and becoming as
such.
Long predating Benjamin, there is another available instructive originary moment
for this examination of our question. When he died on 10 February 1755,
Montesquieu was blind, and had indeed suffered from near-total blindness during the
last years of his life. Shortly after his death, when his fragmentary and still incomplete
Essay on Taste was published, it became immediately apparent what such an affliction
might have meant to him. In that essay (probably begun around 1726, and so con-
temporaneous with the ‘birth’ of aesthetics in the texts of Hutcheson11), Montesquieu
had highlighted the primacy of vision in matters of aesthetic taste. In the section enti-
tled ‘Of Curiosity’, he pointed out that: ‘As we like to see a great number of objects,
we’d also like to extend our vision, to be in several places at once, to cover more space
. . . thus it’s a great pleasure for the soul to extend its view into the distance.’12 How
to do this? What technology exists in 1726 to allow for such a prosthetic extension of
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vision? Montesquieu’s answer is that it is art (and here, he means primarily visual art)
that will enable such an advance. Art not only extends the possibilities we have for
vision, for imaging, but, in doing so, offers us, as its primary content, the beautiful.
The blind Montesquieu, then, is denied beauty, denied ‘imaging otherwise’ or, simply,
imagination and ‘youth’.
Montesquieu’s thesis in his Essay starts from the proposition that we are always
hungry for experience: growing and developing, we want to see as much as possible,
to extend our view as far as possible (or even as far as impossible; into what we would
now – post-Romanticism – term the imagination). We are never at rest, always seeking
more experience, more engagements with objects whose difference and distance from
us grant us our self-awareness or enable our autonomy. These objects, constituted
through distance and difference, lead us always and inexorably further onwards and
outwards in a restless desire for more and more experience.
As will be the case with Benjamin some two centuries later, experience (and par-
ticularly aesthetic experience) becomes constitutive of culture and of its acquisition.
It is through the experience – intense moments of being or of becoming – offered by
our engagement with art that we can imagine things undreamt of in our philosophies
– or, to put this more simply, that we can learn. For Montesquieu, then, education
depends on such aesthetic experience; as, for Benjamin, the lived experience of youth
ought not to be discounted if we are to have an educational system that will contrib-
ute to culture rather than to the endorsement of philistinism.
However, our present elders are also suspicious of the validity of such ‘mere’ expe-
rience, preferring the instrumentalism of a reason that has been abstracted from our
personal being or development. This, of course, is the poverty of that view of ‘educa-
tion’ prevailing among European and American governments (however ‘young’ or
‘modern’ they may purport to be). Education is seen simply as the acquisition of a
transferable skill, preparation of the individual for the taking of her or his place in an
uncritical workforce; and, in such a state of affairs, the idea that an aesthetic educa-
tion might have a value that is ‘spiritual’ or ‘occasional’ in Benjamin’s terms, is simply
anathema: aesthetics have value for our elders only to the extent that art contributes
directly to the economy. This is the most extreme form of instrumentally rationalist
abstraction: art and sensibility purely as commodity. Sadly, however, this conservative
position is shared by that leftist theory or criticism that resolutely refuses to engage
with the primacy of our aesthetic experience (spirited occasionalism) or with a non-
quantifiable, non-computable (untheorised) ‘sensibility’.
What might it mean for youth to engage with art in these circumstances? What
might it mean to have an experience that is evacuated in advance of its content, to
accept Jameson’s ‘texts come before us as the always-already-read’?13 Agamben expli-
citly follows Benjamin in some recent work on Infancy and History, where he claims
that:
modern man’s average day contains virtually nothing that can still be translated into
experience . . . Modern man makes his way home in the evening wearied by a jumble of
events, but however entertaining or tedious, unusual or commonplace, harrowing or
pleasurable they are, none of them will have become experience.14
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Things may ‘happen’, but they no longer acquire the authority of experience, as
attested to by our elders, teachers, governors. This is akin to that situation in which
we suspect that ‘modern man’ may spend the day reading books, hearing music, seeing
pictures; but that it is all so vacuous, productive either of ignorance or of trite rehear-
sals of orthodox ‘criticism’. This is one direct consequence of the age of ‘information’:
the information/aesthetic overload allows no time to engage properly with any of it.
We are thereby radically ‘blinded’, like Montesquieu; or, as Baudrillard has it, we
prefer simulacra or simulation.
Vattimo addressed such a state of affairs in The Transparent Society. There, a key
part of his argument is that the society of generalised communication and of mass
media – and for him this is constitutive of the postmodern society – is one where we
have, ostensibly, the promise of a pure transparency of experience. He comes at this
through a consideration of the Jetztzeit, here called ‘contemporaneity’. The contem-
porary world is contemporary, he writes, ‘because it is a world in which a potential
reduction of history to the level of simultaneity, via technology such as live televi-
sion news bulletins, is becoming ever more real’.15 The consequence of this is a
‘radical revision of the very notion of history’, such that ‘the social ideals of moder-
nity may in each case be described as guided by the utopia of absolute self-
transparency’. The further result of this, however, is that, in the society of generalised
communication, there is an eruption of myriad ‘dialects’ that question the assumed
normative self-transparency of a previously central ‘language’. This is a way of
describing decolonisation, for instance, argues Vattimo; and it is also, of course, a
way of explaining the tendency to assume that all dialects are equally sites of culture
(thus: ‘youth culture’, ‘football culture’, ‘business culture’, ‘rap culture’, ‘working-
class culture’; and so on in various reifications of culture-as-commodity). Instead,
then, of returning us to the fullness of the Jetztzeit, this state of affairs leads us back
to Nietzsche’s famous proposition that, perhaps, finally, the true world ends in a
fable: that truth dissolves into a multiplicity of fablings. We might, thus, have expe-
rience; but there is no truth to such experience. Once more, Erlebnis becomes
vacuous, despite our seeming validation of all kinds of experience; and, ‘truthless’, it
has little relation to education.
Against this we might set Paul Zweig, who argues that our knowledge of adven-
ture tends to be literary nowadays, rather than being drawn from our everyday life:
‘adventures are precisely what few of us know from experience’. Yet, he suggests, our
familiarity with adventure might be more common than we routinely think:
Haven’t all of us, now and then, experienced moments of abrupt intensity, when our
lives seemed paralysed by risk: a ball clicking round a roulette wheel; a car sliding across
an icy road; the excruciating uncertainty of a lover’s response; perhaps merely a walk
through the streets of a strange city? The cat’s paw of chance hovers tantalizingly, and
suddenly the simplest outcome seems unpredictable.16
Another way of putting this, of course, would be to say that with the unpredictabil-
ity of the simplest outcome, we enter the realm of the ‘event’.
This entry into the event is precisely the entry into youthful experience; more
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precisely still, it is the entry into play. Our critical task is to rehabilitate such experi-
ence, to refill it with content; and to regard such content as not only ‘meaningful’ but
also ‘eventful’ and as serving education and culture materially, thereby. Zweig’s case is
that the entry into the event can be as banal as a walk in the streets of a strange city:
that is, the event arises through the defamiliarising contact with the unknown.
Another word for this, of course, is ‘reading’ or any such related aesthetic activity. The
text ‘always-already-read’ by elders/teachers such as Jameson is the text paralysed; and
it is also the reader/student blinded, the cultural event or history arrested.
Experience, life and death
Football isn’t a matter of life and death; it’s much more important than that.17
In his famous ‘Theses on the philosophy of history’, Benjamin proposed what has
become a major insight for contemporary criticism, when he indicates the double-
sided nature of ‘cultural treasures’ that embody what we call ‘civilisation’. Famously,
‘There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of
barbarism’.18 This insight drives that major recent critical tendency – fundamentally
semiotic-deconstructive, and operating as a ‘corrective’ to the norms of a bourgeois
‘high culture’ – indicating that values (especially aesthetic evaluations) are themselves
shaped and conditioned by the political values of the ‘victors’ in the ‘triumphal pro-
cession’ that we call a history of civilisation. That is by now a commonplace.
Lurking within the observation is a yet more telling and a rather different ques-
tion. If culture is genuinely double-sided, might it not also follow that ‘there is no
document of barbarism that is not also and at the same time a document of civilisa-
tion’? This would be the shocking possible corollary of Benjamin’s famous thesis. The
status of the document would thus become genuinely problematic: aesthetic docu-
ments – the artefacts of culture – are neither intrinsically civilised nor intrinsically bar-
baric; rather, the document manifests itself as the merest potentiality for either
civilisation or barbarism. ‘Culture’ would now be the name that we give to the inhab-
iting of this potentiality; and intrinsic to such culture would be a fundamental aes-
thetic education. Those who decide the status of the document see culture, instead,
as the determination of the potentiality, and thereby make the document (and culture
itself ) a commodity, an object, or a sum of objects (Erfahrung) rather than a process
of eventful living (Erlebnis), living as itself the processing of contestations or of inde-
terminacy.
To put the question of experience in terms of a contest is also to understand expe-
rience in terms of Aristotelian energeia, energy. To explore this properly, we might
relate Benjamin’s concern for the (youthful) Jetztzeit to Agamben’s understanding,
derived from Aristotle, of potentiality. The simplest way to do this is to reconsider the
metaphysics of presence. Augustine long pre-dates Derrida in being troubled over
this. In both Civitas Dei and Confessions, Augustine famously pondered the issue of
temporal being. Key to his thinking is that there is a distinction to be made between
a present that is filled with substantial content, and a present that has a merely ‘formal’
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existence, as a structural bridge enabling us to think the relation between past and
future (or to think ‘narrative’, as it were). He begins from a consideration of the great
transgressive moment of death. Meditating on a question whose theological basis is
doubt about resurrection, Augustine asks whether it is possible to believe in ghosts:
‘can one be living and dead at the same time?’. In response, he proposes a sophisti-
cated argument in which he establishes an absolute opposition between being alive
and being dead. That strict opposition then allows him to elide the very moment of
dying itself, for at any given instance, he claims, one is either still alive or one is already
dead; and therefore, one is ‘never detected in the situation of dying, or “in death” ’.
Yet more importantly for our purposes here, ‘the same thing happens in the passage
of time; we try to find the present moment, but without success, because the future
changes into the past without interval’.19
The consequence of this is not only that the moment of death is emptied of
content, but so also is the moment of the present: the present is now marked always
by the traces of past and future that crowd in on it and shape it, thereby stifling any
self-presence therein. In other words, the present moment is merely a moment of
potential. We might say that experience (in terms of the Jetztzeit or ‘felt life’) is thus
only at best potential energy. By analogy, therefore, any ‘present’ engagement with an
aesthetic object can be an engagement with either barbarism or civilisation; and it is
the sustained inhabiting of that potential energeia that is ‘culture’.
The realisation of the text is an act of realising potential, converting potential
energy to kinetic (most usually, in the form of an avowed political energy). My con-
tention here is that the premature politicisation – ‘realisation’ – of the text or of the
aesthetic encounter is always barbaric and anathema to culture; for it actively denies
the experience of the present moment, refuses the encounter with death that is at the
centre of all art, an encounter that is actually a moment of transgression, a moment
of engagement, an ‘event’ or an adventure whose outcome cannot be given in advance.
What I am resisting is the ‘partisan’ position whereby the preference for one
reading ‘kills’ the other (14 May 1948 is nakba, say, thereby ‘killing’ the possibility of
Israeli culture; or vice versa). Rather, I am stressing that the preference for one reading
must always maintain the other reading, as unrealised potential or possibility; and that
it must maintain it as ‘ghostly’, as a potential ‘guest’ in a spirit or occasion of hospi-
tality. That hospitality is what I will now identify firmly with and as culture; or, as
Derrida has it in a different context: ‘Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one
ethic amongst others.’20
This, then, is a counter to partisan reading or to a reading that is a priori deter-
mined by political choice, or by the premature decisionism that would lead a critic to
place the commitment to a reading before the experience of reading. That partisan-
ship – when it precludes the possibility of ‘hospitality’, as in cultural critique – is what
I’ll call, in our normal everyday sense of the term, philistine. While such determinism
may be appropriate in the political sphere, it is out of place in the cultural; and while
an analogy may be available between what happens in aesthetics and what happens in
politics, it is a philistine error to elide the difference. Instead, the only commitment
required is a commitment simply to the aesthetic encounter; but that commitment
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has itself some important consequences. The first is that ‘culture’ is not an abiding
condition, but rather an episodic event: the spirited occasion in which it becomes pos-
sible to inhabit a potentiality.21
Criticism, play, dance
Montaigne opened his great essay on the force of imagination with a citation: fortis
imaginatio generat casum, the strong imagination creates the event. We might compare
here the great poet so beloved of aestheticists, Keats, in whose famous letter of 22
November 1817 to Benjamin Bailey we find that ‘The Imagination may be compared
to Adam’s dream – he awoke and found it truth’.22 Adam dreamt of companionship,
and I shall return to the centrality of such companionship to our ‘new aestheticism’
in what follows. Montaigne’s essay is about the strength of an imagination that can
realise things in material actuality. For example, Montaigne writes, when he is in the
presence of one who persistently coughs, he himself begins to experience pulmonary
irritation: ‘Someone insistently coughing irritates my own lungs and throat. I visit less
willingly those ill people towards whom I have duties than I do those in whom I have
less interest and who mean less to me. I seize upon the illness that I witness, and
embed it in myself.’23 Montaigne advances in the essay a materialist view of imagina-
tion, indicating that imagination realises itself through the body (as especially in
sexual desire), and thus gives an actuality of experience to that which is ostensibly
‘merely’ imagination.
The usual way in which we have configured this question is, broadly, post-
Romantic. It comes in the form of the question whether art makes any material differ-
ence to life. As a self-proclaimed ‘last Romantic’, Yeats, ‘old and ill’, put it thus, in
what is possibly the most celebrated question of Irish literary history: ‘Did that play
of mine send out/Certain men the English shot?’; to which Auden would, equally
famously, reply that ‘poetry makes nothing happen . . . it survives, / A way of happen-
ing, a mouth’.24 At issue between Yeats and Auden, however, is rather the centrality
of play and more especially of the play of imagination; for it is this kind of play that
is, really, another word for the potentiality of which I write here.
The idea of play as central to aesthetics is not new, of course. Schiller had been at
pains to stress the importance of play, Spielen, and of the ‘play-drive’, der Spieltrieb, in
his Letters on Aesthetic Education (specifically in Letter 24). For Schiller, this (deliber-
ately ambiguous) term, hovering between notions of theatricality and of childhood
self-entertainment, effectively regulates the opposition in our consciousness between
the two competing drives of ‘sense’ and of ‘form’ (or between sensibility and reason;
between particulars and universals; or, more pertinently here, between event and the
dead-weight of elderly authority, between Jetztzeit and philistine ‘maturity’):
The sense-drive demands that there shall be change and that time shall have a content;
the form-drive demands that time shall be annulled and that there shall be no change.
That drive, therefore, in which both the others work in concert . . . the play-drive, there-
fore, would be directed towards annulling time within time, reconciling becoming with
absolute being and change with identity.25
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Such ‘play’ gives a content to time while also giving it a formal sense; it reconciles the
particular experience with the more general socio-cultural general authority. Recently,
using entirely different sources, Isobel Armstrong argued something similar: ‘Play,
that fundamental activity, is cognate with aesthetic production . . . I understand play
. . . as a form of knowledge itself. Interactive, sensuous, epistemologically charged,
play has to do with both the cognitive and the cultural.’26 Here, inter alia, Armstrong
is writing against the crude philistinism of a British educational system that has
become increasingly Gradgrindian in its concentration on education as pure instru-
mentality. Play is now seen as a waste of time by politicians who regard children simply
as fodder for political statistics or the achievement of ‘targets’. Just like:
Thomas Gradgrind, sir. A man of realities. A man of facts and calculations. A man who
proceeds upon the principle that two and two are four, and nothing over, and who is not
to be talked into allowing for anything over . . . With a rule and a pair of scales, and the
multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh and measure any parcel of
human nature, and tell you exactly what it comes to.27
Or, as the much later Adorno and Horkheimer have it in their devastating critique of
a crude ‘Enlightenment’, ‘whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and
utility is suspect’.28 Oh, that we had some of Dickens’s anger now.
Thankfully, Armstrong does. Armstrong rightly wants to rehabilitate youthful play
as a central pedagogical activity. She considers childhood play, in which ‘things lose
their determining force’, or, in my preferred terms here, where things become pure
potentiality. Play, she argues, transforms perception, as when a stick becomes a horse,
say, where the stick ‘becomes a “pivot” for severing the idea of a horse from the con-
crete existence of the horse, and the rule-bound game is determined by ideas, not by
objects. Play liberates the child into ideas’.29 ‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty
teeth . . .’ and so on, if taken as definitive of a horse, does not. The former is culture;
the latter constitutes Gradgrindian-like barbaric government ‘not to be talked into
allowing for anything over’, a barbarous criticism as practised by the ‘man of realities’.30
The poem is such a pivotal object, releasing its reader into the experiencing of
ideas, into thinking as such. That ‘eventful’ thinking, eventful precisely to the extent
that its outcome cannot be predetermined, is what we might properly call culture, but
culture-as-activity, culture-as-potentiality, or, more simply, education: the forming
and informing of a self in the spirit of growth, development, and imagining the pos-
sibility that the world and its objects might be otherwise than they are. Another word
for this, of course, is metaphor; but metaphor as a practice of thought, or, in the words
of Ricoeur, as a process of ‘cognition, imagination, and feeling’31: in my own terms,
a thinking that is always hospitable to otherness, and is thus ‘companionable’.
A useful way of characterising the play at issue here is to see it as dance. Valéry, in
particular, made great play with dance as a key figure in philosophy; but it is more
recently Badiou who has argued for dance ‘as a metaphor of thought’. For Badiou, fol-
lowing Nietzsche, dance is ‘all that the child designates’, an always new beginning
prompted by the ‘altering’ event. Dance is a ‘wheel that moves itself ’, a ‘circle that
draws itself and is not drawn from outside’, a pure and simple act of affirmation.32
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This, however, is not the dance that is imposed from without, regulated by external
forces (be it that of choreography, rock music, or the rhythms of mechanical/
industrial production); it is dance that does not submit to an external regulation. By
analogy, we need a criticism that is self-determining, autonomous: playful, between
sense and form. For Nietzsche, the opposite of dance is ‘the German’, marching to the
military beat with her or his strong legs. Dance, by contrast, resists what Nietzsche
called such ‘vulgarity’, the vulgarity marked by the spontaneous reaction of the body
to external forces.
Badiou appropriates Nietzsche in these terms: ‘Dance would be the metaphor of
all real thinking linked to an event. For an event is precisely that which remains unde-
cided between taking place and no-place, an emergence that is indistinguishable from
its disappearing.’33 Dance, in these terms, is what allows experience to occur as event:
Thus we see that dance has to play time into space. For an event founds a singular time
from its nominal location. Traced, named, inscribed, the event designs, in the ‘it happens
that’ (le ‘il y a’ ), a before and an after. A time brings itself into existing . . . Dance is that
which suspends time in space.34
We should here recall Montesquieu, for whom play is pleasurable because it satisfies
our avarice for experience, and, within such play, dance in particular pleases us by its
lightness, grace, beauty and
by its link to music, the person who dances being like an accompanying instrument; but
above all it pleases thanks to a disposition of our brain, which is such that dance secretly
encompasses the idea of all movements under certain movements, of most attitudes
under certain attitudes.35
Lurking more explicitly behind Badiou, however, is Valéry. In L’ame et la danse, Valéry
offers a Socratic dialogue, in which Phèdre tells Socrates to look at a young dancer:
‘Look at her fluttering! You’d say that the dance comes out of her like a flame’, to
which Socrates replies:
What is a flame, my friends, if it is not the moment itself ?. . . Flame is the act of that
moment between earth and sky. My friends, all that passes from a heavy to a subtle state
passes through the moment of fire and light . . . Certainly the unique and perpetual
object of the soul is that which does not exist; that which was, and which is no more; –
that which will be and which is not yet; – that which is possible, that which is impos-
sible, – there indeed is the business of the soul, but not ever, never, that which is!36
Valéry argues that the body of the dancer, in refusing to be localised in one place as a
simple object, thus becomes multiple: playful. Such play, in its multiple release of pos-
sibility, is itself also thought – but thought in the form of event, or thought realised
as potentiality. This is the materiality of imagination; and by extension, it is the mate-
riality also of reading.
Reading thus becomes a matter of companionship. By this, I do not mean to
suggest that (as in Booth, say) there is an implied relation between reader and writer,37
nor (as in Leavis) that an elite ‘common pursuit’ is established between teacher and
student.38 Rather, I mean that reading-as-culture produces an attitude of readiness for
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companionship; and in this, it is like dance, where movement is autonomous yet also
ready for relation with – hospitable to – the movement of other partners. Cultural
reading such as this is that which happens between determinacy and indeterminacy:
culture, we might say, is the potentiality for culture.
In this regard, Socrates learns a deal from Diotima, in Plato’s Symposium.
Discussing the nature of love, Diotima first of all rejects the simple oppositions
between good and bad, wisdom and ignorance, beauty and ugliness, reinstating the
middle terms whose occlusion proves so useful to Augustinian sophistry. Love, she
then argues, is itself such indeterminacy: ‘Love is between mortal and immortal . . .
He is a great spirit, Socrates. Everything classed as a spirit falls between god and
human.’39 If culture is also such indeterminacy, then we might say, modifying
Derrida, ‘love is culture itself and not simply one ethic among others’. The aesthetic
attitude I propose, then, is one that aligns love, companionship, hospitality; and it is
the inhabiting of these, not as stable conditions but as episodic events, potentiality,
that is culture.
The dancer may then be like the flâneur:
As he walks, his steps create an astounding resonance on the asphalt. The gaslight
shining down on the pavement casts an ambiguous light on this double floor. The city
as a mnemonic for the lonely walker: it conjures up more than his childhood and youth,
more than its own history.40
And it is this flâneur that the aesthetic must accompany, rehabilitating memory,
youthful Erlebnis, ambiguity and the exponential potential for more: more dance,
more love, more hospitality, more experience.
Coda
All art is good; if it is not good, it is not art. The critic needs an attitude of potential-
ity, an attitude that releases thought like a dance, like an event; and such an attitude
is one of a deep hospitality. What, then, is ‘bad art’? The notion that there is such a
thing as ‘bad art’ is one that can be seen in the tabloid newspaper outrage at some con-
temporary works; but it is also visible in the outrage of the partisan critic at various
forms of ‘bourgeois’ art, or in the crude anti-intellectualism of Carey, say.41
Both attitudes are equally philistine. The philistinism of contemporary govern-
ments and of their education departments hardly requires assistance from those
within the institutions of education who should, by definition, know better; and who
should, in practice, be more hospitable to the possibilities for culture and to culture
as potentiality.
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2 Jonathan Dollimore
Art in time of war: 
towards a contemporary aesthetic
In times of war
In September 1914 an agonised Hermann Hesse writes of how war is destroying the
foundations of Europe’s precious cultural heritage, and thereby the future of civilisa-
tion itself. Hesse stands proudly for what he calls a ‘supranational’ tradition of human
culture, intrinsic to which are ideals essentially humanitarian: an ‘international world
of thought, of inner freedom, of intellectual conscience’ and a belief in ‘an artistic
beauty cutting across national boundaries’.1 Even in the depths of war, insists Hesse,
a German should be able to prefer a good English book to a bad German one. Three
years later he writes along similar lines to a government minister telling him that he
would be a more humane leader in this time of conflict were he to read ‘the great
authors’ and listen to great composers like Beethoven.2
Much later (1946) Hesse comments as follows on these and other similar writings:
When I call [them] ‘political’ it is always in quotes, for there is nothing political about
them but the atmosphere in which they came into being. In all other respects they are
the opposite of political, because in each one of these essays I strive to guide the reader
not into the world theatre with its political problems but into his innermost being,
before the judgement seat of his very personal conscience. In this I am at odds with the
political thinkers of all trends, and I shall always, incorrigibly, recognize in man, in the
individual and his soul, the existence of realms to which political impulses and forms do
not extend.3
Here is an uncompromising expression of that spiritual, essentialist individualism
which underpinned Hesse’s equally uncompromising universal humanism. Here too
is the corollary of both the humanism and the individualism – a profound distrust of
the political.
Though not beyond criticism – he was little known outside Germany and so
wanted to avoid his own books being banned there – Hesse was implacably opposed
to the barbaric nationalism of his own country from around 1914 onwards. He went
into self-imposed exile in 1919, and never returned to Germany. He was awarded the
Nobel Prize for literature in 1946, but for most of his life remained a struggling,
exiled, writer. His books were eventually banned in Germany in 1943, and that was
a severe blow. He begins his Nobel Prize letter of thanks with the reasons he cannot
be present in person: ‘the hardships of the National Socialist period, during which my
life work was destroyed in Germany and I was burdened day after day with arduous
duties, undermined [my health] for good. Still, my spirit is unbroken. . .’.4
Art in time of war: my title refers not just to the literary encounter with war, but
the way wars in the last century compelled artists and intellectuals into rethinking the
aesthetic – its scope, its power and its dangers. One question is paramount: is litera-
ture most compelling when in the service of humane values, or when it departs from
them? And why begin with Hesse, this once celebrated, sometime cult figure, now
much neglected? I begin with Hesse because the full significance of an aesthetic
humanism becomes apparent in relation to artists like him in a way it doesn’t in, say,
the squabbles within the English literary critical tradition in the last quarter of the
twentieth century. More specifically, the critique of humanism which helped provoke
those squabbles never properly engaged the example of people like Hesse, preferring
instead much easier targets in academic literary criticism. In other words, within both
the humanist tradition and the theoretical critique of it, the historical conditions of
thought matter, and it especially matters that many recent critics of humanism have
been formed entirely within an education system – from school to university – which
is itself the product of relative security and prosperity in the post-war period.
Right now it’s especially revealing to reconsider the life and writing of advocates of
a high European humanism like Hesse. The reasons are several, including the obvious
fact that debates about the relevance (or not) of artistic culture to numerous contem-
porary malaises are more urgent and conflicted than ever. I was about to remark the
crucial proviso that our lives are not, as was Hesse’s and millions of others at that time,
devastated by world war. Indeed they are not, and yet we might recall that Britain has
been involved in several major wars in the last two decades, and wonder about what
part, if any, Hesse’s ideal of a supranational, European cultural tradition played in
those conflicts. And although the historical conditions are indeed quite different, we
too live in a time of acute distrust of, and perhaps despair about, the political realm
which Hesse would have understood. Additionally, in Britain there is an increasingly
bitter debate about just how integrated with Europe – how ‘supranational’ – we
should become, and nationalism, cultural and economic, remains a potent force, lit-
erally breaking up major political parties and stirring potent if as yet localised racism.
Some predict that it will only take another economic depression for the reappearance
in Britain of the barbarism witnessed in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Finally, as Hesse
well knew, the realm of the aesthetic, even or especially when it tries to stand above
the political, never escapes it.
Days after my writing the above in 2001 there occurred the September 11th ter-
rorist attacks on New York and Washington, subsequent to which Britain signed up
to another war, one whose scope and extent was, and remains, unknowable. If the
rhetoric is similar – the need to defend Western civilisation against barbarism – the
conditions of this war are so different as to be unimaginable for those like Hesse. A
hastily formed international coalition against terrorism claims to proceed in the name
of civilisation but it does not need – indeed is embarrassed by – the old humanist
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universals. We know how arrogant and unheeding Western humanism could be in
relation to cultural and racial difference, not least within its own colonial and impe-
rialist domains. That’s one reason why, in Western democracies, a confident human-
ism has given way to an ethic of multiculturalism; for sure, an assumption of
underlying similarities is not entirely absent, but it is subordinate to a cautious
embrace of cultural difference. Which is why Britain’s prime minister, as he com-
muted the world in October 2001 shoring up support for the coalition against ter-
rorism, allowed it to be known that, as he travelled, he read translations of the Koran.
What has become truly supranational is, of course, the very capitalism which Hesse
and others saw as humanism’s enemy. At one level global capitalism needs and nur-
tures the multiculturalism which has superseded humanism; at another it promotes a
cultural imperialism more arrogant than humanism and underpinned by popular
rather than high culture – Hollywood and McDonalds’ rather than Shakespeare and
Harrods. This is an economic and military imperialism which exacerbates cultural
antagonisms. And that means that multiculturalism (or hybridity) can shift very
quickly from being an ameliorating influence on those antagonisms to being an
opportunity for them to intensify. Terrorism may thrive on the multicultural; a certain
kind of terrorism presupposes it. The United Kingdom and the United States are des-
perate to show that this new war is not being waged against Islam precisely because
there are many Muslims, including some residing in Britain, who regard it as precisely
that, or at least as a conflict between irreconcilable cultures and religions. Just as it
seemed as if the ‘global’ antagonisms of the kind focused in the Rushdie affair had
been fudged into history, they erupted again on September 11th, and with a terrible
ferocity. One irony of the Rushdie affair was that a work of literature provoked rather
than ameliorated those antagonisms. In recent months I listened in vain for signifi-
cant voices promoting art as a human activity transcending cultural and religious
antagonism.
More war and the decline of humanist faith
What precipitated the decline in humanist faith? Well, all three aspects of Hesse’s cul-
tural philosophy – its universal humanism, spiritual individualism, and distrust of the
political – were the object of fierce criticism by almost all the strands of so-called
theory (literary, cultural and critical) during the 1980s and 1990s, and with a degree
of success which helped generated the so-called culture wars. Culture became ‘politi-
cised’ as never before, and almost always around the issue of who was excluded from
the humanist universe. Some academics and politicians trying to cling to the human-
ist tradition blamed ‘theory’ for its demise. This is too easy and often plain diversion-
ary: the problem goes much deeper, and back much further. Quite apart from the
growing antipathy to Western humanism among other cultures and world religions,
there were deep misgivings within the tradition itself.
Let us go back to the outbreak of another war. W. H. Auden’s poem ‘1st September
1939’ – widely invoked in relation to September 11th – offers a response to the
impending Second World War reminiscent of Hesse’s to the First:
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Defenceless under the night
Our world in stupor lies;
Yet, dotted everywhere,
Ironic points of light
Flash out wherever the Just
Exchange their messages:
May I, composed like them
Of Eros and of dust,
Beleaguered by the same
Negation and despair,
Show an affirming flame.5
Reminiscent, yes, but so different. There is the speaker’s poignant hesitancy, his
unsureness, composed as he is of Eros and dust, and beleaguered by negation and
despair, as to whether he is strong enough to sustain the affirming flame. And now
the contact between the civilised is furtive; Hesse’s image of a supranational human-
ism operating as an overground unity across and above the strife is replaced here by
one suggesting an underground hiding from it; erratic, clandestine communications
occur at night between the fragmented and the dispersed. And then there’s the
description of these communications as ‘ironic’: perhaps, in retrospect, nothing was
more indicative of the diminishing faith in the humanist salvation of Europe than the
turn to irony. In art no less than in life itself, and never more so than in the writing
of Hesse’s compatriot, contemporary, and fellow exile, Thomas Mann, irony becomes
part confession of, part defence against, the failures of that vision. Irony becomes the
crutch of ‘late’ humanism, at once guarantee of its sophistication and confession of
its uncertainty. No surprise then Auden’s subsequent and infamous downplaying of
the importance of art and the artist; ‘we live in a new age’, he wrote a decade later, ‘in
which the artist neither can have . . . a unique heroic importance nor believes in the
Art-God enough to desire it’.6
Though Hesse’s own faith never faltered, by the end of the Second World War it
was tempered. In that acceptance message for the Nobel Prize, as well as that for the
Goethe Prize, both awarded in 1946, he affirms again the belief that ‘culture is supra-
national and international’, but speaks too of a ‘deathly sick Europe’ and his own temp-
tation to abandon European culture altogether and turn to the wisdom of the Orient.
It’s a temptation resisted, but the influence of the Orient is indeed central to his new
realisation that the fundamental message of mankind’s greatest teachers is stoicism, a
spiritual renunciation of worldly things as the precondition for discerning the mysti-
cal unity in all being. In these final years there is an even greater insistence on the indi-
vidual soul as the touchstone of integrity, perhaps now at the expense of humanism.7
In short the Second World War confirmed, for many, the bankruptcy of
Enlightenment humanism. And now we are talking not just of its inability to prevent
barbarism, but its complicity with it. Theodor Adorno and others in the Frankfurt
school detected in Enlightenment humanism the origins of the very problems which
Hesse imagined it to be an answer to.8 Adorno declared the worthlessness of ‘tradi-
tional culture’, coming as it now does ‘neutralized and ready made’, adding, famously,
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that ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’.9 Later those like Baudrillard would
take this critique to its limit: ‘the “Human” is from the outset the institution of its
structural double, the “Inhuman”. This is all it is: the progress of Humanity and
Culture are simply the chain of discriminations with which to brand “Others” with
inhumanity and therefore with nullity.’10 Even as a thumbnail sketch of western
humanism this is grossly reductive; indeed, that assertion – ‘This is all it is . . . simply
the chain of discriminations etc.’ – is so reductive as to be itself a kind of terrorism,
the intellectual counterpart of the reductive fundamentalism of actual terrorists.
Today’s anti-intellectual guardians of traditional culture love to tell us that
Marxism is obsolete, and heavy-duty continental theory just nonsense. That’s an argu-
ment for another day. I don’t rely on dubious theorists like Baudrillard, or even great
ones like Adorno; I bypass this culture-wars stand-off by invoking George Steiner’s
passionate and seminal essays of the 1960s collected as Literature and Silence. Steiner
gives a blunt, untheoretical elaboration of Adorno’s argument: not only did the Nazis
destroy ‘central European humanism’, but the barbarism of the twentieth century
‘prevailed on the very ground of Christian humanism, of Renaissance culture and
classic rationalism’. Recall Hesse’s confident advice to that war leader in 1917, and
compare it with this from Steiner in 1966: ‘We know now that a man can read Goethe
or Rilke in the evening, that he can play Bach and Schubert, and go to his day’s work
at Auschwitz in the morning. To say that he has read them without understanding, or
that his ear is gross, is cant.’ ‘What’, speculates Steiner, ‘are the links, as yet scarcely
understood, between the mental, psychological habits of high literacy, and the temp-
tations of the inhuman?’11 What indeed.
In today’s international context it is not just Hesse’s idea that salvation might lie
in a reaffirmation of a universal, spiritual and ethical humanism that rings hollow, but
also its underlying premise, namely that art is a humanising force. The extraordinary
thing is, our culture industry and our humanities education system still depend upon
that premise. The centrality of the arts within the humanities, most especially of
English literature, has always rested on the claim that they have a civilising influence
promoting national if not transnational humanitarian values.12 Sir Claus Moser,
speaking in October 2000, puts it well: ‘I speak with a passionate belief in the enrich-
ing force of the arts in the life of each one of us and of society as a whole.’ Complaining
of those philistines in today’s society, some in high places, ‘who fail to appreciate . . .
what the arts bring to a civilised society, to our quality of life . . . [and] that a civilised
society demands fine culture at its core’, Moser endorses President Kennedy’s belief
that ‘the life of the arts . . . is a test of a nation’s civilisation’.13 For Hesse and numer-
ous others in earlier generations, the humanist aesthetic was a liberating expression of
profoundly civilising sympathies. For Moser in 2000 humanism remains just that. I
respect Hesse writing in 1917; I can’t but see Moser, writing in 2000, as deeply com-
placent. Far from being liberating, the humanist aesthetic has become a way of stand-
ing still amidst the obsolete, complacent and self-serving clichés of the heritage culture
industry and the arts establishment. It’s like an edifice which stands still, but on rotten
foundations, propped up by vested interests.
But my argument is not just that Hesse’s humanism is untenable and unpersuasive
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now, ‘after Auschwitz’, but that it was already so at the time in which he proposed it.
In fact, I believe it hardly survived the insight of autobiographical works of his own
like Steppenwolf. Without doubting Hesse’s sincerity, I’ve often wondered whether
other artists haven’t always paid lip service to the humanist defence of art by way of
licensing an aesthetic vision which they knew contravened it. One is reminded in this
connection of literary didacticism in earlier periods, especially when state censorship
prevailed: such didacticism, far from foreclosing on subversive thought, was often its
precondition. Consider a simple example. The ending of an Elizabethan or Jacobean
play is often didactic – the villains get their just deserts and some kind of conventional
and/or providential moral order is vindicated. In the mid-twentieth century a gener-
ation of critics tried to convince themselves that this didactic dénouement effectively
discredits or at least neutralises the subversive questioning and thought which pre-
ceded it. Unfortunately for them, from a creative, a theatrical and an intellectual per-
spective, the didactic dénouement does not so much close off that questioning as
enable it: it subscribes to the law’s letter precisely in order to violate its spirit; far from
foreclosing on it, a conforming framework actually licensed a subversive content.
I make this point about the tendentious objective of didacticism because it’s one
of several respects in which the ‘modern’ conception of the aesthetic I want to propose
is already old; I’m advocating a departure which is also a return. Steiner struggles to
redeem something of the humanist aesthetic from its ruins in the twentieth century;
in contrast I abandon that aesthetic in favour of another, one which becomes visible
in those ruins, and in relation to those challenges, because it was always there.
My case for saying literature all the time violates the humanist imperative could
proceed by invoking the views of those who have wanted to censor art, from Plato,
through the anti-theatrical prejudices to advocates of modern state censorship. But
again I justify this aesthetic not with reference to the enemies of art (though I do argue
that they are not as philistine as some would claim) but from within its practice and
its defence.
Similarly, I could make my case for the daemonic tendencies of the creative
mind with reference to disreputable kinds of writing like pornography, or the semi-
respectable, like gothic fiction or Jacobean tragedy. Instead, in recent books like Sex,
Literature and Censorship I’ve argued the case with texts taken from the heart of canon-
ical respectability.14
I’ll return to this but first, as a way of further following the fate of humanism, I
consider further the core premise of the humanist aesthetic, namely that art is a pro-
foundly humanising force. I mentioned just now that it remains as a rationale for
humanities education and the culture industries. More surprisingly perhaps is that
critics of humanism also adhere to it, albeit in an appropriated and radicalised form.
The stand-off here is not so much one between the humanists and the anti-humanists,
as between a conservative and a progressive humanism. Consider one of the most con-
frontational examples of all, namely the cultural materialist critique of humanism. At
first sight it opposes the humanist project in every respect. Certainly beleaguered aca-
demic humanists see it that way. For example, John M. Ellis laments the threat to a
humanist education posed by this critique’s obsession with gender, race and class. Ellis
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pines for a humanities education which enabled students to become ‘enlightened cit-
izens’; which produced a society of people educated ‘for full and intelligent participa-
tion in a modern democracy’; which helped us ‘develop a richer understanding of
human life and to train the mind’, which taught us to enjoy and to love literature;
which taught the still viable classical precept that poetry ‘delighted and instructed’,
and so on.15 Those like Ellis are right to this extent: the materialist critique resolutely
rejects all three of the tenets I’ve attributed to Hesse (universal humanism, essential-
ist individualism, an aesthetic realm standing above the political); instead it sees art
as either appropriable for the oppressed and exploited, be they defined in terms of
class, and/or sex and/or race, or as an instrument of their oppression, or a merging of
both positions.16 In so doing it clearly retains humanitarian ideals albeit under
another name, with changed terms and constituencies, and a scepticism about how
art, as currently conceived, contributes to those ideals. The argument now is whether
or not, or to what extent, aesthetic discourse has a ‘democratic and radical potential’.17
But there’s a sense in which these arch-enemies, the humanist and the materialist,
are competing for the same ethical high ground. To invoke Ellis again, both humanists
and materialists would endorse the idea of a society of people educated ‘for full and
intelligent participation in a modern democracy’, while disagreeing about (i) what such
a society looks like; (ii) the proximity of actual existing societies to that ideal; (iii) the
part canonical artworks, and an education based on ideas of the aesthetic as convention-
ally understood, actually play in promoting democracy and participation. Additionally,
from the example of a latter-day humanist like Richard A. Etlin, we can see how the
humanist has already conceded ground to the political/ethical agenda of the material-
ist. Etlin defends nineteenth-century novelists against Edward Said’s claim that they
were complicit with imperialism. But far from saying, as his predecessors might have
done, that such political considerations are irrelevant to aesthetic ones, Etlin not only
marshals those novelists’ own anti-imperialist and antislavery sentiments, but reads
their novels for evidence of the same.18 He thereby implicitly extends the humanist
agenda to partially accord with that of his opponents, even while trying to discredit their
arguments.19 It’s difficult not to conclude that the materialists have already won the high
ground, although they’ve also extended its terrain. At the very least, the old argument
that such political considerations are irrelevant to the aesthetic vision has gone for good.
While Etlin refuses to accept Said’s assertion that politics and culture, far from being
different spheres are ‘ultimately the same’, he can only counter it with an evasive gener-
alisation: the humanist refuses to conflate the two spheres ‘in all times and in respects’.20
The irony of all this is that the survival of humanism may well depend on its critics. In
its conservative form as defended by Ellis and Etlin it’s a tired convention; in its appro-
priated form, on the extended terrain of the materialists, it’s at least still alive.
Returns
From within the same materialist critique something else was emerging much more
germane to my purpose than this struggle for the ethical high ground. As the constit-
uencies of the oppressed were refined and enlarged, and the operations of power
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understood in all their (often counter-intuitive) complexity, so attention turned from
the ‘conscious’, manifest and apparently unified project of the artwork, to a consider-
ation of its ‘unconscious’ or latent tendencies, its internal disunity. More often than
not the work was read not for its explicit content but for its tensions, conflicts and
contradictions; for what it did not say, yet half-revealed. In a sense – a sophisticated
sense – it was read against itself. This was part of a significant change in ways of
reading culture more generally: the centre came to be understood in relation to its
margins, the ‘other’ in relation to the ‘same’, the dominant in relation to the subordi-
nate, the sane in relation to the insane, the heterosexual in relation to the homosex-
ual, and so on. A paradoxical dialectic became visible in which the ‘in relation to’
became strangely ‘implicated with’ and even ‘dependent upon’: via a violent dialectic
the excluded, the inferior and the irrelevant return to haunt and terrorise the identity
and well-being of their dominant others, perhaps striking at the literal and symbolic
centre of their being.
The violent dialectic between the dominant and the subordinate was something
which humanism could not comprehend – hence, in part, the so-called ‘anti-
humanism’ of the critique which explored it. It also became apparent from this cri-
tique that certain types of literature had always contained their own imaginative
understanding of this dialectic, and, if only implicitly – perhaps even unintentionally
– a challenge to the very humanism which sought to appropriate them. Many of the
canonical works of literature claimed by and for the humanist vision so obviously
threaten rather than confirm it: put very simply, they reveal too much. And so a new
challenge emerges, one importantly different from the materialist challenge to the
limitations of aesthetic humanism, it’s blindness to the fact of exclusion, the way its
supposed ‘universality’ was not universal at all. The challenge now is to understand
the tension between the aesthetic and the humane as commonly understood; to
understand that the aesthetic vision has been most captivating precisely when it
exceeds and maybe violates the humanitarian one. Captivating yes, but also poten-
tially dangerous: there can be no guarantee that (for instance) the imaginative explo-
ration of the return of the repressed will be conducive to the health of either the
individual or the society; only the utterly naive can believe that all repression/suppres-
sion is bad.
Those who love art and live by it refuse to recognise this potential challenge, believ-
ing instead that art is the most exalted expression of civilised life. They promulgate
well-intentioned lies, telling us that great art and the high culture it serves can only
enhance the lives of those who truly appreciate them; that such art – unlike, say, prop-
aganda, popular culture or pornography – is incapable of damaging or ‘corrupting’
us. Such an attitude not only fails to take art seriously enough, but rests on a prior
process of pro-art censorship more effective than anti-art state censorship. Their
defence of art is more often than not a defence against art, and an exaggerated respect
for it becomes a way of not engaging with it. Those who love art the most also censor
it the most. To approach literature insisting on an alignment of the ethical conscience
and the creative imagination is to be blind to the fact that some of the most compel-
ling writing is about the tension between, if not the incompatibility of, these two
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things. If I allude to Sex, Literature and Censorship again here it’s simply because I only
now have time to sketch and develop the argument outlined there.
We know that the aesthetic vision can challenge reactionary social agendas. Indeed,
for most defenders of art today, though by no means all, that’s welcome enough
because theirs is a moderately liberal agenda. But art can also challenge progressive
and humanely responsible social agendas. For that reason, to take art seriously is to
recognise that there are some reasonable (i.e. rational) grounds for wanting to control
it. I’m not claiming that art is inhumane in the sense that it insidiously legitimates the
interests of the powerful at the expense of the dispossessed, exploited, etc., although
there are indeed some canonical works which have been plausibly read in such terms.
Nor is my argument a transhistorical one about all art, or even all literature. It is obvi-
ously more applicable to some genres, periods and movements wherein a knowledge
of what profoundly disturbs psychic and social equilibrium, of what threatens prevail-
ing notions of civilised life, is central – e.g. Greek tragedy, the drama and epics English
Renaissance (especially Spenser and Milton), countless modernist texts, including
some which have been interpreted quite otherwise.
Again, a disquieting half-realisation of this has often occurred even within conser-
vative aesthetic perspectives. We can detect it in the most basic category of the human-
ist aesthetic, that of ‘character’. Time and again, and literally across centuries if not
millennia, the most compelling individual creations are the daemonic ones: the vice
figures in medieval moralities had vitality and wit on their side; the malcontents in
Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedy are charismatic, insightful anti-heroes whose deep
insight into corruption is enabled by their complicity with it; Milton’s Satan in
Paradise Lost has a perverse integrity which at the very least problematises, and for
some readers discredits, the didactic project of the entire epic. In Paradise Lost the devil
is in the structure as much as the detail. Critics have always tried to avoid this by
arguing that such imaginative identifications with the immoral and the inhumane are
ultimately contained, placed or neutralised by some over-arching ethical vision or
structural closure of the literary work.
There is a strange affinity between an aesthetic identification with the daemonic
and the theological and ethical impulse to exact a full look at the worst. For instance,
what we encounter in Paradise Lost is the courage – or arrogance, and perhaps para-
noia – of the most formidable kind of theology, that which believes it can most effec-
tively overcome what threatens it only by knowing it to the full. In Milton’s case the
need for such a confrontation would be intensified by the experience of revolution-
ary defeat. In Paradise Lost, the damage to didactic intent derives from performing this
impulse not only as theology but as tragic literature, arguably the definitive expressive
medium of defeat. And even if it could be shown that Milton never made, or never
intended, such identification (which it can’t), it would still be the case that he made
it possible for others to so identify, including two of his most influential readers, Blake
and Shelley.21 Two points about their readings: first they indicate how cultural pres-
sures at the time of reception will, if powerful enough, always over-ride formal strat-
egies of closure, reactivating and privileging dissident currents in a work; second, their
somewhat risky identifications with Satan are made not against but on behalf of the
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humanitarian project; in fact they are significant moments in the development of aes-
thetic humanism.
Even so, such readings of Satan were dangerous enough for God and his followers,
if no longer for the rest of us. And that’s my point: we allow such readings when they
no longer challenge us. And yet literature is full of knowledge which is dangerous for
us: it discloses understandings of the world which our own modes of civilised life
cannot or do not want to recognise, perhaps should not recognise. I argue, for example,
that modernists like W. B. Yeats and D. H. Lawrence, under the influence of
Nietzsche, offer an exhilarating celebration of an amoral aesthetics of energy. As
readers have admired and identified with, say, Yeats’s poetic voice they’ve found them-
selves uncomfortably close to an aesthetic which allowed artists and intellectuals to
identify with fascism. My claim though is not that Yeats should be censored as a fascist
but that his verse offers us a different and disturbing insight into recent history and
ourselves. To understand the poetry is not to transcend its violence but to enter its
seductive sublimations. When the poet is free from politics in the narrow sense he can
be most effective in articulating some of the deeper fantasies which contributed to
millions making certain political identifications and affiliations which in turn led to
the death and torture of millions of others. These fantasies remain very alive today. To
put it bluntly, a certain reading of Yeats and Lawrence reveals fascist fantasies as a more
or less repressed constituent of modern cultures. So: to insist that literature never
escapes the political (which I do) is quite different from demanding that it be respon-
sibly political (which I don’t); for me, the value of Yeats and Lawrence lies centrally in
their not being politically responsible because all such responsibility rightly entails
repression.
Of course this is an argument which commits me to a view of aesthetic appre-
ciation as in certain respects cognitive, that is, possessing a truth or knowledge con-
tent. Such an account is associated most immediately with Adorno22 but again, has
a longer, quite conventional history both as working assumption and as theory.
Even conservative aesthetic theories embrace it, for example those, including neo-
classicism, which regard art as offering generalised, universal truths about the world,
though once again the question as to what kind of truth is being offered is one too
few stop to answer or even ask. Arguably art has more often than not been assumed
to possess cognitive content of some kind, and it is only in relation to theories of art
as non-referential that it becomes an issue. The dissociation of art and knowledge is
relatively recent. As J. M. Bernstein puts it in The Fate of Art, ‘the experience of art as
aesthetical is the experience of art as having lost or been deprived of its power to speak
the truth . . . This loss . . . I shall call “aesthetic alienation”; it denominates art’s alien-
ation from truth which is caused by art’s becoming aesthetical, a becoming that has
been fully consummated only in modern societies’.23 To see art as cognitive does not
preclude it having specific and even unique types of formal properties (language, style,
genre and so on), nor does it diminish their importance. But it does challenge claims
that such aesthetic specificity renders the cognitive element of a work as secondary or
even irrelevant. And since such claims are relatively recent the onus of proof is on
those who make them.
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Yet another respect in which a ‘conservative’ or established dimension of the aes-
thetic harbours a challenge to the humanitarian agenda it was supposed to endorse is
latent within the theory of aesthetic appreciation as ‘disinterested’. Such appreciation
involves a profound uniqueness of perception which is both detached from and sees
beyond the mundane world of politics and interest – the idea in other words of aes-
thetic perception as, in Kant’s words, ‘disinterested and free’. This idea has its own
unique route to the non-humane or the inhumane, in for example Schopenhauer’s
reworking of Kant; now aesthetic disinterestedness releases us from the will to live and
requires the death of the self – an eradication of one’s individuality and even of one’s
humanity.24 This aesthetic draws us to the sublime and that fascination with a non-
human beauty whose power has something to do with its indifference to the human.
Subsequently the aesthetic of disinterestedness mutated into a specifically human dis-
taste for, or indifference towards, the human – again most notoriously when beauty
is the object of its gaze. There are so many examples from the twentieth century:
Lawrence/Birkin’s fantasies of a universe aesthetically cleansed of the ‘foul . . . defile-
ment’ which is humanity;25 the symbolist poet who declared of an anarchist bomb
attack, ‘What do the victims matter if the gesture is beautiful?’ Or Wilde’s remark
about Thomas Wainewright: ‘When a friend reproached him with the murder of
Helen Abercrombie he shrugged his shoulders and said, “Yes; it was a dreadful thing
to do, but she had very thick ankles”.’26 Finally, and returning to my war theme there
is Mussolini’s indebtedness to the Futurists when he compared bombs exploding
among fleeing civilians to flowers bursting into bloom.27 Karlheinz Stockhausen alleg-
edly said that the events of September 11th were the greatest work of art imaginable.28
Might it not be that, inside the outrage which greeted these remarks, and the prompt
decisions to cancel performances of his work, was a disavowal? At the very least we
know that millions the world over watched the events compulsively, over and over
again, experiencing a range of emotions: anger, shock, compassion and a horrified fas-
cination at a spectacle which seemed to exceed the cinema’s most sublime special
effects, thereby giving a new, awful sense to the idea that life might imitate art.
To recap – it is in such respects that the aesthetic I’m outlining is already apparent
within the Western tradition: the tendentious function of didacticism, the fascination
and identification with the daemonic, the cognitive dimension of the work of art, and
the way aesthetic detachment enables amoral perception.
Know to know no more: dangerous knowledge
This aesthetic is surely most apparent in the artistic preoccupation with dangerous
knowledge – the kind of knowledge which disturbs rather than consolidates social and
psychic order. Here we’re concerned not just with the dissident perspective of some
writers, but the organisation of human culture. An individual identity is composite,
a partial organisation more or less complex, and always entailing a greater or lesser
degree of repression, suppression and exclusion: identity is constituted by what some-
thing is not, as well as by what it essentially is. So too are cultures and civilisations,
albeit inconceivably more elaborate both in their organisation and their exclusions.
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The more complex the organised unity, the more vulnerable it is to being destabilised,
especially by, or in relation to, its exclusions. Further, what is excluded remains insep-
arable from what is included, which means it is never fully outside. This is one reason
why the most potent threat to something operates internally, in terms of its structure
and organisation; ruin is an internal not an external process, disintegration from
within rather than destruction from without. The alien beast may be slouching
towards Bethlehem, but the greater danger lies in the fact that things fall apart and
the centre can’t hold. Intellectually speaking this has become a modern commonplace,
largely thanks to the likes of Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. There are other
terms for the same or related processes of internal ruin, most of them loaded with dis-
approbation: to degenerate, decompose, dissolve (dissolution, dissolute), unravel,
unbind, regress. And of course revolution, in both its old and its newer senses.
In every case of perceived unbinding urgent political questions arise: is this really a
threat to our modes of cultural organisation, or might it be incorporated with minimal
change? And if the change required is more extensive, does it promise adoption and
survival, or disintegration and loss of identity? That such questions will be answered
differently depending on position, vested interest and existing relations of power and
conflict indicates the complexity of both the process and its perception. That some lit-
erature enacts disintegration is obvious: why else censorship? But we know too that
even literature overtly on the side of binding also necessarily explores the forces which
unbind, and time and again it is these forces which prove the most fascinating: the
depiction of utopias never matches that of dystopias, and writers come most alive when
exploring that convergence of forbidden desire and dangerous knowledge.
As Roger Shattuck and others have shown, forbidden knowledge has always been
a feature of human cultures, most obviously in the concepts of taboo and heresy.29
Ignorance is bliss, we say. In Paradise Lost Milton gives us this picture of Adam and
Eve, sleeping innocently:
These lulled by nightingales, embracing slept,
And on their naked limbs the flow’ry roof
Show’red roses, which the morn repaired. Sleep on
Blest pair; and O yet happiest if ye seek
No happier state, and know to know no more.30
In a phrase, ‘Be lowly wise’. Adam and Eve disobey, and their transgressive desire for
forbidden knowledge brings death and disintegration into the world, into desire. In
other words, it kick-starts history.
To observe the injunction not to know (or, more accurately, for some people, often
the majority, not to know) has been regarded as a precondition of social and psycho-
logical well-being, and the survival of civilisation itself – again implicit in the very idea
of censorship. Against that, the breaking of the injunction has been regarded as pro-
foundly liberatory, albeit with tragic consequences, though sometimes also with
revolutionary ones. Straddling that opposition are some of the great trangressive
figures of myth and literature including Eve, Prometheus, Faust/us, Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein, Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, Thomas Mann’s Aschenbach and Joseph
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Conrad’s Kurtz. Others, like Robert Louis Stevensons’s Jekyll/Hyde, embody the real-
isation that knowledge of evil is more intimate with genius than with barbarism, while
those like Shakespeare’s Macbeth, Dostoyevsky’s Raskolnikov and Nietzsche’s creator
as supreme amoral artist, confirm Pascal’s observation that there is a kind of evil which
often passes for good because ‘it takes as much extraordinary greatness of soul to attain
such evil, as to attain good’.31 Indeed, if most of these figures carry a sense of the dan-
gerous, as well as the liberatory, potential of the forbidden, this is because the knowl-
edge that is forbidden so often reveals the underlying proximities of evil to good.
Freud suggests why:
the objects to which men give most preference, their ideals, proceed from the same per-
ceptions and experiences as the objects which they most abhor, and . . . they were orig-
inally only distinguished from one another through slight modifications . . . Indeed . . .
it is possible for the original instinctual representative to be split in two, one part under-
going repression, while the remainder, precisely on account of this intimate connection
undergoes idealization.32
Dangerous knowledge indeed
In proverb and myth, in theology and philosophy, one human language after another
tells us there are things we should not know, things we should not do, and things we
should not see,33 places we should not go, and of course desires we should not gratify.
Thus the importance of Nietzsche contrasting the Dionysiac conception of art with
the humanitarian, and in terms of two distinct kinds of sufferer – those who suffer
from a superabundance of life and those who suffer from an impoverishment of life.
The former ‘want a Dionysian art as well as a tragic outlook and insight into life’, and
willingly confront ‘the terrible and questionable . . . every luxury of destruction,
decomposition, negation’; while the latter need ‘mildness, peacefulness, goodness in
thought and in deed . . . a certain warm, fear-averting confinement and enclosure
within optimistic horizons’.34 In Nietzsche we see so clearly that transgressive desire,
even when explicitly erotic, aims not just for forbidden pleasure, but forbidden
knowledge too.
The humanist wants literature to confirm who and what we essentially are or
should be. The aesthetic I’m exploring confronts us with what we are not; or rather,
it confronts us with the psychological cost of being who we are, or perhaps the social
cost of becoming what we would like to be, had we but courage equal to desire. It
means we can never be complacent about the benign influence of art, any more than
we can about knowledge per se. To take art seriously is to know it comes without the
humanitarian guarantees which currently smother it. We may agree that the suppres-
sion of ‘truth’ is harmful socially and ethically, while remembering that it happens in
all cultures, including ‘democracies’. ‘Why do they hate us so much?’ was the bewil-
dered, anguished response of some Americans on September 11th, seemingly unaware
of so much: unaware that their country was indeed hated with a vengeance of the kind
wreaked on that day; unaware that they were vulnerable to such an attack; unaware
even of who their enemies actually were. In that case we grieve for the ignorance as
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well as the loss of life because if more people had been better informed history might,
just might, have been different. But it does not follow that a full access to knowledge
is always socially and ethically beneficial. To believe it is must be one of the few
remaining naiveties of Enlightenment humanism. As that humanism declines many
of the older voices it displaced are to be heard once again, distant but compelling. One
especially haunts me: in much wisdom is much grief, and he who increaseth wisdom
increaseth sorrow. Artists have increased both.
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Mimesis in black and white:
feminist aesthetics, negativity and semblance
As Sarah Worth suggests, despite well-established feminist work in literary criticism,
film theory and art history, feminist aesthetics ‘is a relatively young discipline, dating
from the early 1990s’, and thus still open to contestation and new formulations.1 In
this context it might seem paradoxical that one of the founding texts of feminist aes-
thetics, Rita Felski’s Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change,
proclaims its impossibility. Felski concludes that ‘no convincing case has yet been
made for a gendered aesthetics’ because there are ‘no legitimate grounds for classify-
ing any particular style of writing as uniquely or specifically feminine’.2 Felski asso-
ciates the project of feminist aesthetics with a desire to ascribe immanent gendered
meanings to literary forms and styles, and thus with a problematic conflation of lit-
erary and political values:
The notion of a feminist aesthetics presupposes that these two dimensions (the political
and the aesthetic) . . . can be unproblematically harmonised, assuming either that an aes-
thetically self-conscious literature which subverts conventions of representation forms a
sufficient basis for a feminist politics of culture . . . or that texts which have been polit-
ically important to the women’s movement are automatically of aesthetic significance.3
As an alternative, she proposes dialectical mediation between aesthetics and feminist
politics (even though she admits she stresses the feminist side of this dialectics) – a
mediation that would repoliticise art on the levels of both production and reception,
without however reducing it to an instrumental political use value. And what would
provide the means of such mediation is the notion of a feminist counter-public sphere
which, instead of direct attribution of political meaning to particular styles, contextu-
alises women’s art vis-à-vis social and ideological conditions of production/reception.
Felski’s work, including her most recent Doing Time, raises many provocative ques-
tions – for instance, why the project of feminist aesthetics should be defined in such
reductive terms (which are then indeed disclosed as reductive), and more importantly,
why her own approach to women’s art is ‘beyond’ aesthetics. Although it seems new
in the context of feminism, this claim about the impossibility of feminist aesthetics is
after all strangely familiar – it inadvertently repeats the Hegelian thesis of the death
of art without any awareness of the long history of the critical engagements with this
thesis.4 Hegel’s claim, let us recall, does not announce the end of artistic production
but rather points to the eclipse of the inherent and irreducible social function of art,
which for that reason ‘no longer satisfies our supreme need’.5 And if art is not thereby
simply reducible to enjoyment, if it still carries social meanings, they are no longer in
harmony with the sensuality of its form and thus their complexity can be more ade-
quately analysed by the conceptual language of philosophy, science or, in our terms,
cultural studies. We hear an uncanny residue of this sentiment of dissatisfaction in the
opening sentence of Felski’s essay, ‘Why feminism doesn’t need an aesthetic (and why
it can’t ignore aesthetics)’, except that now it extends from the field of art production
to aesthetics as such: ‘My dissatisfaction with feminist aesthetics does not stem from
a belief that there are no connections between art and gender politics. Rather, I do not
think that feminist aesthetics helps us understand these connections adequately.’6 In
this context it is not surprising that Felski’s critique of the French and American fem-
inist approaches to aesthetics – the lack of sufficient historicisation of the female sub-
jectivity and gender ideology on the American side, the abstract fetishisation of the
formal innovation on the French side – repeats Hegel’s critique of the opposition
between historicism and formalism together with his call for the overcoming of art
for the sake of the more appropriate means of social mediation. And if the Hegelian
solution consists in the subsumption of art by philosophy – that is, in the sublation
of art’s sensuous dependence on the particular image, form and affect by conceptual
articulation – Felski’s more Habermasian option, despite her call for a mediation
between aesthetic and political domains, privileges in fact the subordination of art to
the feminist politics of counter-public sphere based on the problematic notion of a
common gender identity.
I begin with Felski because her influential work provides a symptomatic expression
of three difficulties in the revisions of modern aesthetics from the perspective of
gender, race and cultural studies. We are confronted first of all with the inability to
redefine the specificity of aesthetics in the context of the cultural politics of race and
gender without, despite all the claims to the contrary, falling into the trap of either
apolitical formalism or the political ‘death of art’. Thus, when the justifiable critiques
of the modernist ideologies of formalism are accompanied by the uncritical desire ‘to
allow art to return to its social context’,7 they all too often collapse into the opposite
reductive tendency, namely, the re-enactment of the political ‘death of art’. Second,
there is the persisting difficulty of studying the interconnection between gender, race
and sexuality in the cultural politics of modernity, despite all claims to the contrary.
The juxtaposition of Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double
Consciousness, devoted to a brilliant analysis of the black, but mostly male, counter-
culture of modernity, and the protracted feminist discussions of ‘the gender of mod-
ernism’ is a paradigmatic example of this problem. And finally, there is the dependence
on the category of mimesis, which is never interrogated historically. Used in a double
sense as representation and identification, mimesis figures prominently not only in
Felski’s preference for realist art but also in her project of a feminist politics based on
identifications with a common gendered identity. Reproducing the deadlock of the
debate between Lukács and Adorno, this demand for mimesis produces, as Henry
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Louis Gates Jr. remarks, ‘an overly mimetic conception of oppositional literature’.8
Yet, this often unexamined interconnection between the ‘mimetic’ and the ‘opposi-
tional’ produces what Paul Gilroy diagnoses as the politics of fulfilment, that is, pol-
itics ‘content to play occidental rationality at its own game’.9 By legitimating the
contextual integration of aesthetics into cultural logic, even if it is a logic of opposi-
tion, this ahistorical appeal to mimesis, I would claim, neglects not only the aesthetic
process of production but also the changing historical forms of mimesis. Context-
ualising aesthetics all too frequently occurs, therefore, at the price of a disavowal of
the historicity of aesthetic categories.
In order to elaborate an alternative approach to a feminist aesthetic theory, it is
necessary to address the political implications of modern aesthetics without either
sublating art by politics or making abstract claims about the ‘subversiveness’ of experi-
mental form. By thinking through the contradiction between aesthetic autonomy and
the critical social function of art, such an approach would contest the historical sep-
aration not only between political and aesthetic spheres but also between gender and
‘the colour line’ fracturing these spheres from within, while remaining suspicious of
their false reconciliation. Put in a different way, feminist aesthetics has to find new
ways of mediation between the aesthetic autonomy of art and the sexual, racial poli-
tics of modernity without overcoming the productive tension between them. Rather
than subsuming art by politics, this mediation should assume the form of a careful
redefinition of all the crucial modern aesthetic categories – such as autonomy, form,
mimesis, sensibility, negativity and utopia – by taking into account discontinuous his-
tories of aesthetics, social antagonisms and diverse artistic practices.10 In particular,
we will have to begin with the critical interrogation of the historical status of mimesis
in the context of a gendered and racial politics of modernity – the problem on which
I want to focus in this essay.
Needless to say, my approach to feminist aesthetics is influenced by Adorno’s aes-
thetic theory. Although Adorno hardly ever considers black, non-European, or
women writers, there are nonetheless several aspects of his work relevant to my
project: first, there is the relation between form, history and social antagonism;
second, there is the ambivalent function of modern art, suspended between subver-
sion and complicity with the structures of domination; and finally, there is the histor-
ical diagnosis of the ideological status of mimesis in modernity. By rethinking both
form and mimesis in the context of the new forms of power in modernity, Adorno
allows us to formulate the relation between form and content beyond the impasses of
the contextualism/formalism debate. One of his most original claims is that the
unsolved and unacknowledged contradictions in society are reflected primarily not at
the level of content, where they are easily assimilated into the predominant forms of
rationality, but at the level of form: ‘The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in art-
works as immanent problems of form.’11 Obviously, Adorno’s argument does not
repeat the modernist ideology of formalism, but, on the contrary, treats form as a
dynamic social category linked to new technologies, economic structures of exchange,
social relations of production as well as the intrinsic artistic forming of the always
already historically shaped material.
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This emphasis on form as a modality of social making rather than a means of rep-
resentation does not mean that the feminist theory of aesthetics should abandon the
crucial category of mimesis. On the contrary, it means that mimesis should be rede-
fined in the context of the historical investigation of its ideological status in moder-
nity. Toward this end, I will reformulate Theodor Adorno’s social history of mimesis,
understood both as an aesthetic means of representation and as a psycho-political
term of identification, in light of the influential theories of female masquerade and
colonial mimicry proposed by Joan Riviere, Frantz Fanon and Homi Bhabha. This
diverse configuration of theorists not only shows the structural intersections between
race, gender and sexuality in the formation of modern subjectivities but also reveals a
new modality of mimesis as semblance and its ambiguous ideological status. By jux-
taposing Riviere’s notion of masquerade as ‘a compromise formation’ with the social
regulation of mimetic behaviour stressed in different ways by Bhabha and Adorno, I
argue that this new modality of mimesis in modernity not only provides an imaginary
resolution of racial and gender antagonisms but also performs a perverse reconcilia-
tion of sensibility and rationality, jouissance and the law, in the service of domination.
On the psychic level, the colonial and gender masquerade functions as a compromise
formation between the id, ego and superego; on the cultural and political levels, it
contains the contradictions between the imperial metropolis and the colonised
peripheries, between the modern ideal of freedom and economic, colonial and gender
domination, between identity and difference, between social prohibitions and libidi-
nal gratifications, and finally between the autonomy and the commodification of art.
Consequently, on the colonial and gendered peripheries of modernity, mimesis reveals
a new form of domination that is based on fusion of sensibility and intelligibility, car-
nality and rationality rather than on their diremption as is the case in the imperial
metropolis. I would argue therefore that the enormous ideological appeal of mimesis
lies not just in the reduplication of reality, or in the reproduction of the status quo,
but in the semblance of the perverse reconciliation between rationality and sensibil-
ity, prohibition and enjoyment that is missing in reality. Consequently, through the
fetishistic substitution of the utopian consolation for the degraded present, mimetic
semblance provides an indispensable compensatory supplement to what Claude
Lefort describes as the disembodied, abstract regime of power in modernity. In this
context, the critical function of modern art is perhaps more complex than Adorno ini-
tially postulated: it lies primarily not in the recuperation of sensible particularity but
in the negation of this compensatory supplement sustaining modern power and the
subsequent re-enactment of the alterative relation to carnality and otherness beyond
the opposition between diremption/reconciliation of sensibility and rationality.
Influenced by anthropology, psychoanalysis, sociology, art and philosophy,
Adorno’s history of mimesis unfolds in the double – socio-psychological and aesthetic
– register. It is intertwined as much with the changing modalities of subject forma-
tion, social relations and the organisation of labour as with the history of aesthetics.
This critical genealogy reveals a profoundly ambiguous role of mimesis in modernity
– it is both an index of the forgotten, unconscious history of libidinal investments and
fantasies and a controlled, regulated practice in the service of domination. As such,
54 Positions
this historical investigation not only diagnoses an entwinement of rationality, sensibil-
ity and power, but also hopes to disclose the possibility of an alternative, non-
appropriative relation to objects. Mimesis is a notoriously difficult and obscure
concept in Adorno’s work partly because he wants to stress its socio-political ambigu-
ity, and partly because he wants to uncover its forgotten pre-philosophical, libidinal
history. From its earliest manifestations in the cry of terror and the uncontrolled
somatic reactions of the body frozen in fear where the organism in order to survive
approximates the inanimate nature, to the impersonations of the threatening nature
in ritualistic or magical practices, this pre-philosophical notion of mimesis has very
little to do with representation but, on the contrary, is intertwined with the sensible,
carnal receptivity to the outside, or what Adorno calls the non-identical. In contrast
to abstract, general philosophical concepts, these mimetic acts of response and adap-
tation to the other reflect, according to Karla Schultz and Michael Taussig,12 particu-
lar, sensuous modalities of the expressivity of the body. By bearing a trace of the
dependence of thinking on its other (carnality, sensibility, the non-identical), mimesis
enables a contestation of the hegemony of abstract rationality and its destructive ten-
dency toward immanence. As Jay M. Bernstein points out, the dependence of mimesis
on its other reveals the non-identical, which eludes all forms of identification, as a par-
adoxical condition of identification: the non-identical ‘grounds and makes identify-
ing thought possible while making its claim to totality impossible’.13
Adorno argues, however, that even these early mimetic impulses at work in
the uncontrolled responses of the body, magical impersonations of nature, or ritual
performances of dance and song, are dominated by fear and the instinct of self-
preservation. Thus, the mimetic affinity and dependence on the other are from the
outset intertwined with the desire for the mastery of the internal and external antag-
onistic forces. Born out of terror in the encounter with the unknown, this phobic
mimesis – which Frantz Fanon will make a privileged object of his investigation – is
in complicity with the rational domination of nature through the division of labour,
technology and science. Reduplicating the mythic fear of the other in a sublimated
form,14 the rational subject/object dialectic of pure immanence obliterates alterity,
‘because the idea of outsidedness is the very source of fear’.15 Although modern reifi-
cation is itself a mimesis of death,16 instrumental rationality nonetheless ‘outlaws’ and
confines to oblivion uncontrolled, libidinally invested mimesis because it still bears
witness to the threatening proximity of the outside and to the receptivity of the body:
‘Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic behavior
proper, by organized control of mimesis, in magical phase; and, finally, by rational
practice, by work, in the historical phase. Uncontrolled mimesis is outlawed.’17 In
modernity, the social control of mimesis assumes three main forms: instrumental
rationality, modern consumerism and the phobic projections of fascism. In knowl-
edge, the absorption of the other into the same – the conceptual constitution of the
object and its abstraction from sensuous particularity – takes the place of the mimetic
adaptation to the other. In consumption, the compulsive identification and the phan-
tasmatic introjection of what Karla Schultz calls the prefabricated ‘image of self-
realization’ appeases a modern anxiety of non-identity.18 As the history of racism and
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anti-Semitism shows, the obverse side of the imaginary identifications with the nar-
cissistic fulfilment promoted by commodity culture is the morbid projection of pro-
hibited mimetic impulses on racialised others:
Those blinded by civilization experience their own tabooed mimetic feature only in
certain gestures . . . which they encounter in others and which strike them as isolated
remnants, as embarrassing rudimentary elements that survive in the rationalized envi-
ronment. What seems repellently alien is in fact all too familiar: the infectious gestures
of direct contact suppressed by civilization . . .19
Projected onto dominated groups, these remnants of the prohibited mimetic impulses
– ‘the urge to lose oneself in the other’, ‘the lure of base instincts, reversion of ani-
mality’ – evoke anger and aggression because they are reminders of the fear of the
outside and the yearning for jouissance, which nonetheless ‘must be forgotten’ in
order to survive ‘the new conditions of production’.20 And yet, what is forbidden is
nonetheless enjoyed ‘craftily’ on the condition that it is externalised and despised in
the other, just as the ‘bad smell’ can be enjoyed under the rationalising pretext of ‘dis-
infection’. Consequently, political anti-Semitism ‘rehabilitates’ the weakening of pro-
hibition and the regression to the archaic in the name of ‘rational interests’: ‘the
anti-Semites gather together to celebrate the moment when authority permits what is
usually forbidden’.21 Mobilised by fascism in a paranoid fashion, this libidinal
economy of phobic projections, devoid of any critical reflection, becomes an organ-
ised mimesis to a second degree: an administered imitation of the mythical mimesis,
a perverted compromise between enjoyment, aggression and social regulation.
If we take seriously Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s claim that the social regulation of
mimesis in modernity is in complicity with racism and commodification then it
becomes clear that mimesis (in its function of identification and realist representation)
cannot be evoked uncritically as a basis of either feminist politics or progressive aes-
thetics. Nor can it be simply rejected for the sake of abstract formalism, which, when
divorced from ‘mimetic impulse’ and carnal sensibility, remains in complicity with
instrumental rationality and reifications of modern life. Consequently, to exit this
double bind and to recover a critical potential for mimetic impulse in modern art, a
feminist theory of aesthetics has to diagnose the new modalities of mimesis, which,
under the guise of semblance, provide not only an imaginary resolution for racial and
gender antagonisms but also a perverse compensation for the diremption of sensibil-
ity and intelligibility, jouissance and the law, in modernity. Yet it is precisely at this
point that Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s historical critique is insufficient because, in its
failure to account for the new forms of mimetic semblance characteristic of gendered
and racialised identifications, it misses the new modality of power. Despite its ‘empty’
and disembodied character, this power operates, as Foucault has taught us, on and
through the body. Consequently, in order to account for the ideological compensa-
tions of mimetic semblance, we need to supplement Adorno’s work with the feminist
and postcolonial theories of mimicry proposed by Riviere, Fanon and Bhabha.22
Published in 1929 in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, only a year after
the publication of a phenomenal number of major modernist texts by women writers,
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such as Woolf ’s Orlando, Barnes’s Ryder and Ladies Almanac, or Rhys’s Quarter (orig-
inally titled Masquerades),23 Riviere’s ‘Womanliness as a masquerade’ is a major mod-
ernist theoretical exploration of the ambiguous role of mimesis at the historical
moment of women’s entry into and negotiation with the gendered, racial structures
of the public and literary spheres of modernity. Extremely influential in feminist
theory, especially in the 1980s, Riviere’s essay, and in particular, its claim that a mas-
querade and genuine femininity are the ‘same thing’, has been read frequently as an
early, anti-essentialist, performative formulation of gender.24 Yet, despite the critical
potential of this recovery of mimetic semblance in place of authentic identity, female
masquerade remains in complicity with modern power, social anxieties about homo-
sexuality,25 phallic rivalry, racism and the fear of retribution. When read as a new
modality of mimesis, the masquerade of imperial womanliness becomes a sympto-
matic expression of the compensation and social regulation of the colonial, sexual and
racial antagonisms of modernity.
What makes masquerade a particularly useful trope for diagnosing the contradic-
tions of mimesis in the formations of white metropolitan femininity is the repeated
oscillation of the master/slave dialectic, which, as we shall see in a moment, is remi-
niscent of the colonised/coloniser dialectic. In fact, a masquerading woman alternates
between the positions of mastery and subjection, without, however, transcending
their impasses. Ostensibly, Riviere focuses on the case of the white, intellectual,
ambiguously homosexual woman, who suffers from a masculinity complex supported
by the unconscious fantasy of the possession of the paternal phallus – a fantasy acted
out in her intellectual performances, through which she unconsciously displays and
seeks a public recognition for her phallic mastery. Nonetheless, the phallic mastery
purchased by masculine identification is paid for with the intense fear of retribution
from authority figures and the ferocious threat of the superego, reflecting social reg-
ulation. As a defence against the castration threat the woman adopts the mask of a
slave: to hide her phallic possession, she compulsively re-enacts a masquerade of a cas-
trated, degraded femininity. To evoke Adorno’s critique of mimesis, we could say that
in the case of female masquerade the critical potential of the mimetic impulse is
arrested by the structures of domination, fear and an instinct of self-preservation.
The ambiguity of mimetic semblance is further compounded by its subtext of
racist fantasies.26 In her dreams, Riviere’s patient, a white American from the South,
sees herself attacked by a black man, whom she plans to seduce and then deliver ‘over
to justice’, which, as Jean Walton suggests, can only be a euphemism for castration
and lynching.27 In this fantasy, the incompatible psychic formations of aggression,
phallic enjoyment and the defence against paternal authority are negotiated through
a projective identification with the ‘Negro’ – a contradictory fantasmatic figure of
phallic jouissance, the punishing superego, and the punished victim delegated to take
the blame for woman’s theft of the phallus. Paradoxically, in order to function as a
defence mechanism, the masquerade of womanliness has to be reinforced by another
masculine identification – but this time not with the insignia of white power but with
the racist stereotype of black masculinity. In this contradictory identification with the
punished victim/punishing superego, we see here a feminised figure of Negrophobia,
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which Riviere and her numerous feminist critics fail to analyse and which Fanon puts
at the centre of colonial domination. Consequently, it is the black mask of the white
womanliness that consolidates the fragile compromise between sensibility and power,
between the defences of the narcissistic ego, the punishing cruelty of the superego,
and the sadistic aggression of the id, and, in so doing, provides an ideological support
for the racist imaginary.
What has also been ignored in most interpretations of Riviere’s essay, and what is
nonetheless crucial to understanding the new gendered modalities of mimesis, is not
only the paranoid projections of Negrophobia but also the perverse fixation on the
pre-Oedipal relations with the mother. Following Melanie Klein, Riviere argues that
woman’s appropriation of the paternal phallus is an unconscious act of reparation for
her earlier sadistic wishes of the dismemberment of the maternal body: thus the
woman ‘steals’ the paternal phallus not for herself but in order to restore it to the
mother. As Catherine Millot remarks, ‘in this case . . . the father is no more than an
appurtenance of the mother, one of the attributes of maternal power, the equivalent
of fetish’.28 By maintaining a contradictory attitude to the imaginary maternal phallus
– its absence is at once acknowledged and negated through the act of sacrificial resto-
ration – the fetishistic turn of the female masquerade is at once a cipher of longing
for excised sensuality and the maternal genealogy as well as a mark of the daughter’s
servitude to the mirage of the phallic mother: ‘her efforts to . . . make reparation by
restoring the penis’ to the mother ‘were never enough; this device was worked to
death; and sometimes it almost worked her to death’.29 In light of Kristeva’s ‘Women’s
Time’, we can read this deadly dedication to the myth of archaic mother as an ‘arche-
type’ of the utopian belief in ‘a good and pure substance’ without antagonism, frus-
tration or division.30
If the unacknowledged Negrophobia puts female masquerade squarely in the
context of colonial domination, its other features – in particular, the mimetic iden-
tification with masculine power, the aggressive rivalry for the possession of the phallus
and the prohibition of the superego against such possession – can be compared to the
assumption of a white mask by a colonised subject analysed in different ways by Homi
Bhabha and Frantz Fanon. In the context of this comparison we could say that the
impasses of the master/slave dialectic in the position of metropolitan femininity
repeat the oscillations of colonised/coloniser dialectics. Yet, such a comparison reveals
not only the intertwining of racial and gender antagonisms in mimetic semblance but
also the first striking difference in the mode of its social and psychic regulation: If in
the case of metropolitan female masquerade we are dealing with a prohibition of mas-
culine identification and the transgression of this prohibition, in the case of colonial
mimicry we are dealing with the imperial demand for the identification with white-
ness and an instituted failure in the structure of this demand.
It is of course Homi Bhabha who brilliantly diagnoses this new modality of the
psycho-social regulation of mimetic semblance in the maintenance of Western impe-
rialism. Like Adorno, he links the ambiguity of the mimetic impulse both to the struc-
tures of domination and to the possibility of subversion. Bhabha argues that colonial
mimicry is one of the most elusive strategies of colonial power, the effectiveness of
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which comes from yet another compromise formation – this time, a compromise
between the contradictory demands for identity supporting the panoptical vision of
domination and a diachronical sense of difference. It is thus a compromise, to use
Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks’ apt formulation, between the ‘visibility and historicity’ of
the signifier of race.31 To justify the civilising mission of colonialism and the discipli-
nary surveillance of the colonised, the colonial power demands the imitation of white-
ness and at the same time erects a prohibition against such an identification, evident
for instance in the difference between being anglicised and being English. The colo-
nial power has to produce, therefore, not only an enforced imitation of European
ideals but also a slippage, a failure of identification. This faulty ‘colonial mimesis’ con-
stitutes the colonised subject as a partial presence, as a defective semblance – ‘almost
the same but not quite’32 – of whiteness, just as the masquerading woman is ultimately
a defective semblance of the male intellectual. And yet, these two figures of semblance,
like mirror reflections of each other, are in fact symmetrical opposites: note in partic-
ular that the oppressive demand of colonial mimesis (the demand for the partial iden-
tification with the colonising power) mimics the transgressive aspects of female
masquerade (its refusal of the prohibited identification with phallic power). This
means indeed that the colonial mimesis puts the colonised masculinity in a peculiar
feminised position; however, not in a position of traditional femininity, as it has been
often argued, but in the place of an ambiguous homosexual woman passing for a man
passing for a woman. Just as feminist critics fail to notice Negrophobia in the uncon-
scious structures of female masquerade, Bhabha fails to notice this profound ambigu-
ity of sexuality – almost male but not quite – in his analysis of the ambivalence of
colonial power.
Like Adorno, Bhabha argues that the contradictory political regulation of mimetic
semblance is motivated by the fear and subjugation of alterity. Yet if Adorno inter-
prets this obliteration of alterity as a consequence of the abstraction of power /knowl-
edge from sensuous particularity and almost complete repression of the prohibited
mimetic impulses, Bhabha points out that this repression is lifted on the colonial
margins. Consequently, the perverse colonial mimesis provides a compensatory sup-
plement to the disembodied forms of political power in modernity. Similarly, the sub-
jugation of alterity assumes a different form in colonial mimesis: it is not just a
conceptual subjugation of the non-identical in the dialectic of pure immanence but
a libidinally charged, fetishistic disavowal of difference. Simultaneously acknowl-
edged and negated, the otherness of the colonised is replaced by an imaginary substi-
tute, ‘a product of desire that repeats, rearticulates reality as mimicry’.33
It is precisely this fetishistic character of the colonial regulation of mimetic sem-
blance that challenges the authority of the colonial power and the Manichean dualism
on which it depends just as the fetish splits the ego into two contradictory attitudes:
‘The menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of
colonial discourse disrupts’ its epistemological, political and, we have to add, mascu-
line authority. The very partiality and default of imitation alienates the model from
itself and discloses its wholeness as a metonymy of presence. As Bhabha puts it, ‘on
the margins of metropolitan desire, the founding objects of the Western world become
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the erratic, eccentric, accidental objets trouvés of the colonial discourse’.34 Thus the
enforced slippage of colonial mimesis threatens to turn into a mockery of colonial reg-
ulation, into a site of the emergence of the otherness of the colonised and the ‘inter-
dicted’ desires, which resist and threaten the colonialising process. By revealing
ambivalence, incompleteness and doubling of both the white authority and the black
subjectivity,35 the instituted flaw of colonial mimesis not only intensifies disciplinary
surveillance but constitutes a possibility of resistance. As Antonio Negri and Michael
Hardt sum up:
the colonized’s mimicry of the colonizer’s discourse rearticulates the whole notion of
identity and alienates it from essence; cultures are always already partial and hybrid for-
mations. This social fact is the basis on which a subversive political project can be con-
ducted to destroy the binary structures of power and identity. . . . The postcolonial
political project, then, is to affirm the multiplicity of differences so as to subvert the
power of the ruling binary structures.36
Yet, Negri and Hardt fail to note that what is at stake in colonial mimicry is not only
the emergence of ‘the partial and hybrid formations’ but also a perverse compromise
between prohibition and enjoyment, sensibility and power – a compromise that com-
pensates for the disembodied character of power and abstract culture in metropolitan
modernity. By turning to Frantz Fanon’s analysis of colonial mimesis, we can diagnose
the nature of this compromise more precisely: we not only note a shift to a different
libidinal economy of colonial power (from fetish to phobia) but also confront what
has been hitherto evoked only obliquely – namely the black masculine body as the
site of both contradictory libidinal investments and the political regulation of
mimesis. By focusing on the ‘epidermalization’ of mimesis, Fanon locates the politi-
cal regulation of colonial mimicry in the process of the deflection of the specular I
into the social reality of colonial domination – in psychoanalytic terms, in the shift
from primary to secondary narcissism, in Fanon’s terms, from bodily schema to racial-
historical schema. The central figures of this regulation are paranoid projection,
Negrophobia and the abjection of the black body.
As is well known, Fanon interprets the coloniser’s phobic reaction to the black
body in terms of a paranoid projection of aggressivity and incestuous jouissance: ‘pro-
jecting his own desires onto the Negro, the white man behaves “as if ” the Negro really
had them’.37 In so doing, Fanon returns us to the problematic of phobic mimesis and
the resurgence of the mythical fear of the other in the colonial situation. Similar to
Adorno’s discussion of the projection of the prohibited mimetic impulses at work in
anti-Semitism, Fanon’s diagnosis of the paranoia of colonial power emphasises not so
much the emergence of the threatening otherness of the colonised but a certain com-
promise between enjoyment and prohibition of the libidinal aspects of archaic
mimetic impulses – jouissance and death drive: ‘the civilized white man retains an
irrational longing for the unusual eras of sexual licence, of orgiastic scenes, of unpun-
ished rapes, of unrepressed incest’.38 Let us notice, therefore, that Fanon’s diagnosis of
the libidinal economy of colonial power stresses not only the contradiction between
the demanded and prohibited imitation of whiteness but also the perversion, or the
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turning aside, of the prohibition against incestuous jouissance. Neither giving up nor
accepting prohibition, the perversion of colonial power regulates enjoyment by exter-
nalising the punishing cruelty of the superego and the prohibited incestuous longing
for lost jouissance in the black body. As a result of this projective identification, the
sexualised black body – the body of noxious enjoyment – is experienced in the racist
imaginary as a ‘biological’ threat to the imaginary integrity of the white body. As
Fanon points out, ‘the Negro, because of his body, impedes the closing of the postu-
ral schema of the white man’.39 Because of this projective ‘epidermalisation’ of the pro-
hibited mimetic impulses, the specular black image is overlaid with racial-historical
schema constituting the colonised body as the repository of the repugnant jouissance
and the unassimilable aggressivity of the death drive. On the margins of metropolis,
the libidinally invested black body is turned therefore into an at once fascinating and
repulsive memorial of mythical fear and incestuous jouissance, which must be forgot-
ten in the capitalist mode of production.
For Fanon as for Bhabha, the effects of this phobic mimesis are ambiguous. On
the one hand, as the repository of what is ‘the unassimilable’40 within the imaginary
and the symbolic registers, the black body sustains the méconnaissance of the ideo-
logical coherence of whiteness. The paranoid projection allows the white ego to enjoy
what is prohibited by displacing the internal ambivalence, jouissance, and the archaic
fear onto the imaginary other who retrospectively seems to threaten the integrity of
the white body from without. Yet, on the other hand, despite the epidermal barrier
protecting whiteness against the encroaching proximity of the real, the phobic narcis-
sism reveals both the compromise between prohibition and jouissance and the for-
tified identity of whiteness to be perpetually threatened. As Homi Bhabha argues, ‘the
colonizer is himself caught in the ambivalence’ of projective identification, ‘alternat-
ing between fantasies of megalomania and persecution’.41 In other words, the black
body as a phobic object is a correlative of the white body in the grips of mythical fear,
loathing, and yearning.
For the black subjectivity, however, the devastating effects of colonial mimesis are
radically different. That is what Fanon suggests when he argues that ‘the Negro suffers
in his body quite differently from the white man’.42 For Fanon the enforced and pro-
hibited identification with whiteness manifests itself not only as the defective sem-
blance of white presence but as a traumatising fragmentation and expulsion of the
body: ‘What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage
that spattered my whole body with black blood?’43 Paradoxically, the impossible
dilemma of white identification – ‘turn white or disappear’,44 which sounds like a colo-
nial perversion of Lacan’s forced choice between symbolic ‘life’ or being – does not
merely constitute the black subjectivity as a partial semblance but expels the black
body from the symbolic universe: ‘my shoulders slipped out of the framework of the
world, my feet could no longer feel the touch of the ground’.45 The traumatic effect
of the crumbling of the bodily schema under the weight of the projected racial-
historical schema is the loss of the symbolic support of the body. Because of this inva-
sion of the body by the real, ‘a Negro’, Fanon writes, ‘is forever in combat with his
own image’.46
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When juxtaposed with Bhabha and Riviere, Fanon allows us not only to analyse
the default of the colonial identifications – being almost white, almost male, but not
quite – but also to diagnose different responses to the threat of the imperial superego
along gender and racial lines: in particular, we see here a striking divergence between
the protective mask of white womanliness and the ‘amputation’ of the black body.
Thus, if the defensive assumption of the mask of a castrated femininity ‘saves’ the
white skin, the partiality of colonial mimicry produces a tragic disjunction between
the ‘white masks, black skin’ which, as Stuart Hall and Homi Bhabha rightly point
out, does not characterise the duality of the coloniser and the colonised but describes
the immobilising shattering of black masculinity from within. Ultimately, what these
three figures of mimesis – the defensive mask of imperial femininity, the phobic nar-
cissism of white authority, and the ‘corporeal malediction’ of the black skin – fore-
ground, is the compromise between enjoyment, prohibition and social regulation and
its simultaneously compensatory and destructive function. In contrast to the theft and
sacrifice of phallic enjoyment enacted in female masquerade, colonial mimicry is
intertwined with the traumatic encroachment of the repulsive enjoyment, which shat-
ters the bodily image of the colonised subject. Thus, if the coloniser enjoys by pro-
jecting the threatening jouissance onto the other, if the woman turns herself into a
perverse instrument of the enjoyment of the phallic mother, the black man objectifies
and amputates his body in order to get rid of the repulsive jouissance attributed to
him by the white other.
By reading Adorno, Riviere, Bhabha and Fanon together, I have tried to show that
the new psychic economies and social regulations of mimetic semblance in modernity
provide a dubious and ideologically suspect alternative to instrumental rationality and
the disjunction between abstract universality and sensible particularity on which it is
based. Operating on the margins of metropolitan power/knowledge, these gendered
and racialised modalities of mimesis perform a compensatory semblance of reconcil-
iation between rebellion and complicity, between enjoyment and prohibition,
between the fetishisation of white femininity and the abjection of racialised bodies,
between a utopian resolution of antagonisms and the damaged reality of exploitation.
The belief in this compromise can be maintained only by disqualifying those who bear
the burden of its proof as defective yet fascinating semblances of Western subjectiv-
ity. The mimetic semblance of reconciliation is thus preserved at the price of the exter-
nalisation of antagonisms, contradictions and enjoyment in the dominated others. To
refer to psychoanalytic terminology for a moment, we can say that this perverse com-
promise formation, achieved through the disavowal of symbolic inconsistencies and
negativity, is intertwined with the imaginary construction of the phallus as ‘the ulti-
mate white mask’.47 By throwing a veil over the phallus as the signifier of lack, female
masquerade provides support for its imaginary status as a token of masculine mastery
and colonial domination. The imaginary equation of the phallus with white mascu-
linity reinterprets the lack in the symbolic in ideological terms as a default of the colo-
nial imitation of whiteness while displacing the frightening proximity of the
enjoyment onto the abjected black skin. Consequently, the other side of the disavowal
characteristic of mimetic semblance is the abjection of the racialised body associated
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with enjoyment or perverse servitude to the jouissance of the other. Instead of being
a signifier of lack, of the symbolic castration of every subjectivity, the phallus becomes
in these fantasmatic transactions an imaginary object – a ‘desired bit of whiteness’, as
Fanon puts it – the appropriation of which could either legitimate colonial power or
compensate for the ravages of exploitation. However, rather than supporting resis-
tance, this imaginary compromise reproduces a rapacious dialectic of ‘having’, which,
by renouncing lack, instrumentalises the question of ‘being’.
In the end I would like to pose briefly a question about the critical function of
modern art in relation to these new modalities of the social regulation of mimesis in
modernity. In what sense can the precarious status of art, which itself is merely a sem-
blance, negate the compromises and the disavowals of antagonisms, contradictions
and negativity produced by mimetic semblance? Modern art can perform this critical
function only insofar as aesthetic semblance is intertwined, as Lambert Zuidervaart
reminds us,48 with a double negation: first, the artwork has to negate the semblance
of external reality it produces (negation of representation) and second, it has to negate
the artistic autonomy emerging from the first negation (negation of art as in-itself sep-
arated from the social). Consequently, unlike the imaginary reconciliation and the
disavowal of negativity produced through mimetic semblance, artistic semblance
turns against itself and its own complicity with domination in order to foreground
the inconsistencies and internal contradictions ‘between what the artwork appears to
be and what it is’.49
Let us look at this double gesture of negation more closely. In a more obvious way,
abstract and experimental art negates the mimetic function of the traditional novel
because the illusion of external reality denies the materiality of form and the process
of artistic production. In a less obvious way, however, this emphasis on the material-
ity of form also negates the subjective projections and disavowals by externalising/
objectifying the subject in the artistic material. The work of art both re-enacts the
rational/subjective control over the material and ‘extinguishes’ the subject in the mate-
rials: the subject ‘takes part in objectivity when his energy, even that of his misguided
subjective “projection,” extinguishes itself in the artwork’.50 Thus, the critical distance
from masquerade does not reclaim a more ‘authentic’ identity but, on the contrary,
‘unmasks’ its imaginary status by breaking down the default identifications sustaining
colonial power and by ‘sacrificing the sacrifices’51 they entail – the sacrifice of one’s
being, the abjection of black skin or the perverse renunciation of enjoyment to the
Other.
It is by turning against its own aesthetic illusions of external reality and subjective
control that modern art can expose the contradictions and negate the compensatory
function of mimetic semblance operating already on psychic, cultural and aesthetic
levels. On the psychic level, let us recall, mimetic semblance functions as a compro-
mise formation between the id, the ego and the superego, producing a perverse rec-
onciliation between enjoyment and prohibition, sensibility and the socio-symbolic
order. On the cultural level, this compromise, implicated in the politics of self-
preservation and the reproduction of colonial domination, contains the contradic-
tions of modernity between imperial power and colonial mimicry, between the
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abstract commodity form and the sensuality of female and racialised bodies, and
finally, between high and low art. On the aesthetic level, it produces a fetishistic sub-
stitution of the utopian promise of reconciliation for the damaged present. Because
the compensatory nature of these multiple compromises obfuscates antagonisms and
diremption in reality, and thus remains in complicity with domination, the negation
of mimesis in modernism becomes a historical necessity. Consequently, by contest-
ing the aesthetic reproduction of mimetic semblance operating already in reality,
modern art, as Adorno aptly observes, does not just reject representation but ‘rebel[s]
against the semblance of a semblance that denies it as such’.52 Let me just remark that
in the case of the modernist texts of the prominent women writers (such as Woolf ’s
Orlando, Rhys’s novels or Larsen’s Passing) this rebellion against ‘the semblance of a
semblance’ occurs by turning the racial and gender masquerades into the principle of
formal construction.
As many critics of modernism have pointed out, the negation of mimesis could
deteriorate into aestheticisms or the fetish of formal subversiveness. This is for
instance the basis of Felski’s scepticism about modern experimental art. Yet, what
these criticisms disregard is the second negation that the progressive art must perform
– this time, the negation of its artistic autonomy. As Adorno puts it, the illusion of
autonomy ‘became an embarrassment because the gapless being-in-itself, after which
the pure artwork strives, is incompatible with its determination as something
humanly made and therefore as a thing in which the world of things is imbedded a
priori’.53 Although indispensable for the critique of the social regulation of mimesis,
the semblance of art as in-itself, as an autonomous object, disavows the social charac-
ter of artistic materials, the link between form and social division of labour, and finally
the irreducibly social and subjective mediation of artistic making: ‘For everything that
artworks contain with regard to form and materials, spirit and subject matter, has emi-
grated from reality into the artworks and in them has divested itself of its reality.’54
Since this disavowal is in complicity with reification, art has to negate its autonomy,
on which its critical function also depends.
It is only in the aftermath of this double negation of the compensatory compro-
mises of mimetic semblance and the reifications of aesthetic autonomy that art can
redeem its own status as semblance and preserve the critical function of the mimetic
impulse. For Adorno this secular redemption of semblance through the labour of the
negative achieves a ‘tour de force’, which points to the future reconciliation of social
antagonisms even though such a reconciliation is as yet impossible in reality: ‘Those
[works] that are a tour de force, a balancing act, demonstrate something about art as
a whole: They achieve the impossible.’55 Consequently, the mimetic impulse of artis-
tic semblance is counterfactual: it negatively presents the utopian promise as non-
existent and thus as an impetus for a change rather than a compensatory semblance
of the present fulfilment. By turning against itself and its complicity with domina-
tion, art thus can redeem a critical mimetic impulse at the price of foregrounding its
own internal contradiction: in contrast to the disavowals, projections, consolations
and compromises of mimetic semblance, progressive art has to envision future rec-
onciliation and at the same time to negate it as non-existent. In Adorno’s words,
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modernist artwork has to ‘testify to the unreconciled and at the same time envisions
its reconciliation’.56 Thus, the critical mimetic impulse can be redeemed only when
its utopian aspirations refuse to substitute aesthetic reconciliation for the conflicts
and diremptions of an unreconciled reality.
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4 Andrew Bowie
What comes after art?
Kafka’s last completed story has become something of an allegory of contemporary
theoretical approaches in the humanities. In ‘Josefine, the singer, or the mouse
people’, the narrator, a mouse, ponders the phenomenon of Josefine, a mouse who
sings. The problem with Josefine is that she actually seems to make the same kind of
noise as all the other mice, but she makes a performance of it, claiming that what she
does is very special. She is able, moreover, to make a career out of being a ‘singer’,
despite the doubts voiced by some of her audience. Kafka’s story plays with various
versions of aesthetic theory, linking Josefine’s apparent highlighting of the ordinary to
make it extraordinary, for example, to what sounds like Russian formalism’s concept
of ostranenie. The narrator is never convinced by what Josefine does, but is also never
finally prepared to write it off. Given that the story was written by someone who had
painfully devoted his life to ‘literature’, and who knew he was dying, the question as
to whether he might just have been writing texts like everybody else, and thus doing
nothing special really, becomes especially poignant. However, it seems clear that the
ironic amusement produced by the fact that this deep text on aesthetics takes place in
a world of highly articulate mice takes the story into realms which a discursive account
of the issues could not. In this sense, Kafka’s story is a great ‘literary text’ with aes-
thetic value, and this seems to me important.1 Why it is important takes us to the heart
of some much-discussed issues in the humanities.
In recent years some theoretically informed work in the humanities has increas-
ingly focused on revealing the extent to which traditional assumptions informing the
investigation of cultural phenomena are likely to obscure dimensions of those phe-
nomena which should lead us to be suspicious both of their aesthetic appeal and of
their ‘canonical’ status. One obvious consequence of these approaches has been that
invocations of the aesthetic status of a text or other cultural artefact as the decisive
factor in its reception can lead to some version of the accusation of failing to see that,
as Walter Benjamin put it, documents of culture are always also documents of barbar-
ism.2 The problem with many of the contemporary versions of this stance is that the
critic ends up placing herself in something like the position of the narrator-mouse of
Kafka’s story, aware that she is deeply ambivalent about what she is confronted with,
yet still obsessively concerned to get to the bottom of its nature. Added to this,
though, is the lurking suspicion that, in the last analysis, there may not be very much
to get to the bottom of. Kafka’s narrator asks whether Josefine’s song might not be just
a fraud, and claims that it will disappear anyway when she dies.
We can project the sort of thing that developed out of the issues Kafka’s story high-
lights onto some recent theory as follows. Isn’t art in the strong aesthetic sense essen-
tially a product of the bourgeois era, and isn’t part of the contemporary crisis in art’s
status a result of the revelation of the ideological nature of how art was used by the
dominant classes to cover up social contradictions in the name of an illusory harmony
said to be present in the work of art? Furthermore, did not Marcel Duchamp’s ‘ready-
mades’ reveal the extent to which art is in fact a result of the functioning of certain
institutions in which objects can be located? In future ‘art’, in a more attenuated sense,
might instead be seen mainly as one resource for enriching the contexts of everyday
life, as, of course, it had been in some respects prior to the rise of the great bourgeois
traditions. In consequence, so the argument goes, we will be able to do without the
crypto-theology which lies at the heart of aesthetically oriented accounts of art, and
which allowed the ethnocentric, gender- and class-biased, Western tradition to exert
such a problematic influence. The same kind of story has been told about ‘literature’
and the fact that, as Kafka’s story itself reflects, there may be nothing to distinguish
literature in any fundamental way from other kinds of text. Interestingly, it is harder
to do the same with music, though that has not stopped people trying.
These are obviously large and difficult issues, and the caricature just offered does
not do justice to the more reflective suspicions of the aesthetic in recent theory.3
However, there does seem to be a crucial division in the debates around the issue of
aesthetics, which has been suggested by a thinker as concerned to deflate metaphysi-
cal pretension and diminish human cruelty as Richard Rorty. Contrasting the impli-
cations of Fredric Jameson’s and Harold Bloom’s positions for cultural and other
politics, Rorty argues that the difference between their adherents is not ‘between those
who take politics seriously and those who do not’. Rather it is ‘between people taking
refuge in self-protecting knowingness about the present and romantic utopians trying
to imagine a better future’.4 The former think that their theoretical insights are the
key to unmasking the elevated status of the high culture which they link to the roots
of the predicaments of the present; the latter think that significant art cannot be ade-
quately responded to in this manner and that we should be looking to what it can
offer us for the future. Behind Rorty’s version of this issue lies what seems to me to be
a decisive question. The question can be posed quite simply, as we will see in a
moment, but the exploration of its implications for the future of the humanities is
anything but simple.
The main point of serious investigation of the significant products of Western
culture – and this can include everything from Bach, to jazz, Shakespeare, to new
forms of independent film – has become, for some recent theory, to explore the extent
to which these products contribute to or escape from repressive discourses of race,
gender, class, etc. Many approaches put in question by such theory aim, in contrast,
to understand how great culture opens up worlds of the imagination which provide
new resources of meaning in all kinds of different social and historical contexts. The
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simple question is this: are the semantic resources offered by the former positions con-
fined to their insights into the delusions and repressions of Western culture (delusions
and repressions which, I should stress, I have no concern to deny)? More provoca-
tively: are those insights therefore themselves superior to what they unmask, offering
a truth or revelation inaccessible to their object of investigation? In short: having done
the negative critical work, what is on offer as a positive alternative from theories whose
primary aim is to unmask, or is this asking too much of them? Was what an aesthetic
approach saw in the best of Western and other culture merely an illusion from which
we should now be liberated? Now this is obviously a very schematic way of putting
the issue, and the crude opposition of theoretical attitudes just suggested does not do
justice to the fact that many approaches to cultural issues combine something of both
sides. However, even allowing for this proviso, the doubts created by these sorts of
questions seem to me to be part of what has opened up the space for the contempo-
rary renewed interest in aesthetics.
To put it another way: why would one bother to concern oneself with the well-
known products of Western culture, if it were not that they offer more than is appar-
ent when their often quite evident failings with regard to contemporary social, ethical
and other assumptions are exposed? An uncomfortable alternative presents itself here
for those to whom Rorty imputes ‘self-protective knowingness’. The first possibility is
that these works are so powerful that the prime task of the theorist is to defuse their
ideological power, which means, of course, both that the nature of this power requires
a lot more explanation and that the explainer must possess special insight to be able to
see through it. The second possibility is that the works are in fact merely what hap-
pened to be the focus of the existing forms of study in the institutionalised human-
ities, and are therefore used to exemplify what the theorist already believed anyway. In
both cases aesthetic questions cannot be ignored. In the first case the task is to estab-
lish how it is that what had, from the perspective of aesthetics, been understood to
offer new resources for hope and meaning that transcend existing ways of thinking and
feeling, is in fact more important for its exemplification of repressive ways of thinking.
In the second case the question has to be answered as to why one concerns oneself with
works which might be seen as more apt for aesthetic than for ideological investigation,
rather than doing research into changing social and cultural attitudes in contemporary
society or in the historical period in question.5 The justification for taking ‘high’
culture – which is anyway increasingly marginalised in large parts of Western societies
– as one’s object seems quite hard to find, unless, of course, one accepts the first posi-
tion. By accepting this position one is, though, likely to end up by trying to acknowl-
edge the power of something which one is at the same time effectively trying to reduce
to being a mere contingent product of a history marked by barbarism.
Clearly we should all want to disabuse those whom we teach, and those around us,
of racist, sexist and other regressive attitudes. Whether this is best achieved by, for
example, looking at colonialism via The Tempest, or sexism via Schumann’s song-cycle
Frauenliebe und -leben, seems questionable, unless there are other compelling reasons
for reading Shakespeare and listening to Schumann. These reasons would seem to
depend on the fact that these are major artists who did something nobody else suc-
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ceeded in doing. That this fact matters little in large parts of the contemporary cul-
tural world seems to me to suggest that either one sees one’s task as revealing to people
that they are missing something important, or that one should do something else. The
emergence of the orientation in cultural studies towards ‘popular culture’ of all kinds
is in this respect a logical response to the suspicion that works from the great tradi-
tions may now no longer (if, of course, they ever did) have a decisive influence on
political and social life. This does not, however, obviate aesthetic questions, even in
relation to popular culture. The danger here is that an apparent openness to what sup-
posedly (and sometimes actually) elitist positions have unjustifiably ignored can in
fact be based on another kind of failure of openness. Both concentrating on popular
culture, and using major works from the tradition predominantly to reveal ideologi-
cal and other distortions can lead precisely to the situation where one ends up just
confirming what one thought and felt anyway. The point of real aesthetic experience,
though, is surely that it should take one somewhere else, not just to where one has
already been or already is.
Does this mean, then, that the revelation of the history of patriarchy manifest, for
example, in Western drama from the Oresteia, to Strindberg’s The Father and beyond,
a history which was almost wholly invisible until the emergence of feminist criticism,
is missing the aesthetic point of these monuments of Western culture, and so should
give way to more traditional approaches? I don’t think so. Such readings have opened
up a new world which would have remained unarticulated without the perspectives
they revealed in these texts. Crucially, though, such perspectives did not need to be
forcibly imposed on the texts: they emerge from a new interpretation of the structu-
ral tensions in the texts that form part of their aesthetic power. Does the revelation of
the patriarchal assumptions of the Oresteia, where the myth of Athene being born
without a mother is blatantly invoked to reveal the primacy of the male, take away
from the fact that the trilogy has a unique power to convey the trauma involved in
the transition from one social order to another, however unjust we may find both the
orders in question? The patriarchal assumptions may be repellent, but many attitudes
apparent in works of art, like the questionable aspects of the work of Richard Wagner,
repel us, without our assuming we therefore already know more than what such art
can convey. If art is, then, in Heidegger’s terms, a form of ‘world-disclosure’, critical
readings that show new and problematic dimensions of a work can form an essential
part of what that art is.
What I am saying might, though, seem now to leave the door open for a lazy plu-
ralism, in which the Oresteia is just as good for explaining patriarchy to a class as any-
thing else, so that the same might be achieved in cultural studies by examples from a
TV soap. If we wanted to read the Oresteia in the perspective of the history of
Athenian justice, then that would be fine as well. It all depends on what one is trying
to do: the circularity of interpretation will always mean that one gets results relating
to what one started out looking for. In certain respects this pluralism, like the circu-
lar structure of interpretation, is inescapable. As a result of the growth of theoretical
reflection the humanities have developed new perspectives which make it more and
more clear that the idea of finding a definitive method for approaching any aspect of
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culture is simply mistaken. The tools we need for one kind of task may be of little use
for another, and each may be of great value in their own realm of application.
However, this leaves two issues wide open, and they are hardly negligible ones. Indeed,
they go to the heart of questions about value and communication that are at the core
of the humanities.
First, there are unavoidable and fundamental clashes between the tools for differ-
ing tasks, such as those for literary biography based on authorial intention, and those
for analysis of discourse based on the primacy of linguistic and literary resources
before those writing within them. Where do we go to negotiate such clashes? Cultural
judgement has not least to come to terms with the fact that the modern world has
shown there are an indefinite number of different ways of approaching cultural prod-
ucts. The crucial issue is, then, how we are to arrive at the ability to choose approaches
which are most revelatory and most productive. This, as we shall see, is one of the
decisive questions in the history of aesthetics, and is the core of the justification for
making the humanities central to education. Second, the critical revelation of the
failure of cultural artefacts to live up to the normative demands of the present pre-
sumably reaches a limit when that revelation has been achieved. This limit, though,
forces one to ask what such an approach is to undertake next, and to ask what the
value of this could be. It can, of course, also be that this revelation itself has a hidden
repressive aspect. Might criticism based on the critique of ideology actually obscure
the potential political import of a work by blocking off responses to that work which
might enable the reader/listener/viewer to develop new horizons not countenanced
by a view which seeks to make art the location of ideological unmasking? Although
we should always attempt to police our awareness of the possible repressive conse-
quences of how we speak and of what we value, there must also be a place for creative
exploration of the things that positively make our lives more meaningful, without
which we would be immeasurably impoverished. It is this possibility which seems to
be missing from so much ‘knowing’ theory that wishes to unmask its object. The great
pianist Artur Schnabel talked of music that is better than it can ever be played, and
the same can apply to texts which transcend the ways in which they come to be read.6
A tension emerges at this point, though, which is paradigmatically manifest in the
work of T. W. Adorno. Is it not a form of self-deception to concentrate on the value
of aesthetic ‘appearance’,7 if the task should be to make the real world itself more tol-
erable and humane? The basic problem in Adorno emerges from the conflict between
the need for a negative critical perspective which suspects an ‘affirmative’ culture of
complicity in the ills of the modern world, and the need for affirmative resources if
motivation for change of all kinds, from the political to the personal, is to be gener-
ated. This leads him into paradigmatic difficulties, which reveal much about why aes-
thetics has been such a contentious area of recent debate. When Adorno claims, for
example, that ‘The aesthetic totality is the antithesis of the untrue totality’, his asser-
tion depends upon there being a wholesale opposition between the state of a world
seen in the light of the Holocaust and of the continuing dominance of capitalist
exploitation, and the genuine work of art.8 It is not, though, that the beauty of the
work is per se a criticism of the essentially ugly nature of the commodified world. This
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is because, for Adorno, the kind of beauty which manages to be both expressive and
formally integrated, in the manner of the great tonal works of music, from Bach to
Mahler, is now almost certain to have been appropriated by the culture industry.
Adorno is therefore led to an implausible elevation of certain works of aesthetic mod-
ernism – such as those of Kafka or Schoenberg – to being virtually the only source of
non-deluded insight into a ‘reified’ reality. This, of course, makes the status of his own
theoretical claims problematic: do the artworks need his philosophy, or is it vice versa?
Now the difficulties in Adorno are of a quite specific nature, stemming from his
totalising verdict on the effects of commodification on modern culture. This verdict
leads to the idea of a world where repressive identification, the reduction of things to
the ways they can be manipulated for human purposes that is most obviously present
in the commodity form, is the key to the most significant problems of modernity. He
consequently adverts to what cannot be construed in these terms, which he thinks is
manifest in the work of artists who, by refusing to be seduced by instrumental and
commercial aims, engage most fully with the immanent problems and demands of
their materials. Adorno’s present growing popularity seems, though, to depend in part
on the fact that some of his assumptions coincide with certain aspects of other theo-
rists of the kind touched on above, who, unlike Adorno, are suspicious of the aesthetic
dimension in any positive sense, and who at the same time, like Adorno, are distrust-
ful of the ways in which thinking functions in terms of reductive identification. The
question which arises here is the following. Given both that a major aspect of think-
ing in the aesthetic tradition from Kant onwards is a concern with irreducible partic-
ularity, and that an idea often adduced by many recent theorists is the danger of
repressing ‘alterity’, why is a concern with aesthetic experience so questionable in
certain influential areas of the contemporary humanities?
A great deal depends here on the kind of story about the history of aesthetics one
tells, and on how that story informs the development of contemporary theoretical
assumptions. It seems clear to me that the stories which have dominated some theo-
retical debate rely upon a too limited conception of the history of aesthetics, as well
as on questionable assumptions about the nature and role of art. This is not least
because some of the notions most frequently employed in theories concerned to
unmask the aesthetic in fact rely on ideas that emerged as part of the history of aes-
thetic theory. Let us go back to the question of judgement, which involves a series of
revealing problems in this respect.
One of the assumptions of traditional literary or other artistic education is that its
job is to promote the development of people’s ability to judge well, a skill which is part
of being able to live well. The reasons why the development of skill in judging is both
so important and so tricky were shown by Kant. In any judgement about something
in the world one is confronted with a dilemma which has no solution that can be for-
mulated algorithmically. Even in cognitive judgements one has to be able to make a
move from the particular empirical manifestation one is examining to subsuming that
manifestation under a rule which identifies it. There can be no rule for doing this,
though, because one would get into a regress of the rule for the rule for the rule, etc.,
and thus could never judge at all. Finding the general rule for a particular always
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entails the ability to eliminate an indefinite number of possible applicable rules, most
of which will be actually irrelevant, but none of which can just be excluded a priori.
We are often able successfully to apply rules because our unthematised background
knowledge somehow already excludes most of what is irrelevant.9 This is why robots
can have such trouble in performing many tasks we find simple: if one tries to codify
background knowledge algorithmically one just adds even more rules, thus making
the task more and more difficult. For Kant judgement involves the active capacity of
the subject to make choices which are not necessitated and thus cannot be reduced to
a method.10 Kant’s account of aesthetic experience develops from his general account
of the nature of judgement, and the implications of his account of the relationship
between the two are too often ignored in contemporary theory in the humanities.
Arriving at new knowledge depends precisely on the ability to bring a series of
different particular phenomena under a new rule which specifies what makes them
identical. It is a commonplace of theory of the kind developed by Adorno that this
ability can function repressively. In an essay of the early 1930s, ‘Theses on the lan-
guage of the philosopher’, for example, Adorno ponders the issue which Kant is trying
to solve in his epistemology, namely how an empirically infinitely diverse world can
be brought under unifying rules. The danger, as Adorno sees it, is that the forms of
identity employed for this unification will be inherently reductive, because they will
depend, as Kant claims, on the functioning of the thinking subject: ‘If multiplicity’s
unity is subjectively impressed on it as form, such form is necessarily thought of as
separable from the content.’11 The ‘content’ is therefore what these days is seen in
terms of ‘alterity’, and Adorno is concerned precisely with the ‘non-identical’ aspects
of that content, which are threatened in a world where rule-bound judgements are
increasingly the basis for the functioning of all levels of society. The danger of reduc-
tive identification is therefore inherent in the nature of the subject, which seeks to
control the world by imposing forms of identity on a world of irreducible difference.12
The problem is that the search for identity can easily become irrational, invading areas
where it has no place. The sort of thing Adorno means is apparent in gender, racial
and other kinds of stereotyping (though he sometimes, for example in the really
hyperbolic passages of Dialectic of Enlightenment, extends it to theorising in the
natural sciences, which is more problematic).
Like Lacan, Derrida and others, Adorno insists that the subject depends on a lan-
guage which is not wholly in its power. For Adorno this language is itself in part the
product of the repressive history of the subject’s attempt to dominate the other. The
crucial point here is that the subject’s self-transparency, upon which its aim of control
is based, is always a delusion. In the 1933 book on Kierkegaard Adorno claims that,
‘If language is the form of communication of pure subjectivity and at the same time
paradoxically presents itself as historically objective, then, in language, objectless
inwardness [which is supposed by Kierkegaard to constitute the subject’s resistance to
transient external historical developments] is reached by the external dialectic’.13
Language therefore subverts the sense in which the subject can sustain itself as a pure
origin against the objective pressure of the world. How, then, does this relate to the
Kantian questions about judgement?14
74 Positions
The most important thing in the present context is that Kant thought aesthetic
experience was made possible by the fact that even cognitive judgement is, for the
reasons we saw above, not necessitated. We can therefore engage in a ‘free play’ of
judgement when we do not attempt to determine the object conceptually, but instead
allow our ability to judge in differing ways to work of its own accord. He regards the
capacity for aesthetic appreciation which this makes possible as a self-justifying aspect
of our existence, and he sees it as contributing to the development of our ability to
judge well in cognitive and other contexts. Such appreciation is, it is important to
remember, not based on the mere pleasure of a stimulus. Kant already insists in
1769–70 that ‘Contemplation of beauty is a judgement, and not a pleasure’, and the
aim of such judgement is to reach universal agreement, despite the inherently partic-
ular nature of aesthetic experience.15 The essential issue here lies, then, in the relation-
ship between aesthetic experience’s reliance on the idea of the activity of the subject,
and Adorno’s concern with the extent to which the subject functions within linguis-
tic and other constraints. These constraints are more powerful than the subject and
may not be transparent to it, even though they have been generated in the history of
the self-preservation of the species which makes the individual’s existence possible.
Kant’s aim of universality in aesthetic judgement depends, then, on the freedom
of the subject which seeks a community of agreement with others in relation to its
affective and other responses to art and natural beauty. For Adorno universality, in
contrast, is precisely likely to be the result of objective pressures for conformity of the
kind which recent theory analyses in terms of the repression of the other. The source
of such repression is at least in part linguistic, in the form of the prejudices built into
particular discourses by the circumstances of their development. Adorno’s subject may
think it is free, but it is in fact always already formed by such objective pressures. The
question is, though, whether a wholesale rejection of what Kant intended does not
obviate the point of the critical perspective that gives rise to the rejection. If there is
no access to what could be understood in some way as taking us beyond our being
determined by objective social pressures, the sense that these pressures are a problem
at all becomes hard to understand.
In its extreme versions Adorno’s position therefore seems to lead to a kind of neg-
ative aesthetic theology. Only art which is so uncompromising that it could not pos-
sibly be thought of as commanding any kind of consensus in contemporary society
can be true to the historical situation after Auschwitz. In analogous manner, the sort
of ‘knowing’ theory cited by Rorty leads to a farewell to art as a source of insight or
pleasure of a kind that theory cannot provide. This leaves one wondering, though,
what the culture that would emerge if the critique were successful could possibly look
like, once the cleansing of illusions is complete. How can one aspire to something
which seems to have so little positive content? In both cases the model of the subject
involved in the theory seems to be predicated to such an extent on what Adorno terms
the ‘primacy of the objective’, the determining power of the world over the subject,
that the aim of opposing this primacy itself appears illusory.
One significant part of the tradition of aesthetic thinking that concerns me here
seeks to understand what possibilities there can be for the modern subject in a world
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where objective pressures of all kinds do indeed continually increase. Adorno is char-
acteristically ambiguous on this issue. He himself offers a more illuminating way of
addressing the problem of the modern subject than is available in the parts of his work
which repeat the ideas of Dialectic of Enlightenment, in the tension he identifies
between ‘expression’ and ‘convention’ in modern art. The difficulty for modern artists
lies, Adorno argues, in the fact that, as the means of expression are expanded, the space
for individual innovation diminishes, because in time live resources for articulation
will necessarily become mere conventions.16 The Western traditions of modern liter-
ature, music or visual art offer exemplary models of the playing out of this dialectic,
and the best aesthetic theory shows how vital it is to the understanding of modern
culture.
My worry is that we seem to be in danger of losing sight of the exemplary nature
of those traditions, and of the theoretical reflections that accompanied them. Culture
thrives on critical judgement, and criticism needs models which, without becoming
fetishised, can reveal the deficiencies of inferior cultural production. If such models
are neglected, in favour of other critical and ideological aims, or of the attempt, in the
name of avoiding elitism, to elevate the merely local to the measure of what is cultu-
rally valid, the endeavours of those who sought to expand our means of articulation
by both assimilating and transcending the weight of objective cultural pressure are
devalued.17 The likely result of this neglect is a self-deceiving, narcissistic relationship
to culture, in which what Novalis termed the ‘aesthetic imperative’ of seeking to tran-
scend one’s limits by doing justice to major works of art is forgotten. It is important
to remember here that the undoubted elitism that may, for example, have affected the
reception of ‘high’ culture in the nineteenth century cannot, in a Western world where
the best cultural products are widely available in affordable form via mass reproduc-
tion, just be transferred to the present. The way in which such elitism continues is
now more likely to be through the failure to provide the right kind of access to great
culture in education. The danger here, of course, is that ‘knowing’ theory may lead to
such access no longer being regarded as a pedagogical priority.
How the development of the kinds of attitude which are merely suspicious of the
Western tradition of art affects contemporary Western society cannot be adequately
understood in the short term. However, the spread of theories in recent times which
seem to depend on cultural amnesia and on the narcissism of seeking confirmation of
prejudices rather than openness to the way great works can take one beyond one’s prej-
udices may be a sign of deeper cultural problems. The reason why can be suggested
by another aspect of the aesthetic tradition which begins with Kant. This is the
demand that one legitimate to others one’s judgement about cultural products which
can reflect the most intimate dimensions of oneself. It is not, as is too often claimed,
that the attempt to arrive at a sensus communis is something actually achievable (even
if Kant himself seemed to think it might be a way of at least symbolically revealing
our shared ‘intelligible’ nature). The real point is that there can be no definitive way
of concretely achieving such a consensus, even though it can remain a unifying point
of orientation. The idea of consensus must instead, then, remain a ‘regulative idea’,
not an achievable state of affairs.18
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We acknowledge the legitimacy of this idea if we are prepared to engage in dia-
logue about cultural experience in which our own particular judgements must be
regarded as both inherently fallible and yet not merely arbitrary. The key to this aspect
of the aesthetic has best been described by Stanley Cavell, when he claims: ‘It is essen-
tial in making an aesthetic judgement that at some point we be prepared to say in its
support: don’t you see, don’t you hear, don’t you dig? . . . Because if you do not see
something, without explanation, then there is nothing further to discuss’.19 Without
the possibility of a shared level of appreciation which cannot be theorised, the point
of aesthetic judgement dissolves. We may not empirically get to this shared level, but
the important thing is the possibility of appealing to it. This combination of the need
for legitimation with the realisation that such legitimation relies on an appeal to some-
thing which cannot be definitively established also means that what is most essential
about aesthetics is immune to arguments which associate it with the repression or
denial of difference. At the same time, it should be remembered that the ‘non-
identical’ aspect of aesthetic experience, its resistance to explanation, would be mere
mystification without the attempt to render it more generally accessible through crit-
ical dialogue and the development of cultural communication.
Now it is important to be clear at this point that I am not in any way claiming that
the developments in the recent theory and practice of literary and cultural studies,
which have, for example, led to attention to what was excluded by the dominant
Western critical canon – women’s writing, writing by cultural and ethnic minorities,
etc. – have been mistaken. These have led to a whole series of new and exciting per-
spectives which have had important social and political effects. To the extent to which
aesthetic thinking contributed to the exclusion of works and aesthetic practices from
cultures or from groups of people not previously endorsed by Western academic
culture, a critique of ‘aesthetics’ is clearly justified in the name of what it has excluded.
It is vital, however, that the standards of achievement set by the greatest works – stan-
dards which are testified to by their offering semantic potential in ever new contexts
– can still come into the evaluation of what had been excluded. This should, though,
not preclude a rejection of those standards if they are inadequate to the new object’s
capacity for changing perceptions of what is aesthetically valid.20 It does seem odd,
then, in the context of reflections on the ethnocentric nature of some of what resulted
from aesthetic thinking, that aesthetics as a whole has often got such a bad name. The
idea that someone like Friedrich Schlegel, for example, who effectively invented
serious literary history and who had a immense cosmopolitan awareness of world lit-
erature, as well as being a groundbreaking aesthetic thinker, could be seen as part of
a problematic tradition, is indefensible. The real question, of course, as I suggested
above, is which tradition of aesthetics is at issue.21
One answer to the question of how the traditions of aesthetics are often conceived
is the (questionable) philosophical story common to Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida,
Lyotard, in some respects Adorno, and others. In this story modernity is seen as
dependent on the idea that the ‘certainty of all being and all truth is founded on the
self-consciousness of the single ego: ego cogito ergo sum’ (Heidegger), and this has too
often been used to characterise ‘aesthetics’ as well. The link to aesthetics from the
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philosophical story of the domination of being by the subject in science and technol-
ogy is often made via the idea that art becomes reduced to something dependent
upon the contingent individual feeling of the subject. One way of subverting this
view of the subject as the source of judgement is, as we have seen, to show how the
language in which it makes its judgements is prior to it. Another way, proposed by
Gadamer in particular, is to claim that the real significance of art results from its
transcendence of its reception and its revealing a truth beyond the subject: ‘The
“subject” of the experience of art, that which remains and persists, is not the subjec-
tivity of the person who experiences it, but the work of art itself.’22 Clearly the arbi-
trary and contingent nature of individual aesthetic production and reception – where
one sleeps through some vital part of the play or the symphony, or is not ‘feeling right’
for the work in question – is not the basis of serious understanding of art’s signifi-
cance. Whether this means one should therefore exclude consideration of the subject
in the manner Gadamer does is, however, questionable. It is only if one thinks that
the history of thinking about the subject is a history in which the subject is univer-
sally regarded as the philosophical foundation for grasping the nature of the truth of
modernity that such an extreme option has to be adopted.
It is surprising how many contemporary theoretical positions tacitly or uncon-
sciously adopt some of this kind of account. The power of the account is obvious:
the theory wave in the humanities has made many people aware of the potential for
self-deception inherent in the ways we think about culture. This potential derives
particularly from the failure to see the extent to which subjects are what they are both
because of objective pressures and because they are not the masters of their language.
However, ‘theory’ has also tended to overplay the extent to which we can gain higher
insight into those deceptions by locating them as part of linguistic and other prac-
tices that connect, for example, to the exercise of power in society or to commercial
pressures. What is missing in such approaches can be illustrated by consideration of
two related topics which have played a very subordinate role in recent theory. A major
factor in the rise of aesthetic theory is the change in the status of music during the
second half of the eighteenth century. Related to this is the re-evaluation of the nature
of ‘feeling’ that takes place in the same period, which is also linked to the emergence
of the discipline of aesthetics. If, as some people begin to do at this time, one makes
music into the art which is the key to understanding all art, one has, of course,
already precluded a wholesale subordination of the aesthetic to ideology. Music’s
non-representational status does not allow one to make direct inferences to ideolog-
ical matters. This does not mean that music, and, above all, talk about music, cannot
be ideological. They evidently can: all art is situated in social contexts that involve
links between cultural production and mechanisms of power. What matters, though,
is the realisation that there are dimensions of cultural articulation which transcend
what we can say about them, which are not necessarily usable for ideological pur-
poses, and which are crucially connected to the ways we try to understand ourselves
as subjects. Although music’s transcendence of the sayable has too often been used as
a means of fetishising art, it is a mistake therefore to assume that the only possibility
for the critic is to unmask mystifications, rather than reveal the ways in which music
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and, by extension, other art can bring us up against the limits of more discursive
forms of articulation.
Suspicion of discussion about feeling is these days usually directed towards the fact
that feeling is linguistically and symbolically mediated. However, this does not mean
that feeling is wholly articulated by the symbolic forms we habitually employ. The
motor of new articulation in modernity is often the sense that, in Adorno’s terms, con-
vention has taken over from expression, and that new expression is demanded by what
cannot adequately be conveyed by existing means. Anthony Cascardi suggests in rela-
tion to Kant’s Critique of Judgement that ‘Feeling . . . remains cognitive in a deeper
sense; affect possesses what Heidegger would describe . . . as “world-disclosive”
power’.23 There is, as Cascardi indicates, an important sense in which insistence on
the ‘mediated’ nature of feelings – on the idea that they rely on what can be stated
propositionally – gets things the wrong way round. Kant says that ‘The general valid-
ity of pleasure [in beauty] and yet not via concepts but in intuition is what is difficult’
in giving an account of aesthetics.24 Kant’s concentration on pleasure here and else-
where is admittedly too limiting: the point can better be made in terms of the valid-
ity of world-disclosure through feeling. The important point is, though, that if
aesthetic validity were of the kind that is arrived at via conceptual agreement, feelings
would be reducible to the kind of consensus that is possible in conceptual judgements,
and this would obviate the point of the aesthetic. Part of the motivation behind
Adorno’s work is that he thinks that the point of the aesthetic is being obviated in
many aspects of modern culture. Much of the culture industry, as he claims, does rely
upon the schematisation of feelings into standardised forms which are then provided
for by that industry. To the extent that views based on the primacy of ideological aims
try to reduce art to what is already known or felt in some other respect, they can actu-
ally conspire with this situation.
Modernity need not, then, be understood merely in terms of the reduction of feel-
ings to standardised forms. The explosion of expressive resources in the music com-
posed from the period during which aesthetics emerged at the end of the eighteenth
century onwards is a striking illustration of the importance to modernity of forms of
articulation which transcend what can be conceptually grasped. The decisive aspect
of this explosion is that it involves a two-way relationship between the subject and the
forms of expression. The new music both gives rise to new forms of feeling and is a
result of the changed self-understanding of those who produce and listen to it. These
two aspects cannot be methodologically separated. The subject is on the one hand
subjected to existent forms of articulation, and at the same time can refashion these
forms to signify something which they previously did not signify. Establishing where
one aspect stops and the other begins demands the kind of separation between scheme
and content which more and more recent philosophy rejects as a misapprehension of
the nature of our being in the world. The account of the subject as the self-deceiving
locus of attempted domination of the other is, when looked at in relation to the best
aspects of the traditions of aesthetics and modern art, only part of a much more
complex story. One of the reasons why so much recent theory, in which music plays
a minimal role, is prone to misjudge aesthetic issues lies, then, precisely in its failure
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to appreciate the significance of the non-conceptual form of music for any account of
the subject. The best Romantic aesthetic theory, from Hölderlin to Schlegel and
Schleiermacher, regards the essential issue for us as subjects as our failure to be trans-
parent to ourselves, and sees aesthetic production and reception as means of coming
to terms with the divided nature of the self, not as another way in which the world is
reduced to the measure of the human. In this view the aesthetic is a resource for crit-
ical self-transcendence, rather than always being the location of self-deception.25
To conclude: I think there is actually a significant political point to this opposition
between theoretical attitudes to the aesthetic. One of the oft-repeated recent worries
about theory in the humanities has concerned the growing distance of theorising
about art from what non-academic performers, readers, listeners and spectators value
when they engage with art. This worry can be use to hide a merely reactionary attempt
to re-establish the status quo, which does not bother to ponder why that status quo
came under such attack, and this is not what interests me. How, though, might we
arrive at a more effective division of intellectual labour, one which does not lose sight
of the reasons for which we might have engaged in the first place with the works about
which we theorise? These reasons are, of course, the kind of reasons which move
anyone to engage with art. The real challenge is, then, to steer a course between mere
theoretical ‘knowingness’ and mere unreflective aesthetic enjoyment. There is no way
of mapping out such a course in advance: my claim is simply that the balance has in
recent times moved too far in the direction of knowingness, and this has been reflected
in some of the theories that have become decisive for many humanities subjects.
Although we should keep in mind the worry which permeates the Kafka story with
which we began, the worry that there is nothing ultimately significant about art, we
still need to take into account the fact that through that very worry Kafka wrote texts
which far transcend the texts of writers who were convinced that what they were
writing was art. A combination of critical self-doubt with the intuitive sense that there
can always be another, perhaps better, way of articulating what concerns us seems to
me characteristic of the best we can learn from the traditions of aesthetic theory and
from the art to which they were the accompaniment. The contemporary tendency to
argue as though we were already in a situation where we know what comes after art
precludes such a combination. Contemporary aesthetic production may be more
decentred, and the era of the great works may for that reason even belong to the past,
but that is not a reason to underestimate what great works do that nothing else can.
Perhaps, then, we are not reaching the end of the significance of great art from the
Western traditions, but are instead only at a point where some of the academic world
seems to have lost sight of just how significant that art may still be.
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5 Simon Malpas
Touching art: aesthetics, fragmentation 
and community
Art has hitherto been considered, in all possible ways, in terms of both ‘creation’ (poiesis,
genius, and so on) and ‘reception’ (judgement, critique, and so on). But what is left in
the shadows is its befalling or devolving, that is to say, also its chance, event, birth, or
encounter – which, in other terminologies, has been called the ‘shock’, ‘touch’,
‘emotion’, or ‘pleasure’, and which participates indissociably in both ‘creation’ and
‘reception’.1
Throughout the history of literary and art criticism the focus has fallen, as Jean-Luc
Nancy argues, on the creation or reception of works and texts. Theories of genius,
authorial psychology and the material or historical conditions of production have
revalued the creative processes that give rise to art in a range of different ways. Equally,
important questions about reception that deal with notions of canonicity, ideology
and the construction of subjectivities in texts have been generated by critical move-
ments that seek to investigate the politics of literature, art and culture. Stripped down
to a minimal point, however, the question of art’s immediate impact (what Nancy
refers to as its ‘shock’ or ‘touch’) remains a space for thinking a politics of the aesthetic
that might helpfully be explored. Art has always been political: emerging from a given
community, it comments on the identities, needs and desires of sections of its
members, and criticism seeks in a variety of ways to uncover the modes in which those
issues are generated by the work or text. The danger with some approaches to the
work, however, is that they sideline its particularity as art, treating it as just one more
commodity in cultural circulation and thereby eliding its specific transformative
potential. The focus here will be to think the specificity of the aesthetic processes by
which works and texts come to raise questions about the nature of community, and
hence of the political problems of our being in common. The key question, then, is
what is it that is particular to the work of art that raises the question of community?
The aim of this chapter is to begin to open a space for the investigation of the place
of the aesthetic in the contemporary world. It will take as its object the notion of the
artistic fragment that emerges within modernity, and consider the ways in which
modern art functions as a fragmentary form.
The relationship between art, fragmentation and modernity is summed up suc-
cinctly by Theodor Adorno:
Ever since Beethoven’s last works those artists who pushed integration to an extreme have
mobilised disintegration. The truth content of art, whose organon was integration, turns
against art and in this turn art has its emphatic moments. Artists discover the compul-
sion toward disintegration. . . . The category of the fragmentary – which has its locus
here – is not to be confused with the category of contingent particularity: The fragment
is that part of the totality of the work that opposes totality.2
The art of modernity mobilises disintegration: in the drive to completion and closure,
it opens itself to its own fragmentation not as a contingent factor pointing to its lack
of completion, but essentially – as a constituent moment in its drive toward self-
integration. Throughout modernity there have been numerous movements of aes-
thetic thought that have approached art and literature in terms of this fragmentary
status. Since the Romantic period, art has been conceived over and again in terms of
the challenges it poses for attempts to construct the world as a systematically ordered
totality. This disruptive potential tends to be derived from the ways in which artistic
fragmentation is posited as a disturbance of or challenge to the closure and comple-
tion of systems of thought or politics. On this reading, the work of art or literature is
irreducible to critical, political or cultural explanation or assimilation – it always has
the potential to signify more than can be summed up in a single reading or analysis –
and yet it remains indissociable from, and opens questions about, the social space
within which it appears. In this respect, Adorno’s formulation of art’s problematic
autonomy helpfully captures the disruptive relations obtaining between art, the
empirical world and historical specificity: art, he argues, ‘harbours what is empirically
existing in its own substance. . . . Even the most sublime artwork takes up a determi-
nate attitude to empirical reality by stepping outside of the constraining spell it casts,
not once and for all, but rather ever and again, concretely, unconsciously polemical to
this spell at each historical moment’.3 Art is not constrained by the structures of the
actual, but figures and refigures actuality by taking it as a point of departure for aes-
thetic production. It is not, however, a separate realm cut off from the world, but
rather acts as a potential site for a continually changing disturbance of the conceptu-
alisation of the actual in particular historical circumstances. Aesthetic representation
generates a moment in which reflection can begin because of the way its presentation
estranges, disrupts and fragments the actual. But in what might this fragmentary aes-
thetic excess consist? And how might it be able to mobilise a critique of contemporary
systems of thought, culture or politics? By tracing a genealogy of this fragmentation
in the writings of Friedrich Schlegel and the critique launched against it by G. W. F.
Hegel, this chapter will identify a fragmentary Romantic residue in contemporary aes-
thetics. It will argue that the issues that are at stake in the disagreement between these
two key thinkers have not passed away into history but continue to provoke the most
profound questions about the value and role that art holds for us now.
Modernity and fragmentation
The notion of the fragmentary artwork first comes to gain a modern formulation in
the literature and thought of the Romantic period. According to Philippe Lacoue-
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Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, the fragment opens up a space at the limits of modern
politico-philosophical systematisation:
in the very same moment and gesture of fragmentation, the fragment both is and is not
System. . . . This same gesture, which is simply the writing of the fragment, conse-
quently serves to subtract this fragment from the Work, within the continually renewed
ambiguity of the small work of art, thus serving, in sum, to fragment the fragment . . .
and in this respect it is legitimate to recognize in romanticism’s specificity a kind of per-
sistence or resistance, within idealism, of at least an element of the Kantian notion of
finitude.4
For the Jena Romantics who set out the first definitions of the Romantic fragment,
the totality to be challenged was that presented by idealist philosophy, which found
its most comprehensive articulation in the work of Hegel. In the journal Athenaeum,
published between 1798 and 1800, the concept of the fragment and its problemat-
isation of systematic philosophy are worked out. In Athenaeum fragment 116,
Friedrich Schlegel posits Romantic poetry as a ‘progressive universal poetry’: an art
that aims to ‘mix and fuse poetry and prose, inspiration and criticism, the poetry of
art and the poetry of nature’.5 This idea of poetry, in which it both strives to become
a ‘mirror of the whole circumstances of the world, an image of the age’ and yet also
‘hover[s] at the midpoint between the portrayed and the portrayer, free of all real and
ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection’, figures the notion of the aesthetic
as unbounded fragment.6 Beneath what may appear to modern ears as somewhat
overblown rhetoric is a sense of the poetic that transcends generic identification and
closure, and opens up a space for aesthetic self-reflection, analysis and critique. This
aesthetic (and for Schlegel poetry is the supreme moment of aesthetics) is impossible
to pin down and define, to grasp in a particular passage or figure from a poem, text
or work but rather in Schlegel’s formulation is caught up in a continual process of
contextual transformation:
The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real
essence: that it should forever be becoming and never perfected. It can be exhausted by
no theory and only a divinatory criticism would dare try to characterise its ideal. It alone
is infinite, just as it alone is free. . . . The romantic kind of poetry is the only one that is
more than a kind, that is, as it were, poetry itself.7
The explicit notion presented here is that because of its resistance to subsumption
under a system of critique, poetry assumes a state of constant becoming: ‘free’ and
‘infinite’, it is open to continual rereading and reconfiguration by the discourses that
approach it. Never completed or perfected, the poetic fragment is orientated towards
future readings and new openings: as Schlegel states in ‘Ideas’ 48, ‘Where philosophy
stops, poetry has to begin’.8 Because it is inexhaustible by critique, and impossible to
fix with a single meaning, poetry transcends any present critical reading or philosoph-
ical definition and gestures towards a future different from what is currently the case.
In contrast to Schlegel’s valorisation of a poetry and aesthetic of the future, Hegel’s
Aesthetics is premised on the ‘pastness’ of art. Coincident with the arrival of specula-
tive modernity, he argues that philosophical reason has become the key means by
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which the issues and challenges facing the world can be approached, and that this
marks the ‘end of art’:
just as art has its ‘before’ in nature and the finite spheres of life, so too it has an ‘after’,
i.e. a region which in turn transcends art’s way of apprehending and representing the
Absolute. For art has still a limit in itself and therefore passes over into higher forms of
consciousness. This limitation determines, after all, the position which we are accus-
tomed to assign to art in our contemporary life. For us art counts no longer as the highest
mode in which truth fashions an existence for itself . . . With the advance of civilization
a time generally comes in the case of every people when art points beyond itself.9
Because, according to Hegel, art’s vocation is to ‘unveil the truth in the form of sen-
suous artistic configuration’, the emergence of a modern consciousness from the
increasingly technological, scientific and philosophical understanding of the world
developed during the Enlightenment produces a modern culture in which art’s sen-
suous presentations can no longer fully grasp and present the complexities of the life-
world, and it therefore ceases to be able to provide a guide for thought and action.10
Modernity, in this respect, appears ‘after art’; it represents itself as the ‘after’ of art, the
point at which art’s self-transcendence into philosophy has become necessary. It is the
age in which art can no longer play the role it had hitherto undertaken for society:
because art can only present the ‘outward’ or ‘sensuous’ form of the Absolute, and with
the advance in Spirit that is marked by modernity, ‘there dwells in the spirit the need
to satisfy itself solely in its own inner self as the true form for truth to take’.11 Yet, the
‘end of art’ does not mean that no more works are created. Instead of disappearing or
becoming nothing more than the heritage of a bygone age, art, in Hegel’s slightly
strange formulation, ‘points beyond itself ’.
Hegel’s description of the meaning of art’s ‘pointing beyond itself ’ that follows the
occurrence of the phrase in the ‘Introduction’ to the Aesthetics repeats his argument
in the Phenomenology which states that Spirit simply moves beyond art to dialectical
reason and philosophy. Thus, Hegel states quite simply that, although one ‘may well
hope that art will always rise higher and come to perfection . . . the form of art has
ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit’.12 Art is surpassed as a means of generat-
ing truth: sublated in the movement of dialectical speculation it becomes just another
one of the ‘Particular interests’ that are ‘destroyed in the process’ of ‘conflict and
destruction’ from which reason and the Absolute emerge.13
Modernity’s art is thus effectively excluded from the speculative system: it is sur-
passed as a ‘way of apprehending and representing the Absolute’ and thereby, in Jay
Bernstein’s words, ‘loses its capacity to speak the truth concerning our most funda-
mental categorical engagements and commitments’.14 In short, art ‘falls out’ of phi-
losophy as it ceases to be the ‘supreme need’ of the new spirit of the age. Yet, this
‘falling out’ seems to contradict a cardinal rule of Hegel’s system because in the move-
ment of the dialectic nothing is beyond speculation, and therefore philosophy must
have no remainder, must leave no ‘fall out’. Lacoue-Labarthe identifies this apparently
contradictory state of affairs in the following terms in an essay on Hegel and German
Romanticism:
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Philosophical discourse excludes nothing, especially not what it represents to itself as
being of an ‘order’ not its own. And even when it attempts to exclude (if it ever wants
to), its ‘sublating’ power is such that what is excluded never fails to return, so that not
only must philosophy negotiate with it, but it can also claim it, (re)adopt it, or even, at
the limit, pride itself on it. Philosophy divides, decides, and criticizes: but what it severs,
it also constitutes on both sides, and the whole as such (be it rearranged) returns – in all
senses – to philosophy.15
Thus, despite Hegel’s gesture of setting art free from the search for truth, it ‘returns’
to haunt philosophical modernity, sucked back into the vortex of speculation by the
force of the movement of dialectical negation. What Lacoue-Labarthe calls Hegel’s
‘gigantic “war machine” directed against aesthetics in general’ fails both to eliminate
art and to exclude it from systematic thought.16
When Hegel returns to the problem of the ‘end of art’ later in the Aesthetics, he
seems to recognise as much, and the meaning given to art’s ‘pointing beyond itself ’
changes significantly:
in this self-transcendence art is nevertheless a withdrawal of man into himself, a descent
into his own breast, whereby art strips away from itself all fixed restriction to a specific
range of content and treatment, and makes Humanus its new holy of holies: i.e. the
depths and heights of the human heart as such, mankind in its joys and sorrows, its striv-
ings, deeds, and fates. . . . This is a subject-matter which does not remain determined
artistically in itself and on its own account; on the contrary, the specific character of the
topic and its outward formation is left to capricious invention, yet no interest is
excluded.17
In this formulation of the ‘beyond’, art, in ceasing to be the ‘sensuous revelation of
truth’ comes to figure a ‘withdrawal of man into himself ’: the human subject replaces
‘the Divine [as] the absolute subject-matter of art’, and, as such, ceases to be truly
Absolute.18 The implication of Hegel’s argument here points to another sense of artis-
tic fragmentation: for pre-modern societies, art figured the divine essence of a com-
munity (the Egyptian temple, Greek statuary, and so on), but that divine essence is
no longer available for sensuous presentation and so art’s figuring is refocused on the
particularity of individual actors and ideas. Ceasing to present community as a whole,
its focus on the individual fragments the sense of its presentation of a being in
common.
Brought together, what Schlegel and Hegel formulate in their very different ways
is the end of the ‘total’ work of art: the art that encompasses the most fundamental
shared beliefs of a society, and depicts and disseminates its goals. What remains is, on
the one hand, the infinitely becoming plurality of fragments and, on the other, the
‘capricious invention’ broken off from the path of society’s progress. More than this,
though, the differences between the two thinkers point to a tension in modern aes-
thetics that opens a space for a contemporary politics of art.
Hegel’s critique of Schlegel and the Jena Romantics turns on the notion of art’s
withdrawal into subjectivity, and his most pressing condemnation of Romanticism
pinpoints its apparent grounding of the aesthetic in the subjectivity of the artist as an
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individual genius. Aside from some barbed comments about Schlegel not being a
proper philosopher but a dilettante literary critic, the key concern raised by Hegel is
that Romanticism substantialises Fichte’s formalist arguments about the dialectical
movement between the transcendental structures of the I and not-I which give rise to
knowledge. This move from a formal to a substantial I transforms Fichte’s transcen-
dental analysis into an empirical-psychological positing of the personal I of the genius
poet or artist who invents the world according to her or his own interest and caprice.
He argues that for the positing ego of the Romantic artist, ‘everything appears to it as
null and vain, except its own subjectivity, which therefore becomes hollow and empty
and itself mere vanity’.19 In other words, Hegel detects in Romanticism a focus on the
creative genius who acts as a guarantor for the work, which in turn becomes cut off
from the objective world as it explores remorselessly the joys and sorrows of the
(artist’s) human heart.
If Hegel’s critique of Romantic subjectivity and genius is accurate then it is clearly
devastating.20 The notion of a self-creating subjectivity has little currency today
outside of the realms of ultra-free-market individualism, and there is little need even
to resort to theoretical concepts such as the ‘death of the Author’ to grasp the prob-
lems that emerge here. What it does not challenge, however, is art’s futural structure:
although art no longer figures the aims and goals of social progress and has ceased to
be the key means of deploying truth and knowledge, it remains a site of disruption,
challenge and critique.
Thus the art of modernity, which, although redundant at the moment of its incep-
tion, cannot be suppressed (repressed?) by speculation but rather ‘returns – in all
senses – to philosophy’ is what Schlegelian Romanticism announces in the fragment.
Stripped by Hegel’s critique of any substantive or subjective authenticity (or genius),
the work itself retains an openness to the future. In other words, the fragment is the
art that exists on the threshold of speculative modernity: no longer able to tell the
‘truth’ in its ‘true form’ or ground itself in a governing creative genius, but not yet
excluded from thought as a medium of mere relaxation and escapism, it holds out the
possibility of difference and disturbance within systematic organisation. Appearing at
the moment of the ‘end of art’, the fragment’s attempts to ‘reveal the truth in the form
of sensuous artistic configuration’ are already outmoded from modernity’s perspective
and result only in failure. It thus exists, in Thomas McFarland’s phrase, only as ‘the
forms of ruin’, as scraps, contingencies and ‘capricious inventions’ that ‘remain broken
or indifferent to the objective world’ of philosophical modernity.21 And yet, even as
ruin, art is continually drawn back into the speculative system by the ‘sublating power’
of the dialectic. Neither inside nor outside, the aesthetic fragment exists at the limit
of the ‘Work’ of philosophical modernity, ‘completing and incompleting’ the univer-
salising movement of the speculative system which it fragments through a ‘continu-
ally renewed ambiguity of the small work of art’: the art that has come undone from
speculation’s striving after the Absolute and thus has no claim to the totalising per-
spective of a grand narrative. For this reason, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy claim that
‘what interests us in romanticism is that we still belong to the era it opened up’, and
in fact that, a ‘veritable romantic unconscious is discernible today, in most of the central
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motifs of our “modernity” ’.22 At the opposite end of modernity from Romanticism,
Adorno’s materialist thinking of the imbrication of art in the modern echoes the sense
of its fragmentary nature:
Art is modern when, by its mode of experience and as the expression of the crisis of expe-
rience, it absorbs what industrialisation has developed under the given relations of pro-
duction. This involves a negative canon, a set of prohibitions against what the modern
has disavowed in experience and technique; and such determination is virtually the
canon of what is to be done.23
Art stands out against the rationalising and industrialising drives of the modern, frag-
menting them by recapturing the techniques and experiences disavowed in the con-
tinual striving for progress and development. This, for the critics of modernity, is art’s
fundamental critical potential.
Fragmenting the fragment: contemporary aesthetics and the possibility of
community
The fragmentary space of the aesthetic opens up a vantage point from which a cri-
tique of the modern can emerge. Art thus holds the capacity to disrupt the closure of
systematic rationality, fragmenting its categories and structures. The question I want
to pose, though, is how might we think art in relation to the often-posited destruc-
tion of these modern systems? Or, in other words, what happens to the artistic frag-
ment when the world itself becomes fragmentary? In order to begin to propose an
answer to this question I want to turn now to an investigation of the work of Jean-
Luc Nancy, and particularly to his notion of the singular plural.
Recent developments such as the globalisation of capitalism, gradual loss of power
of the nation state, transformation of communications systems and fracturing of con-
sensus about social structures and values that were founded on discredited gender and
racial hierarchies have called into question the idea of a rational, progressive develop-
ment of modernity. Contemporary thought seldom strives for the systematic ration-
ality of Hegelian speculation.24 Rather, the notion of difference – whether it is
thought in terms of gender, the postcolonial, historicism or deconstruction, to name
but a few approaches – provides the structure for enquiry in the contemporary
humanities. In this sense, as thinkers such as Lyotard, Deleuze and Nancy argue, there
is no longer a ‘sense of the world’ available for thought. At the beginning of a book
that takes this phrase as its title, Nancy posits the ‘end of the world’:
There is no longer any world: no longer a mundus, a cosmos, a composed and complete
order (from) within which one might find a place, a dwelling, and the elements of an
orientation. . . . There is no longer a Spirit of the world, nor is there any history before
whose tribunal one could stand.25
For many contemporary theorists, the ‘grand narratives’ of modernity (to borrow
Lyotard’s phrase) no longer have any legitimacy when it comes to thinking and organ-
ising the world, experience and history. In this vein, Zygmunt Bauman argues that the
‘deepest meaning conveyed by the idea of globalisation is that of the indeterminate,
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unruly and self-propelled character of world affairs; the absence of a centre, of a con-
trolling desk, of a board of directors, of a managerial office’.26
In the face of the fragmentation of contemporary cultures, there is little possibil-
ity of recourse to a universal governing notion of truth or emancipation. According
to Nancy, ‘Our time is the time . . . when this [grand narrative] history has been
suspended: total war, genocide, the challenge of nuclear powers, implacable technol-
ogy, hunger, and absolute misery, all these are, at the least, evident signs of self-
destroying humanity, of self-annihilating history, without any possibility of the
dialectic work of the negative’.27 It is not that these histories are no longer being
written, or that speculative thought no longer attempts to grasp the world; rather, this
thinking no longer appears adequate to the plurality that appears in contemporary
worldhood and the fragmentation of experience in today’s cosmopolis. For Nancy, the
plurality of the contemporary presents the contemporary as the space of a radical
absence of sense, or rather a space in which the absence has itself become our sense.
Nancy expands upon and fleshes out his thinking of the plurality of worlds in Being
Singular Plural. Here he links the thought to the post-Marxist (and, again following
Lyotard, postmodern) sense of the development of the ‘spectacular-market society’ in
which ‘commodity fetishism’ and the global domination of capital are accomplished
in ‘the production and consumption of material and symbolic “goods” that all have
the character of being an image, illusion, or appearance’.28 Subjectivity becomes a
function of wealth: the capacity to purchase new images, identities and even bodies
becomes the basis of who we are. The political and philosophical stakes of this are that
‘universal commerce [becomes] constituted by a representation wherein existence is
both an invention and a self-appropriating event. A subject of representation, that is,
a subject reduced to the sum or flux of representations which it purchases, is the place-
holder that functions as the subject of Being and history’.29 This is the basis for the
postmodern idea of culture as it appears in writers such as Baudrillard and Jameson,
and even to a certain extent Lyotard.30 However, Nancy takes a different tack from
these thinkers in refusing either to attempt to delve below the surface of spectacle in
the hope of recovering a Marxian base (à la Jameson), or to celebrate the hyperreality
of a surface-spectacle without depth in the manner of Baudrillard. Arguing that both
of these approaches work through untenable notions of an opposition between good
and bad representation, his move is rather to rethink the ontological structure of the
social bond in terms of being-in-common, or as the title of his book suggests, being
singular plural.
The notion of being singular plural sets out from the Heideggerian concept of
Dasein, which Nancy argues is necessarily and inextricably tied up with Mitsein. By
working through section 26 of Being and Time, Nancy argues that Being-with is an
irreducible moment in the formation of Dasein that remains underdeveloped in
Heidegger’s analysis. For Heidegger, any question of the meaning of Being, any ques-
tion of meaning, is necessarily communal: ‘Dasein is essentially Being-with. . . . Not
only is Being towards Others an autonomous, irreducible relationship of Being: this
relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein’s Being, already is. . . . So far
as Dasein is at all, it has being-with-one-another as its kind of Being.’31 Being, for
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Heidegger, is always therefore a Being-with in which the ‘with’ is primordial and not
just a modification of a pre-established Being. Rather than being based on a pre-given
self-consciousness, one’s identity and existence in the world necessarily emerges from
relations with others.
For Nancy, the problem with Heidegger’s thinking of Being through Dasein occurs
in the relegation of Being-with to ‘average everydayness’. He argues: ‘One cannot
affirm that the meaning of Being must express itself starting from everydayness and
then begin by neglecting the differentiation of the everyday, its constantly renewed
rupture, its intimate discord, its polymorphy and its polyphony.’32 In Heidegger, the
question of the other, or the differences between others, is not explicitly worked
through. According to Nancy, on the other hand, the others who come to stand up
against the self in Being-with are not only different from that self, but also different
from one another in and of themselves rather than modifications of some model or
archetypal other. Each other is singular, unique and irreducible to the mass (even
when part of a mass). This means that what we receive with these singularities is:
the discreet passage of other origins of the world. What occurs there . . . is an origin; it is
an affirmation of the world, and we know that the world has no other origin than this
singular multiplicity of origins. The world always appears each time according to a
decidedly local turn [of events]. Its unity, its uniqueness, and its totality consists in a
combination of this reticulated multiplicity, which produces no result.33
Rather than employing modern categories to think experience through a subject–
object distinction or politics through the relation between an individual and society
(oppositions that always privilege one side or the other of the binary), the analysis of
existence is opened to the workings of a singularity that is always already in relation
to a plurality of other singulars. What emerges from this is an analysis of community
conceived in terms of the singular plural in which subjectivity does not occur on the
basis of some form of modified Cartesian identity, but rather happens in the moments
of encounter with each unique and irreducible other. Subjectivity is irreducible and
unique, and yet indissociable from relations with the plurality of others (each of
whom will also be singular). Community thus obtains in this plurality of singularities
each existing on the basis of its relations with others, which makes it irreducible to
systematic universal analysis or, as Nancy puts it, inoperative.34
The question this raises for my account of artistic fragmentation is what space does
this notion of the singular plural leave for a thinking of art? In debates about the post-
modern, two versions of the place of art dominate, which (for want of a more detailed
analysis) might be identified as the Jamesonian and the Lyotardian. In the former, the
critical edge of modern art has fallen into the self-ironising sentimentality of pastiche
that is cut off from the political and social developments of late capitalism.35 Those
following Lyotard, on the other hand, argue that art continues to play the role that it
did within modernity – to ‘wage a war on totality’ by opening up the system to dis-
ruption.36 The alternative that I want to explore here, however, returns to the
Schlegelian/Hegelian conflict that was outlined in the last section in order to think
art’s relation to community.
Touching art 91
Nancy returns to artistic fragmentation in The Sense of the World, where he begins
to open the question of what is at stake for contemporary thought in the notion of
‘romantic incompletion’ developed in The Literary Absolute. In the light of the col-
lapse of speculative or systematic totalities, the status of the artistic fragment is trans-
formed, which means that:
One must know first of all what remains in the fragments. . . . In other words . . . if one
supposes that fragmentation has properly dislocated the essence on which it supervened,
one must ask oneself if this ‘essence’ has not itself been delivered, thrown, projected, and
offered like what one would have to call, twisting Benoit Mandelbrot’s word, a ‘fractal
essence’. . . . In still other words, in what direction are we to take the step from a frag-
mented cosmetics to an aesthetics of a sensible tracing [frayage], and beyond this to the
fragile permanence of ‘art’ in the drift of the ‘worldly’?37
As the quotation with which this chapter began suggests, the response to this ques-
tion lies in the reading of art as event. This draws on the Heideggerian notion of art’s
ability to disclose the world, to open the setting into work of truth in the appearance,
birth and encounter of the event of disclosure. However, in distinction from
Heidegger, Nancy’s notion of what is disclosed by art draws on the sense of the frag-
mentation of our already fragmented Being-with. For Nancy, art ‘neither operates nor
ensures the continuity and homogeneity of being’, but is rather ‘the presentation of
presentation’ insofar as this presentation is ‘without presentness . . . does not possess
a truth as does (the subject of ) being. Rather, presentation itself is truth’.38
What does this notion of artistic presentation as ‘truth’ consist in? Thrown back
on the fragmentary nature of our being singular plural, we are called upon by art to
respond to its interruption of the circle of signification and its exposure of the fragil-
ity of signified sense. The argument that presentation itself is truth does not ascribe
to it some transcendental status, but rather posits art as a disclosure of truth as ‘the
secret of that which comprises nothing other than the multiple, discreet, discontinu-
ous, heterogeneous, and singular touch of being itself ’.39 This is not therefore the pres-
entation of or that there is an unpresentable, but rather the presentation that
presentation is itself singular plural, that there are multiple origins of the world, that
the world is constituted in and by our Being-in-common, which itself is finite and
fragmented. For Nancy, what remains of the Romantic fragment is the sense of
incompletion and the lack of a Work. Now, however, the fragment discloses ‘the frag-
mentation of sense that existence is’.40 Without guide or rule we as viewers, listeners
or readers who are ourselves exposed to our singular plurality are called upon to
respond.
On the basis of this thinking of the aesthetic, art responds to the fragmentation of
the contemporary with a presentation of the difference at the heart of being-in-
common. It intervenes in the present, opening up identifications (be they ideological
or psychological) to difference: works present the discontinuities implied in the
process of communal existence and question our everyday sense-making procedures.
This presentation is intrinsically political as it provides a ground for questioning the
rules, conventions and customs that strive to govern this existence, sort groups and
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factions from each other under the banners of homogeneity, and direct the behaviour
of each towards a unified end (whether that end is national, racial, gender, religious
or political identity). Art, whether it is classified as high or popular, activates the sense
that difference is. If it doesn’t do this, it isn’t art. It doesn’t matter whether the work
exists as part of a canon or recognised collection; art is what touches upon the differ-
ences between us that form the basis of community, and reminds us of the necessity
of being in common. In the surprise fragmentation of sense elicited by the work there
is the possibility of touching on the sense of a plural community.
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For the most central pathway in this city is more vast and more impassable than even
that extensive and untrodden desert that it took Israel two generations to cross.1
Still the most unreal of the unreal cities, Alexandria remains emblematic of the
modern aesthetic, with its most significant monument dispersed between the
Embankment in London and Central Park, New York.2 The exile of the monumen-
tal fabric of the city to the capitals of modernity testifies to Alexandria’s condition as
a figure for diaspora as well as emphasising the fascination that the city continues to
hold for modernity and modernism. As the home of diaspora, Alexandria has been
celebrated since antiquity for its equivocal hospitality for cultural differences whether
linguistic, religious, scholarly or sexual.3 The city famed for both its orgies and its
libraries stands both for the prodigal scattering of seed, with all its pleasures and dis-
asters, and its gathering together, cataloguing and storage, with all its pleasures and
disasters. This movement of dispersal and collection also informs what might be
described as the Alexandrian aesthetic – a movement between aisthesis as a moment
of pleasurable openness and ascesis as the moment of discipline and closure – a move-
ment that underlies the experience of the ‘allegorical’.
For it is not only the monuments of Alexandria that have been carried over into
the heart of metropolitan modernity, but also the entire aesthetic temper of allegory.
In tracing the origins of the modern allegorical aesthetic in The Origins of German
Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin described its unstable movement between excess and
discipline as essentially Alexandrian. The peculiar complicity between aisthesis and
ascesis that Benjamin finds in allegory has its origins in the figure of the Alexandrian,
a figure that through various routes and vectors has been carried over into modernity
and modernism. Yet in the course of dissemination, what is crucial to the Alexandrian
– namely a certain poetics of diaspora or of scattering and re-collection, the traffic
between aisthesis as sensible pleasure and ascesis as rational discipline – has itself been
disciplined. The equivocal tension between aisthesis and ascesis – the diasporic – has
largely been sacrificed to the desire to resolve the multiple movements into a disci-
plined progression from the confusion of the senses to the discipline of reason. The
self-destructive movements of Christian allegory that Benjamin identified in the
baroque prefigure the attempt to dissolve aisthesis into ascesis that informs modern
aesthetics. Yet in spite of attempts to reduce the disorientation of allegory to the uni-
linear governance of the symbol, the allegory of the Alexandrian aesthetic remains in
movement – or, to use the figure ubiquitous throughout Alexandrian culture – it con-
tinues in a ‘procession’ moving backwards and forwards between aisthesis and ascesis.
The processional movement of aisthesis and ascesis adopts many guises and can be
described in many ways. It is present in the processions between the many to the one,
between dispersal and unification, between the senses and the intellect, between pleas-
ure and abstinence, pollution and purity, between even perdition and redemption. Yet
these polar oppositions are not strictly sustainable – the procession does not move
from one pole to another, but, rather like Ptolemy of Alexandria’s epicyclical explana-
tion for the movements of the planets in the Almagest (AD127–141), it inextricably
entwines progressive and retrograde movements. Yet this is not simply the antinomian
confirmation of opposites by means of their inversion – the discovery of intellect at
the extremes of sense, literality at the extreme of metaphor or even redemption at the
extreme of perdition – that characterises gnosticism and a certain extreme of allegor-
ical thought and practice also analysed by Benjamin, but the mutual implication of
each in the other. There is a procession but not a progression from one term to the
other, there is no orderly and unilinear movement but an inextricable intertwining of
tendencies. The Alexandrian aesthetic is to be found in this procession between aes-
thesis and ascesis, but the time in which this procession unfolds is itself complex. The
movement in question does not assume an unequivocal orientation of time but weaves
together past, present and future. For just as the city is geographically suspended
between desert and the sea, so too its allegorical figure recurs as at once the Egyptian
exile, the desert of Exodus and the promised land.
The origins of Alexandrian allegory in the mutual procession and recession of ais-
thesis and ascesis are closely related to the emergence of aesthetic in the narrower
sense of the ‘philosophy of art’. The latter represents the peculiar ascesis visited upon
works of art that constitutes the philosophical ‘aesthetic’. The vast library and
museum of Hellenistic Alexandria enabled a vast labour of scholarly commentary,
reflection and translation that might be described as the first ‘aesthetic’, if by this is
understood the disciplined philosophical reflection on the interpretation of texts and
works of art. The gathering of the texts and their interpretation was not motivated
solely by philological preoccupations, but also by an undefined commitment to the
distinction between aisthesis and ascesis. This commitment is most evident in the
neo-platonism characteristic of the city – in its Pagan, Jewish and Christian variants
– that saw in aisthesis a doctrine of sensible experience considered as a vehicle, more
or less apt, for an approach to the ideas. The ideas were cloaked in sensible experi-
ence and could thus be revealed through a work of reflection and interpretation that
departed from the data of sensibility. The reflection on texts and works of art thus
formed part of the disciplined movement, procession and in some accounts even the
Exodus from the realm of sense to the realm of ideas. Sensible experience and its
works were, in short, allegorical, pointing beyond themselves and calling for inter-
pretation. The movement from the sensible to the ideal thus not only involved the
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elaboration of interpretative protocols, but also implied a process of ascesis, the mor-
tification of the body or text for the sake of salvation in the revelation of meaning
and truth.
Walter Benjamin’s alignment of the allegorical aesthetic with the ascetic mortifica-
tion of the body in the Origin of German Tragic Drama rehearses the Alexandrian
origins of allegory. Apart from its prodigious library and the erudition of its scholars,
Hellenistic Alexandria was also celebrated for its anatomy, sometimes, reputedly,
involving live human subjects. It subsequently pioneered Christian ascetic theology
with its accompanying monastic ascetic practice and was the source of the vicious con-
troversies concerning the nature of the body of Christ that violently divided – and still
divide – Christianity. This mortification of the flesh whether for the sake of knowl-
edge or salvation contrasted violently with the neo-platonic procession from the sen-
sible to the ideal – a link between ascesis and knowledge sanctioned above all by Plato’s
Phaedo and figured as a cosmic procession in the Phaedrus.
The passage between aisthesis and ascesis would be restated by Baumgarten in his
reinvention of aesthetic – the Reflections on Poetry (1735) – commentary on Horace’s
Ars Poetica structured around what it identifies as a patristic, but is more accurately a
neo-platonic distinction between aisthesis and noesis. It is also central to his incom-
plete Aesthetica which attempted to reorient aisthesis and noesis largely but by no
means exclusively through the hierarchical subordination of the former to the latter.
Yet even he, while stressing the importance of the rational education of the senses,
insisted that they not be suppressed but developed through the experience of sensible
perfection of the beautiful. Nevertheless, Baumgarten introduced rational ascesis into
modern aesthetics through the notion of the education of sensibility, a tendency
advanced by Schiller in his Aesthetic Education.
The modern subordination of the aesthetic to the ascetic in terms of a stage in the
progression from sensibility to reason contrasts with the Alexandrian view of it as the
site of a complex processional movement combining progressive and recessive tenden-
cies. For the latter, the movement between the sensible and the ideal is not an ascent
but a complex and equivocal alignment – the descent of the soul, for example, requires
the ascent of the body and both may indeed imply other more complex, underlying
movements. The significance of the complex rising and falling procession is evident
in the peculiar location of Alexandria in the economy of salvation – it simultaneously
figures the fleshpots of Egypt, the desert of Exodus or the site of repentance, and the
promised land. The complexity of the movements that make up the aesthetic – under-
estimated by Baumgarten and the aesthetic tradition after him, with the exception of
Kant – may be revealed through reading of the classic Alexandrian allegorists and neo-
platonists (Philo and later Plotinus) who plotted a figure of the aesthetic that still has
the capacity to disrupt the more ascetic version advocated by Baumgarten and his
modernist successors. The complexity of this movement between ascesis and aisthesis
can be appreciated from a different perspective in the work of the Alexandrian mod-
ernists such as Giuseppe Ungaretti (1888–1970) and C. P. Cavafy (1863–1933) with
their poetry of exile and nostalgia exploring the complex movements of loss, errancy
and salvation through the diasporic languages of Italian and Greek.
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Allegory – the ascetic aesthetic
The outrage that followed the Alexandrian church father Origen’s act of self-castration
was provoked not so much by the deed itself – with its proximity to extreme ascetic
pagan practices associated with the worship of Cybele – as by its motivation by a literal
reading of Matthew 19:12. The literality of Origen’s interpretation betrayed an unex-
pected lapse of allegorical sensitivity in one who was heir to a sophisticated tradition
of allegorical interpretation of biblical and other texts. The self-mutilation testifies not
only to a painful over-investment in literality, but also to a victory of ascesis over aes-
thesis. The ambiguous and ambivalent relationship between the two was here, like the
Gordian knot, resolved by a single cut. Origen’s gesture may be said to have consoli-
dated an alliance between the investment in the literal (the unnegotiable fixing of
meaning, its promised land where meaning is brought home for good) and the anti-
aesthetic extreme of asceticism that finds meaning in the mortification of the flesh.
It points also to the characteristically Alexandrian elision of textual interpretation,
sexuality and the body. For Origen’s self-mutilation, on closer inspection, anticipates
the unilinear and progressive movement of sensibility to reason characteristic of the
modern aesthetic. The ascent from the senses to the ideal is cast as a violent ascetic
movement of liberation from the body and its pleasures towards a higher, sublimated
state. In this ubiquitous interpretative strategy, stress is laid upon the achievement of
literality; the meaning of a journey is found in the destination rather than the journey
itself, in the arrival at the promised land rather than the formative forty years of
errancy in the desert. This concatenation of themes was already highly developed in
the work of the first-century neo-platonic Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria.
Philo pioneered the allegorical interpretation of the Torah, producing a large number
of extended and sophisticated allegorical readings. Yet Philo’s allegories exemplify,
sometimes in spite of themselves, the complex syncopation of ascent and descent that
characterises the equivocal procession between sense and ideal characteristic of the
Alexandrian aesthetic.
Philo’s three ‘Allegorical Interpretations’ (‘Legum allegoriae’) offer not only a prog-
rammatic statement of the allegorical method of interpretation applied to the account
of the creation of the world offered in the book of Genesis, but also an uneasy reflec-
tion on the meaning of pleasure and the role of pleasure in meaning. In these allego-
ries, the pleasures of the senses are given the allegorical figure of ‘Egypt’, collapsing
together the ‘fleshpots’ of biblical Egypt with the temptations of Philo’s contempo-
rary Alexandria. Yet even here there are the beginnings of a characteristic ambivalence
with respect to the city – does it represent only the Egyptian ‘house of bondage’, or is
it, as for Dionysos of Alexandria, the Sinai desert or even the promised land?
To complicate matters further, Philo carries over the biblical metaphor or ‘Exodus
pattern’ into the aesthetic through the parallels between the biblical and the philo-
sophical Exodus, from the pleasures of the senses to reason, and the philological
exodus, from the letter to the meaning of a text. The same ascetic method is assumed
to be at work in the biblical, philosophical and the philological orders. Yet the
complex issue of this method is nicely revealed in the third of the ‘Allegorical
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Interpretations’ where Philo describes his own attendance at the Alexandian orgies
already famed in antiquity:
for when I have gone to entertainments where no respect was paid to discipline, and to
sumptuous banquets, whenever I went without taking reason with me as a guide, I
became a slave to the luxuries that lay before me, being under the guidance of masters
who could not be tamed, with sights and sounds of temptation, and all other such things
as work pleasure in a man by the agency of his senses of smell and taste. But when I
approach such scenes in the company of reason, I then become a master instead of a
slave . . .’4
Here the appeal to ascesis seems familiarly unilateral: pleasure and the temptations of
the senses tend to slavery, reason to mastery. But it is crucial to note that Philo
‘approaches’ scenes of pleasure in the company of reason. He is not urged by reason
to shun them; reason even serves as his ‘guide’ to excessive pleasures. In short, reason
is far from committed to an ascetic anti-aesthesis. The complexity of Philo’s view of
pleasure and reason is evident in his allegorical interpretation of the subtlety of the
serpent in Genesis 3:1. The serpent has a powerful role in Philo’s sexualised biblical
cosmogony: ‘God, who created all the animals on the earth, arranged this order very
admirably, for he placed the mind first, that is to say, man, for the mind is the most
important part in man; then outward sense, that is woman; and then proceeding in
regular order he came to the third, pleasure.’5 The figuration of the mind as man
(Adam) and sense as woman (Eve) is commonplace, but the figuration of pleasure as
a serpent has more interesting implications. Philo’s analogical justification of the
figure holds that:
as the motion of the serpent is full of many windings and varied, so also is the motion
of pleasure. At first it folds itself around a man in five ways, for the pleasures consist both
in seeing and in hearing, and in taste, and in smell, and in touch, but the most vehe-
ment and intense are those which arise from connection with woman, through which
the generation of similar beings is appointed by nature to be effected.6
Unlike some later Platonists, Philo is not a gnostic; he does not decry sexual repro-
duction as contributing to the continuance of a fallen world created by an evil dem-
iurge. Quite the contrary, he implies that pleasure, and its figure the serpent, are an
essential part of creation. Such approbation of pleasure seems far from the conven-
tional ascetic tendency to negate the body and its pleasures in the name of reason. For
Philo there is a pleasure of the senses that may be approached and enjoyed in the
company of reason.
Philo quickly retraces his steps, distinguishing between different kinds of pleasure
in a way that anticipates Kant’s later distinction in the Critique of Judgement between
disinterested and interested pleasure. Philo introduces a distinction between ‘the
pleasure which arises from the contemplation of pictures or statues; and all other
works which are made by art’ and the ‘pleasures of the belly’ or of sense.7 The division
of pleasures between those of the soul and those of the senses brings with it a dou-
bling of the figure of the serpent, who is now called to figure the ambivalence of pleas-
ure. The pleasures of sense, also described as those of ‘the multitude’ or of the ‘houses
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in Egypt’, ‘bring on death’, but not death as the separation of soul and body, cele-
brated in Plato’s Phaedo as the liberation of the soul from its prison in the body, ‘but
that [soul death] which is the destruction of the soul by vice’.8 The serpent that brings
on soul death will prevail until both body and soul ‘turn to repentance’. Philo sug-
gests that this turn or movement is achieved not by the simple destruction of the
serpent – as in Origen’s self-mutilation – but through the creation of a second serpent,
the serpent of the pleasures of the soul. Moses’ creation of the brazen serpent – a work
of art – is read allegorically as a figure of those pleasures of the soul that would after
Kant be known as disinterested ‘aesthetic’ pleasures. These are the peculiar pleasures
of the third critique in which reason and sensibility ‘accompany’ each other to the
scene of pleasure. The second serpent is a remedy to the threat of soul death posed by
the first. Philo interprets Genesis 21:6 in terms of Moses’ remedy for the children of
Israel in their Exodus who suffer from the memory of the pleasures of Egypt: ‘for if
the mind that has been bitten by pleasure, that is by the serpent which was sent to
Eve, shall have the strength to behold the beauty of temperance, that is to say, the
serpent made by Moses in a manner affecting the soul, and to behold God himself
through the medium of the serpent, it shall live.’9 Interestingly, the soul can only see
God through the eyes of the second serpent, through art or the pleasures of the soul.
The antagonistic serpents were destined to have a long life, with Moses’ serpent
being called by the Alexandrian Christian heirs of Philo allegorically to figure Christ,
or for Pagans, the God of healing Asclepius. It was also carried over into the Genesis
narrative, with the escape from Egypt, the land of serpents, assisted by the brazen
second serpent. The allegory of the serpents points to a complex relationship between
ascesis and aesthesis. There would be no need for the figure of the second serpent if it
served only to extirpate the first – the pleasures of the senses – through an act of
ascesis. For ascesis here does not simply suppress the pleasures of the senses but enjoys
them in the company of reason; the second serpent stands for a pleasure in which both
the ascesis of reason and the aesthesis of sensibility are implicated.
The mutual implication of ascesis and aesthesis is central to the work of Plotinus,
the leading representative of the Alexandrian school of neo-platonism during the third
century. It is unfolded in the complex reflection upon the relationship between the
movement of ascesis and the pleasure of the senses in the sixth tractate of the first
Ennead, ‘On beauty’. This meditation is characterised by the mutual animation of
ascesis and aisthesis, choreographed as an opposition resolved into complementarity.
The ascetic moments of Plotinus’s text stress the separation of the soul from the body:
the soul has descended into the body and has now to reverse the movement through
an act of dieresis or separation. That the act of separation is not simply a suppression
is evident in its various figures – as a separation of pure gold from ore, as a lustration,
and as the liturgical procession of a mystery religion – but all involve the abstraction
of a pure substance from a mixture. The gold is ‘worked out’ of the ore, the soul is
‘washed clean of all that embodiment has daubed it with’ and the initiates who would
‘mount to the temple sanctuaries must purify themselves and leave aside their old
clothing, and enter in nakedness’.10 Yet this ascesis is a means to the liberation of, not
a liberation from, aisthesis. Aesthetic beauty always testifies to the idea in its purity; it
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embodies a memory of the idea that needs to be drawn out or abstracted from its
material distortions but not necessarily liberated from them.
The joint works of ascesis and aisthesis are combined in the celebrated metaphor,
drawn from Plato’s Phaedrus, of the sculptor ‘working at the statue’. The sculptor’s
work consists in drawing out the beautiful form implied in the matter, not in impos-
ing form upon recalcitrant matter: ‘he cuts away here, he smoothes it there, he makes
this line lighter, this other one purer, until he disengages beautiful lineaments in the
marble’.11 The work of clarifying matter is also figured in terms of a procession or
exodus. For Plotinus, ‘The fatherland for us is there whence we have come’ and indeed
where we always are. But to arrive where we were, are, and will always be requires ‘a
new manner of seeing’ through which ‘remaining here you have ascended aloft’.12
Remaining in the senses while having ascended above them in the company of reason
marks for Plotinus the negotiation between aisthesis and ascesis or ‘new way of seeing’,
the view from Philo’s brazen serpent. It may be figured as the home of diaspora – the
Egypt of the body that is to be abandoned, the desert the site of the body’s errancy
and the promised land where the body has always been.
These fragmentary analyses of the Alexandrian aesthetic have brought out two
salient characteristics. The first is a concern with troping – with movements and turns,
ascents and descents, departures and arrivals – that make dynamic the relationship
between sense and reason and complicate the temporality of the aesthetic. The second
is a preoccupation with pleasure, and in particular with its distribution between the
pleasures of the senses and those of the senses accompanied by reason. The figure of
the two serpents or the account of the discovery of the idea in matter and the senses
respects the mutual implication of ascesis and aisthesis. Neither dominates the other.
What holds for the classical statement of the Alexandrian aesthetic holds also for its
modern expressions. Both characteristics define the work of the two main Alexandrian
modernists – Giuseppe Ungaretti and C. P. Cavafy – Alexandrian authors of diasporic
oeuvres subsequently claimed by the Italian and Greek national traditions that respect
the mutual implication of ascesis and aisthesis, the one departing from the standpoint
of the trope, the exodus pattern or procession, the other from the standpoint of the
doubling of pleasure achieved through unrepentant retrospection, a turn that converts
the pleasures of the senses not into a pillar of salt but into the pleasures of the soul.
Both are Alexandrian, with Ungaretti writing from the strange time of simultaneously
being at home, in exile and returning, and Cavafy from the time of recollection that
returns to scenes of earlier passion, but always in the company of reason, never to
condemn but through art to relive and in some way perpetuate them.
Ungaretti’s poetics of diaspora
Giuseppe Ungaretti was born in Alexandria in 1888 to Italian parents who ran a
bakery in a suburb of the city. In 1912 he left Egypt for Paris, where he studied with
Bergson and frequented the circles of avant-garde painters and poets. With the out-
break of the First World War he moved to Milan and was mobilised in 1915. His
first collection of poems, Il porto sepolto, was published in 1916, republished with
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amendments in 1919 as Allegria di Naufragi, then with more amendments as Allegria
in 1931 and 1936, and in a final version for the collected works Vita d’un uomo:
poesie i L’Allegria 1914–19. This first collection comprises poems 1914–19 that con-
front the poet’s Alexandrian childhood with his experience of metropolitan moder-
nity and modernism, above all with the experience of mechanised trench warfare.
Ungaretti begins the ‘Nota introduttiva’ that accompanies his collected works, Vita
d’un uomo: Tutte le poesie, with a commentary on his poem ‘Eternity’ that, like a mani-
festo, opens L’Allegria: ‘From a flower picked to the other given inexpressible nothing’.13
Ungaretti’s own commentary identifies this poem as an allegory of Alexandria. The
commentary identifies in ‘nothing’ and ‘eternity’ the ‘constant destruction produced by
time’, an experience that is not abstract, but linked inseparably to Alexandria:
Alexandria is in the desert, in a desert in which life is more intense than the time of its
foundation, but where life does not leave any trace of permanence in time. Alexandria
is a city without a monument, or better with hardly a monument to recall its ancient
past. It changes incessantly. Time carries it away, at all times. It is a city where the sense
of time, of destructive time is present to the imagination before everything and above
all.14
Yet this intense and specific childhood experience of transience – the city disintegrat-
ing into the desert of time or submerged in its sea (Il porto sepolto was Ungaretti’s first
title for the collection15) – is extended to the condition of modernity. Speaking spe-
cifically of L’Allegria, Ungaretti carefully claimed that this experience of temporal and
spatial transience ‘Does not just concern philosophy, it concerns a concrete experi-
ence from a childhood passed in Alexandria and necessarily intensified, embittered,
deepened and crowned by the 1914–1918 war’.16 Yet this experience was complex: it
involved not just the melancholy ‘constant recall of death’ provoked by the ‘annihilat-
ing landscape’ of the desert17 (although this is nevertheless a vital moment) but also
that of exhilaration before the open horizon of the sea and the promise of adventure
that it seemed to offer. Alexandria is for him the port between past and future, death
and life, hovering like a mirage between them both.
The poems of L’Allegria speak of the city from the standpoint of both the desert
and the sea, from the standpoint of death and fear of loss and of desire and love for
the future, not that these are strictly separable in Alexandria. In his prose commen-
tary on ‘Eternity’ Ungaretti describes this ambiguity in terms of the nothing that is
death and the desire of love that is life, but remaining alert to the possibility of
mirages – whether of life or death – a suspicion that he shares with fellow Alexandrian
Cavafy: ‘I am from Egyptian Alexandria: other oriental places may have the
“Thousand and One Nights,” Alexandria has the desert, has the night, has the
nothing, has mirages, the bare imaginary that falls hopelessly in love and causes to
sing in a way without voice.’18 This song without voice – Ungaretti repeatedly evokes
the call of the city watchman at night uahed – which turns its back upon both desert
and sea is also the voice of a war poet for whom the exterminating landscapes of child-
hood have become the entirely modern landscape of trench warfare. The child’s expe-
rience of Alexandria is completely compatible with the adult’s destructive experience
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of metropolitan modernity. The voiceless songs of L’Allegria 1914–1919 thus weave
together the memories of an Alexandrian childhood with the violent experience of
trench warfare. Yet in this major work of North African/European modernism, the
aesthetics of childhood memory and the violent discipline of warfare are not kept
apart, but drift into proximity through the simultaneously destructive and redemp-
tive figure of Alexandria. The pivot of the movement between memory and hope is
located in the omnipresence of death – allegorical insofar as the death that is omni-
present itself dies in Alexandria – confirming Benjamin’s description of the saving
irony of allegory – its total destructive movement turning back upon itself – total
negation negating itself. (Cavafy makes a similar turn with love and the repetition of
desire.) Out of the extreme experience of transience and the proximity of death
figured in desert and the trench, emerges hope for the future – the sea or peace.
Alexandrian troping forever insinuates hope into despair and despair into hope –
Egypt is the exile is the desert is the promised land.
The parallels that Ungaretti draws between Alexandria and the landscape of
modern warfare are most evident in the earlier versions of L’Allegria. The changes
between the early and the later editions indicate an attempt to make less explicit the
local, Alexandrian specificity of the collection, most notably in the suppression of one
section, ‘The Panorama of Alexandria of Egypt’, and the reassignment of its poems
under the more generic title ‘L’Ultime’.19 The transition from Alexandria to Europe
and modernity – which was also the departure from the home that was already itself
part of the Italian diaspora – is the subject of the pivotal poem ‘Levant’. The liminal
character of this poem is evident in its internal windings and unfinishable state, tes-
tified by radical changes it underwent between 1915 and 1942. In all its complex and
often baffling windings the poem presents an epitome of Ungaretti’s Alexandrian aes-




on the distant circle of the sky
Clicking of heels, clapping of hands
and the clarinet’s arabesque squawk
and the sea is ashen grey
trembles softly troubled
like a pigeon
In the poop Syrian emigrants are dancing
In the prow a youth is alone
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The poem has a complicated genesis, the definitive version under the title ‘Levant’
appearing in the 1942 edition. Before this it appeared under the title ‘Mist’, which
was itself a revision, in 1919, of a rather different poem ‘The Supplicants’ published
in the Florentine journal Lacerba in 1915 and absent from Il porto sepolto. The final
version is the outcome of a sustained process of distillation that, beginning with an
inelegant autobiographical account of a voyage shared with emigrants, was trans-
formed into a magnificent meditation upon migration, death and commemoration.
‘Levant’ is structured in terms of a procession, with the voice located on a ship
moving slowly away, leaving Alexandria. It seems to speak from the point or at the
moment – the poem is literally at sea in the gloaming – when the last trace of the city
dips below the horizon and finally disappears, from vision if not from memory.21 The
ambiguous mood of the poem – retrospective and prospective – is already set with
respect to the line that ‘dies vaporously’ on the distant circle of the sky. It is left open
whether this is a horizontal line – the mist surrounding the distant city which with
distance resolves into a misty blur on the line of the horizon, about to merge with it
and disappear – or the vertical plume of steam from the ship’s funnel which is dis-
persed in the distant circle of the heavens.22 Whichever it is, or even, most likely, if it
is both, there is no doubt that the vaporised lines die on the distant circle (horizontal
and/or vertical) of the sky. (Indeed, morire (‘to die’) is the first verb of the poem).23
The vapour itself does not escape ambiguity, serving as a figure of life – breath – as
well as a figure for the dissolution of liquid into its constituent drops that is inversely
analogous with the sand of the desert, whose pulverised and pulverising grains are
associated by Ungaretti with disintegration and death.
The liquid states evoked in the poem shift drastically in the course of the action,
moving from the opening vapour to the ashen expanse of the swelling sea and ending
with the turbulence left by the ship’s propellers. Associated with these different liquid
states is a movement in the place of the narrated gaze, from the stern to the poop to
the bows of the ship and then again back to the stern. The shifts in viewpoint are
accompanied by shifts in affect that can be indicated in a preliminary way by cata-
loguing the very few verbs that follow ‘to die’: ‘squawk’, ‘tremble’, ‘dance’, ‘carry away’
and ‘hear’. These verbs swirl around to form a figure of movement and death and help
identify the poem as itself a funeral procession, with all the complex affects associated
with carrying away the dead.24 The ambiguity surrounding what it is that dies by
being reduced to vapour is thus compounded by the spectral movement of the voice
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and point of view around the ship. If the opening line is oriented vertically, the ship’s
smoke rising into the sky, then the voice of the first half of the poem can be located
in the bows – looking up, then looking back at the dancing emigrants, and then, via
the memory of the Jewish funeral processions, moving to the stern. If the opening
line is oriented horizontally as the vaporous dissolution of a now distant Alexandria,
then the voice begins to speak in the stern, is interrupted by the dancing emigrants,
then speaks from the prow and then again from the stern. In both cases the move-
ments are complex, even more so if they are combined, for then the viewpoint is
simultaneously oriented forward and up and backwards and down – establishing a
spiral form whose presence is enforced by the many explicit references in the poem
to spirals – the clarinet’s arabesque howl, the spiralling alleys of Alexandria and the
spiral of turbulence left in the ship’s wake. The viewpoint and place of utterance is
unstable, even in terms of its movements around the ship itself let alone when ori-
ented with respect to the ship’s movements between points of departure and destina-
tion. There is also a suggestion, amplified by the reference to the Jewish funeral
procession and the intimated parallel between the ship and a coffin, that the entire
poem may be a view of the funeral procession from the standpoint of the ghost of the
corpse.
The meditative gaze, whether back to the city or up to the dying plume of steam
and smoke, is suddenly interrupted by the sound of music and dancing. The reverie
is rudely interrupted by revelry, by the clicking of heels and the clapping of hands and
the squawk of the clarinet coming from what are subsequently identified as emigrants
dancing in the poop to celebrate their passage, which is, of course, from their past to
their future.25 But the elation of the dance is immediately modulated by a literal
undertow; the dancing on the ship is countered by the soft tremor of the ashen sea.
The implausible likeness of the sea to a pigeon is ostensibly motivated by their shared
characteristic of colour – greyness – and the likeness between the tremor of the
pigeon’s breast and the gentle waves of the Mediterranean. Yet there are less obvious
aspects of the metaphor that become apparent in the variants. The earlier versions
have the sea ‘gently trembling’ (‘trema dolce’) like restless pigeons whose breasts are
swollen by a ‘loving wave’ (‘d’onda amorosa’), thus likening pigeons to the sea and the
sea to pigeons. Both, it seems to be suggested, bear witness to an almost cosmic pulse
of desire and love that runs through them. But there is also another aspect to this wave
that is evident in an earlier poem from 1915 published in Lacerba: ‘Il paessagio
d’Alessandria d’Egitto’ (‘The landscape of Alexandria of Egypt’), in which the swell-
ing chest of the pigeon is likened to the song of the ‘fella’ – the ululation or song
without voice of the desert. This invests the seascape with desire, establishing a link
between the gentle swelling of the waves, the swelling of the breast of the pigeon and
the song without voice of the desert and, finally, of the poem itself. This song ‘without
voice’ underlies the swell of the waves and establishes an immediate contrast with the
raucous music of the emigrants, a discord which is resolved in the poem through the
suggestion that both musics give voice to nostalgia for what has been lost and longing
for what is to come.
The encounter of the two songs – the sombre music of the sea and the raucous
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music of the emigrants (the inseparable songs of death and life) – coincides with the
translation of the poetic voice from the stern to the prow of the ship – ‘At the prow a
young man is alone’. (Ungaretti later commented ironically, ‘It is of course me’.) In
the 1931 version he is to be found leaning on the railings and ‘looking like a shadow’,
emphasising a little too bluntly the questionable presence/absence of this figure who
managed to survive the otherwise radical editing of the poem. But although in the
forward position, at the cutting edge of the ship, which it may be recalled is also the
position Mallarmé ironically yields to his younger contemporaries in his toast to
the avant-garde Salut, the young man is sunk in retrospection, remembering the
Jewish funeral processions (in which, Ungaretti noted, ‘I assisted in Alexandria’26).
The memory of the Jewish funeral processions drives the poetic spiral that begins
with death and moves through song to end in turbulence. It is also the matrix of the
poem, the original experience that fuelled the intense process of condensation that
issued in the final poem. Indeed, the final and definitive 1942 title of the poem –
‘Levant’ – refers back to the description of the Jewish funeral processions in the 1915
and 1919 ‘versions’.27 The 1915 poem ‘Supplicants’ that would mutate into ‘Mist’
and finally ‘Levant’ is greatly indebted to Apollinaire’s ‘Zone’ for its structure, and at
one point in its autobiographical narrative evokes an intense shipboard experience of
light and colour in the fog:
Those covers of rough material
that the Jews of the Levant use
carrying away their dead on a Saturday night28
The memory of the Jewish funeral processions is thus borne into the poem by the
colour of the fabric; the lemon yellow evokes the memory of the ‘coperto di crespo’
used by the Jews of the Levant in their funeral processions. This almost incidental evo-
cation of the memory serves as an illustration of chromatic intensity and provokes
powerful consequences even for the 1915 poem, let alone its subsequent incarnations.
In 1915 the autobiographical improvisation slips into a sombre key. The entry of
death and the funeral procession causes the sky almost to touch the earth and under-
lines the finality of the departure from Alexandria.
In the 1919 version, the memory of the Jewish funeral procession has been divested
of its role as chromatic simile, appearing now as a verse in its own right. The residual
reference to colour, ‘nothing can be seen / except the swaying / of light / covered in
crespo’, is evident only in the reference to crespo. This will persist into the 1931 version
but by 1942 has completely disappeared. In all the versions from 1919 onwards, the
only colour to survive the chromaticism of the first version is grey. At the same time
as the colour fades into the fog and out of the poem, the reference to the Jews changes
its geographical character. The reference to ‘Jews of the Levant’ is carried over into the
1919 version but is thereafter replaced by ‘Jews down there’ (‘ebrei laggiu’), referring
specifically to the Jews of Alexandria and situating their processions in the winding
alleys of that city.
The memory of the funeral procession becomes increasingly insistent, forming the
gyre of the poetic spiral. Its original motivation as a chromatic simile is already suc-
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ceeded in the second version of 1919 and in all subsequent versions by an explicit tem-
poral parallel – ‘On Saturday night at this time’. The time of the poem and the time
of the funeral procession are thus linked, not accidentally but structurally. At the same
time as the Jews carry away their dead in Alexandria, the poet is carried away in a ship
from Alexandria. The elation of a voyage to a new life expressed in the songs and
dancing of the emigrants is not shared by the poet. In a typical Alexandrian trope, the
voyage to the future is likened to the last journey of the dead to their graves. The sea
is ash and bears on its back a ship/coffin.
The poem ends with a parallel between the labyrinthine streets of Alexandria
through which the dead are carried on the shoulders of the living and the labyrinthine
turbulence – the confusa acqua – of the sea. The poem exemplifies the complex trop-
ings of the Alexandrian aesthetic, combining a number of progressive and regressive
movements, locating Egypt, the desert and the promised land with the Alexandria that
has been left behind. The movements traced by this poem are almost dizzying in their
complexity. The linear movement of the ship away from the port of Alexandria across
the Mediterranean to Genova – from past to future – is qualified by the undulating
movement of the waves and the allegorical correspondence between the ship on the
sea and the coffin bobbing on the shoulders of the mourners in Alexandria. The
journey in a straight line across the sea is also a journey between an African past and
a European future, but one in which the voyager is already dead. Then there is the
movement of the dancers, the emigrants who, borne by the movements of the boat
ahead and up and down, dance patterns within it. This is opposed to the shadow in
the bows who seems passive, but of course is himself in motion. For in the course of
the poem he moves between stern and prow, between retrospect and prospect, from
looking back to looking forward, from waking to sleep. All in a tumble of movements
figured in the final turbulence that is the response to the vaporisation of death that
opens the poem.
Ungaretti’s ‘Levant’ may be read as an allegorical evocation of Alexandria as the
allegorical city. The attempt to move away from the city that figures destruction and
death for this poet brings this experience with it. The attempt to leave the movement
of destruction only translates it into the diaspora. The complex tropings of this and
other poems in L’Allegria make this collection a work of scattering and recollection.
It is the complex movements that make this work diasporic. In it there is no home,
no point of rest – even the ship provides a site for restlessness. The ship leaving the
city becomes a fixed point around which everything else moves – as does the coffin
on the shoulders of the mourners, the dead body replete with significance for being
empty of it.
‘apo ten polu anome edone’ – Cavafy’s dates
If Ungaretti’s Alexandrian poems consummately explore the complex movements of
exile, homelessness and return that are central to the Alexandrian aesthetic, those of
his fellow Alexandrian C. P. Cavafy focus on the aspect of pleasure and its embalm-
ment in art. Although born in Alexandria, Cavafy spent much of his childhood in
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England and wrote his first poetic work in English. However, there is no nostalgia for
England comparable to Ungaretti’s nostalgia for Alexandria, and Cavafy’s work in
Greek focuses largely on the pleasures and regrets of the city of Alexandria where he
spent all of his adult life.
Cavafy’s work presents an intense exploration of the intrication of ascesis and aes-
theis but one which, unlike in Ungaretti, is not projected upon the city as the
coffin/ship bearing within it the destruction of past and future, but rather on the city
as a desired body and especially on the desired bodies of some of the city’s inhabitants.
His preoccupation with incarnation – in all its guises – takes the form of a series of
allegories of pleasure, usually framed in terms of recollection of sexual pleasure, or
rather more frequently, regret at missed opportunities for it. Pleasure in Cavafy has
always already happened or not-happened, or is about to happen or not-happen. The
poem ‘In the Street’ has the artistic-looking youth drifting aimlessly ‘as though still
hypnotised by the illicit pleasure, / the very illicit pleasure that he’s just experienced’.29
The poetic is not the anomalous pleasure, but the hypnotic even anaesthetised state
that succeeds it, its recollection and repeated transformation into something new.
Cavafy’s work exemplifies the movement between Philo’s two serpents – the Egyptian
serpent of sensible pleasure and the brazen serpent that recollects it, from the sexual
desert of the present to the promised land of pleasure that has already happened and
had seemed to have been lost for ever.
Yet Cavafy’s work should not be mistaken as the lyrical cameo to Ungaretti’s
Alexandrian epic of exile and impossible return. His lyrical introspection is deliber-
ately untrustworthy, cast within a strategy of adopting personae that marks one of the
more astonishing developments of the legacy of Robert Browning. This is evident
above all in his constant resort to seemingly precise but not entirely reliable dates.
While Ungaretti fixes a moment and a place – twilight at sea – Cavafy cites a date.
The date fuses the persona and the lyrical, and becomes one of Cavafy’s preferred
means to transform occasions of real or imagined sexual pleasure into the brazen
serpent of disinterested art.
Cavafy’s work is consistently Alexandrian in its preoccupation with processions,
but his are not the funeral processions remembered by Ungaretti, but the processions
of lovers – all combining the sensual and the ideal, but not by any means adding up
to a progression. In retrospect he too sees no line but a turbulent procession through
the winding byways of desire. In this unruly procession of rough trade mingled with
sensitive aesthetes it is the precise memory of dates that offers a common denomina-
tor and allows the procession to adopt a tangible shape. The dates are a turning to the
past that transforms it, a pagan repentance that turns past pleasures and missed pleas-
ures of the senses into pleasures of the soul.
Such a transformation is evident in an undeclared series of poems scattered
through Cavafy’s oeuvre – the five ‘days of ’ poems: ‘The Days of 1903’ written in
March 1909 and published in 191730; ‘The Days of 1908’ written in July 1921 and
published in 1932; ‘The Days of 1896’ written in 1925 and published in 1927; ‘The
Days of 1901’ published in 1927 and finally ‘The Days of 1909, ’10 and ’11’ pub-
lished in 1928. The ironically nostalgic formula ‘The Days of . . .’ conceals a complex
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relationship between the past and the present, one that is governed first of all by a
queer aesthetic of the concealment and revelation of homosexual pleasure and then
by an Alexandrian aesthetic similar to Ungaretti’s of a complex trope that brings past
experience – in this case homosexual pleasure – into the present and transforms it
from a pleasure of the senses to a pleasure of the soul. It marks the return or even the
redemption of an exiled sexuality to the promised land that it passed by because dis-
tracted by convention – ‘society / totally narrow minded, had all its values wrong’.31
The trope of turning to the past that informs the series is inaugurated in a pair of
early dated poems from 1903 that remained unpublished during Cavafy’s lifetime.
Although they do not use the formula ‘Days of . . .’ their complex temporal structure
and shifts in mood anticipate the act of recollection that informs the other poems of
the series. As inaugural poems of the series they present more visibly the complexity
of the poetic act that is performed in the later poems.
‘September 1903’ is made up of three verses, one of two lines, one of five and
one of four. Within these Cavafy employs a complex metrical pattern of 13-11,
12-12-11-12-12 and 11-12-13-1132 that serves to reinforce the use of repetition in
the poem, but also qualitatively to distinguish between the repetitions. This distinc-
tion between repetitions reveals the transformation of the experience by the act of rec-
ollection.
September 1903
At least let me now deceive myself with illusions
so as not to feel my empty life.
And yet I came so close so many times.
And yet how paralyzed I was, how cowardly;
why did I keep my lips sealed
while my empty life wept inside me,
my desires wore robes of mourning?
To have been so close so many times
to those sensual eyes, those lips,
to that body I dreamed of, loved-
so close so many times.33
The poem begins by locating itself in a present ‘empty life’ the feelings of which may
be anaesthetised by self-deception through illusions. However, the second verse does
not present an illusion, but a state of disillusion. It is in the form of a question, begin-
ning with a statement of regret that announces the first of the poem’s many repeti-
tions, here of the formula ‘And yet’ – ‘And yet I came so close so many times’ ‘And yet
how paralyzed I was, how cowardly’. The incantation of ‘And yet’ prefaces two lines
of twelve syllables which, far from evoking a consoling illusion, present the very
feeling of regret that would seem to make up ‘my empty life’.
The experience of the ‘empty life’ of regret is intensified by the question ‘why did
I keep my lips sealed / while my empty life wept inside me, / my desires wore robes of
mourning?’ Here a level of ambiguity sets in that begins to transform the anaesthesia
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of the empty life into something more vital. In what sense are these lips sealed – are
they silent or did they deny a kiss to the lover, or both? The empty life of regret in the
present is subtly located in the past as the cause of the experience of regret. The emp-
tiness in the present of then not having spoken or opened the lips to the lover is the
cause of present not speaking. The weeping empty life of then – the past – becomes
the empty life of the present. And yet, at this point another ambiguity emerges around
the way in which the question is framed: is it ‘why did I keep my lips sealed’ followed
by the suggestion of two answers ‘while my empty life wept inside me, my desires wore
robes of mourning’; or is it a rhetorical question, ‘why did I keep my lips sealed / while
my empty life wept inside me’ with the answer ‘[because] my desires wore robes of
mourning’? The metrical pattern of 11-12-12 is neutral, but the implications of the
ambiguity are considerable. In the first, the tears of the empty life and the mourning
desire are the same, while in the second, the silence and refused kiss as well as the
weeping empty life arise from nursing ‘desires in robes of mourning’.
The second position seems marginally endorsed by the final stanza where the
mourned, but also ‘dreamed of ’ body was indeed loved – but ‘loved-’ with a typo-
graphically striking dash on love- (to be repeated and made the subject of the com-
panion poem ‘December, 1903’). The dash leaves open the question of whether the
dreamed of body was enjoyed or loved in being mourned and dreamed of. The ques-
tion of mourning and the dream is here put in terms of the desired body. What loss
are these desires mourning? How is it that a desire, oriented towards future enjoyment
and fulfilment, should already be mourning the loss of the desired object? Is the object
of desire then impossible – unattainable within human time – or is it that the fulfil-
ment of the desire discharges it? The latter case makes sense of the movement of this
poem, in which the pleasure of the desired, enjoyed and rejected body, a pleasure
unambiguously of the senses, is transformed into another kind of pleasure enjoyed in
a different kind of time.
This is confirmed by the main structural feature of ‘September 1903’, namely rep-
etition, a trope associated by Walter Benjamin with allegory. This concerns not only
the repetitions of ‘empty life’ and ‘And yet’ – the first temporally ambiguous (the link
between the empty lives of the present and the past), the second a formal repetition
– but most significantly the repetition of the phrase ‘so close so many times’. The
phrase, which is itself about repetition, changes meaning through its repetitions and
emerges as the site for the transformation of the pleasure. The first statement of it is
preceded by ‘And yet I came’ which gives ‘so close, so many times’ the sense of an
opportunity repeatedly missed, a repeated approach that never arrived. The first rep-
etition of the phrase, however, finds it changed: at the beginning of the third verse ‘To
have been so close so many times’ suggests regret, but then this is changed by what
follows – for ‘To have been so close so many times / to those sensual eyes, those lips,
/ to that body I dreamed of, loved-’ is a memory of fulfilment, a repeated act of love
with the beloved whose absence now is the cause of the empty life. The second verse
in retrospect (we have turned and are looking back in almost the same way as
Ungaretti in the boat leaving Alexandria) is regret not for unfulfilled desire but for a
desire that was fulfilled, was repeated, but not repeatable to eternity. The latter is
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accomplished in the final line and final repetition of the poem. The past perfect tense
of ‘To have been so close so many times’ becomes, after ‘loved-’ the continuous present
–‘so close, so many times’. Repeated to eternity. In this the moment of pleasure is per-
petuated, and ceases to be a finite encounter or pleasure of the senses and becomes an
infinite pleasure of the soul. The repetition of repetition, rather like the Hegelian
negation of the negation, thus becomes something different, something new.
But then, maybe it is this continuous present of repeated, recollected pleasure that
is the deceptive illusion. The repetition is the illusion, and was always. And perhaps
it is the desire to repeat that is the mourning desire – repetition can never be accom-
plished and so is lost. What is crucial in any decision about the redemptive potential
of repetition now emerges as the meaning of ‘love-’, the theme which is explored in
the companion poem ‘December 1903’:
December 1903
And if I can’t speak about my love-
And if I don’t talk about your hair, your lips, your eyes,
still your face that I keep within my heart,
the sound of your voice that I keep within my mind,
the days of September rising in my dreams,
give shape and colour to my words, my sentences,
whatever theme I touch, whatever thought I utter.34
Set two months after the despair of September and its consoling illusion of repeated
repetition, ‘December 1903’ proposes another solution, although perhaps it will turn
out to be another deceptive illusion. The sealed lips lamented in September are now
granted an allegorical reversal, a movement whose authority is reinforced by setting
the argument within one verse, thus reducing the uncertainty provoked by the breaks
in thought between the verses in ‘September 1903’, but even more so by beginning
with a metrical falter of 12-17 and then proceeding with a remorseless catena of lines
of 15-15-15-15-15 syllables. The attempt continually to repeat the feeling of the prox-
imity of the lover’s body – that feeling of repetition in the continuous present that
would overcome the feeling of the empty life – is abandoned in the first two lines.
Employing an ascetic trope from negative theology, the inability to open his lips and
to speak the lover’s attributes is no longer a cause of suffering and emptiness. By ascet-
ically denying speech, in not speaking ‘about my love-’, not speaking about his hair,
lips and eyes (according to the December catalogue – September evoked his eyes, lips
and body), the silence is no longer born of despair, but of excess. The ‘love-’ which
cannot be spoken, both the beloved and the feeling of love itself, far from being absent
and an object of mourning, now becomes omnipresent – it is everywhere and in every
time. The ascetic denial of the lover, the refusal of the alleviations offered by contin-
uous repetition in September, provoke the allegorical reversal or turn that allows the
lover to fill the ‘empty life’ of the present.
In December, the pleasure of the soul is achieved not by the repetition of love in an
eternal present, but by acknowledging its omnipresence. If the lover’s attributes cannot
be spoken, nevertheless, and here begins the chain of fifteen-syllable allegorical lines,
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his face is kept in the heart, his voice in the mind, and the days of September in dreams.
The lover is totally present – in passion (in the heart), in reason (in the mind) and in
desire (dreams). As such his attributes cannot be analysed or felt, because they are the
condition of all acts of feeling, reason and desire. The ubiquity of the lover is evident
not in the object of words and sentences but in their ‘shape and colour’ – it informs
‘whatever theme I touch, whatever thought I utter’. The latter is both a description
and a promise, a declaration of fidelity that goes beyond a particular beloved and
becomes a condition for life. It is an experience that in another, religious context might
be described as the turn of ‘repentance’ – a looking back that does not provoke the
despair of being chained to repetition.
Postscript
To a certain degree the work of Ungaretti and Cavafy continues to be troubled and
shaped by a series of preoccupations that were already evident in classical Alexandrian
aesthetics. These preoccupations inhabit the margins of the modern aesthetic – they
mark a diversion of the attempt to reduce the pleasures of sensibility to the ascesis of
reason that has characterised aesthetics since Baumgarten. However, they also mark a
moment that is latent in varying degrees to the modern aesthetic – Baumgarten and
Kant both admit the complexity and the errancy of beauty, its movement that does
not necessarily pass from the senses directly to reason, but may take other routes in
other company. Similarly with the theme of pleasure and the body; especially for
Kant, the question of the relationship between interested and disinterested pleasure is
central and by no means given a single or definitive answer. Finally, the religious
undertow of modern aesthetics is rendered explicit and central in the Alexandrian, for
which the questions of exile, diaspora and redemption are ineluctable features of the
aesthetic. This dimension is evident in work as diverse as that of Ungaretti and Cavafy,
both of whom struggle with the questions of exile, loss and redemption. If a conclu-
sion is possible perhaps it should be framed in terms of the wish that these fragments
of an Alexandrian aesthetic will, if nothing else, contribute to complicating and hope-
fully even intensifying the character of the modern aesthetic.
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16 Ibid., p. 517.
17 ‘A sense of death, from the beginning, and surrounded by an annihilating landscape: every-
thing reduced to fragments . . . everything with but a minute duration, everything precar-
ious. I was prey in that landscape, that presence to the reminder, the constant recall of death’
(p. 499).
18 Ibid., p. 505.
19 While not wishing to anticipate a later discussion, this seems an apt point at which to
mention the poem published in Lacerba in February 1915, ‘Il Paesaggio d’Alessandria
d’Egitto’, not published in Il porto sepolto. Contemporary with the other Alexandrian poems
and with the first version of ‘Levant’, it is like them dedicated to producing a ‘landscape’ or
‘panorama’ of the city as spatial and temporal mirage.
20 Ungaretti, Vita d’un uomo, p. 7.
21 Although the first version, the 1915 ‘Supplicants’, is five nights into the voyage, the later
version brings the action back to the night of departure. In the 1919 version the proximity
to Alexandria is spelt out (‘And we finally lose track of the city / and proceed with the sky
above’), as is the nostalgia (‘O my hot country I have nostalgia tonight’), an emotion that
is even more overwhelming in the final version for not being declaimed.
22 The 1931 variant – published in popolo 14 June 1931 – is vaporosamente muore ‘dies
vaporously’ (Ungaretti, Vita d’un uomo, p. 596) the adverb emphasises, perhaps too bluntly
(as in the translation), that death occurs through vaporisation, an observation that is indi-
rectly, mistily, sustained by the adjectival vaporosa.
23 Ungaretti also suggests an archaic sense of morire, namely to extinguish.
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24 The importance of the figure of the funeral procession for Ungaretti will become apparent
below – it is a figure that recurs in his work, most poignantly in his elegy for Moammed
Sceab, who committed suicide in Paris (‘In Memoria’, Ungaretti, Vita d’un uomo,
pp. 21–2). There are few comparable poems in the European tradition, even in the
European modernist tradition, devoted to the sufferings of the immigrants to the European
metropolises – ‘He was called / Moammed Sceab / Descended / from nomadic emirs, com-
mitted suicide, because he no longer had a country . . .’.
25 In ‘Supplicants’ the noisy everyday presence of the emigrant families is emphasised over
their dancing and their music, as is a reference to the cold mist – ‘faceva fredo’ – that sur-
vived into the 1919 version, where the ambient noise of children and their mothers has
been silenced, but where the music is that of a ‘piffero’ rather than the raucous clarinets of
the final version.
26 Ungaretti, Vita d’un uomo, p. 519.
27 I can only speculate on Ungaretti’s motives in choosing this title in 1942, especially given
that a version of the poem under the title ‘Mist’ was published in the fascist popolo in 1931.
28 Ungaretti, Vita d’un uomo, p. 354.
29 C. P. Cavafy, Collected Poems, trans. E. Keeley and P. Sherrard (London: Chatto & Windus,
1998), p. 48, lines 7–8.
30 It is perhaps indicative of the complexity of the memorial strategy employed in the series
that the ‘Days of 1903’ was originally entitled ‘Days of 1907’ – what is important is not
the actual date but the fact that the experiences are datable.
31 ‘Days of 1896’, Cavafy, Vita d’un uomo, p. 105, lines 21–2.
32 For descriptions of the Greek metrical patterns adopted by Cavafy, see Keeley and Sherrard,
p. 190.
33 Cavafy, p. 138.
34 Ibid., p. 139.
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7 Mark Robson
Defending poetry, or, is there an early 
modern aesthetic?
Is there an early modern aesthetic?
Or, better:
What does one call the space currently occupied by aesthetics before aesthetics emerges?
This question appears within the space occupied by what has become known in certain
literary-critical circles as the early modern period, broadly defined as 1500–1700.1
Formulation of the idea of the early modern can be taken as an exemplary moment in
the permeation of a ‘new’ historicism through literary studies since the early 1980s,
most obviously through the twin historicisms of cultural materialism and cultural
poetics (or ‘new historicism’).2 The periodising title early modern is part of a movement
away from notions such as ‘the English Renaissance’ or from ‘the Tudor period’,
although such names are retained by some of historicism’s adherents.3 That the emer-
gence of the phrase ‘early modern’ seems to mark a strategic attempt to delineate what
otherwise appears to be a depressingly familiar ramification of what I suppose we must
now term ‘old’ historicism doesn’t diminish its institutional effectivity.4
One area that has created concerns about the new historicist project is its treatment
of aesthetics. ‘Cultural poetics’, previously Stephen Greenblatt’s preferred term for his
form of criticism, makes clear the expansion of ‘poetics’ into a domain that is no
longer strictly associated with ‘poetry’ (widely conceived).5 Aesthetics has been
expanded as a term within new historicist discourse to encompass any form of sym-
bolic interaction that is susceptible to (literary-) critical analysis. As Catherine
Gallagher and Greenblatt have argued:
In the analysis of the larger cultural field, canonical works of art are brought into relation
not only with works judged as minor, but also with texts that are not by anyone’s stan-
dard literary. The conjunction can produce almost surrealist wonder at the revelation of
an unanticipated aesthetic dimension in objects without pretensions to the aesthetic.6
This sense of wonder is crucial to Greenblatt’s (and Gallagher’s) project.7 Eschewing
theoretical formulations, new historicism favours an attention to ‘particularity’ over
what is considered to be the universalising impulse of more rigorously delineated
critical projects.8 Thus the readings of ‘social energies’ produced, encompassing
objects and practices that are not bounded by an aesthetics that takes art as its focus,
deliberately offer no systematic place for the aesthetic.9 Part of the reasoning behind
this is a desire to avoid falling back into a conservative notion of the ‘special’ quality
of art in which, as Gallagher and Greenblatt put it, ‘The rest of human life can only
gaze longingly at the condition of the art object, which is the manifestation of unal-
ienated labour, the perfect articulation and realization of human energy’.10 Certainly
such an aesthetic idealism does not seem to offer a fruitful avenue for enquiry. But
does a more narrow conception of the aesthetic than that offered by new historicism
necessarily entail such a vision of unity, lack of alienation and perfection? Part of the
purpose of this essay is to suggest that this form of idealism was always an illusion,
but that this does not mean that it can so easily be dismissed.
Tellingly, in the narrative given in Practicing New Historicism, one of the main
impulses behind the authors’ approach comes not from within early modern culture,
but instead from Herder.11 Thus new historicism locates itself within the ambit of
German Romanticism/Idealism and its inheritances, seeking to read the early modern
in terms of an aesthetic that is post-Kantian (although not Kantian) rather than being
itself early modern. This should not be surprising. Indeed, new historicist discourse
frequently foregrounds its imbrication with present concerns, but tends to be selec-
tive about what those concerns are.12 So while it would not be possible simply to avoid
the impact of a modern notion of aesthetics on contemporary critical practices, it is
worth giving further consideration both to the relationship between modernity and
early modernity, and to the role of the aesthetic within modernity itself. It will then
be possible to look to an early modern text on the role and functions of art, Sidney’s
A Defence of Poetry, in order to begin to address more fully my opening question.
Hugh Grady has been one of the most consistently interested critics of recent years
in the modernity of the early modern, and in a series of books he has focused his work
on Shakespeare.13 As Grady has pointed out, however, the term early modern has itself
been employed with a certain degree of ambivalence:
Widespread use of the term early modern expresses much of the ambiguity [around the
question of Shakespeare’s modernity] by positing both continuity and difference: the era
is part of modernity but it’s ‘early’ modernity. While Stephen Greenblatt has called for
something like a revival of Burckhardt’s idea of Renaissance modernity, critics such as
Catherine Belsey and Jonathan Dollimore have followed T. S. Eliot, making of the
Renaissance a premodern transitional age in which discourses from an earlier medieval
mentality overlap newer ones from the Age of Absolutism and an embryonic modernity.14
Leaning more towards what he identifies as Greenblatt’s view, Grady suggests that
rather than seeing Shakespeare (who here almost seems to stand in for the early modern
tout court) as caught between a residual medieval position and a modern humanistic
one (a view which he sees particularly in Belsey’s work), it is possible ‘that Shakespeare
was working from a mentality that was specific to his own phase of early modernity’.15
One aspect of the problem is that the term early modern is a slippery and ill-defined
one for the most part, especially in its relation to the modern, and consequently in
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different contexts ‘modern and early modern overlap and compete with each other’.16
When Grady comes to discuss his sense of Shakespeare’s modernity in this essay, he
provides a familiar set of characteristics which he wishes to call modern: instrumental
reason, power and autonomous subjectivity. Any philosophical notion of aesthetics
becomes submerged in talk of the effects of a ‘postmodern’ aesthetic of discontinuity,
and Shakespeare emerges as ‘distant enough from modernity to be its critic, implicated
in its logic and dynamics enough to speak to us of its unfulfilled possibilities’.17 The
aesthetic here, then, is almost entirely negative. It is seen to be part of a modernity that
it is not significant in shaping in conceptual terms, and its role for Grady is as a marker
of critical distance and a reminder of unfulfilled possibilities. What of the possibilities
that were fulfilled? They are seemingly not Grady’s concern. For Grady, then, the early
modern (as Shakespeare) is not modern, but it remains modern enough to be recog-
nisable in its differences from modernity. This is plausible enough, since anything that
was absolutely different would be unrecognisable. It seems clear, though, that Grady’s
ambivalence to the term early modern hinges on a concept of the early modern that is
itself ambivalent. Further, what lies behind this is a more deep-seated ambivalence
towards modernity itself. Grady’s attempt to find a ‘mentality’ specific to the early
modern period, rather than one defined as between the modern and the medieval,
should suggest that we look more closely at what lies within both modern and early
modern aesthetic discourses.
Aesthetics and modernity
To repeat: What does one call the space currently occupied by aesthetics before aesthetics
emerges? Let me recall what prompted me to consider such a question in the first place.
In part, I was motivated by a series of concerns about definitions of modernity that
necessarily impact upon the emergence of the idea of the early modern. Reading The
Fate of Art, Jay Bernstein offered what seemed in many respects to be a compelling
delineation of modernity, which Bernstein sees as beginning with the Kantian critical
project, remarking that ‘it is Kant’s third Critique that attempts to generate, to carve
out and constitute, the domain of the aesthetic in its wholly modern signification’.18
We have to begin with this wholly modern signification. Outlining Kant’s attempt to
separate the categories in the process of delimiting pure and practical reason, and thus
to establish a division of art from truth and goodness that persists in the notion of
autonomous art, Bernstein notes the crucial role that aesthetics plays in the articula-
tion of Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole. Indeed, the question of philosophical
aesthetics is the question of philosophy as system. For Kant, as for Hegel, the role of
the aesthetic is crucial to the elaboration of a systematic critical project, that is, for the
possibility of the closure of this thought as system. The aesthetic, then, is not some-
thing to be added to philosophy, nor is it simply one branch of philosophy among
others. It is, rather, that which allows for a crucial step in philosophy’s project of com-
pleting itself. We might say that a philosophy without aesthetics is not a philosophy,
and certainly not a critical philosophy. Equally, we must not think of aesthetics in
terms of a category that is separated or separable from this philosophical context, from
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a context which always conceptualises the aesthetic in relation to (in Kantian terms)
theoretical and practical reason.19
Reason, then, always provides the framework for the discussion of aesthetics. The
context for this post-Romantic ‘story’ of aesthetics is usefully reconstructed by
Andrew Bowie, following Gadamer. In a trajectory which stretches from Kant and
Baumgarten through German Idealism to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, Bowie sug-
gests that the crucial aspect of the story of aesthetics is ‘the relationship between com-
peting claims to truth’ but that, as Gadamer indicates, ‘one cannot presuppose that
the nature of the division between philosophy and art can be truly defined by philos-
ophy’.20 In freeing art from instrumental social functions, German Idealism stresses
the role of the imagination in going beyond particular rules of and for art: ‘Instead of
being conceived of principally in terms of mimesis, representation, or entertainment,
art begins to be conceived of in terms of its ability to reveal the world in ways that
may not be possible without art.’21 This is a shift, then, not just in how art is con-
ceived as an object, but also in terms of its functions. The terms which are here being
abandoned, such as mimesis and representation, are central to early modern debates
about art, and to the classical tradition from which these debates are derived, and I
will return to these ideas later. The central thing to note at this point is the connec-
tion between art and truth.
The truth offered or revealed by art is the point from which Bernstein begins. The
categorial separation of domains in Kant’s critical philosophy does not in itself, sug-
gests Bernstein, offer any real problems to those who believe in a notion of enlight-
ened modernity, but it must be related to the parallel move to use aesthetic judgement
to prove the underlying unity of reason. This far less successful Kantian move, argues
Bernstein, opens the space in which it is possible to read the emergence of the critique
of enlightened modernity, since the fragmentation of reason that the categorial separ-
ation reveals may be seen to mirror the fragmentation of modernity itself. This estab-
lishes a line of critical thought that we might for convenience’s sake call Hegelian.
From this recognition of the failure of Kant’s move in the Critique of Judgement, and
its consequences for the idea of the autonomous artwork in modernity, Bernstein puts
forward his notion of ‘aesthetic alienation’.22 In this alienated form, aesthetics suffers
mourning for its separation from reason and morality, and the ‘fate’ of art of
Bernstein’s title refers to this alienation from truth. Having stressed the importance of
a sense of mourning to modernity, Bernstein reads in the third critique what he calls
a ‘memorial aesthetics’, in which pain is brought together with the experience or pro-
duction of pleasure. Bernstein cites Kant’s own example in the third critique of the
possibility of feeling some pleasure in a painful experience, which is that of the
mourning widow who simultaneously remembers both her loss and the worth of her
dead husband. It is tempting to read the widow as an allegorical figure for the posi-
tion of the philosopher who wishes to preserve both the critical and systemic ambi-
tions of the critical philosophy.
For Bernstein, the loss of the systematic unity of Kant’s critical project is not to be
read as a purely negative fall from a rational grace, since the critical element of the
project need not be abandoned. To those who would wish to save Kant from his trou-
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blingly aporetic reading of the third critique, Bernstein proposes that ‘Resistance to
the memorialization of aesthetics on the grounds that it destroys the universality of
Kant’s critical system through the introduction of an essentially aporetic moment, a
non-recuperable indeterminacy at the core of determinate reason, is nonetheless mis-
placed since it ignores the fact that his metaphysics was aporetic from the beginning’,
adding that ‘to ignore the moments of limit and opacity in the critical system is to
render it uncritical’.23 Resistance is, then, misplaced if it is motivated by a desire to
preserve an illusory integrity, since the unity for which it offers to stand guard can
only be sustained by ignoring the critical integrity of the critical system. In other
words, to be critical is more important, ultimately, than to be systematic, and clearly
any system could only be produced through and as a result of the critical integrity of
any rational approach. One way to think through this might be to say that the criti-
cal aspect of Kant’s project is doubled or enfolded, in that it acts as a form of resis-
tance to its systemic ambitions. It remains necessary to be systematically critical, even
if that critical element disrupts the system that it is supposed to guarantee.
It seems pertinent to consider further what relationship Grady’s ambivalent period-
isation bears to Bernstein’s Habermasian characterisation of modernity, and thus to
turn again to the question embedded in my title: is there an early modern ‘aesthetic’?
One of the problems for a historicist attempt to answer this question is that the spectre
of anachronism is involved here, not least because it is well accepted that the term ‘aes-
thetics’ itself is first used by Baumgarten in 1735, and that the system of the arts to
which it refers emerges in the eighteenth century.24 The emergence of aesthetics in this
period marks an attempt to make a decisive shift away from discourses of art that focus
upon rules and prescriptions; in other words, aesthetics emerges as that which is not
poetics or rhetoric. As Cynthia Chase has argued: ‘The rise of aesthetics happens con-
currently with the fall of rhetoric: it is the institutionalised discipline of “Rhetoric” that
is displaced by aesthetics, and it is the power of “rhetoric” that is castigated in the liter-
ature and the politics which in this respect it may be right to call “romantic”.’25 Rhetoric
is not then just replaced; it is explicitly abjected in romanticism. It is this negative val-
uation of rhetoric within the post-romantic tradition that we must think beyond if we
are to encounter that which occupies the space of aesthetics in the pre-romantic period,
and yet it must not simply be assumed that this is possible. In part this is because any
notion of a sudden division of pre- and post-romantic thought is dubious as well as
hard to define, but it is also because any rational enquiry must proceed according to
categories, concepts and procedures fully imbricated with this romantic inheritance.
From cultural poetics to poetics
Certainly, ‘aesthetics’ in the post-Kantian terms with which we are familiar did not
exist in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England, and the matter of aesthet-
ics must be traced in a submerged form in discussions of poetics and rhetorics in this
period, as well as reconstituted from what is frequently a very self-reflexive literary
culture.26 The treatment of rhetoric identified by Chase inevitably raises the question
of what precisely is being abjected. Alongside reading the often prescriptive ‘how to’
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manuals of poetics and rhetoric, it is important in attempting to assess early modern
discourses on art to look to the various prefaces, epistles, dedications and other para-
texts that frame both literary and non-literary texts, as well as to read those moments
in the texts themselves in which their own textuality becomes an explicit matter of
concern.27 Metatheatricality has long been a topic of critical interest in the study of
Renaissance drama, and there are similarly metapoetic and metarhetorical elements
to be found in verse and prose.28
Of course, in constituting this reflexivity, much of this material reflects a classical
inheritance, which often follows and disrupts the ‘Aristotelian’ division between
poetics and rhetoric. The question of poetics is opened up in Aristotle’s work through
an emphasis on mimesis, and all of the poetic forms that he discusses are treated as
‘modes of imitation’, including not just poetry (in the linguistic sense) but also music
(flute-playing and lyre-playing).29 In this, Aristotle is picking up on the discussion in
Book X of Plato’s Republic, in which the poet also appears as an imitator.30 Here it is
part of an argument about the relationship between appearance, reality and truth, and
art is thought of in terms of other forms of making (that is, as poiesis). Again, it is the
relationship of art to truth that is central to the debate. The notably negative concep-
tion of poetry in this section of the Republic condemns poets, like all imitators, to a
position at ‘the third remove from truth’, arguing that ‘the imitator knows nothing
worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play, not
to be taken seriously, and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or
heroic verse, are all altogether imitators’.31 Such a view of art as fundamentally non-
serious and parasitic upon reality continues even into the work of modern (‘analytic’)
philosophers such as J. L. Austin.32
Poetry in this Platonic and/or Aristotelian sense includes everything that we have
come to call literature. Against this emphasis on mimesis in the definition of poetics,
in rhetoric, for Aristotle, ‘The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of
the art: everything else is mere accessory’.33 Rather than being a second-order repre-
sentation of a first-order reality (or in Plato’s terms a third-order imitation of a second-
order reality that is itself a weak model of the Form), the rhetorical dimensions of
linguistic works have a direct impact on the world in working upon the listener or
reader. Since both poetics and rhetoric are primarily arts of language, however, there
are points at which Aristotle’s categories intersect, and as Clark Hulse argues,
‘“poetics” never exists in isolation, and is always overlapping, contesting, combining,
and separating from the other arts, especially the arts of rhetoric, music, philosophy,
theology and even geometry. It is precisely in those zones of interaction that theorists
are best able to work out the important issues of poetics, concerning the nature, func-
tion, and forms of literature’.34 It is for this reason that Hulse employs the term ‘aes-
thetics’, in order to mark the co-implication of poetics with other domains of artistic
production and enquiry, in particular those which are non-linguistic. Yet this does
seem to leave aesthetics as a largely strategic category in which all discourse on art
(broadly conceived) might be contained. As such, it fails to occupy a systemic posi-
tion similar to that envisaged in the Kantian critical project.
This mimetic inheritance can be read a little differently. Translation of mimesis as
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‘representation’ rather than ‘imitation’ offers a way out of the problem posed by the
apparent secondariness of literature, but we need to remember that in the early
modern period imitation does not itself have negative connotations.35 Equally, lin-
guistic arts are frequently related to the other arts, even in attempts to define poetry
itself. As Sir Philip Sidney proposes in A Defence of Poetry, perhaps the most famous
of English Renaissance treatises on art: ‘Poesy is . . . an art of imitation, for so Aristotle
termeth it in the word µµησι [mimesis] – that is to say, a representing, counterfeit-
ing, or figuring forth – to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture – with this end, to
teach and delight.’36 Here we see a positive valuation of imitation (mimesis), but one
that is valued in particular because it has a specific purpose, to teach and to delight.
The figure of the ‘speaking picture’ recognises that the figures and images of poetry
are already metaphorically crossing from language into another realm (and this is, of
course, what metaphor means, ‘to carry across’). For Sidney, both pleasure and moral
content must be present. The teaching invoked here is what Brian Vickers has called
the ethical-rhetorical function of early modern literature, and Sidney recognises that
this lesson is unlikely to be successful if the mode of instruction is unpalatable.37 This
is in part why, for Sidney, poetry is to be preferred to historical writing, or indeed phi-
losophy. Literature, according to this definition, fails to recognise a clear distinction
between poetics and rhetoric, partaking of both in its attempts to delight as it per-
suades. There is seemingly no purity or autonomy to poetics, in that it always attempts
to act within the world, but what is the nature of this action? What is it that litera-
ture as poetry teaches?
The eminence of poetry, for Sidney, comes from the idea that the poet is a maker.
Picking up on the Greek word ποιεν as the root of poetics, Sidney uses this to suggest
that poetry cannot be relegated to the status of mere copying.38 Noting the reliance
of the astronomer, the geometrician and arithmetician, philosophers both natural and
moral, the lawyer and historian, and others, on objects and rules (including in this the
world and nature), Sidney argues that:
Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of
his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature, in making things either better
than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature, as the
Heroes, Demigods, Cyclops, Chimeras, Furies, and such like: so as he goeth hand in
hand with nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely ranging
only within the zodiac of his own wit. Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapes-
try as divers poets have done; neither with so pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet-smell-
ing flowers, nor whatsoever else may make the too much loved earth more lovely. Her
world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden.39
Here, then, is a treatise on poetics that emphasises the possibility of going beyond
rules and prescriptions. Instead of a comparison between nature and art in which the
representation is able to go in only one direction, from nature to art, nature is held
up to the richness of art and is found wanting. There is a line of argument in the
Platonic inheritance that would accept this reversal of the relationship of art to nature
while retaining a sense of art as a secondary manifestation. Here it could be argued
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that art offers access to the Forms that is equivalent to that offered by objects in nature
(that is, to sense-experience), and is thus not tertiary compared to a secondary reality,
but is still no better than secondary. Despite this secondarity, Sidney asserts the pos-
sibility of moving beyond sense-perception, beyond the world, beyond ‘subjection’,
beyond history (conceived of as the constraint of saying ‘what really happened’). What
might be read as irresponsibility in the face of history is revealed to be in the service
of a higher notion of truth. Such a truthful element, which might be seen as a moment
of utopian invention, carries with it (like all utopias) the negative recognition that the
world of the senses from which it is freeing itself is imperfect, or fallen. Such a recog-
nition would certainly accord with Sidney’s Protestantism. But from the perspective
of our discussion, this movement beyond history may be read as an attempt to offer
a truly historical cognition of the world.
In this allusion to a truth beyond a mimetic relation to the world, Sidney is also
able to combat charges that poets are liars. Sidney argues that ‘though he [the poet]
recount things not true, yet because he telleth them not for true, he lieth not’ (53).
The truth lies in the moral example, not in the fiction through which it is conveyed,
and the emphasis is again on persuasion, since as he notes earlier in the Defence, ‘a
feigned example hath as much force to teach as a true example’ (36). The truth of the
true example has no moral validity beyond that of the truth which may appear
through a fiction, but this does not entail upon the writer any necessity to claim that
the fiction is itself true. This insight is not the subject of unalloyed joy, however. Only
poetry can deliver a vision of the golden world, but the pleasure that this produces
cannot free itself entirely of the painful tarnish of its brazen counterpart. Brass is, of
course, an alloy, a combination of elements that could only mistakenly be associated
with purity. The poet may be able to offer a glimpse of this purity, but his status as
maker firmly places his work within the world of objects. Poetry, as defined here by
Sidney, is co-extensive with the world but opens the space for critical engagement with
that world. Its speaking pictures, as mirrors up to nature, open a space for reflection.
Back to modernity
In this context of debates around the term early modern, everything hinges on the word
‘modern’ (although it would also be worth, in another place, pausing over the word
‘early’).40 If we simply abandon the modern sense of aesthetics on the grounds of some
notion of fidelity to periodised chronology, can the concept of the early modern be
retained, or must it similarly be jettisoned? The Habermasian view of modernity that
Bernstein elaborates makes clear the centrality of the aesthetic to its definition, however
alienated that aesthetic may be, and indeed aesthetics is crucial to post-Kantian
accounts of philosophical modernity as modernity. The consequences for those
attached to the term early modern would seem to be that, without the elaboration of an
effective role for what we would now call aesthetics, the early modern will cease to bear
any relation to modernity that might afford any genuinely critical purchase. The force
of the term early modern threatens to dissipate along with the aesthetic, revealing itself
as an indefinable concept, without any referent in the ‘world’ (and there are several pos-
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sible ways in which world might be conceived here).41 In other words, the narrativisa-
tion of modernity that the term early modern implies would reveal that the sense of the
word modern would have to remain open, perhaps even empty. Furthermore, the con-
cept of the early modern would also appear to have no necessary relation to the concept
and narrative of history upon which historicism depends. What seems on the verge
of appearing, then, is a historicism with no securely knowable connection to history. If
historicism does not seem to provide a reliable conceptual scheme, then, how are we to
think about the relationship between literature, aesthetics and history?
One answer would seem to be offered by a return to rhetoric and poetics, here con-
ceived precisely in terms of their combination of persuasion and force with pleasure.
Rhetoric opens the relation of text to world, recognising that language as art (the arts
of language) can only be gifted autonomy through a violent separation. This is fun-
damental to early modern notions of poetics that stress an ethical-rhetorical dimen-
sion to art. It is this dimension that promises art’s connections to truth and cognition.
Early modern discourse on the aesthetic domain itself exhibits an awareness of the
interrelation of pleasure and pain, and this is activated through the dual recognition
that (as part of the world) it always occupies a fallen, secondary position with respect
to a transcendental realm, and simultaneously that any glimpse of that realm is only
possible through an act of invention, imagination or desire. As an act, art does not fall
outside that which is available to sense-perception, but it is not simply bounded by
it. Indeed, it is this doubled or enfolded act of (re)cognition that art makes possible,
both in spite of and because of its secondarity (as mimesis or representation). Kantian
modernity, precisely located in this violent separation and in the mourning that
ensues, is a doubling of the recognition that the interaction of poetics and rhetoric
ensures. Prior to the Kantian critical philosophy is not a happily unified realm in
which aesthetics might be observed in harmony with pure and practical reason, and
this is what spurs Kant on, but the mourning that Bernstein posits is itself an enfolded
version of the pleasure and pain that art produces through and as (rhetorical) force.
Such a force offers the pleasurable pain of reflective thought (of thought as reflection).
Rhetoric and poetics, at the points at which they intersect, always seem to be aware
of their loss (the golden world of unity). Modernity’s sense of loss is thus a doubling,
a double mourning; we have lost the unity of reason, but have also lost the rhetori-
cal/poetical discourse that allowed us to recognise that such unity was always already
lost. The recognition of this loss can only come about through a questioning of aes-
thetics itself; it cannot simply be thought from a position securely ‘outside’ it. Art as
poetics, even before the rise of aesthetics, was always already alienated. This is what
an early modern ‘aesthetic’, in the form of rhetoric and poetics, can tell us.
Notes
A version of this piece was presented in a session organised by John Joughin and Simon Malpas
at Post-Theory: Politics, Economics and Culture, De Montfort University, 6–8 September 2001.
I am grateful to them, to the conference organisers (Gary Day and Andy Mousley), and to the
participants for comments.
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8 John J. Joughin
Shakespeare’s genius: Hamlet,
adaptation and the work of following
Adaptation: the following work and the work of following
The issue of Shakespeare’s uniqueness keeps coming up . . . as cause both for acclaim
and for dismay, together with a repeatedly documented cause for alarm concerning the
indiscriminate appropriation of Shakespeare to underwrite, or to neutralize, cultural and
political oppression. I suppose I am to be counted among those who take Shakespeare’s
‘position’ here as indeed a matter of his appropriability, as when Brecht shows us how to
consider the opening scene of Coriolanus from the side of the rebellious populace. Such
inspirations to appropriation, or counter-appropriation, point a way to articulate our
persistent, or recurrent, intuition of Shakespeare’s all-too-superhuman ‘humanity’.
I imagine this emphasis is prompted by, and finds ratification in, the perception of our
age, in the theatre of the West, as one less of innovation in the composing of plays
(and operas) than originality in their productions or readings, our unpredicted recon-
siderations of works from any period.1
The survival of Shakespeare’s plays continues to demonstrate that literature means
different things to different people in different contexts. To say that this facility for
reinvention and restaging seems to be valued is not to reduce the evaluative to a pre-
scriptive form of interpretation – indeed, the range of ways in which those texts we
now term canonical continue to be valued and reinterpreted, often from diametrically
opposed points of view, suggests rather the contrary.
In considering the question of Shakespeare’s ‘uniqueness’, Stanley Cavell points
us to the simple truth that the continued proliferation of Shakespearean adaptations
and productions, in an ever-burgeoning variety of media, itself confirms that a par-
ticular play’s afterlife is nothing more or less than a constant process of origination.
In doing so, he remains willing to allow that our relation to literature is open-ended
and creative rather than predetermined or rule following, commenting elsewhere that
‘a work such as a play of Shakespeare’s cannot contribute the help I want from it for
the philosophical issues I mention unless the play is granted the autonomy it is in
one’s power to grant, which means, seen in its own terms’.2 Clearly, Cavell is not
seeking a return to an autotelic or self-contained notion of ‘the-text-in-itself ’, much
less some spurious sense of original authenticity or immutable literary value. Rather,
his interest is linked directly to the originary governance of the work of art and the
hermeneutic yield of what he terms ‘our unpredicted reconsiderations of works from
any period’. This surplus potential, manifested by the plays’ ‘appropriability’, is
perhaps especially evident in the case of theatrical appropriation where, as Mark
Fortier reminds us:
Interpretation in the form of theatrical conceptualising or performance . . . can and
sometimes must take license in ways that literary criticism narrowly defined does not. . . .
Theatrical adaptation, especially radical rewriting and restaging of an existing work, goes
one step further: although adaptations of Shakespeare’s work may be driven by a belief
in fidelity to something about Shakespeare, and although in large measure they are forms
of critical and interpretative practice, questions about the accuracy of adaptation have
little practical meaning.3
Theatrical adaptation is arguably ‘less constrained’ than other modes of interpreta-
tion. As such it offers us a way of rethinking the fuller implications of our hermeneu-
tical encounter with those works which are in some sense ‘exemplary’ – not only
insofar as these texts enable continued rewriting and restaging, but also in the sense
that they then often remain paradigmatic, as radical or ‘ground-breaking’ adaptations.
By speaking of these works as exemplary, then, I mean to suggest not only those texts
which survive over a long period of time, but those works which in doing so main-
tain their originary power and thereby serve to extend the ways in which we make
sense of them.4 In this respect, as Fortier’s distinction suggests, it makes little sense to
speak of the ‘accuracy’ of adaptation. Yet this of course raises a series of related issues:
why is it that, even in the case of contemporary evaluations of the playwright’s work,
some Shakespearean adaptations remain more memorable or significant than others?
More problematically still, even if we acknowledge the originary power or qualitative
distinction of some adaptations over others, how can we then do so without merely
reinstalling traditionalist clichés concerning Shakespeare’s eternal value?5
It is evident that the apparent opposition between originality and adaptation actu-
ally needs to be construed more rigorously, and in this chapter I will argue that we
need to theorise adaptation not only in relation to the singularity of our encounter
with exemplary or originary works, but also in terms of our capacity to receive the
‘new sense’ of those works which must by definition remain unprecedented and non-
thematisable. In the first half of my argument this opens the way to a reconceptual-
isation of Kant’s notion of original works in his discussion of genius via the
intermediary concept of the exemplary, and in specific relation to the elaboration of
this term as a central concern of modern aesthetic discourse.6
Rather than regarding Shakespeare as a poor unwitting adjunct of reason or as a
means of underwriting ‘cultural and political oppression’, I want to argue that the
resistance of the playwright’s work to definitive interpretation or conceptual control
might finally turn out to be a far more crucial resource for critical thought, as, only
in understanding the resistance or refusal of the text are we are ‘exposed’ to its other-
ness. In this respect, as Gerald Bruns remarks of Cavell’s account of the hermeneuti-
cal encounter, ‘The idea is not to accommodate the text to our way of thinking but
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to recognize its alienness, its otherness, as a question put to us, such that understand-
ing the text will mean understanding the question, what it asks of us’.7 In reminding
us that the succession of any literary text customarily manifests itself in the form of
exposure to the other which cannot be readily construed or subsumed within the
framework which attempts to confine it, and in emphasising the limits of the herme-
neutical situation, Cavell’s sense of the ethical significance of aesthetic response could
be directly aligned with the work of Levinas and Derrida. In the case of all three think-
ers this means remaining responsive to the irreducible otherness of the other in an
encounter with alterity which is ‘refractory to categories’ and which foregoes philo-
sophical ‘knowing’, if that ‘knowing’ is construed in the narrower sense of mere
objectification.8 In Cavell’s account, the desire for certainty within the modern phil-
osophical tradition is itself exposed as a form of scepticism which barely conceals a
rage at the non-identity of the other. So that, within the hermeneutical encounter, it
is precisely because scepticism is forced to concede the limits of an experience beyond
its grasp that it exposes us to the possibility that we might ‘acknowledge’ the ‘other-
ness of the human’.9
For Cavell, then, if Shakespeare’s texts are philosophical dramas, it is because they
retain an ethical dimension within the limits of those social, historical and linguistic
conventions which simultaneously remain in need of redress and actually conjure an
ethical situation into being. Evidently, these distinctions concerning the locatedness
of our hermeneutic experience and its ethical implications go to the heart of literary
tradition itself insofar as it constitutes a hegemonic process that is dynamic and con-
tingent and which allows for the possibility of intervention as well as future change
and transformation. By Cavell’s ‘measure of resistance’, however, the question of how
we relate to literary texts and the profession of literary criticism (insofar as it purports
to ‘profess’ anything) occurs at a type of limit, and as such it is a matter of unsettling
con-sequence and self-estrangement. The critical act is curiously non-appropriative –
a form of possession that all too often dispossesses – in a process that challenges ‘our
prepossessions, our preoccupations with what we think we know about what our
intellectual or cultural fathers or mothers have instilled in us’.10 Yet insofar as those
texts we recognise as literary continue to offer us ‘new resources for hope’ in creative
forms that promise to transcend ‘existing ways of thinking and feeling’, literary criti-
cism also necessarily embraces the possibility of transformation.11 In either case the
key question remains how can one succeed, or adapt to that which continues to
remind us of the limitedness of our present condition and thereby in some sense
refuses to be followed? This is a fate exemplified to some extent by Shakespeare’s
Hamlet, the proto-intellectual and critic-adaptor to whom I’ll want to turn in the
second half of this chapter.
In summary, then, one might say that each critical act is a form of adjustment, yet
paradoxically adaptation – the work of following as well as the following work –
encapsulates a hermeneutic process that stages the impossibility of following in the
very process of attempting to follow or locate the measure of the work. Yet impor-
tantly how we negotiate, adapt or ad-just to the alterity of adaptation also necessarily
constitutes its own measure of creativity; furthermore the work of adaptation reminds
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us that aesthetic experience is itself dynamic and historically variable. It follows that
in its dependence on an endless adaptation to the other and the non-identical, the
work of following is conjoint with a certain responsibility, or more accurately perhaps,
demands a certain responsibility of us, and in this respect the question of a text’s suc-
cessivity, of how we attempt to measure up to it, or vice versa, might also disclose more
than radical criticism has previously allowed for.
From genius to exemplary work?
To speak of ‘Shakespeare’s genius’ is of course already an act of provocation, evoking
as it does a notion of the ‘transcendent bard’ that the recent historicist turn in liter-
ary and cultural studies has helped to dislodge and demythologise. Yet the refusal to
think of Shakespeare’s work in terms of this most traditional category is curiously
unhistorical, and not only constitutes a failure to engage with the critical history of
what is a key concept in aesthetics, but also arguably comprises a missed opportunity
for the critique and renewal of the category itself. As it appears in Kant’s third critique,
genius is a fairly new concept, yet its critical prehistory includes some clear associa-
tion with the playwright’s work, most notably perhaps in Edward Young’s influential
Conjectures on Original Composition (London, 1759) where, notwithstanding his
‘faults’, Shakespeare is adjudged ‘an Original’ in contrast to Ben Jonson the classically
correct imitator:
Shakespeare mingled no water with his wine, lower’d his Genius by no vapid Imitation.
Shakespeare gave us a Shakespeare, nor could the first in antient fame have given us
more. Shakespeare is not their Son, but Brother; their Equal, and that, in spite of all his
faults. . . . Jonson, in the serious drama, is as much an Imitator, as Shakespeare is an
Original.12
In fact, as Jonathan Bate reminds us, this contest between ‘originality’ and imitation
is as old as the First Folio itself, as, in attempting to account for the source of
Shakespeare’s distinctiveness, the various early dedications to the plays oscillate rest-
lessly between intimations of Shakespeare as a ‘natural genius’ on the one hand, and
Shakespeare as the consummate craftsman on the other – precisely, that is to say,
between the accusation and counter-accusation of originality and adaptation, creat-
ing and making.13
In Young’s treatise, as elsewhere, the focus is as much on ancient exemplars of ‘orig-
inal genius’ as it is on the ‘modern’ and the accent is not exclusively Shakespearean,14
yet by the eighteenth century, as Bate reminds us, a sense of the exemplary status of
Shakespeare’s genius already clearly plays an important literary-critical function
within a more public domain. To follow debates in the pages of The Spectator or the
Tatler during this period, or within the growing archive of commentary and editorial
glosses that quickly surround the recuperation of the playwright’s work, is to witness
something of the potential hermeneutic yield that accrues from the singularity of the
Shakespearean text. Even in its Renaissance context this transformative potential of
literature, as well as its generative power, is clearly bound up with the sense in which
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the ‘principal books’ of a particular age survive as a form of exemplary presiding spirit
or ‘genius literarius’.15 Yet as these discussions become increasingly codified within an
emergent public sphere, Shakespeare’s ‘genius’ rapidly emerges as a category which
reveals compliance with and deviation from the formal aesthetics of which it is part.
Here, the playwright’s refusal to submit to existing rules or to correspond to any ante-
cedent begins to insinuate an important leglislative function, and disputes concern-
ing the nature of Shakespeare’s artistic creativity are crucially implicated in producing
new forms of social interaction and in helping modify the criteria for taste and judge-
ment. In the process of helping to situate and contest existing contemporary cultural
norms concerning truth, value and meaning it follows that, just as Shakespeare
becomes aesthetical, he becomes political and contentious too. So that as Margreta de
Grazia observes, the playwright’s work is central to:
the neo-classical critical tradition of determining Beauties and Faults, an exercise that
required and refined the generally interchangeable faculties of Taste, Judgement and
Reason. Analysis of an author’s Beauties and Faults (Excellencies and Blemishes)
involved major critical issues, the rivalry between art and nature, for example, or between
rules and genius. Dryden was apparently the first to apply the categories to Shakespeare,
but the major eighteenth-century editors from Rowe (1709) to Samuel Johnson in 1765
regarded the judging of Beauties and Faults as one of the editor’s major duties.16
Here again of course Shakespeare’s heuristic function is a direct product of his resis-
tance to interpretation. Indeed as de Grazia reminds us:
Shakespeare is quoted in all these publications – anthologies, editions, periodicals, and
critical essays – because, in all of his irregularity, he offers ‘the fairest and fullest subject
for Criticism’, providing the critic with both positive and negative examples of moral
probity and literary decorum. . . . It was precisely because Shakespeare afforded, in
Pope’s words, ‘the most numerous as well as the most conspicuous instances, both of
Beauties and Faults of all sorts’ that he provided the best material for developing and
refining Taste.17
Viewed in an eighteenth-century context, then, notions of the playwright’s genius
clearly retain a subversive quality that remains beyond regularisation and in so doing
provides the very exception that proved the rule. In the process of making Shakespeare
‘fit’ for consumption Restoration editors, adaptors and critics alike are forced to
concede that in its untheorisable excess the playwright’s work sustains its relative
exclusivity by ‘authenticating’ a claim to validity which is somehow unique, yet simul-
taneously also exceeds the restrictive demands of empirical truth which governs the
neo-classical criticism of the period. In its ‘British’ context, the pressure of situating
these variant truth claims in relation to Shakespeare’s work in some part serves to
locate the inherently contradictory formation of an emergent ‘national literary criti-
cism’ itself. As Christopher Norris reminds us, such is the ‘paradoxical consequence’
of Dr Johnson’s editorial project that:
On the one hand Shakespeare has to be accommodated to the eighteenth-century
idea of a proper, self-regulating discourse which would finally create a rational corre-
spondence between words and things, language and reality. . . . On the other hand,
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allowances have to be made for the luxuriant wildness of Shakespeare’s genius, its refusal
to brook the ‘rules’ laid down by more decorous traditions like that of French neo-
classicism.18
As Norris’s comments suggest, these divergences concerning the indeterminacy and
opacity of Shakespeare’s work go to the heart of key questions concerning the hetero-
geneous affiliation of a native culture and its values, and in time they become the
proving ground for emergent senses of national and cultural identity in other contexts
too. Indeed, discussions concerning the nature of Shakespeare’s genius arguably site
one of the earliest conjunctures through which to view an emergent relationship
between literary criticism and aesthetic theory in something approximating to a
modern European context.19 Yet it is, as Bate reminds us, in Germany that early
English literary criticism marks perhaps its most complex antecedent relationship in
providing a crucial developmental spur to ‘the growth of what we now think of as
Romantic aesthetics’.20 Such is the impact of the playwright’s work that by 1812
Friedrich Schlegel observes: ‘German Shakespeare translations [have] transformed the
native tongue and the range of national consciousness.’21 By the beginning of the
twentieth century Friedrich Gundolf goes still further, claiming that the German
tongue had literally ‘embodied Shakespeare’s Seelenstoff, his anima or “soul sub-
stance”. . . . Shakespeare has not been translated into the German language it has
become that language’.22 As George Steiner observes, ‘The notion is, at one level,
absurd, at another of the greatest philosophic-linguistic interest’.23 Crucially, of
course, in its hermeneutic context the pivot of this ‘philosophic-linguistic interest’
concerns a shift in understanding about the nature of language itself. For German
Romanticism, the semantic indeterminacy of Shakespeare is directly linked to the
emergence of a new native ‘literary language’ which cannot be subsumed under exist-
ing rules, as, beyond the systematic endeavours of modern philology to establish a
science of language, ‘literature becomes the realm of language which arises for its own
sake and is not bound to representation’ or to descriptive analysis.24
In the same tradition, a more explicitly philosophical justification for reading
genius as an acategorical category is provided by Kant’s Critique of Judgement, which
also of course in some part itself sets the agenda of modern aesthetics. Kant locates
some helpful distinctions which serve to clarify several of the points we have touched
on so far. Firstly, in the course of his conceptualisation of genius, Kant confirms that
the ‘product of genius’ could be said to evade definitional procedure insofar as it is
without antecedent.
[G]enius (1) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given: and
not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some rule
. . . consequently originality must be its primary property. (2) Since there may also be
original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e. be exemplary; and,
consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve the
purpose for others, i.e. as a standard or rule of estimating.25
Genius then cannot be subsumed within book learning or ‘academic instruction’
insofar as it exhibits a talent ‘for producing that for which no definite rule can be given
136 Readings
and not an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some
rule’.26 Again this non-subsumability of genius ensures its leglislative (canonical)
function. Moreover, as Kant goes on to remind us, the products of genius are distin-
guished by being exemplary. Paradoxically, this means that whilst genius is beyond
comprehension by standard definitions it simultaneously provides its own measure in
serving as a standard or model for others. In short, as we have already inferred, genius
is rule breaking but also rule making.
As Jay Bernstein suggests, in the course of Kant’s analysis originality ‘becomes
manifest in two modes: destructively and constructively’.27 In respect of the former
the provocation of exemplary items is transgressively to overturn a conventional
understanding of what has previously passed as art. Yet, as Bernstein points out, for
Kant ‘originality must involve more than breaking rules; its deformations must allow
for the possibility of reformation’.28 In this sense the open-endedness of exemplarity
is secured in terms of its successivity and can be construed as ‘serving the purpose for
others’ in providing ‘new ways of making sense’.29 So that as Kant puts it:
Following [succession] which has reference to a precedent, and not imitation is the
proper expression for all influence which the products of an exemplary author may exert
upon others – and this means no more than going to the same sources for a creative work
as those to which he went for his creations, and learning from one’s predecessor no more
than the mode of availing oneself of such sources.30
Again, importantly, Kant distinguishes between imitating and following works of
genius: the former is ‘slavish’ and ‘would mean the loss of the element of genius, and
just the very soul of the work’; while the following work of genius runs the risk ‘of
putting talent to the test’, in ‘one whom it arouses to a sense of his own originality in
putting freedom from the constraint of rules so into force in his art, that for art itself
a new rule is won’.31 This is a crucial distinction and evidently comes close to the idea
of adaptation I have already outlined above, i.e. the work of following as a form of
creative con-sequence.
In one respect Kant’s sense of the succession of an exemplary work could be said
to ‘provide possibilities in the plural, that were not previously available; and . . . may
alter what we conceive those possibilities to be’ only by reference to a precedent.32 Yet
by extension we might say that modern adaptations often themselves only disclose the
provocation of an original work precisely by ‘virtue of succeeding it’.33 Thus such an
affinity through distance might only materialise unevenly over a period of time.
Moreover an adaptor might ‘acknowledge’ the relation between exemplarity and suc-
cession by ‘producing the successive works themselves’.34 This helps us view say Baz
Luhrman’s William Shakespeare’s Romeo  Juliet as disclosing something newly
‘Shakespearean’ in the course of simultaneously constituting its own form of unprec-
edented innovation. Bernstein offers a clarification of the connection between exem-
plarity and succession and the production of succeeding works by referring us to the
example of modernist art:
Here . . . exemplarity means the opening up of new possibilities without the item
or items that do the opening up being able to be accounted for in terms of its or their
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antecedents. Exemplary items provide the measure, with only their provocation, on the
one hand, and succession on the other, ‘measuring’ (without measuring) them.35
In some sense I would want to argue that the production of successive works and their
exemplification of a measureless measure could be construed as analogous to the inde-
terminate process of (Shakespearean) adaptation itself. However, as Bernstein rightly
points out, in conceiving of succession in terms of one genius ‘followed by another
genius’, Kant ‘does not quite see this possibility’ for exemplary works.36 As such,
Kant’s analysis still arguably runs the risk of imposing a uniformity on the potentially
measureless possibilities of the exemplary. Yet as Bernstein argues, this would be to
reduce ‘the indeterminacy of the exemplary instance to unity’ and ‘to reduce the new
rule won through exemplarity to a single case’.37 Meanwhile, insofar as Kant under-
stands the act of genius as constituting ‘free action [and] as creative and legislative
rather than rule following’,38 this also serves to suggest that artistic practice might
itself be open to reconceptualisation in terms of its proto-political and ethical poten-
tial within the public domain. These are possibilities I shall want to return to below.
A thrust enters history . . .
The origin of the artwork is art. But what is art? Art is actual in the artwork. Hence we
first seek the actuality of the work. In what does it consist? Artworks universally display
a thingly character, albeit in a wholly distinct way. The attempt to interpret this thing-
character of the work with the aid of the usual thing-concepts failed – not only because
these concepts do not lay hold of the thingly feature, but because, in raising the ques-
tion of its thingly substructure, we force the work into a preconceived framework by
which we obstruct our own access to the work being of the work. Nothing can be dis-
covered about the thingly aspect of the work so long as the pure self-subsistence of the
work has not distinctly displayed itself.39
We need to push the concept of exemplarity still further. How does one apprehend
the measureless possibilities of the exemplary? And in what sense can we argue that
there is a qualitative distinction in the succession or survival of great works, and their
open disclosure of transformative possibilities over a period of time? Bound up with
how we interpret, remember or testify to the enduring semantic power and signifying
possibilities of literary works, Heiddeger’s remarks on ‘The origin of the work of art’
offer us a more ‘generalised thinking of the Kantian notion of genius’, and in doing
so help tease out the historical implications of exemplary artworks.40
In some sense, as Heidegger’s comments suggest, we need to confront the actual-
ity of the artwork. But then if the artwork or the play is the thing, what type of thing
is it? Heidegger’s key point here of course is that an artwork’s distinct thingly charac-
ter remains beyond the grasp of the usual thing-concepts, which fail because they force
the work into a preconceived framework and thereby obstruct our own access to what
he terms ‘the work being of the work’. As Heidegger implies, conventional approaches
to the question of the authenticity of artworks operate according to a correspondent
model of truth in which art’s relationship to the world is conceived in terms of a naive
mimeticism which posits the truth of an anterior or pre-existent reality, of which art
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is then a ‘true’ re-presentation. So far so good of course, insofar as in ‘displacing the
dominance of the representational understanding of truth and thing’,41 Heidegger is
in agreement with post-structuralism in its critique of those ‘natural forms of reading’
which traditionally presuppose a rather fixed understanding of the value of artworks
and their claim to authenticity.
Yet Heidegger’s essay on the origin of the work of art is careful to preserve a place
for truth or authenticity in the sense that, as the philosopher puts it, art is truth setting
itself to work:
In a work, by contrast, this fact, that it is as a work, is just what is unusual. The event of
its being created does not simply reverberate through the work; rather, the work casts
before itself the eventful fact that the work is as this work, and it has constantly this fact
about itself. The more essentially the work opens itself, the more luminous becomes the
uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than is not. The more essentially this thrust comes
into the open region, the more strange and solitary the work becomes. In the bringing
forth of the work there lies this offering ‘that it be.’42
For Heidgger, this ‘disclosive’ thrust-like dimension to art is one of the ways in which
truth happens. Moreover, ‘art is one of the ways in which history takes place’ insofar
as, as Bernstein puts it, for Heidegger ‘whenever art happens – that is whenever there
is a beginning – a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts over again’.43 If
we extend this sense of the originary power of artworks via the notion of exemplarity
to the notion of great works and their continued epoch-making capacity to set truth
to work, the questions that Heidegger raises clearly go to the heart of the formation
of a literary tradition as an indeterminacy of disruptive settings.
To summarise, then, before moving on: the most effective adaptations are without
anterior motive and as such they cannot claim to copy or ‘lay hold of ’ an original. To
conceive of adaptation as ‘agreement with’, imitation of, or depiction of something
actual44 is to treat adaptation as pre-scriptive in the sense of merely re-presenting a
copy of what is, or to rehearse a restriction which, rather like textual revisionism of
the worst kind, imposes a misplaced notion of fidelity on a unified original and
thereby duplicates a ‘logic of the same’. Most literary and cultural theorists would
concur with this qualification and would agree that in this sense adaptation is fated
never to measure up. Yet there is clearly a qualitative measure which distinguishes
some adaptations from others and this relates directly to a conceptualisation of exem-
plary works as dynamically historical and notably successive. In this respect the event
of adaptation can be locational (epoch-making even) in the difference that it makes.
Indeed its sense of occasion could be said to disrupt and constitute a cultural history
itself. In practice of course theatrical adaptation visits this disclosive, non-uniform,
‘happening truth’ potential of adaptation setting itself to work on an almost nightly
basis, so that as Artaud puts it staging or setting becomes the ‘starting point for theat-
rical creation’:
A performance that repeats itself every evening according to rites that are always the
same, always identical to what they were the night before, can no longer win our
support. The spectacle we are watching must be unique, it must give the impression that
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it is unprecedented, as incapable of repeating itself as any action in life, any event
brought on by circumstances.45
Crucially, as Artaud’s comments suggest, insofar as the work of adaptation ‘works’ it
is because the work of adaptation ungrounds itself on its own terms. What Heidegger
might term the originary thrust of a work, its actualisation, is without antecedent even
as it then ensures its own historical success as a measure without measure.
The play’s the thing . . .
Thou art a scholar, speak to it, Horatio. (I. i. 45)46
In conceiving of a literary tradition as a form of discontinuous history, we are clearly
far removed from traditional attempts to install a fixed or a priori distinction between
‘one kind of writing and another’. In the very act of challenging our critical expecta-
tions exemplary works resist generalisation, and as such literary criticism is forced to
confront the possibility that inheritance (literary or otherwise) is always already
incomplete – a history only of located dislocation and partial assimilation – an expe-
rience which cannot be fully accounted for. Frustratingly, in the course of provoking
thought and in making us think, this also ensures that literary texts are phantoms
which finally resist critical appropriation. And no doubt this is partly because, in their
own way, the questions of how we remember, of being and not being, knowing and
not knowing, are themselves linked in intricate ways to the literary critical ‘event’. For
how can we ‘know’ that which simultaneously remains beyond our full comprehen-
sion? Or even (as Marcellus requires of the scholar Horatio) ‘speak to it’?47
Hamlet of course stages this dilemma of critical finitude in some detail and in doing
so opens with the most evidential of questions, ‘Who’s there?’(I. i. 1), while Francisco’s
response to Barnado’s enquiry ‘Stand and unfold yourself ’ (2) almost immediately
directs us to the question of ‘exposition’ and interpretation.48 In dramatic terms the
staging of the Ghost during the opening scenes of the play effectively restages what
Cavell might term a ‘philosophical drama’ insofar as we are confronted with an entity
that does not fall within conventional bounds of ‘naming’, so that an audience is
forced to reconsider ‘that which one thinks one knows by the name of knowledge’.49
Again of course it is precisely those more traditional or propositional modes of enquiry
which attempt to establish an anterior or predetermined relation to the ‘truth’ that are
immediately called into question here. The Ghost’s arrival cannot be anticipated or
prepared for. Indeed, in keeping with the best literary events ‘it’ appears quite literally
without preamble in medias res (into the midst of things), and ironically, in doing so
it interrupts Barnado’s own ‘Ghost story’, so that, once again, any ordered sense of nar-
rative sequence is further complicated and the boundary between the ‘literary’ and the
‘fictional’ is further blurred. As a result the apparition itself is more real than fiction,
for as Barnado asks: ‘Is not this something more than fantasy?’ (I. i. 57). Again, the
apparition is ‘thing-like’ insofar as it is referred to as an ‘it’, although ‘it’ is used inter-
changeably now with the antique form of he (‘a’) in Barnado’s: ‘Looks a not like the
King?’ (46). Here and in his preceding observation that the entity appears ‘In the same
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figure like the King that’s dead’ (44), Barnado relies on a form of recognition that is
also a form of re-cognition, i.e. a form of cognition that is based on comparison.
Marcellus picks up the same comparison moments later, asking Horatio ‘Is it not like
the King?’ (61). Yet Horatio’s response to Marcellus, ‘As thou art to thyself ’ (62), teas-
ingly suggests that, insofar as an insistence on similitude or likeness depends upon a
sense of difference, then it also constitutes a form of identification that is already split
and divided against itself, insofar as it depends on a self comparing ‘self ’ with self. It
follows that the apparition throws any conventional sense of critical ‘self-possession’
or transcendent detachment into crisis, a situation Horatio (the most ‘scholarly’ and
‘sceptical’ of the observers) is unable to deal with. As a consequence, and as a mark of
his confusion, Horatio the ‘scientist’ is now forced to swear a religious oath that he is
witnessing something than cannot be, but somehow is: ‘Before my God, I might not
this believe / Without the sensible and true avouch / Of mine own eyes’ (59–61).
Insofar as Horatio’s brand of scepticism relies on objective distance and proof the
Ghost is clearly not susceptible to interpretation on these terms. In some sense, then,
he and the others are unable to learn what Cavell characterises as ‘the lesson of skep-
ticism’, namely that ‘the human creature’s basis in the world as a whole, its relation to
the world as such is not that of knowing, anyway not what we think of as knowing’.50
Interestingly enough of course Hamlet – arguably the most performed of all
Shakespeare’s plays – itself pivots around the question of adaptation, in terms of
Hamlet’s staging of the play within the play. And here again of course, in more senses
than one, succession and ‘knowing’ arise as the very nub of the problem, insofar as
the act-event of Hamlet’s own adaptation ‘The Mousetrap’ (III. ii) (with ‘some dozen
or sixteen lines . . . insert[ed] in’t’, II. ii. 535–6) is already an attempt to ‘test’ the ‘accu-
racy’ of the Ghost’s testimony. In some respects of course Hamlet’s problem here is
analogous to the problem we have already faced, i.e. how does one stage what is appar-
ently not there? Moreover the play-within-the-play once again highlights issues relat-
ing to interpretation and performance, insofar as it stages an audience on stage and a
director (Hamlet) hoping to influence the outcome.51 In some ways the failure of
Hamlet’s adaptation (his own attempt to stage the Ghost) is seminally instructive for
those who attempt to direct theatre in anything other than an open-ended fashion –
though, unsurprisingly perhaps, his own response during the play-within-the-play
discloses ‘a desire for certainty’ and empirical evidence as he manifests the rage of the
epistemophile who would pedantically ‘piece out’ and over-interpret every aspect of
the story. As Ophelia observes, later on during the scene itself, ‘You are as good as a
chorus, my Lord’ (III. ii. 240); while, for his part, Horatio assures Hamlet that
nothing will escape his ‘detecting’ (III. ii. 89). Many literary critics have repeated the
same mistake. And in some ways Hamlet’s adaptation has become the editorial and
interpretative crux of the play, as in trying to pin down the ‘meaning’ of Claudius’s
‘response’ to the play-within-the-play generations of ‘scholars’ have effectively com-
mitted the same category error of attempting to preserve the ‘veracity’ of the Ghost
‘at all costs’.52 Yet in this sense, of course, in ‘The Mousetrap’ the ‘burden of proof ’ is
miscast and is the crux on which interpretation must founder, insofar as there can be
no ‘test’ for testimony.
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During the course of Hamlet, then, the attempted adaptation might be cast as an
act of narration in which Hamlet the proto-intellectual will clarify the act of sovereign
succession and rewrite the official history. Yet Hamlet’s ‘excessively goal-orientated
consciousness’ (in terms of theatre direction at least), ensures that both prior to and
during ‘The Mousetrap’ itself, in casting himself as a ‘minor’ dramatist he unwittingly
emerges as what Deleuze might term a ‘despot of the invariant’.53 Because Hamlet
approaches adaptation from a homogenised perspective there is no allowance for the
recursive ‘catch’ of ‘The Mousetrap’ or the surprise of the ‘power of improvisation’. In
brief, Hamlet anticipates a form of revelation or incarnation ‘under the sign of pres-
ence’ and fails to construe the non-originary origin of the event of disclosure. During
his advice to the players, Hamlet condones an instrumentalist approach to the vagar-
ies of performance that negates adaptation. In his desire for certainty he fails to allow
for the fact that literary transformation is a form of what Heidegger calls ‘preserving’
– that is to say ‘letting a work be’ rather than attempting to restore it to what it once
was.54 One might say that the unfathomability of Claudius’s response belongs to an
abyss of the play’s own making, as, however he tries to adapt or modify the conditions
for its reception, it can never be Hamlet’s play.55 Rather like the ol’ mole that burrows
in at the beginning of the play, adaptation works its wiles in displacement. Following
the play within the play, Hamlet necessarily reverts to the onto-theology of a deter-
ministic universe. Or, as Francis Barker memorably puts it, the play effectively
imposes military rule upon itself.56
As the creation of the other, adaptation is without motive, a relinquishment of self
that is also a response to a provocation of the work’s own making. It follows that there
is no way of reincarnating the ‘truth’ or making such a world ‘present to oneself ’.57
Ironically of course, in one further twist, Hamlet’s failure to relate to his world in any-
thing other than narrowly conceived terms of epistemic certainty is already exposed
in advance of his attempted adaptation, during his initial response to the player’s
speech (a speech which itself of course also in some sense serves as a further prompt
to stage ‘The Mousetrap’, cf. II. ii. 584–601):
What’s Hecuba to him, or he to her,
That he should weep for her? What would he do
Had he the motive and the cue for passion
That I have? (II. ii. 553–6)
In some ways Hamlet’s ‘own’ mistaken sense here of not ‘measuring up’ finally returns
us to the importance of the Kantian distinction between imitating and following,
though we might say that he effectively refuses to put ‘talent to the test’ insofar as his
response to the player is one of identification and ‘self-possession’ rather than an
openness to alterity. As Gerald Bruns comments, generally speaking, ‘Hamlet’s desire
for certainty . . . is continuous with his desire not to expose himself to the world
around him’.58 It follows then that despite his protestation of an aesthetic sensibility
his own response to the player’s speech betrays his inability to forego knowing for




Thou art a monument without a tomb,
And art alive still while thy book doth live
And we have wits to read, and praise to give.60
With its talk of tombs and monuments, being and non-being, the question of liter-
ary succession is evidently entwined with what Derrida would term a ‘logic of haunt-
ing’, insofar as its surplus potential is not a matter of ‘the meaning of an original’ but
is always already deferred and infinitely translatable, whether as a form of memorial
or as a trace of a future-to-come. Again, for Derrida, it is important to stress the
heterogeneity of this process. Moreover he does so in direct relation to Shakespeare:
‘This is the stroke of genius, the insignia trait of spirit, the signature of the Thing
“Shakespeare”: to authorize each one of the translations, to make them possible and
intelligible without ever being reducible to them.’61 As Derrida suggests, there is evi-
dently a claim here that is in a certain sense ‘cognitive’ but non-reducible – as such it
is bound to prove unsettling for any humanist in search of authentic originality.
Genius calls us to follow: not in any slavish sense of imitation but rather in the hope
that we gather around the disjuncture that makes following a possibility.
In the case of Hamlet, as we have seen, the official history relentlessly imposes its
own narrative on events and as such it construes the question of memory and related
questions of intellectual inheritance in terms of a more reductive form of identifica-
tion with the past. In doing so it underpins a regime which is based on vengeance and
injustice – we might say that it belongs to the ‘hegemony of the homogenous’. In this
respect, of course, Hamlet’s hyperbolic misidentification with the past is itself uncan-
nily reminiscent of humanism’s own nostalgic yearning for complete restitution. And
in some part the progressive idealisation of Hamlet during modernity as a non-
recuperable figure itself also caters to this nostalgia. In the process, ‘Shakespeare’s
Hamlet’ eventually emerges as a simplifying synecdoche for ‘Shakespeare’s genius’,
and by a further act of association quickly becomes the most readily identifiable rep-
resentation of the liberal intellectual ‘paralysed in will and incapable of action’, yet still
somehow possessing Hamlet’s ‘generalising habit’ and thereby occupying the ethical
and cultural high ground.62 In short, we are presented with a version of intellectual
life at a quasi-transcendent remove, though of course it is a living and an intellect that
remains secure only in its inability to come to terms with what is in effect a produc-
tive melancholic entrapment with the past.
Yet the prompt provided by the example of Hamlet can be construed otherwise,
for as Derrida observes: ‘If right or law stems from vengeance, as Hamlet seems to
complain . . . can one not yearn for a justice that one day, a day belonging no longer
to history, a quasi-messianic day would finally be removed from the fatality of ven-
geance.’63 The play’s provocation, as Derrida rightly reminds us, is to pose the ques-
tion without offering a solution that we can live with – unless, that is, we learn to live
with ghosts.64 In this sense the spirit of Hamlet exemplifies a non-foundationalist peti-
tion to justice that remains unfulfilled, yet it is difficult to see how a criticism which
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claims to be ‘political’ could refuse this call to justice. Again the ad-justment, the move
towards justice, to ‘put yourself in my place’ remains a question of displacement rather
than comparison: an act of adaptation that allows for the creation of the other. Yet in
these terms alone exemplarity itself arguably always insinuates a reconceptualisation
of the political.
Crucially, of course, in burdening himself with restitution at any cost, Hamlet fails
to realise that memory itself is an ethical instant and an opening instance: ‘O cursed
. . . / That ever I was born to set it right’ (I. v. 196–7). In this respect his misappre-
hension of his own legacy proves onerous. After all, one cannot expect a finite subject
to think of all ethical obligations; such a legacy would be ‘inhuman’, though Hamlet’s
legacy to Horatio is precisely a form of inhumanity, as if to bequeath the full-bore
canon of divine law – a type of madness. These questions go to the route of the
problem of Hamletism: Hamlet the intellectual, the literary critic, the philosopher.
The act of inheritance or witness, the aesthetic contract by which Hamlet and human-
ism seem bound, actually remarks nothing more or less than the inaugural aporia of
intellectual life. As Derrida reminds us, ‘the truth of the acolyte who follows without
being fully present is [finally an analytic figure] who accompanies and does not
accompany’65 – a witness who must follow without following. This in turn also comes
close to the freedom implied by Kant’s theorisation of genius, without subscribing to
its subjectivism.
Conclusion
In reconceptualising great works as ‘successful’ we might say that rather than adapt to
circumstance, or adjust to new conditions, they (great works) continue to precipitate
crisis on their own terms as well. It follows that some of the sharpest appreciation of
the dislocationary potentiality of adaptation of great works comes from those who
remain open to what we might term after Derrida the continued ‘emergency’ of adap-
tation, and who adopt a stance towards adaptation which is both interruptive and
‘presentist’ in terms of its critical orientation. In Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the
Philosophy of History’, for example, adaptation (‘blasting a specific work out of the
lifework’, etc.) surfaces as a recurrent preoccupation. Yet again, for Benjamin, we
might say that, configured in these terms, the work of adaptation draws us together
in a ‘fitting’ way only by being uniquely ‘out of joint’. Opposed to the empty quan-
titative homogeneity of historicism his ‘materialist historiography’ is nonetheless
based on an adaptive ‘constructive principle’ and as such it elicits a qualitative
response, engendering what he terms elsewhere ‘a unique experience with the past’.66
In short, Benjamin’s ‘constructive principle’ makes for an uncontainable ‘presentist’
type of moment which is no less fully historical for letting ‘history happen’ even as it
marks a messianic cessation of happening.
For a range of theatrical adaptors of Shakespeare including Brecht, Artaud, Heiner
Müller and many others, the ungrounding of adaptation aligns itself with the new aes-
thetic of a revolutionary theatre, which in its estrangement reactivates a ‘political con-
sciousness of the present’ both in provoking an audience and in potentially transforming
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established modes of cognition. Yet it would be wrong to speak in terms of the motive
or agenda or ‘aim of adaptation’, not least insofar as ‘the political effects of such a theatre
cannot be foreseen’.67 Rather, in adaptation, as in Benjamin’s sense of Janzeit or time of
the now, we witness a teleology that undermines telos and where ‘origin is the goal’.
Maybe this is simply to say that, like history, adaptation works itself out behind the
backs of the actors. This means that while successful revivals are name-making and
epoch-making within the actualising thrust of adaptation itself, as Heidegger puts it,
‘the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passage-
way that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge’.68
Paradoxically, even while the most successful Shakespearean adaptations could be
said to ‘belong’ to others – Brook’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Césaire’s Une tempête,
Müller’s Hamletmachine, etc. – no one can ‘own’ the event of adaptation itself. Or at
least one could say that adaptation stakes its claim for ownership in non-proprietary
terms, or that if adaptations ‘catch on’ or are successful it is because they possess an
‘originary governance’, or again, that they are unmeasurable works which then
measure future productions. Finally, as Hamlet teaches us, there is no setting it right.
Adaptation implicitly conjures forth an ethical relation with an other in that it
acknowledges an irreducible excess of things being out of joint. Yet how we negotiate,
adapt or ad-just to the alterity of adaptation itself inevitably constitutes its own
measure of creativity rather than following the rule. In this sense to adapt is also to
ad-just – to move towards justice or rather to open up what Derrida might term the
indeterminate future-to-come of justice itself. And in this latter sense, of course, there
is no adapting to adaptation. As the ‘creation of the other’, adaptation is without
motive, a relinquishment of self that is also a response to a provocation of the work’s
own making. In this respect just as the exemplary work measures its work as succes-
sion, then maybe adaptation could also be construed as the interval between adapted
works. In fact we might say that the interval between works ‘presents’ itself as the non-
determinable condition of adaptation itself, a summoning forth to further adaptation
yet beyond the director’s will.
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9 Robert Eaglestone
Critical knowledge, scientific knowledge
and the truth of literature
Introduction: criticism has the character of knowledge, but it is not a kind of
scientific knowledge
At the now-famous conference at Johns Hopkins University in 1966 that introduced
both structuralism and what one could call, roughly, ‘post-structuralism’ to the USA,
the critic Georges Poulet meditated about the nature of reading:
a book is not shut in by its contours, is not walled up as in a fortress. It asks nothing
better than to exist outside itself, or to let you exist in it. In short, the extraordinary fact
in the case of a book is the falling away of the barriers between you and it. You are inside
it; it is inside you; there is no longer either outside or inside.1
In the conversation afterwards, he said that ‘criticism has the character of knowledge,
but it is not a kind of scientific knowledge’.2 The ‘new aesthetics’ – like all good names,
a tag given to it by its enemies – seems to be an attempt to explore this position. In
as much as it is a movement, it argues that the truth of art and the knowledge art gen-
erates are not the same as the truth of science and its knowledge. In turn, this reveals
a mismatch between the way a text is experienced and how it is usually discussed by
the disciplines that analyse it. These disciplines (forms of ‘literary criticism’) often,
and usually implicitly, claim to offer a knowledge about the text that is true in the
same way scientific knowledge is true: as if criticism did have the character of scien-
tific knowledge. The ‘new aesthetics’ and its view of art are set against this claim.
However, to take the argument a step further, if, as Bernstein, Bowie et al. argue, the
character of art and of criticism is not scientific, what sort of knowledge can it claim?
What are its characteristics? The ‘new aesthetics’ seems to leave hanging the question
of what sort of knowledge criticism can have. The aim of this essay, then, is to explore
the claim about truth that lies at the centre of the ‘new aesthetics’ and to see what it
might be possible to know about art in a ‘non-scientific’ way.
Truth and art: truth as correspondence and aletheia
A significant strand in a range contemporary philosophy concerns the ways in which
truth is to be understood. To simplify: there are two different conceptions. One
(Putnam calls it ‘metaphysical realism’), is the belief that truth ‘involves some sort of
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets
of things’: the agreement or correspondence of a judgement, assertion or proposition
with its object.3 This is the ‘common or garden’ sense of truth, often identified with
scientific understandings of the world. Assertions made under this way of understand-
ing truth can, given the right circumstances, be proved or disproved. However, this
model of truth – by far the most widely accepted and dominant model – seems to
exclude much that people find of great value: visions of how the world was, is and
ought to be, things that are core for people’s personal and communal identity, feel-
ings and judgements.
These are illuminated by another conception: another sense of truth which
involves or invokes ‘who we are and how things are in the world’. Some thinkers have
argued that this ‘existential’ truth lies outside the realm of ‘truth as correspondence’
and is more ‘true’ to these concepts, ideas and feelings. This distinction is central to
Andrew Bowie’s work. Suggesting that ‘many of the most important philosophical
questions lead inevitably to issues connected to art’,4 he argues that, in the hermeneu-
tic philosophical tradition at least, this understanding of truth is intrinsically involved
with art
via the claim that art reveals the world in ways which would not be possible without the
existence of art itself – a version of this view can be ascribed to Schlegel, Novalis,
Schleiermacher, Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno and Gadamer . . . Truth here is seen in
terms of the capacity of forms of articulation to ‘disclose’ the world.5
For Bernstein, too, ‘art and aesthetics . . . appear as somehow more truthful than
empirical truth . . . more rational than methodological reason, more just than liberal
justice . . . more valuable than principled morality or utility’.6 This is not to argue that
art, and the world disclosed in art, are simply ‘more true’ than truth as correspon-
dence, that ‘art and aesthetics are true while truth-only cognition, say in its realisation
in the natural sciences, is false’.7 Rather, it is an attempt to think through ‘what truth,
morality and beauty (in its primary instance: art) are when what is denied is their cat-
egorical separation from each other’.8 It marks, as far as I can see, an absolutely oppo-
site position to Peter Lamarque’s and Stein Haugom Olsen’s work, seemingly on the
same topic.9
Heidegger, perhaps, offers the strongest discussion of this view, principally in Being
and Time and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, by arguing that truth is unveiling.10
Dahlstrom argues that from the very ‘outset Heidegger runs up against the logical
prejudice of conceiving truth primarily as a property of a proposition. This prejudice
abets and is abetted by the notion that theory and scientific knowledge, as so many
systematic sets of true assertions, form the endgame of philosophy’.11 Heidegger, in
Section 44 of Being and Time, argues that truth as correspondence relies in turn upon
a more primordial understanding of truth: the idea that truth is an uncovering or what
he calls aletheia. Heidegger is not saying that ‘truth as agreement’ or as correspon-
dence, or ‘propositional truth’, is wrong: his philosophy is ‘not at odds with logic’.12
Rather, he is arguing that the ‘traditional’ understanding of truth comes from and
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relies upon more primordial truth and, in turn, this ‘being-true’ is possible only ‘on
the basis of Being-in-the-world’. James Dicenso cites a very illuminating remark by
Ortega y Gasset which predates Heidegger but captures his sense well:
once known, truths acquire a utilitarian crust; they no longer interest us as truths but as
useful recipes. That pure, sudden illumination which characterises truth accompanies
the latter only at the moment of discovery. Hence its Greek name aletheia, which orig-
inally meant the same as the word apocalypsis later [did], that is, discovery, revelation,
or rather, unveiling, removing a veil or cover.13
The question that arises, then, is this: what is revealed in this aletheia, this primordial
revelation of truth? The answer to this is, in part, in Heidegger’s essay ‘On the Origin
of the Work of Art’. Bernstein argues that this essay is not only central for understand-
ing Heidegger but is a response to Kant. Very roughly, Bernstein argues that Kant sep-
arates the domains of understanding and reason – those that create assertion, truth as
correspondence – from the domain of judgement – the faculty that appreciates beauty
and art. It is this division that both formalises the separation of these two forms of
knowledge and institutes the first as superior to the second. However, as Bernstein
argues, this separation is complicated in Kant since judgement is entwined with ‘com-
monality, communication and sensibility’ and being ‘capable of . . . judgement . . .
and being human appear to be consubstantial’.14 An ‘attunement between us and
things’ is also ‘an attunement between persons’ and points to, or relies on, our being
with others, our ‘common’ or ‘communal sense’ (‘sensus communis’).15 Putting the ‘tra-
ditional’ conception of truth as assertion at the summit of philosophy is exactly the
gesture Heidegger has been criticising, as it forgets Being. So, for Bernstein, the ques-
tion the essay tries to answer is: what was ‘art’ like before this separation (of ‘truth’ and
‘art’) became taken for granted? Only by answering this can we see what the work of
art is and does, and so, in turn, what is revealed in aletheia.
In ‘On the Origin of the Work of Art’ Heidegger argues that artworks do not
simply represent reality as assertions do (although they do do this). More importantly
and more fundamentally, they open up or ‘unconceal’ the world. A Greek temple
‘opens a world’, an artwork transforms ‘our accustomed ties to the world’.16 Art is able
to break ‘open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than usual’
because of its nature as what Heidegger names ‘poetry’.17 It is ‘poetry’ because lan-
guage is the paradigm of how all artworks work, since ‘language alone brings what is,
as something that is, into the Open for the first time’.18 Thus, for Heidegger, the
‘nature of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth . . . art
lets truth originate’.19 An artwork reveals its – and our – world; it ‘gives to things their
look and to men their outlook’.20 It reveals who and how we are, and how things are
for us. It does this both by ‘defamiliarising’ what we take for granted in the world and
so drawing attention to it but also, and in the same opening, drawing attention from
‘the ordinary and particular to that which lets the ordinary and particular have their
peculiar shape and meaning’: the world.21 There is no ‘content’ in a simple sense: truth
reveals a world into which ‘content’ is put. This world, unveiled in an artwork, will
vary from work to work: the world of a Greek temple is not the world of a Van Gogh
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painting nor the world of Ulysses, Midnight’s Children or Heart of Darkness. Yet, this
understanding of truth as unveiling a world cannot be reduced to truth as correspon-
dence, but opens and shapes a world. As Heidegger writes later,
Insofar as truth is thought in the traditional ‘natural’ sense as the correspondence of
knowledge with being demonstrated in beings, but also insofar as truth is interpreted as
the certainty of the knowledge of Being, aletheia, unconcealed in the sense of the
opening, may not be equated with truth, rather, aletheia, unconcealment thought as
opening, first grants the possibility of truth. For truth itself, just as Being and thinking,
can only be what it is in the element of opening.22
That is, aletheia is the opening of a world on which truth as correspondence rests.
First a world is established, opened, then truth claims in that world are made. This is
a way of explaining philosophically the experience of art Proust describes:
the original painter or the original writer proceeds on the lines of the oculist. The course
of treatment they give us by their painting or by their prose is not always pleasant. When
it is at an end the practitioner says to us: ‘Now look!’ And, lo and behold, the world
around us (which was not created once and for all, but is created afresh as often as an
original artist is born) appears to us entirely different from the old world but perfectly
clear.23
A Matisse or a Picasso, or a poem like Paradise Lost, first opens a world before we can
ask questions of this world. And it is the idea that art reveals or opens to a truth that
is ‘beyond’ or different from ‘truth-only cognition’ that underlies the ‘new aesthetics’.
The truth of art and ethics (and anxiety, irresoluteness, conscience, death)
The ‘new aesthetics’ seems to go further than this, though: both Bernstein and Bowie,
drawing on Adorno, argue that it is through art, through this kind of revelation of
truth, that an ethical critique can be made of the ‘truth only cognition’ characteristic
of modernity.24 Bowie argues that a conception of reason (and politics – I do not think
the two can be separated) which fails to take account of aesthetics is potentially dis-
astrous, as it is, for example, when the conception takes the form of contemporary sci-
entism, or when it is unconcerned with the need to find ways of communicating
rationality that will have a broad social resonance.25 Bernstein writes that art ‘is the
critical self reflection of truth-only cognition and its conscience’.26 In his recent book
on Adorno, Bernstein describes what he calls ‘Ethical Modernism’: the radical claim
that all the rational authority of modern moral norms and principles derives from
fugitive ethical action and experience. Fugitive ethical experiences reveal the becom-
ing modern of the ethical; by modern, I mean that conception of it which Adorno
sees exemplified in modernist works of art. Thus, what is revealed by certain rare
moments of ethical experience is an ethical modernism, that is, a fully modernist com-
prehension of the ethical.27 Art here, in the form of offering a fugitive ethical experi-
ence, is, for Bernstein, one part of a source for ‘a challenge to contemporary moral
thought as well as a substantive alternative to it’.28
Although Adorno was opposed to Heidegger in many ways (illustrated by the first
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part of Negative Dialectics, for example), he shared some of the same philosophical tra-
jectory, over the issue of truth at least. (Indeed, Bowie argues that Heidegger’s con-
cerns are not ‘a total novum’ and ‘map onto the dominant concerns of Romantic
philosophy and the history of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy’; if so – and
Bowie makes the case very strongly – this contiguity is hardly a surprise.)29 Adorno
writes of Benjamin that his
writings are an attempt in ever new ways to make philosophically fruitful what has not
yet been foreclosed by great intentions. The task he bequeathed was not to abandon such
an attempt to the estranging enigmas of thought alone, but to bring the intentionless
within the realm of concepts: the obligation to think at the same time dialectally and
undialectally.30
That is, Benjamin’s work, and the task Adorno takes up, is an attempt to bring into
the ‘realm of concepts’ – philosophy – that which stands outside it (think of, for
example, the role of the divine language in Benjamin’s ‘The task of the translator’, or
of the messianic in his ‘Theses on the philosophy of history’). Bearing in mind the
differences between Benjamin and this tradition, much post-Heideggerian thinking
– including the hermeneutic tradition and the French phenomenological (and so, in
part, post-structuralist) tradition – can be understood in an analogous way. In trying
to explain the development of Heidegger’s thought from Husserl (and not forgetting
Heidegger’s attempt cover up this influence, including his excision of his acknowl-
edgement to Husserl in the fifth edition of Being and Time in 1941),31 Dahlstrom
writes that the
young Heidegger sees something that largely escapes Husserl’s intellectual radar, namely
that the phenomena constituting religious experience, phenomena at the core of time-
liness and historicity of human existence, do not readily admit, if at all, of a scientific
comprehension. Just as importantly, he has – or better, comes to have – a conception of
philosophy that would be imperilled if it either ignored these phenomena or attempted
to secure them in a theory. The religious experience calls human beings back to such
existential phenomena as anxiety, irresoluteness, conscience, death, not for the sake of
theoretical closure but for the sake of opening human beings up to the disclosure of the
original sense of these phenomena. So, too, philosophy, as Heidegger conceives it, must
retrieve the phenomena for analogous purposes.32
Heidegger wants to bring these religious experiences (‘anxiety, irresoluteness, con-
science, death’) into philosophy.33 It seems to me that, although it may be a risk to
invite these, and similarly unreasonable motivations (the desire to do good?), into
philosophical thinking and certainly into how we understand literature, it is a risk well
worth taking.34 That this risks something worse seems to me to call for vigilance, not
its elimination from thought.
The experiences of ‘anxiety, irresoluteness, conscience, death’ and the like that
Heidegger and others sought to bring into philosophy are not, or are not only, or need
not only be, religious experiences. They are also literary experiences, as thinkers about
art, from Aristotle (‘fear and pity’) to the present, suggest. This is not to say, with so
many, that religion and literature are the same (not, pace the highly significant and
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influential Newbolt Report of 1921, that ‘literature is not just a subject for academic
study, but one of the chief temples of the Human spirit, in which all should worship’
and that the ‘professor of Literature in a University should be . . . a missionary’).35 It
is to say, though, that the literary experience also calls for ‘anxiety, irresoluteness, con-
science, death . . . for the sake of opening human beings up to the disclosure of the
original sense of these phenomena’: (this is surely one reason why religion and litera-
ture are often mistaken for each other). This is true of, for example, the Kafka aphor-
ism about the need for books that, like axes, break the frozen sea within us or – in a
longer analysis – Kermode’s discussion of the relationship between death, apocalypse
and literature in The Sense of an Ending. In this way, the ‘new aesthetics’ reveals –
contra its defining critics Beech and Roberts – that how we conventionally discuss
texts fails to take these profound experiences into account: pace Adorno on Benjamin,
criticism fails to bring what is outside criticism into criticism. Being able to taxonom-
ise Shakespeare’s prosody or discuss his historical context is not the same as being
moved by his plays – and it is the ‘being moved’ that we want to investigate. So this
begs a question; indeed, from the point of view of the ‘new aesthetics’, it begs one of
the questions.
‘What is it about the art work that . . . ?’
If a work of art does offer a different sort of truth to what Bernstein calls ‘truth-only
cognition’ – if the ‘new aesthetics’ is onto something – then just what is it about the
artwork that does this? What sort of knowledge does this? What is it about, say, a
picture of a pair of shoes (the painter’s or a peasant’s) or a day described in Dublin
with adultery and an advertising canvasser that actually does this? And how might we
discuss this without simply, say, presenting the artwork again?36 (Is this a version of
the question: what makes a great work of art great?) One thing that the ‘new aesthet-
ics’ seems to reveal is the inability to answer these questions in conventional critical
discourse. But does it offer any way of resolving this disjunction?
In one sense, clearly, ‘what is it about the artwork that . . . ?’ is a mistaken ques-
tion that leads to a mistaken answer. (What thing in a novel reveals truth? The descrip-
tion of the freezing, starving army retreating from Moscow? The suffering of the main
character? The adverbs? A banal and meaningless list.) Just as we do not feel molecules
of air pressing against us, we feel the westerly wind, similarly we do not respond in
this deep way to ‘characterisation’, say, or ‘blocks of colour’ or to ‘metaphors’ in a work
but to the whole work as a whole work. Works of literature ‘present’ themselves and
do not ‘re-present’ themselves. To begin to break down an artwork (‘character’, ‘plot’,
‘themes’) in this way is already to treat it as an object of almost of ‘natural science’ to
be looked at in a ‘scientific’ way: and so – while issues which we might call ‘literary
craft’ might be more easily foregrounded in this way, and this is not unimportant –
hoping to find the ‘truth ingredient’ in this way is mistaken.
The ‘what is it about this artwork that . . . ?’ question may also be a mistaken
because it may be that each work of art reveals truth in a unique way which, if it
allowed for any description, would ask for a unique description or act of criticism,
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one for which no rules of description or criticism, would fit. Perhaps only an innova-
tion in critical language would be able to describe it. (This is perhaps what happened
with Anglo-American literary modernism: the practitioners – Eliot, Woolf, Pound –
had to be great critics as well as great artists in order to describe and think through
what they were doing. Perhaps it is a pity that some of them – the racist and fascist
Pound, for example – didn’t think some more, or along different lines.) Yet can there
be an altogether new language, let alone an altogether new critical language? Or
perhaps no critical metalanguage could describe a work, leaving all ‘criticism’ to take
place in new acts of artistic creation (‘All serious art, music and literature is a critical
act’).37
But if this is a mistaken question, it seems we are left in a position where one would
just present ‘a great work of art’ – to an audience, to a seminar, to a society – and let
them appreciate it or not. It seems to me that learning to engage with art does not just
happen in this way: that, rather, there is a process of learning to attend to art in certain
sorts of ways. This does not mean that one could not develop other ways, or that there
are not in fact numerous (and perhaps conflicting) ways of attending to an artwork.
(‘I was deeply moved by this novel even though I had to sit an exam on it’.) But it
does mean that there are things to which one’s attention can be drawn; this is one of
things that teaching might be. There must (mustn’t there?) be something about a great
artwork that allows it to open towards, or to embody, or to be, this ‘different sort of
truth’. This ‘something’ is something we can talk about or, perhaps, talk around if we
cannot name it directly (this is not an aesthetic mysticism). Stendahl’s The Red and
Black offers something other than (just) a history of France in 1830 or a satire on a
conventional, generic Bildungsroman or a textbook on the psychology of love, ambi-
tion and hypocrisy or any other point of comparison.
Here an inadequacy in the language criticism uses to describe literature is made
clear. This inadequacy is not at a ‘surface’ level: we all know what plot means, or meta-
phor. Nor is at the level of philology or literary history (‘Hardy died in 1928’). This
inadequacy is at the level ‘before’ these terms and on which these terms rely, the level
of describing what it is about the work that grabs us. When somebody says they like
a work because they identified with a character, or because of the ‘way it was told’, or
because they like ‘that sort of story’, these are often thought of as naive reactions; in
fact, they are the more primordial reactions. The (scandalous) inadequacy of much
critical discourse is that we can’t really do better than that: that while we use terms
like ‘identification’, ‘form’ and ‘genre’ (to choose just three examples from many), and
indeed base a whole critical industry on these terms and others like them, we don’t
have much of an idea what they actually mean or how they work. We take these terms
for granted and so ignore them.
What does ‘identification’ mean?
For literature ‘experts’ (who are, exactly?), of course, reading is often considered to be
much less ‘naive’ than ‘identification’, but I still think it apodictically true that for
most people, and even for those employed to read and teach prose narratives, whether
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‘literary’ or ‘historical’, identification is part of how and why we read: ‘an embarrass-
ingly ordinary process’, one so common and taken for granted that critics often
neglect to examine it, like the spectacles forgotten at the end of one’s nose.38 And, like
these spectacles (the sole joke in Being and Time, as it happens), it works best when it
is not noticed. When it is cloying, mawkish or over-heroic, or when readers find texts
sexist or racist or unacceptable (‘Am I that name?’) a ‘dissonance’ appears.39 Yet, when
they work, as Diane Fuss writes, identifications
are the origin of some of our most powerful, enduring and deeply felt pleasures . . . the
source of considerable emotional turmoil, capable of unsettling or unmooring the pre-
carious groundings of our everyday identities . . . Identifications are erotic, intellectual
and emotional. They delight, fascinate, confuse, unnerve, and sometimes terrify.40
In her insightful book, Psychoanalysis and the Scene of Reading, Mary Jacobus
approaches these issues by using ‘British object relations psychoanalysis, particularly
the version of object relations theory associated with contemporary post-Kleinian
thinking’, aiming to explore ‘the question of how things get, so to speak, from the
outside to the inside – simultaneously establishing the boundary between them and
seeming to abolish it’.41 Yet the phenomenon is described as clearly in the high
Victorian idiom of Robert Louis Stevenson, who wrote that the ‘plastic part of liter-
ature’ is ‘the highest and hardest thing to do in words’. Once ‘accomplished’, he con-
tinued, it ‘equally delights the schoolboy and the sage . . . Compared with this’,
Stevenson continues, ‘all other purposes in literature . . . are bastard in nature, facile
of execution and feeble in result’.42 These powerful moments are moments of iden-
tification, for ‘we push the hero aside; we plunge into the tale in our own person and
bathe in fresh experience . . . Fiction is to the grown man what play is to a child; it is
there that he changes the atmosphere and tenor of his life’.43 Both these in their differ-
ent ways attest to the revelatory power of identification and to its centrality in the ways
in which an artwork reveals a world. Identifications are also complex, able to ‘reverse
and disguise themselves, to multiply and contravene each other, to disappear and to
reappear years later’.44 The process of identification is also part of how we think more
critically about reading: whenever a book or article discuses ‘identity in such and such
a novel’ it relies on the concept of identification with (say) characters, without explain-
ing how that identification might arise in the first place. This is not to say that
accounts of identity formation (like Butler’s basically Hegelian paradigm, for
example) are not accurate (if, for Butler, identity is constructed through parody of
texts – literary, living – this is to say identity is a sort of parody: but it does not explain
why or how it happens). It is to say that these sorts of accounts do not explain how
identifications work, how they get from text to subject, or how they have such power.
Indeed, for example, even in the discourse of psychoanalysis, the most likely place to
find such an explanation, Fuss finds that
the psychoanalytic literature on identification is littered with taxonomic qualifiers that
seek to identify, with greater and greater precision, modes and types of identifications:
primary and secondary, feminine and masculine, imaginary and symbolic, maternal and
paternal, idiopathic and hetereopathic, partial and total, centrifugal and centripetal,
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narcissistic and regressive, hysterical and melancholic, multiple and terminal, positive
and negative.45
Fuss goes on to suggest that this ‘often incongruous proliferation of kinds of identifi-
cation points to a theoretical difficulty psychoanalysis must routinely confront in
laying hold of its object, a difficulty, that is in identifying identification’.46
And, yet, this thing we cannot identify or explain clearly is crucially important
because, as Lacoue-Labarthe says, the
term ‘identification’ is, however, borrowed from Freud, because it is ultimately the only
one we possess to designate what is at stake in the mimetic process and, above all, because
once eased out of its aesthetico-psychological context, in which it in fact remains prob-
lematical, it can be drawn into the stronger network of the proper (or own: le propre)
and appropriating, of appropriation and de-propriation or disappropriation etc.47
That is, identification is the basis of politics (‘We, the people . . .’) and so is involved
with art. What is at stake in the mimetic process is identification, which is what makes
up the political (thus, the politics of deconstruction: ‘an interrogation of the mime-
tologism and essentialism and hence of the metaphysics of presence’).48 Clearly the
process of identification in reading novels is part of the revelation of ‘how the world
is for us’ and part of the way that art changes the world. (How else was Don Quixote
the ‘novel that laughed Spain out of chivalry’?)
And yet, although it can be described, it cannot be, has not yet been, explained or
defined. Perhaps, except for terms that are either vague (Stevenson’s ‘bathing’, for
example) or too precise to be useful outside a highly specific situation (Fuss’s list of
psychoanalytic taxonomies), there can be no strict definition, no one ‘pinning down’
of this fundamental experience that is part of reading, part of the revelation of truth
in a work; but that does not mean that we should not talk about it. Indeed, to think
that without a strict definition it is impossible to use this term, or discuss this experi-
ence, is the sign that criticism has misunderstood itself, and thinks that it is a (partic-
ular sort of ) science, aspiring solely to ‘truth as correspondence’ and passing over the
way that a world is revealed in artworks. Yet, identification is clearly centrally impor-
tant in reading, in the way that literature opens up a different form of truth to ‘truth-
only cognition’.
What do ‘form’ and ‘genre’ mean?
The case of form and genre is more complex. Whenever a book or article discusses
‘postmodern’ or ‘modernist’ or ‘realist’ texts, or ‘revenge tragedy’, it relies on ideas
about form and genre (and we can tell these apart and argue about what pigeonhole
to put them in perfectly well: Beckett, modernist or postmodernist?) without expli-
citly understanding what form actually is. The rigorous attempts to split ‘form’ from
‘content’ (as in high structuralism, for example) only seem to reinforce the idea that
the two are not really separate, save in our discussions of literature (as James said, ‘the
story and the novel, the idea and the form, are the needle and thread, and I never
heard of a guild of tailors who recommend the use of the thread without the needle
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or the needle without the thread’).49 Clearly, form isn’t simply ‘how it’s told’ because
– to choose just one example – the ‘form’ of a postmodern novel may include a rejec-
tion of narrative closure which will, clearly, involve ‘content’ elements. Form is how
text and genre meet.
Peter Middleton and Tim Woods argue that genre
is too often treated as a formalism, as if it were no more than a form of prosody that
could be copied out of a manual. It is better thought of as a code of practise [sic] con-
stantly under negotiation between texts and their readers, listeners, publishers, aca-
demics and reviewers, which advises them how they are expected to respond to the
text.50
Indeed, for them, texts (which are all, in simple or in complex ways, perhaps, generic)
and genre (which is, of course, textual) are the ‘key sites of literariness . . . where lit-
erary production is not reducible to algorithms of language and cannot be dissolved
into wider historical matrices’.51 Even
the most innovative writing presupposes many generic reading and distribution prac-
tices. Equally, the most production-line generic text may sometimes test the limits of
genre and reformulate them tentatively, because genre is remade by every instance of its
use. Like language, it exists only as practices, and its codes are no more than partially
articulated recognition of its sedimented forms.52
Genre is not just a way of writing: it is a way of reading, too. It is where reading and
writing meet. Genre – with all its signs, both textual and extra-textual – forms a
horizon of expectations. Genre is the context of a work that both frames it and makes
it comprehensible, as it were, ‘externally’ and gives it a shape ‘internally’. Works – in
their creation, in their reception – are suffused by context, by the language games they
inhabit, and ‘genre’ is how context and language games are described for literature.
In the opening essay of The World, the Text and the Critic, Edward Said offers a way
to understand how texts work in the world by discussing the interplay of ‘filiation’
and ‘affiliation’. For him, roughly, filiation – the lines of descent – reflects how works
influence and descend from each other, how, in T. S. Eliot’s terms, the tradition of
writing works. Affiliation reflects the text’s relation not to the influence of other texts
over time, but to the text’s location in its own time, context and culture, a ‘phenom-
enon in the world, located in a network of non-literary, non-canonical and non-tra-
ditional affiliations’.53 I suggest that genre and form are a way of describing how these
two meet at the point of any one text – a way of describing both the diachronic and
synchronic influences on a text and on how that text is to be read. For example and
to generalise, Said’s work has generally concerned the affiliations of a work: his first
book explored how Conrad’s life and imperial experiences shaped his writing. Again,
as with ‘identification’, there is no clear-cut definition of genre and to look for a
general one is to think of criticism as a science, seeking to atomise both its concepts
and its objects. Yet, even though these concepts are vague and changeable, they are
vital in coming to terms with ‘what is it about the artwork that’ grabs out attention:
that makes it great.
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An example: Heart of Darkness
Of course, much of the ‘new aesthetics’ could be seen, as Beech and Roberts argue, as
conservative and backward looking. However, this is not necessarily the case. If we
assume that ideas about ‘identification’ and ‘form and genre’ are part of how a work
reveals or uncovers a world, both can be seen as radically changing the way in which
we understand literary texts. This is the case with Heart of Darkness, for example.
Eugene Goodheart writes that when he first encountered the novella in the 1950s,
little mattered ‘apart from Marlow’s psychological drama on his African journey’.54
Even in Hannah Arendt’s account in The Origins of Totalitarianism, which uses the
book as a way to discuss imperialism, the focus is on Kurtz as a European. F. R. Leavis
wrote that the ‘details of the journey to and up the Congo are presented to us as if we
are making the journey ourselves’ and Andrea White discusses the use of Marlow to
‘control our response’.55 These are questions of identification, of the way in which the
European readings are identified through the European characters. However, quite
famously, the study of Heart of Darkness was shaken up by another identification:
from Chinua Achebe’s point of view, Conrad was a ‘bloody racist’ (and so were
Marlow and Kurtz).56 From this – from this act which stemmed from a very different
identification – a new way of seeing this novel has emerged: Conrad’s Congo is not a
psychic phantasmagoria, but the historically located site of an imperialist atrocity. The
colonial exploitation is not the backdrop to the journey of a Western mind: rather,
the ‘vilest scramble for loot that ever disfigured the history of human conscience and
geographical expansion’ leads to the psychic collapse of the European narrator.57 W.
G. Sebald writes, with insight, that on the march to Leopoldville, ‘Korzeniowski
[Conrad] began to grasp that his own travails did not absolve him from the guilt
which he had incurred by his mere presence in the Congo . . . he now regarded his
original plan of taking up a command . . . with revulsion’.58
And this, too, leads to questions about genre, about how Heart of Darkness is read.
Clearly, it is conventionally seen as a novel. However, what if it were seen not as a
novel but as an act of testimony? Shoshona Felman and Dori Laub write of how tes-
timony is ‘pervasive, how it is implicated – sometimes unexpectedly – in almost every
kind of writing’.59 More than this, their discussion suggests that testimony is a differ-
ent genre to fiction: ‘the concept of the testimony . . . is in fact quite unfamiliar and
estranging . . . the more we look closely at texts, the more they show us that, unwit-
tingly, we do not even know what testimony is and that, in any case, it is not simply
what we thought we knew it was.’60 As Conrad’s biographer Norman Sherry makes
clear, Conrad and Marlow had different experiences and cannot be mapped onto each
other. However, it is also true that there is no cordon sanitaire – as Achebe puts it –
between the two.61 Hawkins argues that Heart of Darkness was ‘remarkably faithful to
the facts of the Congo in 1890’.62 And, while Ian Watt argues that the novella is ‘no
more a direct representation of conditions in the Congo in 1890 than it is of Conrad’s
actual experience there’ he does concede that ‘it is an expression of the essence of the
social and historical reality of the Congo Free State as his imagination recreated it’.63
If the genre of the book changes – if its context or genre as testimony is foregrounded
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– then Heart of Darkness looks very different: an account of an unwilling perpetrator
in the genocide (or at least, the mass murder) that characterised the Congo Free State
during this period. Indeed, our view – our context – of this whole period has changed.
In his second edition of The King Incorporated, a book discussing the Congo Free
State, Neal Ascherson writes that 
moral reflection on the details and implications of the Nazi ‘Final Solution’ . . . has come
to overshadow all assessments of our times. And the discovery that genocide is still with
us, in Cambodia or Rwanda, has only made that shadow darker. This change of empha-
sis has altered perspectives on the history of the Congo Free State. What now seems most
important is the sheer loss of life.64
Marlow and Conrad may not be analogous to Nazis, but they are certainly collabora-
tors in atrocities (how far and how much, how real and how fictional are all questions
to be asked). The unsettling effect that these suggestions have reveals that questions
about identification, form and genre, in turn prompted by asking ‘what is it about the
art work that . . . ?’, have led to a new vision of this text and the world it reveals.
Conclusion
In his much-praised book Consilience, which spreads from science to scientism, E. O.
Wilson writes that the ‘structuralist approach [to culture] is potentially consistent
with the picture of mind and culture emerging from natural sciences and biological
anthropology’: to further improve our understanding, it needs ‘a realistic connection
to biology and cognitive psychology’.65 (Indeed, much fascinating and insightful work
has been done on literature following scientific advances, under the sign, as it were,
of ‘truth as correspondence’.)66 However, at the core, perhaps, of the conference at
Johns Hopkins on The Language of Criticism and the Science of Man, was an
encounter between a scientific understanding of the truth of art (‘truth as correspon-
dence’) and a different understanding (‘truth as revealing’). In this encounter, and fol-
lowing Heidegger, it was not that either way of understanding truth was wrong, but
that they were different, and one relied on the other. This is the centre of Derrida’s
contribution to the conference, which can be seen as a meditation on the relation
between art and science. He writes of the ‘two interpretations of interpretation’: one
‘dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the
sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile’.67 This is interpreta-
tion understood as looking for propositional truth, truth as correspondence: the sort
of truth which inspires the science that ‘interprets’ the world around us, believing that
‘the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural laws’.68 The
other form of interpretation, ‘which is no longer turned toward the origin affirms
play’, the Nietzschean ‘joyous affirmation of the play of the world’ as it is revealed,
somehow, before it is taxonomised.69 Derrida goes on to argue – after Heidegger, again
– that these two are ‘absolutely irreconcilable, even if we live them simultaneously and
reconcile them in a obscure economy’ and that there is no question of ‘choosing’
between them.70
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However, although there may be no question of choosing between them in how
we live (that is, perhaps we are all hypocrites, relying day to day on both ‘truth as cor-
respondence’ and aletheia, how the world is for us), there are choices in how we come
to use these understandings of truth in criticism and the so-called ‘human sciences’ in
general. The work of Michel Foucault, for example, stems precisely from the disjunc-
tion between these two as it explores, genealogically, precisely how, and with what
contradictions and paradoxes, ‘truth as correspondence’ stems from ‘how the word is
for us’, truth as revealed (another legacy of Heidegger). That is, for example, the dis-
courses of ‘how we are’ establish the possibility of an identity on which power can be
enacted – the ‘Soul’ Foucault calls it in Discipline and Punish – which acts both as ‘the
prison of the body’ and as the site for further discoveries that could be in correspon-
dence with this worldview – ideas about the science of criminology or of reforma-
tion.71 Foucault ‘is trying to show us how every culture lives, thinks, sees, makes love,
by a set of unconscious guiding assumptions with non-rational determinants’ (‘how
the world is for us’) and how, in turn, these determinants are the basis for discoveries
which have ‘truth as correspondence’.72 These two different forms of truth also seem
to underlie ideas about communal and communicative reason. To change one’s world-
view, the truth as revealed to you, as you, is a conversion; that is why these moments
are considered so important. It is a change that happens for many reasons – the expe-
rience of war or of religion, say – and those who champion Reason argue that Reason,
too, can be central in these conversions.
However, the choices that the disciplines which deal with literature have made
might be questioned. Putnam finds a ‘certain scientism’ not only obviously in logical
positivism but also in the ‘relativism’ that reduces ‘all there is to “rationality”’ – to
‘what your culture says . . . that [rationality] is simply defined by the local cultural
norms is a scientistic theory inspired by anthropology’.73 One could add in the case
of literary studies, that structuralism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, nearly all forms of
historicism (old or new) which rely on positivism all partake of this scientific positi-
vism and make the same claim to ‘truth as correspondence’, a sort of truth that only
offers one form of interpretation of an artwork. Perhaps criticism should eschew pos-
itivism and aim for a different aesthetic, informed by a philosophical tradition more
in tune with literature, rather than simply plumping for an unspoken and often
unrecognised scientism. The critical language in which we discuss artworks seems
often to pass over the ways in which worlds are revealed in art and the ethical and
political potential of this. However, there must be some form of discussion that can
be held about artworks concerning what is worth attending to in them: what is it
about them that . . . ? I have suggested that naive or undefined but widely used terms,
such as identification, genre and form, might, in fact, be very useful and revealing
when thought through more fully. They might be the grounding of some form of very
provisional knowledge for criticism, different from scientific knowledge. In the case
of Heart of Darkness, shifts that stem from these categories of understanding radically
changed, in a politically challenging way, how the novel was understood. The ‘new
aesthetics’ questions the positivist scientism that seems, often implicitly, to dominate
intellectual enquiry.
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10 Jay Bernstein
Melancholy as form: towards an
archaeology of modernism
When traditional aesthetics . . . praised harmony in natural beauty, it projected the self-
satisfaction of domination onto the dominated.1
We can date the end of the novel precisely: the last novel ever written was Flaubert’s
Sentimental Education, published in 1869. It is sometimes said that Flaubert’s work
inaugurates the waning of the Bildungsroman and the inauguration of the novel of dis-
illusionment. But that says too little. Can there be a roman without the Bildung? The
unifying biographical form of the classical novel, paralleling the ambitions and trajec-
tory of secularising modernity, chartered the formation, education, quest and achieve-
ment of identity and worldliness of its bourgeois heroes and heroines. What was
previously narrative and adventure becomes in Flaubert a stutter, every appointment
of learning a site for blindness, every posting of hope a tour of disappointment, each
potential moment of formation a blank; the best there ever was, its protagonists con-
clude, is the memory of the adolescent visit to the local bordello – a visit, we should
remember, which terminated in humiliation, mortification, and flight. The disillu-
sioning of Frédéric portends the end of beauty: the semblance of wholeness or
harmony through which narrative form raised the contingencies of empirical life into
meaning; in Flaubert the semblance of wholeness devolves into nothing more than
the movement of time.2 One might claim that what Flaubert’s novel projects is not so
much the ruin of the ideal but the accommodation of bourgeois ideals to worldly
reality, and hence a realism of maturity. The unfolding of modern fiction from
Flaubert belies this easy synthesis of ideal and real; what transpires in modernist fic-
tions is either the elaboration and continuation of Flaubert’s stutter, in extremis in
Proust, or, when even that seems no longer possible, an interrogation of those ideals
as what themselves make life stutter and collapse, hence the affirmation of what is
incompatible with those ideals as alone what might be required for their satisfaction.3
Adorno pointedly expresses this conception of modernism: ‘Rimbaud’s postulate of
the radically modern is that of an art that moves in the tension between spleen et idéal,
between spiritualisation and obsession with what is most distant from spirit. The
primacy of spirit in art and the inroads made by what was previously taboo are two
sides of the same coin.’4
In order to begin prosecuting this conception of modernism, I will first sketch out
the central lineaments of the dialectic of spleen and ideal as they are presented in
Adorno’s modernist philosophical aesthetics. These aesthetic claims inevitably raise a
question: why consider the unfolding dialectic of forming-giving and decomposition,
the immanent cancellation of form as modernism’s most exacting aesthetic, hence
formal demand as somehow a mode of resistance to the social world outside art, as not
simply critique, but for Adorno the most salient and rationally coherent mode of cri-
tique? The long answer to this question, which I will not be pursuing here, would
involve demonstrating the internal connection and necessary opposition between the
development of the practical forms of bourgeois social life and those of autonomous
modern art. My short answer will proceed through a discussion of Philip Roth’s
American Pastoral.5 At first blush, this might seem a strange choice since Adorno’s aes-
thetic theory is informed by the classic works of high modernism – Beckett, Kafka,
Berg, Picasso – and it is the works of these artists that unquestionably best exemplify
Adorno’s thought. But it is less clear that reflection on these artists will illuminate the
social question. On the reading of American Pastoral I will offer its representational
content, the categories practically informing its representational world themselves
undergo the dialectic of spleen and ideal, hence allegorically reinscribing the modern-
ist dialectic as the truth content of empirical experience. To put the same thought
another way: there is something uncannily 1869ish about American Pastoral, as if
Seymour Levov is a very American Frédéric Moreau, as if Vietnam and the race riots
contiguous with it were America’s 1848, and hence as if in the narrating of that
moment the necessity of modernism itself, the dialectic of form-giving and decompo-
sition, were borne (again), or perhaps born in its American form, discovered as some-
thing not inherited from Europe and hence as a continuation of European art and
history, but as intrinsic to the art practices of our place and time. American Pastoral can
thus be conceived as performing an archaeology of American modernism, the spleen
incumbent upon, or proper to, our ideals. American Pastoral narrates and represents
the collapse of narration and representation, and the becoming of the self-reflexive,
self-lacerating text whose relation to its world lies in its failure to be one with it.
Against beauty: categories
Adorno reconstructs the categories of aesthetics from the perspective of the achieve-
ments of high modernism, post-stutter so to speak. Modernist art is autonomous art,
but autonomous art must always be understood as possessing a ‘double character’:
‘something that severs itself from empirical reality and thereby from society’s func-
tional context and yet is at the same time part of empirical reality and society’s func-
tional context’.6 Hence aesthetic phenomena are directly both purely aesthetic,
phenomena that have their gravity and meaning as ingredients in an autonomous
practice, and social facts, although these two aspects are never experientially simulta-
neous. In a gesture that will always strike his critics as intolerably fast, Adorno con-
ceives of autonomy in art as categorially or formally setting art into opposition to
society:
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Much more importantly, art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies
this position only as autonomous art. By crystallizing in itself as something unique to
itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as ‘socially useful,’
it criticizes society by merely existing, for which puritans of all stripes condemn it. There
is nothing pure, nothing structured strictly according to its own immanent law, that does
not implicitly criticize the debasement of a situation evolving in the direction of a total
exchange society in which everything is heteronomously defined. Art’s asociality is the
determinate negation of determinate society.7
It cannot be the simple fact of art’s elaboration of its own immanent laws that explains
how artistic autonomy resists social utility and heteronomy. Rather the specificity of
art’s immanent laws is that what they enable is the production of particular works
whose claim to authenticity, art’s form of rightness, depends upon nothing apart from
their own internal complexion. Artworks are neither fungible things satisfying some
antecedent end or idea nor empty universals that equate all the elements falling under
them; as being lawful in its own right each work attains universality through partic-
ularisation.8 Hence, it is only by means of particularisation that artworks epitomise
the unsubsumable. An autonomous work is the semblance of a thing-in-itself, the
semblance of something that is emphatically ‘for itself ’ and not for another.
Because there are in fact no final laws of form, no laws constitutive of the novel or
painting or music, then in each art form particularisation occurs progressively through
the negation and departure from those formal requirements that have appeared to be
constitutive of that form, its autonomy. Through a reiterative negation of features
extrinsic to what enables a work to be a work of a kind, and the very work it is, mod-
ernist works seek a stringency of form in which their capacity to claim binding aes-
thetic attention is achieved wholly immanently. At this level of abstractness, there
would seem to be little to separate this account of modernism from Clement
Greenberg’s, in which, in the case of painting, the representational or compositional
demands of traditional painting are displaced by what can occur on and through ded-
ication to a painting’s surface – although Adorno’s ascetic predilection for an intense
muteness and silence as the terminus of this process would make Gerhard Richter’s
grey monochromes exemplary rather than the vibrant large canvases of Jackson
Pollock. This difference, however, is more than a matter of preference or emphasis;
for Adorno progressive autonomisation, the achievement of particularity, comes to
possess the ‘ideal of blackness’9 since, as Kant anticipated, without the impoverish-
ment implicit in this ideal artworks, however absorptive, would too easily lend them-
selves to consolation or a culinary sensuality, becoming thereby useful once more. But
in order for this thought not to be an importation into art of a moralised asceticism
(and art cannot make asceticism its norm10), there must be something more to the
characterisation of the progressive achievement of autonomy than regression into
immanent laws of working. The achievement of autonomy must be capable of being
comprehended through the dialectic of ideal and spleen.
The collaborative antagonism between ideal and spleen is, in fact, but one of a
number of pairs that function at different levels of analysis emerging from different
conceptual spaces that Adorno employs in order to construe the core dialectic of
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modernism: beauty and ugliness, integration and disintegration, spiritualisation and
fragmentariness, construction and expression, harmony and dissonance, art and anti-
art. In Adorno’s account the second term of each pair begins as the outside, the boun-
dary, border or limit of the modern work, what compelling works normatively
surmount or leave behind, and then in the reversal that makes modernist works the
unavoidable fate of artistic autonomy becomes the condition through which the
dominant or positive term is enabled to carry on functioning. It is then less a ques-
tion of each artistic practice finding its own laws of form, its a priori (even its con-
tingent a priori), and more an issue of each practice finding itself being required,
simply as a matter of its forms being wholly and only secular, disenchanted, to fully
acknowledge the diverse elements composing it, the material or given or elemental
on which its form-giving works. And while in a wholly formalist way it would not be
false to say that the second term of each pair represents the material condition of pos-
sibility that both must and cannot be wholly avowed by the positive term, this unduly
normalises the dialectic. For Adorno, the reversal is more radical. As I read Aesthetic
Theory, Adorno sees in the unfolding dialectic of modernism the emergence of a
material logic of normativity. Hence, in the moment of disintegration and spleen
what was formally excluded from the ideal, formally its material condition of pos-
sibility, becomes its stand-in and bearer: only in what fails the ideal is the authentic
hope of the ideal to be found.
‘Dissonance,’ Adorno states, ‘the seal of everything modern, gives access to the
alluringly sensuous by transfiguring it into its antithesis, pain: an aesthetic archetype
of ambivalence.’11 Dissonance is the seal of the modern in the sense that it is that
moment in which a work’s illusoriness, its semblance character, is seen through and
acknowledged; hence dissonance is a general term for the moment of negativity in
modernist works in which their material or elemental substratum becomes manifest
in divergence from their controlling formative elaboration (albeit necessarily only
through and in virtue of that elaboration). Artworks, after all, are not real particulars,
but only images or semblances of particulars; they exemplify particularity without
being it. And they can appear as unique particulars, non-exchangeable thises, only on
the condition that they remain enclosed in semblance. But this dialectic is only intel-
ligible if we conceive of each form of autonomous art, each practice, as essentially the
vehicle through which its elemental components, its material and practical givens and
presuppositions, attain articulacy. Because, again, if nothing predetermines what is to
count as a material component or elemental given, and nothing further predetermines
what is to count as providing their articulation, then modernist works can assure
themselves of their integrity only in their departures from eloquence.
According to Adorno the stakes of modernist art, then, are its material components,
experiential givens, elemental presuppositions, all that is worked up in a modernist
work. Or more precisely, in its unfolding modernist art discovers that works are the
vehicles for their components, hence not the ideals operative in its form-giving but
the materials formed become art’s stake. One might conceive of this reversal as
implicit from the outset in art practices that, by virtue of the rationalisation of modern
social and political forms, have autonomy imposed upon them. The half-truth in this
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thought is that it is the unavoidability of autonomy that exposes modern art to the
reversal that takes hold in modernism. But modernism progressively enacts a reversal,
discovering and rediscovering it, only in the recurrent experiences of disillusionment,
inside and outside art, with bourgeois ideals, experiences in which those ideals them-
selves are found to block the immanence and secularity they initially appear to
promise and constitute. Spleen’s obsession with what resists artistic forming is both a
critique of aesthetic idealism and a reversal internal to autonomous art whereby its
stakes are transformed from ideal to object, hence a demand for a bottom-up rather
than top-down form of working. This thesis, if correct, would certainly lead to the
monochrome and the readymade having a quite different significance than that
usually offered. Equally, it is this reversal in which ideal is the vehicle for its spleenish
other that gives Adorno’s aesthetics its most peculiar inflection: art is the vehicle for
and hence for the sake of non-art; artistic semblance is both the condition of articu-
lacy and the prison house of its elements. This is the pathos of each modernist work:
its fullest achievement can only be its failing – it is not the particular it longs to be
but only a semblance. Dissonance as the determinate emancipation of the elemental
from its integral setting evinces the aspiration to non-art in art; which, again, is why
dissonance is the seal of everything modern.
There are many names for semblance in Adorno, but beauty is certainly the most
insistent. Yet, Adorno contends that beauty is systematically elusive; it is indispens-
able in signalling an object’s departure from the economy of self-preservation and
utility, and hence in conveying the locus of a beholder’s interest in an object beyond
the practical, without it being possible to specify in what its transfigurative power con-
sists. Beauty hence comes to function in Aesthetic Theory as the generalised equivalent
or dummy term for the transfigurative mechanisms through which art raises its com-
ponents to absorptive particulars. This is why, in the section dedicated to ‘Art
beauty’,12 beauty is almost never mentioned. The first two sentences of the section are
emphatic in this regard: ‘Nature is beautiful in that it appears to say more than it is.
To wrest this more from that more’s contingency, to gain control of its semblance, to
determine it as semblance as well as to negate it as unreal: This is the idea of art.’13
Modernist art is the practice of disenchanting beauty, secularising it without reduc-
tion or deceit. This thought anticipates the manner in which the modernist dialectic
can perform a material logic of normativity: if beauty is the conceptual site of the more
through which objects escape the sway of instrumentality, and hence the site of a
meaning or normativity that eludes means-ends rationality, and art the disenchanting
of that site, then art is ‘the secularization of transcendence’.14 That phrase encapsu-
lates both the categorial ambitions of Aesthetic Theory and its guiding thought. Art, as
much as any other modern practice, participates in the dialectic of enlightenment,
albeit taking that dialectic in a direction different than what occurs outside art. In
what, then, is art’s secularisation of transcendence meant to consist? What counts as
or reveals an artwork’s accomplishment as one of secularising transcendence? Plainly,
nothing other than work on and against illusory transcendence; and if beauty is a
unique site of traditional transcendence, the unique site outside the domain of the
practical, and art the field of disenchanting beauty, then only anti-art, only what spells
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the artwork as beyond the beautiful while remaining art can pronounce secular
transcendence.
In art the most immediate conveyors of transcendence are unity, harmony, inte-
gration; through them artworks raise the elements composing them into intensive
wholes. Art’s power to raise the elemental, to give it a place within an integrated whole,
make it, finally, beautiful, is art’s power of transcendence. This is what the traditional
prohibition on the ugly signified: there must be nothing that is not specific, not
formed here and now. In traditional aesthetics the ugly was that element opposing the
work’s ‘ruling law of form; it is integrated by that formal law and thereby confirms it,
along with the power of subjective freedom in the artwork vis-à-vis the subject
matter’.15 Within a pre-modern metaphysics, art’s integration of the ugly revealed the
place of even the lowest within a world that was meaningful in itself, shot through
with significance; even mud must have its form. In becoming autonomous the oldest
philosophical truth about art becomes emphatic: artworks are not intensive wholes,
true unities of the diverse, but semblances; their distance from the demands of praxis
is both what enables them to unify the diverse, and what makes those unities illusory.
Art disenchants transcendence by revealing that its transfigurative power relies on
nothing but its practical doings and the materials those doings work on.16 But what
is so revealed could not conceivably matter either inside or outside art, could not be
a locus of mattering and concern, unless the materials worked on were somehow ‘real’,
worldly, elements not belonging intrinsically to art in its traditional and formal self-
understanding. Hence there is a material motive subtending the formal one in art’s
becoming autonomous. And it is this material motive which transforms the signifi-
cance of the ugly, and by extension the meaning of the beautiful.
Formally, art disenchants beauty by making its practical activity and the elements
worked visible, integral moments in a work’s appearing. Because the ‘utmost integra-
tion is the utmost semblance’, modernist art comes to experience integration, previ-
ously the organon of art’s truth content, as its antagonist. Artworks disillusion
themselves by shattering integration, by mobilising a moment of disintegration and
making that moment their truth content. Of course, ‘the truth of such disintegration
is achieved by way of nothing less than the triumph and guilt of integration’17 – a
thought we shall need to return to. Under the weight of the material motive the
making of the disintegrative moment a truth content requires that what is so released
be emphatically non-art. On the one hand, the generalisation of this requirement
transforms the ugly into dissonance, which in Adorno’s lexicon refers to whatever in
a work materially and aesthetically exceeds its integrative structure. But this is equally
to say that the moment of dissonance in modernist works materially bespeaks ugli-
ness. On the other hand, then, the ugly is no longer what initially resists a reified con-
ception of the harmoniously beautiful in order all the more to demonstrate spirit’s
omnipotence, but comes to stand for whatever cannot be illusorily integrated. But in
a secular setting, what cannot be integrated is what secularising modernity has left
behind in its spiritualising progress, what is so unworked and ruined in that progress
that nothing can beautify it without utter deceitfulness18 – remembering all the while
that nothing is easier than that deceit. As the earliest practitioners of modernism knew
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perfectly well, and their successors often less so, the nauseating, the physically revolt-
ing, the sexually transgressive are not romantic embellishments but the site of the
stakes of modern art. This is why Adorno is willing to affirm the prejudice that equates
the ugly with the expression of suffering,19 and hence espouse the dissonant transfor-
mation of sensuousness into pain. Which is not to deny that in being echoes of suffer-
ing, artworks diminish it: ‘form, the organon of [art’s] seriousness, is at the same time
the organon of the neutralization of suffering’.20
Art’s identification and obsession with what is incompatible with it reverberates
onto beauty. Art cannot side with the ugly without at the same time coming to see in
beauty a power that is antagonistic to that end. This thought has two fundamental
moments. First, art’s power of integration and closure comes to appear as precisely the
espousal of the ideal above its materials; rather than the unification of the heteroge-
neous, beauty comes to appear as an act of totalisation which cannot acknowledge the
heterogeneous within it without forfeiting its transfixing stillness, its power to
compel. It is this thought Adorno has in mind when he states: ‘In serene beauty its
recalcitrant other would be completely pacified, and such aesthetic reconciliation is
fatal for the extra-aesthetic. That is the melancholy of art. It achieves an unreal recon-
ciliation at the price of real reconciliation.’21 If once upon a time it was the glory of
art to offer its contents a simulated eternity, the haunting stillness and immobility of
the classically beautiful, its irresistibility, now appears to have an uncanny affinity with
death. The affinity is more than a contingent association; it derives from ‘the idea of
pure form that art imposes on the diversity of the living and that is extinguished in
it’.22 Beauty, in its formal aspect, is utterly bound to pre-modern metaphysical ideal-
ity that opposes itself to the intransigently earth-bound; this is why from the space of
the helplessly living, the overwhelming power of beauty appears as something deadly.
If beauty nonetheless signifies an ideal of unity, call it presence, that we cannot forgo,
then it is for the sake of the beautiful that modernist art sacrifices beauty: ‘because it
is no longer beautiful’.23
Secondly, the idea and appearing of beauty could not have this aporetic character
unless it was integral to the practice of making artworks, the activity of forming and
integrating; and this compromises even those art practices that aim for a wholly
secular transcendence. Obsession with the ugly and the cruel do not belong solely to
art’s antithetical subject matter:
art’s own gesture is cruel. In aesthetic forms, cruelty becomes imagination: Something is
excised from the living, from the body of language, from tones, from visual experience.
The purer the form and the higher the autonomy of the works, the more cruel they are
. . . If in modern artworks cruelty raises its head undisguised, it confirms the truth that
in the face of the overwhelming force of reality art can no longer rely on its a priori ability
to transform the dreadful into form. Cruelty is an element of art’s critical reflection on
itself; art despairs over the claim to power that it fulfills in being reconciled. Cruelty steps
forward unadorned from the artworks as soon as their own spell is broken.24
At least for the time being, art cannot endeavour even the least act of forming without
that forming bearing the stigmata of surgical abstraction, even if the point of the
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abstraction is to give a second-order life to what has been deprived of life empirically.
Hence, the disintegrative moment of modernist works is ironically the same moment
in which they, implicitly or explicitly, confess their cruelty, confess the violence in
which forming is implicated and the impotence of that forming. But this is equally to
say that beauty does not end or die; it lives on, practically, in the cruelty of artistic
forming, in the violence that severs the aesthetic from purposiveness, and formally,
ideally, in the rebarbatively dissonant that eludes that forming. Even as a world apart
from empirical experience, art belongs to the social world it opposes; its oppositional
stance does not free its forms of acting from complicity. When, in Minima Moralia,
Adorno states that ‘Every work of art is an uncommitted crime’,25 a murder, say, he is
not proclaiming art’s innocence, but on the contrary asserting its utter proximity to
what is violently criminal without as yet being it. In art so-called humaneness only
signifies a lack formal rigour.
Categorially, and it is nothing other than a train of categorial thought that we have
been tracing, Adorno’s contention is that modernist art in its dissonance, cruelty and
self-implicating reflexivity rehearses a material logic of normativity, and hence an
envisioning of secular transcendence. But that this rehearsal and envisioning has fallen
on art to perform only makes sense if it has failed to occur in the social world outside
art. What counts as transcendence outside art is not yet secular, not yet at one with a
world that is irredeemably temporal and natural. But this claim for art can only be
made binding in art, otherwise the characterisation of secular transcendence would
be available wholly independently of art, and art’s autonomy, its specific forms of prac-
tice, would not be categorially the bearer of another form of praxis bound to another
conception of transcendence. Reiteratively, even the claim for art being bindingly
available only in art can be made only in art. While true, that claim is still about the
relation of art to empirical social norms. Tracing the fate of secular normativity as inte-
gral to the character and meaning of aesthetic normativity is very much the burden
of Roth’s American Pastoral.
‘Beauty itself must die!’ (Schiller)
The task of art today is to bring chaos into order.26
With a flat Jamesian irony and allegorical cruelty Roth names the protagonists of his
novel Seymour, Dawn, Merry, since calling them too quickly by their true names,
Blind, Dusk, Despair, would empty their lives of what makes those unspoken names
fit, hang over them like an unendurable fate. Not immediately knowing that fate is
all that allows the novel, or a life, to begin. Ten years after bumping into him at a Mets
game, Nathan Zuckerman, Roth’s long-time fictional alter ego, receives a letter from
his childhood hero, Seymour, the Swede, Levov, asking him to help write a tribute to
his father. Zuckerman recalls the moment in which he became forever caught in the
Swede’s orbit. It is a chill fall afternoon in 1943, Nathan is standing beside a practice
pitch watching as the Swede is slammed into the ground after catching a pass. The
whistle blows, the practice is over. The Swede rises up flexing a bruised elbow, and
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begins limping off. Then, spotting Nathan among the gaggle of his admirers who have
been gazing at his performance, he calls out to him, ‘Basketball was never like this,
Skip.’27 For a brief moment, but one indelible in his life, Nathan participates in the
‘glory’ that is the Swede. It is not simply a matter that ‘The adored had acknowledged
the adoring’,28 but the manner of that acknowledgement: gracious, easy, generous,
self-mocking, all the abundant self-pleasure and modesty of the athlete for whom
‘there were no obstacles, who appeared never to have to struggle to clear a space for
himself ’.29 What Nathan is overwhelmed by is the Swede’s perfect grace at that
moment in our history when an athletic performance could still be the repository of
an immigrant community’s hopes,30 when athletic virtuosity was still an icon, a
symbol not only for the morally good or the virtuous life, but something that while
partaking of those is more specific; call it the American dream.
The Swede physically embodies, believes, will live the American dream. So com-
plete is Seymour Levov’s assimilation that it has crept into his genes: six foot three,
blond hair, blue eyes, possessed of unsurpassable style, a so ‘unconscious oneness with
America’31 that Zuckerman wonders where the Jew in him is – where is the wayward
temptation, the guile, the artifice, the doubleness; indeed, what does he do for sub-
jectivity? Still, in the case of the Swede this unconscious oneness really does adum-
brate a life: after high school he will join the Marines, go to college, marry a former
Miss New Jersey (who almost became Miss America), he will master the intricacies
and the lore of his father’s leather glove business, become wealthy, buy the gorgeous
stone house in Jersey countryside. But these external trappings, as everything we come
to learn will confirm, are not external goods, but ingredients in a life dedicated to the
liberal virtues of decency, tolerance, hard work, fairness, responsibility, concern. The
Swede is ‘blessed with all the attributes of a monumental ordinariness’;32 he is ‘The
philosopher-king of ordinary life’.33 Even the Swede’s narcissistic, cynical brother will
conclude: ‘“My brother was the best you’re going to get in this country, by a long
shot.”’34
I can think of no better way of characterising the distinctly secular, egalitarian
vision of America than through the synthesis of material aspirations, prosperity and
liberal virtues that transform ordinariness into something monumental. The
American dream figures this synthesis, turns its discrete elements into a vision. It is
again this dream that has crept into Seymour Levov’s genes and imagination, natu-
rally, spontaneously governing all he believes, does, hopes for himself and those
around him. What, then, finally moves Seymour Levov, compels him and makes his
life compelling is a vision of beauty, first, metonymically, the beauty of a stone house
and a girl on a swing glimpsed during a high-school outing,35 later the almost para-
lysing beauty of the Miss New Jersey to be,36 but in all beauty; beauty not as an empty
image but as the promise and hope of American ordinariness, monumental ordinari-
ness. American Pastoral is a novel about the meaning of beauty, democratic beauty,
truly demotic beauty, about the end of beauty. The beauty in question is the beauty
of the American dream for it is only as beautiful that the complex set connecting
industriousness, prosperity and liberal virtues have their truth as ideals both worthy
and capable of orienting a life. The beauty of the American dream as exemplified by
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Seymour Levov physically and practically is the charismatic authority of ‘America’, the
idea of America.
While for the still not quite fully assimilated Jews of Newark the young Swede was
like an ‘Apollo’37 or ‘Zeus’,38 these signify only the pagan and secular nature of the
ideal. Seymour Levov is not a god or a saint, not a noble hero or a hopeless innocent;
he is simply unshakeably decent, monumentally, which is to say visibly, beautifully
decent. American Pastoral is about beauty because only in so being can it be about
what, arguably, is ‘the best’ America has to offer, what is truly American, and hence
record our true story. From the outset Seymour Levov ‘was fettered to history, an
instrument of history’.39 If there is a history to be told about America from the end of
World War II – ‘No more death and war!’40 – to the present, a history which probes
the meaning of America through the values and ideals that moved the generations of
immigrants that flanked the war on either side, it must be a history of beauty; the nor-
mative history of the past half century is the history of this beauty, its fate.41 And the
question being interrogated must be about the normativity of the norm, about the
intrinsic meaning of that normativity. But the intrinsic meaning of a wholly secular
ideal cannot be something separate from its history, the realisations and failures of the
idea in practice as events belonging to it.
This, at any rate, is Roth’s claim. And it is the explanation of why this novel is
Roth’s least reflexive, least playful in its exchanges between art and life, least modern-
ist and spleenish since Portnoy’s Complaint. It is no accident, I think, that this novel
follows on the heels of Sabbath’s Theater, whose ambitions were not that different from
American Pastoral, to summon up and make a judgement upon the past half century
of American life, but which is Roth’s most spleenish work to date, full of vituperation,
sexual excess, vulgarity and a sour anger that repels and attracts in equal measure.
Mickey Sabbath exuberantly exemplifies ‘all the crudeness it takes to stay alive’.42 How
one judges that crudity is here beside the point; for what is missing from Sabbath’s
Theater is any convincing account of what all the anger is about, and hence something
that would make intelligible why an art of spleen, an extremist art embracing all that
is base, is called for and necessary in order to pass judgement on our history; why its
celebration of vulgarity is not sheer spectacle or a pleasure in shocking or a relish in
what American hygienic hypocrisy would prefer to forget, but demanded as a condi-
tion of aesthetic rightness and authenticity, what novel writing must here and now
take on board. What makes Sabbath’s Theater fail in its highest ambitions is that its
excesses remain unmotivated, disconnected from the judgement it wants to pass and
the lament it means to offer. In the consideration of Seymour Levov, in his iconic
beauty and in the beauty that moves him, Roth finds an answer. The role of beauty
in history, its failure, to state the thought at its weakest, is the condition for an art of
spleen, for American novelistic modernism. American Pastoral is thus not only an
attempt at construing the normative fall of America, in so doing it means to provide
an archaeology of the very modernism Roth has been practising throughout his career;
the fall of the dream is, at the same time, the undermining of the forms of represen-
tation of the realist novel as providing the epic of the modern world. If dissonance,
formally, is to become the bearer of a secular ideal, then its claim must be about the
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relation between collapsing ideality without and within the novel. Only working
outside in, from the representational order to the order of representation, can estab-
lish this internal connection. Thus in order to succeed in the archaeological project,
to locate the necessity of modernist spleen in history, Roth must withdraw from high
modernist excess, dampen the transgressive brio of his ‘alter id’43 Zuckerman with
prostate cancer, impotence and incontinence in order to clear a compelling space for
the beauty of the Swede’s America and for history’s own introduction of chaos into
order. Roth can only reveal the ultimate meaning and validity of a lifetime of pyro-
technic performances by gently bracketing the inevitable performance his novel is.44
At the dinner meeting with Seymour in order to discuss the writing of the tribute,
the project is not mentioned. So insistent is Seymour on the bland ordinary goodness
of his life, so without side is his talk, that Zuckerman wonders if he is mad. Maybe.
Or maybe he is just happy. Maybe ‘Swede Levov’s life . . . had been most simple and
most ordinary and therefore just great, right in the American grain’.45 A few months
later, whilst attending his forty-fifth high-school reunion, Zuckerman runs into
Seymour’s brother Jerry and learns of Seymour’s death. Zuckerman also learns that
Seymour’s life was not simple or great. He had had a daughter, Merry. In 1968 Merry,
age 16, at 5 a.m. one morning, in protest against the war in Vietnam, had bombed
the village post office, inadvertently killing the local doctor. She had then disappeared.
‘The monster Merry’46 had detonated the Swede’s life, ruined it utterly. Why had she
done it? How could a child of the unutterably decent Seymour and his beautiful wife
living their unutterably decent lives become a maddened bomber? What makes
Merry, if anything, the outcome of that life, its ruination? How can we hold together
in one thought, one narrative, those decent lives and what explodes them? What is
the line connecting the longed-for American pastoral and ‘the fury, the violence, and
the desperation of the counterpastoral – . . . the indigenous American berserk’?47
There are no ultimate facts of the matter here: the Swede is dead, and what
Zuckerman gets from Jerry are but brief, angry fragments from a mourning brother.
So Zuckerman, the novelist to his core, will need to dream a ‘realistic chronicle’,48 he
will need to invent the exact history which holds together the man of monumental
ordinariness, the beautiful wife, and the monster daughter exploding it all in 1968 in
protest against an unjust war only a year after the Newark race riots that had almost
burned away the glove factory, and did spell the demise of Newark, ‘the worst city in
the world’.49 Why this history must be invented, a novel, is a matter I shall return to.
Throughout the course of the novel numerous answers to the question ‘Why?’ are
proffered, some by Seymour himself, most by other characters: because the American
dream is only a fantasy and the real world is the violent chaos that Merry makes
visible; because the truth of America is capitalist greed and imperialist rapaciousness
that decent liberalism colludes with rather than truly ameliorating; because, in fact,
meaninglessness exists and cannot be indefinitely hidden from; because her parents
are so respectable, decent and tolerant, that in order to separate from them, as any
child must from any parents, Merry must go to the extreme; because as part of the
natural history of nations and peoples, the time for the fall of American has come. We
know all these explanations, left, right, political, apolitical, and they are not altogether
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wrong; but what none of them accounts for, what makes each so partial and slanted,
is that they leave out the most puzzling and significant piece of the picture: American
beauty, the Swede himself and all that he stands for. What none of the explanations
will allow is the actual beauty and hence the actual rightness of the American dream.
Hence each makes Merry an instrument of unveiling: beneath the veil of the dream,
just outside the enclosed rural pastoral is the truth, the fact of the matter: the urban
decay that is the final legacy of American racism, material greed, national power, exis-
tential chaos, or just the ordinary psychological yearnings of an adolescent girl going
through a stage she would have grown out of if . . . Whether in terms of false con-
sciousness or, what is nearly the same, the discovery of some explicit transgression and
hence injustice, what each of these accounts yearns for is some ultimate fact of the
matter, some fact or flaw that will finally explain, and so explain away, Merry.
The most desperate and pathetic of these, and hence standing for all of them, is
Seymour’s own. He thinks he must be to blame, he is the father and so he must be
responsible for what happened, and hence surely there is something he did that will
explain it all, some moment, some act that working like a virus on Merry’s psyche
drove her to become the mad bomber of Old Rimrock. Achingly, Seymour imagines
that the cause of it all was a fumbled impassioned kiss as he and 11-year-old Merry
drove home sun-drunk from the beach on a hot summer’s afternoon. ‘“Daddy, kiss
me the way you k-k-kiss umumumother,”’50 his 11-year-old begged; and after he
coldly rebuked her, and she, humiliated by the rebuff, in desperately trying to with-
draw her request got caught in another long stutter, Seymour became overwhelmed
with frustration and guilt and pity and compassion and love and so covered her stut-
tering mouth with his own. Is this the transgression, this crack in the etiquette of the
family romance, that explains it all? As the years pass after Merry’s disappearance and
Seymour hallucinates kitchen-table conversations with Angela Davis explaining to
him the brutality of American imperialism at home and abroad and Merry’s political
heroism; as he imagines Merry coming under the influence of the Weathermen in the
person of the messenger between him and Merry, the malevolent, dark angel Rita
Cohen (whom Merry will deny ever having known, and who hence may or may not
have ever existed); as he considers the anger, envy and resentment others might well
feel toward him and his life; as he rehearses over and over again the politics and the
everyday of Merry’s young life, searching for the cause, he keeps coming back to the
kiss.51
And in a sense the kiss is a more accurate representation of the fall than any of the
other explanations offered, not because it is transgressive, not as the emblem for a
breach in morality and justice that is Seymour’s and America’s tragic flaw, a particu-
lar wrong for which remorse would be possible, and which, if the mark of a larger
wrong, would be put right; but because the kiss is an emblem of his love and tender-
ness and compassion and sheer hopeless decent ordinariness.52 As Seymour places his
mouth over the mouth of his stuttering daughter he is re-enacting his entire life: let
this impassioned and innocent kiss heal and transform this gross brokenness, these
words blasted into meaningless fragments of noise, these flying bits of pained sound,
of speech become pain. Merry’s stutter in miniature is the remnant of liberal fluency,
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its excess, what it leaves behind in its ascent. So to imagine the kiss as the cause of
Merry’s pain is to imagine that it is, precisely, the actual beauty of Seymour Levov and
his life that produces the monster Merry. It is beauty itself that is evil and hence the
very beauty of the American dream that is the cause of the fall. Although we have
already, implicitly, worked through this claim in tracing out the categorial dialectic of
ideal and spleen, as it imposes itself in the representational discourse of Roth’s novel
its difficulty and complexity becomes palpable. He cannot be thought to be urging
that the immediate cause of Vietnam and the race riots and Merry’s bombing is the
beauty of the American dream, although he does want to say that this beauty is evil,
murderous, and that the inability of America to really be a melting pot, to truly trans-
form its heterogeneous mass into fully American citizens in which Thanksgiving
might be the celebration of the American pastoral,53 its antithetical pursuit of war and
power are also all correlates of beauty, its inevitable detritus. Beauty produces these
monsters because its ideality, its mode of transcendence, is insufficiently immanent,
not yet a form of truly secular transcendence. The American berserk is the exact cor-
ollary of the American pastoral. American beauty is cruel, and in its cruelty evil.
This is why the overwhelming focus of the novel is not on Merry, as one might
have expected, but on Seymour. He is a mystery darker than Merry because conceiv-
ing of him must be a conceiving of liberal decency somehow being evil in itself. To
conceive of him is to conceive of how ‘a kiss could make someone . . . criminal’,54 not
as transgression, but as kiss. Hence what can appear on first reading as a relentless
charting of Seymour’s overwhelming decency – his sixty-seven endlessly patient dis-
cussions with his rebellious daughter about her life and politics;55 his dedication to
his work like that of a traditional craftsman to his; his loyalty to the Afro-Americans
who work for him and hence to Newark well after the rest of the business world has
left them and it behind; his tender nurturing of his despairing wife as their world col-
lapses around them – all this unexciting and undramatic stuff is the stuff of ordinari-
ness and decency and hence what must be shown if the beauty of the American dream
is to be something other than a myth or a fantasy.56 ‘“Decency?”’, a voice not unlike
Zuckerman’s own on other occasions cavils, ‘“Much overvalued, wouldn’t you say, the
seductions of decency and civility and convention? Not the richest response to life I
can think of.”’57 So one burden of the novel is to show the seductions of decency, its
beauty. The other burden, of course, is to show how the pursuit of beautiful ordinari-
ness is cruel.
Consider this in small. From the outset Dawn is ambivalent about her role as Miss
New Jersey since she senses that there is something about the beautiful that is danger-
ous and deforming, just as, in retrospect, she senses that there has been something
dangerous and deforming about Seymour’s pursuit of beauty, his having to have her,
the beautiful, and to create their life of beauty:
‘I was trying to help out at home! But then you arrive. You! Those hands! Those shoulders!
Towering over me with your jaw!This huge animal I couldn’t get rid of! You wouldn’t leave
me be! Every time I looked up, there was my boyfriend, gaga because I was a ridiculous
beauty queen! You were like some kid! You had to make me into a princess. Well, look where
I have wound up! In a madhouse! Your princess in a madhouse! ’58
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Both Seymour’s own Apollonian beauty and his pursuit of it have now become
unbearable. What is trivially and obviously unbearable about this beauty is that it
denatures, squeezes the life out of all it touches. So Dawn continues her diatribe in
recollecting how when she won the Miss New Jersey contest she was still introvert,
awkward, unpolished. Hence in preparation for the Miss America pageant they would
teach her how to sit, stand, listen and above all walk. Walking, ordinary walking, was
not good enough; you must not swing your arms too much, but not keep them stiffly
by your side either; you don’t just walk, you must somehow glide. Ideal walking, Miss
America walking, the ordinariness of walking become monumental, makes impossible
one thing: walking – ‘“All these little tricks of the trade made me so self-conscious I
could barely move! ”’59
Beauty, the very beauty that transfigures the ordinary into a secular ideal, making
the ordinary into a form of life worthy for its own sake, kills the ordinary. We can
press this thought further and ask what of walking is left over when it is transformed
into gliding? What of everyday speech is left over when it is transformed into the
fluent reasonableness of liberal tolerance? What of the human body is left over after
it has been idealised into the perfections of Dawn and Seymour Levov? Only one
answer seems possible: the six-foot, fat, angry, stuttering monster Merry. Merry is
perhaps ‘The ugliest daughter ever born of two attractive parents’.60 Her ugliness is
not the raw stuff of nature that beauty has yet to work its magic on, but what is left
behind of the human after democratic beauty has done its work. And we are meant
to find that image of Merry’s ugliness compelling because we are meant to see it as a
direct inflection and intensification of Dawn’s beauty. For Dawn, her own beauty and
the beauty of her life progressively develop from being a threat to mobility, to an
immobility escaped from only in sex and in caring for her herd of cows, that is in
escapes from form and endeavour into intentionless nature, to, finally, madness. A
natural history of American beauty. But this is Merry’s mother, and her ambivalence
is how she loved her daughter. Despite herself, her intense ambivalence is all she can
pass on to her daughter; hence the ironic justness of Merry’s rage against her. Merry
is beauty’s stutter.
What kind of account or explanation of Merry or the fall of America is this? What
do we know of Merry as yet other than her stuttering and her bombing, her small and
large exploding of the fluency of American life? Five years after the bombing Seymour
receives a letter from Rita Cohen saying that Merry is working in an old dog and cat
hospital in Newark. What he sees walk out of the building in one of the most dere-
lict bits of the city is unrecognisable, a scarecrow figure, stick thin, a veil made of the
ragged foot off an old nylon stocking covering her mouth and chin. Her speech now
fluent, she tells him she has become a Jain: she wears the veil so as not to harm micro-
scopic organisms, reveres all life, does not wash so as not to harm the water, eats as
little as possible. And there is a story to tell. Fluently, quietly, with insane clarity she
tells it: wanderings and hidings, four rapes, other bombs made, three more dead, and
then the discovery of Jainism. Of course in the centre of the conversation between
father and daughter is the recurrent question, ‘Why?’ After some limp armchair
psychological accounting by Seymour, Merry objects: ‘“You can’t explain away what
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I’ve done by motives, Daddy. I certainly wouldn’t explain away what you’ve done by
motives.”’ Seymour replies that he does have motives; everyone has motives. Merry:
‘“You cannot reduce the journey of a soul to that kind of psychology. It is not worthy
of you.”’61 Motives might explain this or that action, but they cannot explain a life;
rather it is the shape of life, its form, that makes its motives intelligible. Is not
American beauty the fundament of Seymour’s life, the condition of its intelligibility,
and hence what shapes his motives here as elsewhere?62
For exactly the same reason, trying to understand Seymour’s and Merry’s lives
through freedom and unfreedom, reason and unreason will misfire. Seymour accuses
Merry of not thinking for herself, of being tyrannised by a revolving set of extremist
ideologies, of letting other people do her thinking for her; if only she would think for
herself, become autonomous, she would see the wrongness of her ways. But how can
he, Merry objects, who is conformist to his bones, who does exactly what the world
expects of him, accuse her of not thinking for herself?63 At this level of concreteness,
can we distinguish between what is autonomous and what is heteronomous? Apart
from psychological and social extremes, can we label anyone’s thinking as either one
or the other? Are not acting in accordance with the norms of liberal decency and
acting against them (but for their sake) both potent images of autonomy belonging
to its full expression? And conversely, will not social conformity and transgressive
action both always raise the possibility of heteronomy? Neither her radicalism nor his
conformism is either obviously autonomous or heteronomous. Nothing will shift the
stalemate here.
But these two possibilities, explanations in terms of motive, on the one hand, and
through either reason or its determinate failure on the other, can legitimately be
regarded as exhausting the possibilities of comprehending these lives conceptually.
Conceptual understanding is going to be deficient because for it ideal and fate, value
and fact remain separate; to be sure, related to one another (facts can be adequate or
inadequate instantiations of the value, better or worse applications), but nonetheless
distinct. To think that the modes of failure are to be understood through contradic-
tion (in the concept), causal interference, or via simple not measuring up is already to
have departed from the immanence of secular life. Conceptual understanding will fail
here because ingredient on both sides of the equation, with respect to father and
daughter, is the material embodiment of an idea which, in being so embodied, is con-
stitutive of it. Tracking the fate of the idea is tracing its material transformations. In
order to comprehend Seymour, his ordinary beauty, we must see Merry’s ugliness as
its catastrophic fulfilment. And hence we understand Merry fully not through all the
perfectly good psychological reasons for her explosion, but through seeing those
reasons as beauty’s regurgitated other. Roth’s discretion in not providing Merry with
a subjectivity worth noting, of letting her be solely the figure of her life, is the condi-
tion for seeing it as a life. Only then in the telling and narrating of these lives, only in
the finding of a form of telling that is responsive to what they demand, can they
become perspicuous. So the binding relation between Seymour and Merry is not
psychological or causal but formal, a matter of form.
As stated, even this is too quick and undiscriminating. For what is at stake in this
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novel is the informing power of beauty, the power of form to render the secular every-
day intelligible. Or, again, the issue is what the American form of beauty enables and
destroys. It enables the life of Seymour Levov and destroys his daughter. So the fate
of a certain form (of life) will be the informe, if you will, ideal life disintegrating into
its components, bare life. Finally, in despair and frustration at Merry’s insane reason-
ableness and his inability to puncture it or find a reason he can understand for all that
she has done and become, in a wild and manic attempt to get at the truth he tears the
veil from her face and orders her to speak. Greeted with nothing but silence Seymour
deserts the last shibboleth of liberal decency and, in remembrance of a kiss, violently
pries her mouth open:
‘Speak!’ he demanded, and at last the true smell of her reached him, the lowest human
smell there is, excluding only the stench of the rotting living and the rotting dead. . . .
[W]hat he smelled now, while pulling open her mouth, was a human being . . . a mad
human being who grubs about for pleasure in its own shit. Her foulness had reached
him. She is disgusting. His daughter is a human mess stinking of human waste. Her
smell is the smell of everything organic breaking down. It is the smell of no coherence.
It is the smell of all she’s become. She could do it, and did do it, and this reverence for
life is the final obscenity.
[. . .] A spasm of gastric secretions and undigested food started up the intestinal piping
and, in a bitter, acidic stream, surged sickeningly onto his tongue, and when he cried
out ‘Who are you! ’ it was spewed with his words onto her face.64
When Merry first emerges from the dog and cat hospital and she and her father
embrace like any passionate father and daughter might embrace, crying in one
another’s arms, it is an embrace, we are told, between ‘the dependable father whose
center is the source of all order . . . and the daughter who is chaos itself ’.65 As Seymour
in body and belief is American beauty, so Merry in body and belief is the repository
of all that is incompatible with beauty. Seeing her thus is all. Beneath the veil, the
slightest art that allows Merry her fluency, is indeed the truth about her: she is all and
exactly what cannot be rendered beautiful; she is all and exactly what has been left
behind in the forming action of America; ‘[she] was his daughter, and she was
unknowable’.66 If one wants a name for this moment, call it ‘self-recognition in abso-
lute otherness’, but Merry’s unknowableness reverses the meaning of that philoso-
pheme. Beauty finds itself in its opposite, in the decomposing rancidness Merry has
become. Merry is life decomposing, beyond incorporation or forming; but she is this
as being her father’s daughter, as if in the tearing of the veil he all unknowingly
becomes the artist renouncing his forming capacity, decomposing his work in order
that its elemental being can appear. Ordinariness cannot be ordinary if it leaves no
room for walking. But the ordinariness that immobilises life leaves decomposing
Merry in its wake. She is the stakes of ordinariness, she is the repository of what beauty
cannot tolerate, and hence as its failure its ideal future. Merry’s Jainism, its reverence
for the ordinary even in its microscopic incarnations, is crackpot and chillingly
knowing.
The unveiling which transforms the artist’s fluency into vomit at the sight of
what cannot be seen, however shocking, is and is not a moment of dissonance; it is
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not dissonant because it falls squarely within the representational order of the novel;
but in its representation of sublime, grotesque unknowability it devours form, blind-
ing it, leaving only the smell of incoherence and vomit in its place. In place of the
judgement of beauty, but as a consequence of it, we, formally, find ourselves making
a judgement of disgust, revulsion, horror. But this is a judgement (the smell of decay
is not literal, after all), the way in which we experience the entanglement of beauty
and decomposition. This is the end of American beauty. This is the origin of modern-
ism. Every effort of art from now on and in remembrance of this moment will find
its authority dependent upon what it can neither enliven, beautify, nor forget (since
forgetfulness, aesthetically, is just sentimentality, entertainment, the culture industry).
Dissonance, sublime unknowability, is the aesthetic (non-)representation of the
undead.
Near the beginning of the novel this climatic moment is anticipated as Zuckerman
reflects on how everyday life depends on our trying to understand those people
around us and how, no matter how careful, judicious, patient, attentive our efforts,
we get it wrong: ‘You get them wrong before you meet them, while you’re anticipat-
ing meeting them; you get them wrong while you’re with them; and then you go home
to tell somebody else about the meeting and you get them all wrong again.’67 As
temptingly modest as it sounds, Roth cannot quite mean this literally; is not the
gamble of his novel that he will get Seymour, Dawn and Merry Levov right? But then,
perhaps, wrongness is not wrongness. Zuckerman continues: ‘The fact remains that
getting people right is not what living is all about anyway. It’s getting them wrong that
is living, getting them wrong and wrong and wrong and then, on careful reconsider-
ation, getting them wrong again. That’s how we know we’re alive: we’re wrong.’68 The
great and impossible task of the novel is to know the other; but the other that is to be
known now is the life without Bildung, the life that is from the first a stutter. In this
casual reflection on the problem of other minds, I hear the emergent dialectic of ideal
and spleen in which the attempt to get people right is the business of form-giving, of
beauty, and getting them wrong the release from form-giving that enables life in its
broken concreteness to appear. Only in the wrongness that transpires through efforts
of right-making can we know we’re still alive, or rather know the extent of our lack of
life. The crescendo of ‘wrong’ in this reflection is normative not factual; and the issue
is one of knowing what being alive was. We can come to knowledge of being alive,
that someday we might just walk, only via the systematic escape from rightness.
Modernist art, the art of wrongness and dissonance, is the condition for us knowing
of life, death and what lies between.
If the scene of decomposition, the revolting image of revulsion, is the pivot of
American Pastoral, if it is the formal centre of the novel, it is neither its meaning nor
its end. Even what is without form, what cannot be formed, must be transmitted,
hence is related to form, so in another way formed. The remainder of the novel must
unpack that image not through interpretation but through uncovering the durée
appropriate to it. Seymour’s life continues, or if that is too strong, becomes a certain
kind of stutter; or rather, he must learn stuttering as a way of continuing. What
Seymour must learn is that he cannot reclaim, enliven, protect or save Merry. It is a
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hard lesson that he initially avoids by focusing on the fact of the four rapes as iden-
tifiable failures of his power to protect. But there is guilt here too, since what he truly
could not protect Merry from is himself, in small his violently prying her mouth open,
the rape Merry always suffered. If Merry was ‘“always a defenseless girl”’,69 she was
also always without protection, vulnerable and ruined. And it continues. Seymour
cannot reclaim or enliven Merry, but he cannot leave her behind, mourn her, either.
There is a temptation to mourning, a temptation to think that all the crudeness it
takes to stay alive is a matter of leaving the dead behind, letting them go – letting the
dead bury the dead. This temptation is voiced continuously by Jerry; he is nothing
but that voice. But his hysteria, masquerading as egomania, underlines how illusory
the escape from the undead is. Merry is not quite dead; and because she has never
been fully alive either, she cannot die, and so cannot be mourned, ever. Seymour in
and through his decency knows he is bound to her, bound to her undeadness, her
decaying life. Finding what might count as acknowledging and sustaining a relation
to the undead is Seymour’s conundrum. If Merry was always the undead, the not yet
living, and Seymour always her executioner and her protector, the order of her disor-
der, then the mystery of Seymour is, finally, the mystery of that relation.70 But it is a
mystery that cannot be lived or take shape as a life – a certain crudeness, life’s insis-
tence, does always intervene in a life to de facto separate what cannot be separated.
And this is what Seymour, in the midst of being relentlessly, crudely, moved forward
through attachments to a second wife and new children, must have implicitly sensed
in approaching Zuckerman in the first place. Doing justice to Merry is nothing he can
accomplish, something that nothing in life can accomplish although it is the meaning
and failure of his life.
To say that nothing in life can do justice to Merry is hence equally to say that what
doing justice to her amounts to is something that cannot be represented. Hence doing
justice to Merry is what drives the novel back into itself, drives representation into
figure and form. This is the ultimate reason why this so-called realistic chronicle is not
a work of representation, finally, but of exactly imagining; why a work at moments
relentlessly realistic must, finally, withdraw its power to depict as its ultimate author-
ity. Zuckerman’s realist chronicle is, well beyond realism and disillusionment, the
non-narrative form of Seymour’s loss, America’s loss. At its furthest extreme, American
Pastoral is, formally, first the discovery that the requirement of doing justice to the
undead is its condition of possibility, both the space between and what connects each
name with its allegorical actualisation; thus, secondly, the self-reflexive or internal
becoming of the form which transmitting the undead takes. Its discovery of itself as
novel is nothing other than its conveying of the undead, the movement whereby it
narratively transforms realist chronicle into melancholic form, its form being the
emergence of modernist form as not representation but refuge, the almost painterly
figure of the grotesque embrace of order and disorder. Thus all the modernist novel is
now, perhaps was always, is affirmative melancholy, impossible mourning, the narra-
tive mechanism through which melancholy becomes affirmative or mourning
becomes permanent, the reiterative undoing of itself before all that it fails, its form a
mode of embrace of the undead.71
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And is not this form of protection of the undead precisely what the idea of secular
transcendence now comes to, the idea or possibility or hope of binding meaning being
located in the transmission, through form, of the undead – the art of stuttering? Not
the monumental ordinariness of the American dream, but the affirmative melancholy
of its dissolution now spells secular transcendence. What could be more emphatically
secular, as bound to the materiality of human lives and yet transcendent, than that
gesture which, here and now, prevents the undead from being left behind? Which here
and now repeats their loss as the intolerable itself, the unjust itself? To be sure, there
is something exquisite here, nearly beautiful. There can be no transmission of the stut-
tering without form, thereby mitigating its pain. But the seal of the novel’s authentic-
ity is that, finally, it is only life in its brokenness that is transmitted, just the most
minimal holding of ruination. Nothing else is possible. And even that, of course,
nothing but semblance.
American Pastoral ends with a débâcle of a dinner party in which Seymour discov-
ers his wife being dry humped by the family architect; where the focus of conversa-
tion is the new popular pornography in the person of Linda Lovelace in Deep Throat;
and where his father is nearly blinded in a fork attack by the architect’s drunken wife.
Marcia, a New York intellectual, at the sight of this final indignity finds herself con-
vulsed with laughter and delight: these pillars of society are going down, their
decorum now truly only facade, their life not robust at all, but enormously assailable
and frail. Is not this laughter the one Roth himself has encouraged for a lifetime? Not
quite, for although it is true that the dream is over and cannot be recovered still he
queries: ‘And what is wrong with their life? What on earth is less reprehensible than
the life of the Levovs?’72 In his review of American Pastoral Michael Wood complains
about these final sentences that ‘they still seek to moralise the wreck of a world, as if
Zuckerman had never heard of Job, as if the Levovs’ virtue ought really, after all, to
have been a protection for them, rather than an invitation to damage’.73 This seems
to me quite wrong; almost the first thing we can be sure of is that this novel is going
to be the adult version of the adolescent Swede’s favourite book, John R. Tunis’s The
Kid from Tomkinsville, a baseball ‘boys’ Book of Job’.74 The stakes of the final passage
are not the question of protection,75 but of rightness. Intrinsically, American beauty
which has liberal decency as one of its fundamental components is evil. Roth’s further
and darker thought is the query, the wonder whether nonetheless ‘on earth’ this is not
the least reprehensible of lives? One might think that showing how normative beliefs
themselves produce evil outcomes demonstrates their falsity. The shape of Roth’s novel
throws this comforting belief into question. Would not any form of life capable of
sustaining a vision of transcendence have to partake in the beautiful as condition for
it figuring something desirable, something capable of inspiring and moving human
beings? Is the idea of a post-charismatic form of life capable of sustaining transcen-
dence intelligible? Is not beauty the very thing which internally connects normative
ideals with human sensuousness? And hence is not the raising of ordinariness to mon-
umentality as encapsulated in the American dream the furthest reach of secular
transcendence? In showing the decency of Seymour Levov to be evil, has it been
shown that he is anything other than unutterably decent? Beauty has stopped being
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beautiful and become grotesque, evil. But only nihilistic laughter would think this
means that there is no longer beauty or that beauty is not the ultimate stakes of non-
beauty.
Secular transcendence transpires in art; but since art is semblance even in its furthest
disintegrative reach, it transpires only as a material idea. Consider the notion of
material idea as what modernist art adds to the inventory of modern social experience
and epistemology. Secular transcendence can be integrally conceived, that is become
binding for us, nowhere else than in art as material idea, since otherwise it would
forsake the necessarily bottom-up movement which makes secular norms truly
secular. For the present, at least, Roth is contending that the immanence of ideality is
sustained in an integral and not negative dialectic of ideal and spleen, in a movement
in which the wrong carries the burden of the right without as yet falsifying or elimi-
nating that very right, and hence in the elaborated figure of the crying embrace
between the father whose centre is the source of all order and the daughter who is
chaos itself. That is the material idea of this life. So being is the social significance of
art. But that significance is politically idle. Art can be the bearer of the knowledge of
this life only as art, as semblance. Art’s autonomy ensures its practical harmlessness.
That is not an objection to art, but to the world in which beauty survives, when it
does and probably for not very long, as also emphatic evil.
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Kant and the ends of criticism
Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a marked revival of interest in both
Kant and aesthetics.1 This revival has been accompanied with a move beyond the
theoretical positions that sought to displace the notion of aesthetics and often requires
a rethinking of the relationship between criticism and philosophy. I wish to present
here an account of Kant’s ‘invention’ of aesthetics that allows its terms to become both
operative within and yet also transformed by the practice of critical engagement with
literary and visual works of art. It is important to mention however that the context
for this reinvention of an aesthetic criticism is one that should embrace the different
kinds of artworks, as an exclusive focus on the literary tends to reduce the discussion
of art to an account of language, a reduction partly responsible for the prior tendency
to dismiss aesthetics.
Alongside this attentiveness to the distinction between literary and visual works
should also come a challenge to the attempt of many thinkers to dismiss aesthetic con-
siderations in favour of historical readings. The historicist orientation in criticism has
had a long vogue despite the general recognition of the real problems that such con-
centration has, not least in accounting for its own conditions of possibility.2 The real
reason for the continuing production of works that present an opposition between
‘contextual’ reading and aesthetics is a wide acceptance that aesthetic accounts of
works do not involve historical considerations.3 I would like therefore here to present
an account of aesthetic criticism that makes clear the nature of its historical purchase.
This account of a Kantian aesthetic criticism will be presented by first making clear
the expansive sense the term ‘aesthetics’ has for Kant, secondly arguing for the vital
importance of understanding Kant’s decision to discuss the critique of taste in the
same work as he presents a critique of teleology, thirdly describing the ‘ends of criti-
cism’ and fourthly setting out the type of criticism that can be produced by the
approach that thus emerges.
The multiple senses of ‘aesthetics’ in Kant
It is not generally noted that each of Kant’s three critiques contains a discussion of
something termed ‘aesthetics’. I will here briefly revisit the three distinct senses given
to the term ‘aesthetic’ in Kant’s three critiques, suggesting thereby an agenda for an
expansion of the term beyond the restricted notion which presently is the major one
accepted.
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason opens with a section entitled the ‘transcendental aes-
thetic’. In this part of the work Kant treats of the contribution to knowledge provided
by sensibility. The use of the term ‘aesthetic’ to describe the notion of sensibility was
widely accepted at the time Kant wrote the first critique and Kant uses it in this work
to discuss an ‘immediate’ relationship between cognition and an object as opposed to
a mediated relationship between the two, as is provided by concepts and judgements.
The reason why Kant here is not just presenting an account of sensibility per se is his
transcendental purpose. As Kant puts it:
Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form
cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a pos-
teriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be
considered separately from all sensation.4
The way in which sensations are presented to us in their specific vividness is what Kant
terms a matter. This matter is contrasted with that which permits us to receive this
matter as such, and this is termed by Kant form. Since Kant identifies the matter here
with the term ‘sensation’ itself we need to separate sensation from that which makes
us capable of receiving its inputs, and this we can term ‘sensibility’. If there is some-
thing that organizes and permits reception of sensation then the enquiry into this
must be an enquiry into something that is not derived from experience and is hence
a priori. Since we are here enquiring into sensibility we are forced to the view that
there is such a thing as a priori sensibility.5
We will see that this notion of a priori sensibility is important in reviewing Kant’s
other enquiries into something termed ‘aesthetics’. In the second critique sensibility
is approached not in terms of the capacity of receipt of sensation but rather in the
sense of ‘feeling’. Here what Kant wishes to suggest is that there is a ground for think-
ing of feelings in a non-empiricist manner. The ground for this second sense of the
term ‘aesthetic’ is that Kant has uncovered within this work the pure basis of moral-
ity. This argument leads him to consider the relationship between the moral law and
motivation to act in accordance with it. The examination of this latter must turn on
the question of an a priori feeling, otherwise we would be faced with the irresolvable
paradox of a pure law and a merely pathological motivation. So, if the argument about
the purity of morals is to carry conviction it is essential that Kant should demonstrate
that there are pure feelings. Given that the moral law acts as a counter to the demands
of sensuousness the first feeling that it produces in us is humiliation. But humiliation
has also a positive correlate in the form of respect for the moral law, a feeling ‘pro-
duced by an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one which we can know
completely a priori and the necessity of which we can discern’.6 Further, respect is not
a ‘drive’ to morality but rather ‘morality itself, regarded subjectively as a drive’ and
which is produced in us by the example of another person following the law.7
The basic notion of intellectual feeling given in the second critique is made much
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more intricate in Kant’s subsequent works, particularly Religion within the Limits of
Reason Alone.8 But whilst these works suggest that the picture given in the second cri-
tique requires further elaboration they do not present reasons for rejecting the basic
notion of the ‘aesthetic’ of this work. The reason for describing the discussion of pure
feelings as an ‘aesthetic’ is not merely because Kant does this himself.9 It is also the
case that many contemporary moral theories also relate the importance of thinking of
feeling in morality and, indeed, so did theorists in Kant’s time.10 That the term ‘aes-
thetic’ should include a clear reference to ‘feeling’ is a crucial development in the
second critique and connects it to the demonstrations of the third critique. It is essen-
tial however to be clear that ‘feeling’ should be understood not merely as a reference
to a set of empirical states but, if we are undertaking to set out a description of feel-
ings which we characterise as ‘aesthetic’, that these feelings should be understood to
be pure in nature.
It is in the third critique that Kant turns to examining the credentials of a ‘critique
of taste’ to be entitled an ‘aesthetic’. In section VIII of the first introduction to the
work he described how the connection between the presentation of an object and a
feeling of pleasure or displeasure has come to be termed an ‘aesthetic’ relation even
though in this relation we do not find a cognition presented (as is the case with the
intuitions discussed in the transcendental aesthetic). Rather, what is occurring in the
relation in question is that we have given to us a presentation of intuition to which
no concept corresponds and this lack of correspondence can take the form of either
pleasure (as is the case when we describe something as beautiful) or displeasure mixed
with pleasure (as when we describe something as sublime).
It is important for Kant to distinguish between the aesthetic judgements that are
thought of as involving only particular sensations and those which affect the basic
judgement itself in its intrinsic nature. The former type of relation to an object does
not fall within the province of a transcendental enquiry as it concerns only things
found, contingently, to be ‘agreeable’ whilst a transcendental enquiry is concerned
with that which seems to us to involve a necessary relation to pleasure and displeasure.
So, just as the description of ‘feelings’ as aesthetic in the second critique only applied
to pure feelings, here it is also the case that not all types of relation to an object that
involve pleasure or displeasure are included in the province of an ‘aesthetic’, only those
that involve a necessary relationship.
The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement concerns itself with the two forms in which
there is an experience of the essential nature of subjectivity, in relation to the beauti-
ful and the sublime. The experience of the beautiful harmonises a relation between
the subject and what it relates to such that the beauty perceived and the one perceiv-
ing it appear to be intimately united, which is why beauty provokes a ‘lingering’ and
a feeling of peacefulness that we term ‘taste’. The experience of the sublime is much
more violent and entails a conflict involving alternate feelings of attraction and repul-
sion, which is why Kant does not address the sublime under the heading of ‘taste’ but
rather places it in close proximity to moral feeling by describing the feeling of the
sublime as an ‘intellectual feeling’.11
The distinction between taste and intellectual feeling parallels the distinction
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between the relation to nature in terms of law and the relation to morality in terms
of law. Just as the comprehension of the world as ordered is productive of pleasure and
a feeling of relation between perceiver and perceived, the experience of the beautiful
involves a sense of the connection between the one experiencing something as beau-
tiful and that which is so experienced. Similarly, the relation to the moral law involves
a mixture of feelings, as is evidenced in the attraction and repulsion of humiliation
and respect, an admixture given a clear parallel in Kant’s description of intellectual
feeling in the case of the sublime. These parallels should help us to see that there is,
on the one hand, a connection between the experience of beauty and the thought of
purpose and, on the other hand, a notion of the necessity of a conflict involved with
our relation to morality that is paralleled in some of our aesthetic experiences.
These parallels between the discussions of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement and
Kant’s other critical works indicate the systematic placing of the former. They also
suggest the dependence of the whole critical system on an expanded notion of ‘aes-
thetics’.12 The relation between the three forms of enquiry Kant terms ‘aesthetic’ can
now be summarised. The transcendental aesthetic explicates the a priori conditions of
sensibility, the second critique provides us with reasons for thinking that there are
pure feelings and the third critique details the relationship between pleasure and dis-
pleasure and necessity. All three forms of ‘aesthetic’ therefore reveal the non-sensuous
grounds of sensuousness.
The unity of the third critique
The Critique of Judgement is concerned to describe the relationship between the
general structures of law outlined in the first critique as the basis of a nature in general
and the laws that contingently prevail in the world we happen to inhabit. In other
words, the question arises, given the demonstrations of the first critique, of why we
describe such things as the law of gravity as laws when the operation of them in our
world seems contingent and the notion of law itself is intrinsically necessary in its
thought. In order to treat of this question Kant finds it necessary to return to the topic
of how ‘judgement’ should be described.13 Whilst the importance of the topic of
‘judgement’ in the first critique is undeniable (the understanding itself is described
there as a ‘faculty for judging’ and the discussion of the notion of schematism is given
as part of the doctrine of judgement), the ‘reflective’ aspect of judgement is relegated
to an appendix to the transcendental analytic.14 Since reflective judgement deals not
with the nature in general that is at issue in the first critique, but rather with the con-
tingencies of the world we happen to inhabit, it must address the problem of relating
the ‘laws’ we discern in this world to the thought of law presented in the first critique.
So this type of judgement cannot rely on the understanding to provide it with laws
but since it is dealing with nature (and not freedom) it also cannot rely on reason.
Therefore there is, for this type of judgement, no pre-given mode of operation. It thus
has to deal with appearances ‘artistically, in terms of a principle that is universal but
also indeterminate’, which is ‘a purposive arrangement of nature in a system’.15
In order to justify the principle of purposiveness what Kant has to do in the third
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critique is to show how the concept of ‘art’ (or techne) arises and what the connection
is between ‘art’ and the cognition of nature as possessing laws. Once we have described
the task of the third critique we can begin to see why it contains both a critique of
aesthetic judgement and a critique of teleological judgement. What Kant is treating
in this work is a logical purposiveness in nature (a teleo-logic) and an aesthetic purpo-
siveness in nature, and the division between logical purposiveness and aesthetic pur-
posiveness repeats the division in the first critique between a transcendental aesthetic
and a transcendental logic.
This description also helps us to grasp the notion Kant has of the term ‘art’. The
connection between the terms is clear in the sense of a ‘making’ that is the product of
a form of cultivation. This suggests that the question of ‘culture’ will be of some sig-
nificance in grasping the manner in which Kant describes art and that it will also be
the key to a criticism of works of art. It should be remembered however that Kant is
also describing the capacity of our judgement to ‘make laws’ as itself ‘artistic’ due to
the fact that this reflective capacity involves a use of universal but indeterminate con-
cepts. Kant refers to the universal but indeterminate concepts through the principle
of ‘purposiveness’. It is the principle of purposiveness that enables us to treat the reg-
ularities of experience through the notion of law. Similarly, there is such a principle
in operation in both creating and judging works of art.
Kant and fine art
The manner in which Kant treats the work of art in the Critique of Aesthetic
Judgement has rarely been regarded with much enthusiasm.16 One of the reasons for
this is that it has been thought, perhaps under the influence of Hegel’s account, that
Kant has less interest in works of art than in natural beauty. There is a passage where
Kant refers to the ‘superiority’ of natural beauty over artistic beauty, but it is worth
noting that the place where Kant states this is during a discussion of the ‘intellectual
interest’ in the beautiful before he has set out the distinction between fine art and
the thought of art in general.17 When Kant turns to discussing ‘fine art’ he describes
its purpose as involving the standard of the ‘reflective power of judgement’.18 This
involves fine art in an intimate relationship to nature as its artistry is dependent for
its effect on a certain type of self-effacement that involves us in looking upon it as
‘natural’.
The manner in which this impression of a natural power is conveyed to us by fine
art is through the rule that is responsible for its production, a rule that Kant terms
‘genius’. Just as the ability to perceive nature as purposive requires a relationship to take
place between the presentation of a regularity and a reflective giving of law, so the pro-
duction of an object after the rule of genius requires a self-renunciation of determinate
results in favour of simple attention to the act of creation as such.This attention relates,
however, in the production of fine art, to the ‘material’ that is worked on whilst the
active formation of this material ‘requires a talent that is academically trained, so that
it may be used in a way that can stand the test of the power of judgement’.19 The rela-
tionship between the talent that is required to make formation artistic and the genius
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that is required to find the material worked on exacting is an intricate one that par-
allels the relation between receptivity to sensation as such and the active formation of
sensibility in the provision of our formative role in placing sensuousness within its con-
ditions.
The creation of a type of beauty that is the product of the combination of cultiva-
tion with intimate receptivity is responsible for a ‘superiority’ that fine art has over
natural beauty, namely, the beautiful description of things that we would find ugly in
nature itself. To be able to exhibit things in this manner is what requires genius, but
genius itself is based on the possession of ‘spirit’ (Geist). Kant terms this ‘the animat-
ing principle in the mind’ and states that it is ‘the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas’.20
An aesthetic idea is a presentation to which no concept is adequate, ‘so that no lan-
guage can express it completely and allow us to grasp it’ or, in other terms, an intui-
tion that exceeds the powers of a concept to govern it through the rules of
understanding (which is why Kant also terms this type of idea a presentation ‘of the
imagination’).21 This involves a relation to the understanding, but one which is
expressive of an idea rather than a concept.
Whilst the discussion of ‘genius’ gives us a clear clue to the production of a work
of art, it is only the combination of this with ‘taste’ that allows us say that we have
‘fine art’. If genius is governed by the imagination in its freedom, then taste requires
the introduction of a lawfulness that tempers the fertility of reference to aesthetic ideas
and gives them form. Because of this, taste, like judgement in general, ‘consists in dis-
ciplining (or training) genius’.22 Before looking further at the conditions for this train-
ing, conditions which will lead us beyond the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement and to
the Critique of Teleological Judgement, it is first necessary to look in more detail at the
very notion of ‘fine art’ itself, as so doing will help to defuse the notion that an aes-
thetic criticism is one that is blind to history.
The fact that the opening sections of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement concern a
discussion of ‘pure judgements of taste’ has led to a misleading reading of Kant’s
account of fine art. Whilst the notion of a pure aesthetic judgement is outlined by
Kant to be ‘disinterested’, this term is not applicable to his account of works of art.
Kant explicitly states this when he writes that judgements that concern works of art
‘have to assess the thing’s perfection’ and that this entails that they are not purely aes-
thetic judgements.23 Rather, the judgements of works of art approximate to the Ideal
of Beauty described in the Analytic of the Beautiful rather than to the pure judge-
ments of taste accounted for there. Because of this a relation to a concept is at work
in judging and producing works of art. The incorporation of conceptuality into the
production of works of art is described in the notion of ‘aesthetic ideas’ – presenta-
tions of the imagination which prompts much thought but to which no concept can
be adequate, which is why ‘no language can express it completely’.24 But the incorpo-
ration of such aesthetic ideas into the production of a work, which is the work of
genius, can only be given through the training that results from taste. This training
requires an essential involvement of the artist with history. To understand this involve-
ment of the work of art with the history of art is integral to the act of criticism and
this shows the centrality of a historical purchase for an aesthetic criticism. It is this
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notion of a discipline or training that requires an effective step beyond the account of
the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement towards the Critique of Teleological Judgement. The
reason for stating this is that the production of forms of an exemplary kind involves
a clear relationship to the history of the production of artworks and, with this, an
account of the conditions of culture. Kant describes culture as the production in a
rational being of ‘an aptitude for purposes generally’.25 This production requires two
conditions.
Kant terms these conditions two forms of culture, though in fact they are part of
the unitary complex that culture itself constitutes. The first is what he terms a culture
of skill and this is required for the promotion of purposes at all, but its condition is
the development of a culture of discipline which is necessary in order to free us from
the ‘despotism of desires’.26 The fact that it is within the discussion of the Critique of
Teleological Judgement that we are led to this idea of discipline as a precondition for
the exercise of freedom is in itself very instructive about the unity of the whole third
critique.
Whilst the most obvious sense of teleology is in relation to the understanding of
organisms it is also the case that Kant’s key example of final causation is a cultural rela-
tion involving the notion of ‘rent’.27 The recursive logic of final causes operates in
culture through the production of inequality and conflict in history, a production that
ensures competition and distortion, a process which we could term a ‘cunning of
nature’ or to use Kant’s own expression ‘a deeply hidden and perhaps intentional
endeavour of the supreme wisdom’.28 This ‘deeply hidden’ endeavour directs the con-
flict within which the history of humanity is found to an overall goal of further pro-
duction of culture and is the prime means of ‘discipline’ for nations as inequality is
the means of disciplining individuals. This important set of claims is key to the under-
standing of what discipline is involved in taste. Taste is analogous in its action on the
work of art during its production and in the course of its judgement to the cruel and
vigorous elements of culture itself. A final way of putting the relationship into focus
is through Kant’s contrast between mechanism and teleology. Just as ‘mechanism’
involves only a linear causal relation as opposed to the recursive causality of final
causes and this leads the former to produce only limited operations incapable of
‘spirit’ (because of lacking life), so also the interaction between the artwork and its
criticism is one of connection between that which is filled with life and the fixity that
produces death. Criticism’s ends can include the destruction of a work just as easily
as its perpetuation and reproduction.
The ends of criticism
To describe the implications of the agenda for criticism that emerges from this
account of Kant requires revisiting the notion of ‘ends’. There are four types of ‘ends’
that need to be distinguished: we can think of an ‘end’ as the limit of something; we
can describe an ‘end’ as something’s purpose; we can think of an ‘end’ as a conclusion
or destination; finally, we can think of an ‘end’ as an ‘affinity’ between elements or as
a notion of ‘co-determination’ of parts. Whilst the notions of limit and purpose are
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closely interconnected for Kant, as to think of a purpose of something is limit our
comprehension of it to the terms of that purpose, these elements of ‘end’ are still ana-
lytically distinct.
The limit of the criticism of a work should be given in terms of the relationship
between setting rules for its comprehension in a lawlike manner and recognising that
this law has to be referred to the nature of the work itself and not simply pre-set.
Hence, the act of criticism has to involve a reflective judgement, which uncovers the
law within the work and relates the law ‘of ’ the work to the thought of law in general.
This limitative element of the ‘end’ of criticism is connected to the purpose of criti-
cism itself, this purpose being one of relating the work to the formation of culture.
The purpose of criticism in other words is to further sharpen the process of relation-
ship between the elements of skill and discipline within a culture, providing condi-
tions for ‘disciplining’ the work in the process of inaugurating its entry into the
historical network of works. This disciplinary aspect of criticism is both its promise
and its danger. The promise of criticism at this level is that its introduction of the work
assessed into the network of works will permit new reflection on the corpus of works
already assessed; the danger is that it will simply kill the work and permit no new
growth to emerge from it.29
Whilst the danger of criticism’s foreclosure of a work is one sense of the under-
standing of ‘end’ as destination the real sense of this notion of criticism is its relation-
ship to the Idea of the work, an Idea which we can grasp as contained within the
possibility opened by the work and which is not a destination in the sense of a finish
but an infinite possibility that permits further critical reaction and the elaboration of
an embedded presence of the work within culture as part of its own criticism. This
notion of a ‘destination’ indicates the infinity of criticism and the way in which crit-
icism lives through its own history. This aspect of criticism is another element of the
negotiation that an act of criticism involves, as without a relation to the history that
has made possible its intervention in relation to the work the criticism produced has
the tendency to be merely a ‘view’ or opinion which does not itself have any ‘spirit’.
For criticism itself to possess ‘spirit’ is for it to be involved with the ‘life’ that is its own
historical condition. However, this relation is again something that requires a reflec-
tive negotiation, as a determinative relation to the history of criticism reduces each
critical act to a mere repetition and does not permit the reopening of the engagement
with the work that will allow the conflict that is the life of culture. Hence, there is the
same danger and the same opening for each act of criticism in relation to its own
history as there is for this criticism’s relation to the possibility of the work confronted,
and the case is further complicated when we include discussion of the criticism
directed upon the particular work, a relation which soon involves considerable com-
plexity.30 Hence, not merely the production of the work and a recognition of its entry
into the set of works is an historical act but the critical relation to the history of the
criticism of a work is a further historical act, and these twin historical conditions
require thinking in relation to their own possibility, a thinking that has precisely been
ruled out by recent forms of historicism.
The notion of ‘end’ as affinity or co-determination involves assessment of the work
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criticised in relation to its conditions of production and is often the most decisive
element of the critical act, not least because there are many conditions of production
for a work and the relation of the work to the different elements of culture can again
enrich relation to the work or simply produce a reductive response to it which permits
no new invention. Understanding the conditions of the work involves grasping the
strife of which it is part and negotiating a relation between the work and this strife,
without either ceasing prematurely to close the strife or simply articulating this strife
as exterior to the work’s immanent sense.31 This relationship to the work involves not
a simple rendition of ‘contexts’, as is all too common, but rather seeing the work as
emerging from a medium that is specific to itself and grasping this medium not simply
as a sociological or historical given but as marking an originary irruption and thus as
saturating any ‘context’. Grasping the nature of this irruption clearly involves a sense
of what makes the originary work possible. This is endless work as there are no defin-
able ‘facts’ that could close this accounting; hence the accounting should overflow the
arena of facts and reshape them. In other terms, this grasp of the medium that permits
the work’s emergence is one that should reshape the work’s ‘backgrounds’ in the work’s
image instead of fashioning the work in the image of the circumstances of its arrival.
The listing of the thoughts of end and the thinking through of how they relate to
acts of criticism should help us to see that Kant’s notion of aesthetic judgement is not
intended either to freeze works within some straitjacket of formal beauty or to fore-
close a relation to history as integral to the comprehension of their aesthetic import.
The key element underlying all these disparate considerations, however, is the rela-
tionship between art and life, culture and the reproduction of its conditions through
a reference of both to law and its reflective comprehension. The combination of these
considerations suggests strongly that works are engaged in the same difficult negotia-
tion with death that is, in fact, a condition of life itself. It is this ultimate relationship
between life and death, work and its destruction, that is involved in the critical rela-
tionship to works of art.
Practical exemplifications: Wyndham Lewis and Robert Mapplethorpe
The works of Wyndham Lewis provide us with a case study for the application of
this view of criticism to the understanding of artistic productions. Lewis’s work has
been subjected to the same range of assessments as most other authors, from the
classic description of it in terms of certain types of basic writing patterns to the rela-
tion of it to psychoanalytic or Marxist categories.32 If we turn to the novels of Lewis
from a Kantian direction, however, we can see the vital character of his work as con-
sisting precisely in its negotiation with the characteristics of life itself. This is clearly
seen in such a work as The Revenge for Love, a work in which description of the polit-
ical struggle engaged in by the leftist artists and writers of the 1930s against the back-
drop of the Spanish Civil War is set out as involving a struggle between the
engagement with life and the surrender to the forces which mechanise life. This can
be seen in the passages where the characters are given lucid moments, as when
Margaret, at a party, is driven to reflect on those around her as being ‘big portentous
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wax-dolls, mysteriously doped with some impenetrable nonsense, out of a Caligari’s
drug-cabinet, and wound up with wicked fingers to jerk about in a threatening way
– their mouths backfiring every other second, to spit out a manufactured hatred, as
their eyeballs moved’.33
This vivid description, which involves references to drugs, the cinema and wax-
dolls, conjures up an image of the various forces that are included in the mechanical
reproduction of modern humanity and is one of the characteristics that stamps Lewis’s
work as a whole and the narrative of The Revenge for Love in particular. Within the
space of this work there is the perception, stated by Margaret, but involving the con-
sciousness of the majority of the characters, that living is a ‘fever’ and that the char-
acters are merely ‘all ghost-persons together’.34 This collapse of the vitality of the
characters is orchestrated within the work as part of the elemental struggle with the
condition of their own life, a condition that is shaped by impersonal forces that are
mechanising existence.
This sense of a struggle between mechanism and life is Lewis’s version of the rela-
tionship between teleology and mechanism elaborated within Kant’s Critique of
Teleological Judgement. Just as Kant reveals the ‘deeply hidden’ intention of cultural
history to be the reproduction of conditions of strife that constantly endanger life
itself, so Lewis sets out the intensification of this conflict within conditions of
mechanical modernity. The depth of Lewis’s engagement with this difficulty in his
novels encompasses a whole range of different types of situation from the isolation
described by him in Self Condemned to the eschatological involvement of The Human
Age.
The fact that Lewis’s work can be addressed in this manner is itself a tribute to the
type of criticism that is possible from a Kantian position. If, however, it were simply
the case that the assessment of a work, whether by Lewis or anyone else, was an appli-
cation of a pre-set notion of criticism and did not involve an alteration of the terms
of that criticism, we would not have described a reflective criticism at all. The engage-
ment with works has to alter the terms of the criticism otherwise the immanence of
the law of the work has been missed. In the case of Lewis we can note a continuous
setting out of instability in the relation between life and death, automation and
humanity.35 The introduction into the terms of the criticism of what is required by
the nature of comprehension of the work offers a living futural character to criticism
as it enables it to engage with its own conditions of possibility and articulate its own
methods in a manner that consistently requires invention.
Whilst Lewis’s work, as a literary work, reveals its effects through a process of lin-
guistic display, it relies heavily on the relationship modern literature has to mechan-
ised production of images. The arrival of cinema and photography as contemporary
means of production altered the condition of literature in terms of both its produc-
tion and its criticism. The quotes from Lewis that refer to cinema directly are only the
most obvious sign of this intrusion of visual art into modern literature. The writing
that Lewis produces is in fact much more heavily involved with modern images than
this suggests. Lewis understood his work to be based on tracing an ‘external’ relation-
ship to character in which behaviour and physical appearance become the source for
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understanding rather than an appeal to a deep ‘inner’ self. This understanding of the
nature of the character in terms of a fixity that is grounded in their physicality emerges
from the nature of figures that are given to us statically in photographs and through
a kinetic procession in cinema. This behavioural engagement with personality is part
of the increasing becoming-artificial of humanity.
In conclusion therefore it is worth looking at the placing of literature in relation
to visual art and to tracing out the connection between the two required for an aes-
thetic criticism as well as indicating something of the distinction between them. The
photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe are a reference of some import for discussing
the nature of visual media. In the posthumously published collection Pictures the most
explicitly erotic of Mapplethorpe’s photographs are presented together.36 There is for
example the four-picture sequence Helmut and Brooks (1978), Fist Fuck (1978),
Double Fist Fuck (1978) and Fist Fuck (1978). These works caused considerable con-
troversy and have been at the centre of battles about censorship. The point of discuss-
ing them is not to revisit this debate but to suggest, in agreement with Arthur Danto,
that a defence of these works cannot be based on a ‘formalist’ discussion of them as
‘figure studies’.37 I do not accept that such a purely ‘formalist’ reading of the works is
Kantian. Rather, a Kantian appreciation of these works has to begin from assessing
them reflectively in terms of the type of entry they have into the world of works of
art. As a fourfold sequence they make a powerful collective statement, but it would
not be ‘formalist’ to relate them to the conditions of their framing, conditions always
of central significance to Mapplethorpe. Hence Helmut and Brooks displays the action
it portrays through a geometric spacing of the figures that places the apex of the but-
tocks central to the composition, a centring that ensures the eye follows a curve
upwards to the back of the chair and downwards to the inserted face with a smooth-
ness that is clearly classical. Similarly, the first Fist Fuck places a figure’s profile in full
view, albeit with a backwards vision that permits a sliding portrayal of the man on the
floor and allows a graceful upwards movement of the eye towards the point of the fist’s
insertion. Double Fist Fuck by contrast offers a foreclosure of its subject which places
its elements in a bare relationship that simply and compellingly allows the connection
between the limbs involved to be presented. Of the four, only the second Fist Fuck
might be thought to be unsuccessful in terms of the relationship the tableau has to
the history of visual works. Here the figure that is entering is presented standing, with
a forward thrusting movement that prevents a clear focus on his form and renders the
composition less harmonious.
This limitative criticism of these works, which places them within the conditions
of their talented production, is only the first part of their appreciation. The purposive
orientation of the works and their criticism is to alter the way in which the conven-
tions the work has utilised can be understood and this involves the fact that the shapes
of the presentations given affect much other subject matter that is governed by the same
rules of portrayal. We can see this in relation to Mapplethorpe’s own work, where por-
traits of film stars and pictures of flowers cannot be viewed without a sense of how their
portrayal partakes of the eroticism of the works just referred to, and in relation to works
of other photographers who use or abjure these conventions. Cultural awareness of the
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works and the intertwinement between their compositional possibility and the subject
they present affects the comprehension of Renaissance paintings of angels as much as
it does the history of photography.
A criticism of these works that has ‘spirit’ will relate them in unexpected ways to
the history of which they are part and will in the process ensure that this history bears
the traces of its effect. As for example Thierry De Duve has ensured that it is now part
of the history of thinking of Duchamp that we think also of Kant, so also this reading
has ensured that Kant’s name is now connected to that of Mapplethorpe. The
‘medium’ of production of Mapplethorpe’s work is not simply photography but the
place of photography in relation to the arts as these are placed after the invention of
photography. This placement requires the comprehension of this history as one of a
displacement that constantly requires an invention of criticism, an ‘invention’ that
pretends neither to collapse the appreciation of works into the form of one type of art
(as is done with semiotic criticism) nor to suggest that distinct art forms are not inte-
grally related. This double vigilance, attending both to the specificity of a medium
and grasping its emplacement in a wide history that it alters due to its originariness,
is key to a futural criticism.38
This involvement of criticism with its own invention is the condition of criticism
having a future at all. The involvement of aesthetics with teleology in a unitary rela-
tion that comprehends works as parts of a ‘culture’ that they both continuously create
and are judged by is a recursive process and hence part of what the third critique has
enabled us to recognise. For criticism to become reflective concerning itself is for it to
live up to the challenges of the transcendental conditions of its own possibility, a chal-
lenge Kant himself did not feel he was in a position to meet.39 In suggesting that the
resources for criticism to meet this challenge are certainly available I wish to propose
a new future for aesthetics as integral to the criticism of works, a future that will enable
a different type of criticism than is generally practised, a criticism that will remain
open to its own conditions of transformation.
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12 Andrew Benjamin
Including transformation: notes on
the art of the contemporary
Central to any understanding of contemporary art and therefore central to any
engagement with a contemporary politics of art is the question of the nature of the
contemporary.1 Even before definitions of art and politics are offered it is the contem-
porary that emerges as the more insistent problem. While any attempt to pursue the
contemporary in a detailed manner must become, in the end, an engagement within
the philosophico-political problem of modernity, here, in this context, a form of
abbreviation needs to be found. A shortened yet insistent staging of the issues involved
in a sustained investigation of the contemporary will stem from a consideration of the
terms ‘transformation’ and ‘inclusion’. As will be seen, their positive and negative
determinations can be taken as defining an opening in which the art of the contem-
porary can be located.2 Prior to pursuing the detail of these terms their initial field of
operation needs to be identified. They stage a number of different possibilities.
The term ‘transformation’ marks the presence of a contested argument. Without,
at this stage, commenting on its viability, its opening move involves the claim that the
term ‘transformation’ identifies a political possibility that is taken to pertain no
longer.3 The argument continues in this vein. Projects of political transformation have
been replaced by strategies either of adaptation or of denial. Art that was linked either
directly or indirectly to transformation has, from within the purview of this argument,
failed to note the move away from strategies of complete social transformation. To the
extent that certain artistic practices identify with this conception of transformation,
that act of identification constrains art to oscillate between a series of carefully iden-
tified positions. Art that seeks to be directly political can be viewed as either utopian
or outmoded. Work that attempts to resist incorporation and thus allow for an
opening up of transformation because of the autonomy entailed by such work, suffers
the charge of elitism. The direct or indirect politicisation of art can be dismissed there-
fore because of its failure to address the contemporary. Such would be a ‘contempo-
rary’ view of art. Any engagement with this position cannot take place merely on the
level of the work of art. The locus of engagement is that specific conception of the
contemporary within which art is taken to announce the impossibility of transforma-
tion. The work of art becomes the site of that engagement.
‘Inclusion’ is a term that can be taken as working in relation to the oscillations
already identified within the domain opened up by any consideration of transforma-
tion. There are two different senses of inclusion. The first is a conception of inclusion
in which there is a shared agreement – or at least the assumption of such an agree-
ment – concerning the conditions of inclusion and exclusion. Without being immut-
able such assumptions are already in place. In this instance inclusion is dictated by a
commitment to a reiteration of sameness. Within the confines of this argument, same-
ness is the refusal of transformation. Allowing this conception to dictate how the con-
temporary is understood means that all works of art, even in being different, are the
same. What makes them the same is their implicit recognition of the impossibility of
there being a transformation. This recognition is linked as much to works that are
explicitly connected to the social as to ones whose relationship is always to be estab-
lished. Once art is defined beyond any link to a project other than the one provided
by its content, what remains is a proliferation of styles without end. There is however
a second sense of inclusion. Here, rather than the assumption of sameness as under-
lying relation, there is the presence of difference. Difference, rather than being an
effect of sameness, is already present. Difference and thus the problem of relation are
at work ab initio. (This accounts for why sameness and difference do not form a
simple opposition.) From this perspective inclusion becomes a form of negotiation
where the accepting and the ‘housing’ of the different has to allow for strategies that
maintain the different as such. This will have an eventual transformative effect on the
site in which the different is housed. The question that will have to be pursued con-
cerns the way this possibility is registered.
Having sketched some of the issues at work within these terms they now need to
be developed. In the process both the contemporary and the art of the contemporary
will be able to figure. What will emerge is that the nature of the contemporary and
the presence of contemporary art demand that the site of intervention be linked to
the act of criticism. In other words, art will not be able to intervene without the assis-
tance of criticism. While criticism can always be presented such that it reiterates the
position in which difference is the work of an unending sameness, criticism cannot
be equated absolutely with a presentation of this nature. There is another possibility.
It arises precisely because it is equally the province of criticism to allow art to inter-
rupt that perpetuating similitude. To allow for that interruption is to allow for the
structure of transformation. Moreover, not only will criticism emerge as central, of
equal importance is the fact that it is the nature of the contemporary – its particular
determinations – that demands this exacting role from the critic.4
Transformation
The argument against the possibility of transformation and thus for a version of the
equation in which realism equals political conservatism warrants a detailed analysis.5
The position contains a fundamental flaw. While it may be the case that direct cau-
sality no longer pertains such that it is not possible to argue that a series of political
actions or even artistic actions will have necessary effects, it does not follow that argu-
ments for a politicisation of art are themselves no longer possible. (Politicisation, in
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this context, involves the affirmed retention of transformation thought in terms of an
interruption of the repetition of sameness.6) In the absence of causality the question
that emerges concerns how art is to be political. To allow for this question is to resist
the claim that the only way in which art can interrupt a consensus concerning the
impossibility of transformation is by being directly political. Indeed it may be the case
that allowing the political to be coextensive with that which is literally ‘political’ is
allowing such art to be dismissed as simply unrealistic. Fundamental to the problem
of the literal is the belief that the desired end can be achieved by art alone. Not only
is such a view of art heroic, it is also false.
If the contemporary is the site of contestation concerning the possibility of trans-
formation, then the claim that transformation is impossible cannot be met with the
counter-claim of its possibility. After all, the copresence of both positions is that which
defines the contemporary. What is significant is that its possibility can no longer be
assumed and that therefore what counts as a response to the art of consensus is left
open. And yet, it is the presence of that opening that provides the way of taking up
what looks to be an aporia at the heart of transformation. The aporia is simply that
there would seem to be no way out of the setting in which art is positioned as no
longer having the capacity to stage an interruption and that this positioning cannot
be overcome by the direct politicisation of art. Art as a practice cannot be straightfor-
wardly politicised while at the same time remaining art. To allow for the aporia, which
in this context is to identify contemporary art with an unending proliferation of styles,
is to reduce art to no more than a register of decoration articulated within the cult of
personality as well as the temporality of fashion. Any move beyond the aporia will
have already signalled holding fashion and personalities in abeyance. How is the
holding to be done? In what name is it to be undertaken?
The initial answer to these questions is ‘art’. Art is that which escapes the hold of
fashion and therefore of differing forms of complacency. Its escape is undertaken in
the name of art. Once again such a response is circular. And yet, within that very cir-
cularity there lies another possibility. If art can be interpreted as no more than part of
an endless proliferation of possibilities; or if art is able to be reduced to the staging of
the ‘personality’ behind its production – and there will be other examples – then the
truth of art does not lie in the particular interpretation or reduction but in the fact
that art is able to lend itself to such possibilities. Art’s truth therefore lies in its capac-
ity to bear different and conflicting interpretations. What this means is that art is able
to function as the locus in which the contestation concerning the contemporary is
able to be staged. While one interpretation of art’s work will support claims concern-
ing the impossibility of transformation, since the evidence for such claims is that the
practice of art is the continuity of difference where difference is always that of the
same, it is equally the case that this ‘evidence’ can also be marshalled within arguments
and interpretations that resist this particular conception of the contemporary. As such
what is also changed is that for which art functions as evidence. Given that art’s truth
is its interpretive instability, what that truth demands is criticism as integral to art’s
work. Criticism – now understood as an inseparable part of art’s truth – is, in this
context, best approached under the heading of ‘inclusion’.
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Inclusion
As has already been intimated, there is an ineliminable divide within the space marked
out by this term. In the first instance, once it is assumed that art is no more than a
collection of different permutations of a generalised problematic, then all art is poten-
tially able to be assimilated and therefore included. Part of the strategy of an avant
garde was to create works of art that resisted assimilation. The museums and tradi-
tional gallery spaces would have been unable to house such interventions. That this
is not the case means that on the level of literal inclusion the museum has yet to be
challenged. If the price of inclusion is a certain homogeneity – and this is often the
case even for those works that seek forms of differentiation – then does this not mean
that art is, in fact, the site of an unending conformity to the given in which the pos-
sibilities of interruption and transformation are necessarily excluded?
Answering this question involves a twofold move. In the first instance an analogy
is necessary. If the incorporation or inclusion of new work (or even works that had
been thought to have been incorporated, assimilated and thus rendered familiar) par-
allels a version of citizenship, then the argument would be that a certain conformity
to expectation is the price of admission. And yet the site of incorporation seems to
be infinitely expandable and thus able to incorporate all possibilities. In the case of
citizenship the incorporation of the outsider – be it immigrant, refugee or even
home-born person – will be the inscription of the outsider within a process of
homogenisation. Marginalisation becomes the cost and possibility of a resistance to
that process. The limits of tolerance within contemporary democracies can be located
within the terms set by this process and the way it operates in given contexts. The con-
temporary problem of the refugee tests the system precisely because the inclusion of
refugees may have a transformative effect on the site that absorbs them. Holding to a
liberal doctrine of tolerance while at the same time resisting the cost of absorption is
the contradiction within government policies dealing with refugees. The task of intel-
lectuals in this regard is to argue that inclusion has an effect and that the effect con-
tains real potential for development and change (perhaps the only such potential
within the European context).7
The analogy with art emerges at this point. However, the analogy is not between
the work of art and the citizen (or would-be citizen); it occurs at the locus of reception.
The problem posed by the refugee is that inclusion could interrupt the repetition of
sameness. For the work of art there is a conflict – even if it is unstated – between that
form of reception in which the work is easily assimilated and the form that works to
identify and maintain a significantly different conception of assimilation, one present
in terms of the continuity of negotiation. There will always be forms of assimilation.
However, art’s capacity to transform or to maintain forms of criticality can always be
muted by, for example, a concentration on the cult of the artist. In such an instance
a consideration of the work is deferred by the emphasis on the artist. Assimilation can
only take place by refusing the work in the name of the artist.8 The capacity for the
work to have a transformative quality is stilled not by the work in and of itself but by
its reception. Assimilation is necessary in order that the repetition of sameness be
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maintained. The new can only be incorporated if such an act is not the occasion where
this repetition is interrupted. The threat of the refugee is the potential staging of such
an interruption. Once art and criticism are interarticulated, art is able to maintain the
same position. Consequently, while it is possible to include most works, because of
the nature of the artwork such objects bring with them the power to maintain them-
selves as sites of contestation and therefore as sites of potential transformation. The
potential lies not in the work of art in itself but in the question of its reception. That
question is the province of criticism.9
To the extent that the refugee is allowed to maintain difference as the determina-
tion guiding inclusion, then housing the refugee necessarily becomes a form of nego-
tiation with that difference. While it will always be possible to demand of the refugee
that conformity to expectations such that inclusion is undertaken in the name of
sameness, there is this other possibility. What matters with the refugee is the policy
guiding inclusion. Different directions and therefore different avenues of government
policy emerge with an inclusion structured by the maintenance of sameness than
would emerge in allowing for the continuity of negotiation. The latter is a form of
inclusion that allows for the potential endlessness of negotiation within a community
structured as much by continuity as by discontinuity. The divisions concerning the
reception of the refugee are reiterated within the activity of criticism accompanying
the reception of the work of art.
The point that needs to be argued therefore is that the divisions within reception,
and therefore the presence of at least two different modes of inclusion, are inextricably
bound up with what has been identified above as the truth of the work of art. It is this
point that needs to be developed. Moreover, it is only in recognising this ‘truth’ that
it becomes possible to address the question of policy in relation to the production of
works of art. The claim here therefore is that the only way that it is possible to take
up questions of policy in relation to art, the production of art and finally the recep-
tion of that production is within the terms set by the nature of the artwork itself.
Furthermore, because there is no such entity as the work of art in and of itself, what
is essential is that the art of the contemporary be given its appropriate setting; namely
that it be given an account that takes the present – the contemporary – as a necessary
component within art’s work. That necessity arises precisely because there cannot be
any real separation of the work from the activity of criticism – the activity that iden-
tifies the work, thereby allowing the work to become a site of contestation.
From truth to policy – the name of criticism
The obvious counter to the argument that policy depends on a decision concerning
the truth of art is that such a position overstates the needs of policy makers and con-
fuses philosophical argumentation with the ‘hard-nosed’ practice of decision making.
The are many ways of responding to this claim. The most germane for this argument
concerns the nature of a decision. What is it to decide? What is a decision?
A decision in this context is linked to the truth of art. That truth is simply that
fundamental to art’s work is the impossibility of there being any form of finality
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concerning the nature and thus meaning of the work. The absence of interpretative
finality is neither relativism not semantic undecidability. It is a direct consequence of
the ontology of the artwork. What absence opens up here is the necessity for a deci-
sion concerning the work of art. Interpretation – and this will be the case whether it
is recognised or not – has the structure of a decision. While what is at stake in the
practice of criticism is the decision, the question that has to be asked concerns the
relationship between this formulation of criticism and policy. Answering a question
of this nature involves tracing the move from the nexus made up of artwork/criti-
cism/decision to the domain of policy. Policy cannot be self-justifying. Implicitly it
maintains a conception of this nexus even if it is a banalised one. Given this nexus,
policy can work in at least two different directions.
In the first instance policy will stem from the position that holds to the impossibil-
ity of transformation and therefore from the description of artistic practice taking
place in terms of a proliferation of styles. Within this set-up such a proliferation has
to be maintained. Consequently, what will have to be excluded are artworks which
seem to question the likelihood of inclusion. In this context that questioning will not
be ostensibly ‘political’ artwork. Indeed, such works can always be included in the
name of tolerance. Exclusion will be linked to difficulty. And yet, this position is more
complex than is allowed for by a simple evocation of difficulty. Within the domain of
contemporary art the work that is apparently the most difficult seems to find a place.
Inclusion, for the most part, is an ineliminable possibility. Indeed, that is the point.
The question therefore has to concern what it is that would make work difficult. Prior
to pursuing this question the other eventuality for policy needs to be noted.
If, rather than linking policy to a reiteration of sameness – a position guided by an
interpretation of contemporary art that refuses it a transformative power – the strategy
behind policy is the refusal of that reiteration, then a more demanding question
emerges. What would it be like to decide that there is another possibility for art and
that the realisation of that possibility should be the result of decisions made by govern-
ment and public funding bodies? The answer to this question involves a similar policy
response as one that would be made to the refugee. If the refugee is encouraged and
accepted on the basis that inclusion will have a transformative effect on the site of inclu-
sion, then policy has to be linked to realising that end and thus allowing for a mode of
acceptance articulated in terms of negotiation. What this yields is a redescription of
the site of inclusion as one of negotiation. If the work of art is allowed a position in
which its presence is mediated by negotiation, this gives rise to two specific openings.
The first opening stems from the recognition that this mediation has always taken
place. In many instances it was unstated. In such instances inclusion was always
unproblematic. Where there was a potential problem then either curatorial practice
or criticism effected inclusion by operating in ways that overcame any potential diffi-
culty. However, to allow for the presence of explicit negotiation is to allow for work
by curators and critics whose task is to stage an explicit negotiation. There is a need
here to insist on the term ‘negotiation’. Explicit negotiation precludes both the didac-
tic and the prescriptive. Once negotiation is taken as central, policy becomes linked
to staging a set-up in which what occurs, and therefore the event that will happen, are
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not inscribed, directed and ordained in advance. And yet, the retention of the term
‘negotiation’ does not mean that anything is possible. Explicit negotiation only ever
occurs from a position. Here, what is being suggested is that this position sustains
negotiation. (It will be in terms of the continuity of negotiation that ‘difficulty’ will
come to be reworked.) The necessity that there be a position is a consequence of the
ineliminable presence of the decision. Negotiation, in this sense, cannot be thought
other than as the result of a decision.
The second opening occurs once explicit negotiation is allowed a central role, one
where it works as a motif for reception. From the start such a position is actually closer
to what has already been identified as the truth of art. This proximity does not guar-
antee the approach. Rather, it reinforces the necessity of holding to the nexus of
artwork/criticism/decision as integral to activities undertaken in the name of art.
When used in a number of contexts the term ‘negotiation’ brings with it a specific
goal. Negotiation can envisage a particular end. Once that end is reached, the nego-
tiation is over. While the term needs to be retained, it has to be given a different tem-
poral description. In this context the importance of a negotiation lies in the continuity
of its being maintained. In other words, the term designates a specific strategy of
reception in which the conditions for the reception of given works resist automatic
assimilation, such that the question of how such works are to be included becomes
the question to be pursued. Pursuing such a question is not an activity that pertains
to the work alone. It involves curatorial decisions as well as the practice of criticism.
Indeed, the work of art on its own cannot sustain a negotiation concerning its own
reception. The recognition of the work’s limit – a recognition that is, on one level, no
more than a redescription of the nature of the work of art – reinforces the central place
of criticism. Difficulty describes the predicament in which a work resists automatic
assimilation. Part of that resistance is that the work – and here work now has to
involve curatorial practice and criticism – comes to set the conditions of its reception.
It is in the attempt to set those conditions that there is a potential conflict with the
reiteration of sameness. The conflict occurs precisely because such an attempt would,
almost of necessity, interrupt that reiteration.
Within this framework policy is defined by the retention of difficulty and the
maintenance of sites of negotiation. While this is an abstract formulation, its force lies
in the recognition that its site of application is always strategic. In other words,
abstraction is always resolved by the decision. The immediate counter to the reten-
tion of even a reworked conception of difficulty itself coupled to the affirmation of a
conception of negotiation marked by the problem of resolution rather than its inevi-
tability, is that it re-establishes boundaries and therefore makes access to work more
exacting. Such work will only appeal to a privileged few. This is of course a highly
charged description of what would occur. Another description is that holding to diffi-
culty and negotiation opens up the work of art as a site of engagement – an engage-
ment which is constrained to take place in the name of art. Once inclusion is
uncomplicated, and any negotiation is only even implicitly present – present almost
to the point of its own disappearance – then art slides into mere entertainment and
thus loses its capacity to function as art.
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Allowing for difficulty means that judging policy, devising policy and implement-
ing policy take place in relation to the nexus comprised of artwork/criticism/decision.
The question that always needs to be addressed is straightforward: what, here, is to be
negotiated? In the case of new work the challenge resides in allowing that work to be
criticisable. The task of criticism therefore cannot be foreclosed in advance. In the case
of already existent, if not canonical work, the task is to reactivate that potential. In
both instances what allows for such strategies is the ontology of the work of art. As
has already been indicated, it is an ontological set-up that allows for the nexus of
artwork/criticism/decision to define the work of art. Finally, therefore, criticism is not
an extra element that can be either added or subtracted. Nor, moreover, is criticism
necessary because art no longer has a sustained philosophical basis. Indeed the con-
trary is the case. The inescapability of criticism – its need – lies in the ontological
nature of the work of art. The truth of art is its work.
As a conclusion it is vital to pursue, albeit schematically, this relationship between
art and truth. The argument developed here has, given the ineliminable presence of
the present having a determining effect on the activity of criticism, two central tenets.
The first is that art depends on criticism, since the concern of criticism is to establish
the way art works as art. The second is that the predicament of criticism is that even
though acts of criticism take the form of a decision, that decision cannot stem other
claims – critical claims – about either particular works of art or art in general. To opt
for the centrality of ontology is not to define ontology within the terms provided by
any prevailing claims about the ontology of the work of art. What the term ‘ontology’
is intended to designate here is the mode of being proper to art being art. While it is
possible to approach ontological considerations in terms of arguments concerning art
itself – and this designates a task to come – these concluding comments will concern
particularity.10
The particular work of art has a twofold reference. It is articulated within and crit-
icisable because of this referential set-up. The two types of reference are, firstly, that
any particular work of art refers to the genre of which it forms a part, and, secondly,
that it refers within a space which will be interrupted by the decision. Modes of recep-
tion that take the form of a decision need to be linked to particularity. As particular-
ity will always involve distinctions in terms of style and value, reception needs to be
governed by the question of how particularity is to be maintained. Maintaining the
presence of the particular and thus paying attention to its detail should not be thought
a type of interpretive empiricism. Such a position would be constrained to deny what
was identified above as the referentiality that is integral to art’s work. Holding to the
particular orientates the concerns of criticism towards the presence of the particular
as art. The argument is that the particular should be judged not in terms of the ways
it evidences art but in terms of the way it is art. The distinction is vital. Concentrating
on particularity takes the particular as the work of art. The artwork is such that it sanc-
tions an interpretive conflict without end. And yet it is a ‘without end’ that is inter-
rupted by the specific act of criticism.
The differing possibilities for the way the artwork is received all underlie the fact
that the work of art is a complex within which an interpretation – understood in the
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widest sense – is an act of individuation that does not deny the inherent plurality of
the work; rather it depends upon it. Recognising that as the state of affairs that allows
for criticism will give it a particular direction. Refusing it and insisting on the singu-
larity of the object – whether that singularity is thought historically, politically or phil-
osophically – reduces criticism to an informed description and as such the challenge
the work may have presented is eliminated from the start. To allow for difficulty and
thus for whatever overlap art and politics may have is to sustain criticism. The chal-
lenge for criticism is to return to the work of art.
Notes
1 The term ‘art’ is used here with great generality. It goes without saying that any detailed act
of criticism has to engage with particular works. Furthermore, the use of the term ‘con-
temporary’ forms part of a general philosophical project which takes as its object the devel-
opment of a philosophical understanding of the present. I have begun to develop this
position in a number of different places; see in particular Present Hope (London: Routledge,
1997).
2 For an extremely valuable and persuasive discussion of ‘inclusion’ as both a political and an
aesthetic term see G. Hartman, The Fateful Question of Culture (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997), pp. 166–203.
3 The form this argument takes is that the emancipatory programmes linked to Marxism and
even to socialism neither have an explanatory force let alone a programme for the future.
As such the present becomes the site marked by the necessary impossibility of emancipa-
tion and thus differing forms of transformation.
4 By extension such a set-up also delimits the necessity for, as well as the task demanded of,
intellectuals.
5 A fundamental part of that analysis has been undertaken by Perry Anderson in The Origins
of Postmodernity (London: Verso, 1998).
6 ‘Sameness’ is a complex term. From one perspective the proliferation of styles marking the
present state of art while allowing for individual differences between works establishes a
reign of the same once it is also assumed that integral to the practice of interpretation is the
elimination of the possibility of transformation. Interrupting the endurance of this concep-
tion of the same becomes an activity that need not demand other works – though their pres-
ence is not being precluded; rather what is demanded is a different strategy of interpretation
and therefore of critical practice.
7 The way in which the refugee is able to be excluded is in terms of a refusal of this process.
Claims that a given group is too different are generated from a position in which inclusion
is the consequence of a process of inscription. One of the most philosophically acute and
politically alert studies of the impact of the refugee on how inclusion is to be thought is M.
Dillon, ‘The scandal of the refugee: some reflections on the “inter” of international rela-
tions and continental thought’ in D. Campbell and M. J. Shapiro (eds), Moral Spaces:
Rethinking Ethics and World Politics (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1999),
pp. 92–124. While pursuing a different direction, Giorgio Agamben is also concerned with
the way the refugee functions as a limit concept. See Homo Sacer: Soverign Power and Bare
Life, trans. D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 131–2.
8 It is in these terms that it would be possible to begin an interpretation of Tracy Emin’s
work Bed. Whatever force the work may have had was quickly muted by the nature of its
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reception. The fact that the artist was in some sense complicit in this reception only rein-
forces the claim that the capacity for transformation lies in the possibility that the work can
be interpreted as having that quality. While there may not be unanimity concerning how
that quality is to be identified and thus named, what is essential is that criticism is able to
win the work of art from the hands of ‘biographers’ (and ‘autobiographers’).
9 While it cannot be argued for in detail, what this claim amounts to is a reassertion of the
position identified by Walter Benjamin as central to Romanticism, namely that criticisabil-
ity is integral to an object being a work of art. Criticisability cannot be separated from the
truth of art. This position is developed by Benjamin in ‘The concept of criticism in German
Romanticism’ in W. Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 1, ed. M. Bullock and M. W.
Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 116–200.
10 I have given a detailed account of the argument concerning particular and universal in my




Aesthetics and politics: between
Adorno and Heidegger
Antinomies of reason
The alignments of T. W. Adorno to the protracted, difficult process of coming to
terms with a broken Marxist inheritance and of Martin Heidegger to the Nazi poli-
tics of rethinking the human might seem to leave them at opposite non-communicat-
ing poles of political difference.1 Their views on aesthetics seem similarly starkly
opposed, in terms both of judgements and of the place of aesthetics within the phil-
osophical pantheon. Aesthetic theory for Adorno marks out a domain of experience
relatively immune from the impact of the banalisation of evil, indicated by Hannah
Arendt to be distinctive of the latter part of the twentieth century.2 Heidegger con-
versely seeks to build the movement of presentation and withdrawal of art in artworks
into a central place in his dangerous affirmations of a fatal twentieth-century and spe-
cifically German destiny.3 With his mythologising hope for a distinctively German
word for holiness, spoken by that distinctively German poet Hoelderlin, Heidegger
displaces aesthetics as analysis of sensibility and judgement, with universal scope, in
favour of affirming a transformative power of poetic naming within a quite specific
linguistic register: German. The differences between Adorno and Heidegger, then,
concerning politics and language, aesthetic analysis and its philosophical significance
are clear cut. This essay will however suggest that taking their positions as two halves
of a divided exposition, rather than as competing accounts of art, gives a clue to the
paradoxes of the relation between art and politics, which have caused much perplex-
ity in the twentieth century. While Adorno and Heidegger give different philosophi-
cal responses to these paradoxes, they are in agreement about the importance of an
analysis of artworks in assessing what philosophy can contribute to an understanding
of epochal change and world crisis.4
This epochal change and world crisis Adorno analyses in conjunction with
Horkheimer, in 1944, as an irresolvable dialectic of enlightenment, Heidegger in terms
of a dangerous domination of human endeavour by technology.5 Adorno goes on to
read Heidegger critically in Jargon of Authenticity: On German Ideology (1964) and in
the even more demanding Negative Dialectics (1966), from which the former text was
separated off.6 The proposal here is to read Adorno and Heidegger as presenting two
apparently incompatible halves of one argument, two halves of what Gillian Rose has
called a ‘broken middle’ or an unresolved antinomy of reason.7 The key to the com-
monality in their analyses is to identify the role of time and of temporality in their
respective accounts of enlightenment and reason, of technology and authenticity. The
notion of antinomy has a complex origin in the writings of Kant.8 It is also deployed
distinctively by Adorno, in his analysis of artworks.9 In this context, however, its devel-
opment as a technique for thinking about specifically twentieth-century conditions in
the writings of Benjamin is more significant. For Benjamin, in his address to the
Institute for the Study of Fascism, ‘The Author as Producer’ (Paris, 1934), the antin-
omy is between the necessity to align artistic activity with the exigencies of political
transformation and the constraint of artworks providing their own standards of excel-
lence.10 The task is to show how both lines of determination can be shown to be true
and compatible one with the other. It is thus Benjamin’s version of antinomy which is
to be evoked here, for both Adorno and Heidegger work in philosophy for its own sake
but also with an eye to a political transformation.
Notoriously Heidegger thought for a while that the destiny of the German people
had a promising future under the leadership of Hitler and his Nazi party. Of course
Heidegger was not alone in this, and was not alone later both in claiming to recog-
nise the enormity of the error and in failing to give an account of it. This, however, is
not the topic of the current essay, as the literature discussing Heidegger’s Syracuse is
too vast to permit of easy summary.11 Instead this essay gives an account of Adorno’s
critique of Heidegger’s notion of authenticity, in his book Jargon of Authenticity: On
German Ideology, in order to argue that this emphasis on authenticity, aligning
Heidegger with existential philosophy, conceals a more challenging engagement
between Adorno and Heidegger on the nature of history and time, and on the rela-
tion between historical conditions and concept formation. Indeed it will become clear
that had Adorno discussed Heidegger’s concept of historicality at greater length,
perhaps even making it and not authenticity the focus of the title, the encounter
would have been more clearly delineated. For what Heidegger shares with existential-
ism is less significant than what he shares with Adorno: a dispute for the inheritance
of the Western philosophical tradition. Adorno reads this tradition as culminating in
negative dialectics, because philosophy, ‘which once seemed to have been overtaken,
remains alive since the moment of its realisation was missed’.12 Heidegger reads that
history as culminating in devastation and destitution, as a consequence of a retreat of
being behind its emanations in historical circumstance. This retreat of being behind
its historical instances leads to a flattening out of the presentation of being in history
as no more than what is simply present, erasing both history and being. Heidegger
reads artworks not as sites for a restricted exploration of sensibility but as showing how
more generally in what presents itself to an observing subject, there is an emphasis on
what is present, in which its mode of presentation goes missing. For Heidegger this
mode of presentation as concealment conceals within it, and thereby obscures, the
moment of being as how there comes to be what there is; and it conceals its histori-
cality and its relation to time.
For Adorno there is a determination of time as the no longer of political hope; for
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Heidegger there is both a no longer, in a loss of an understanding of being, and a not
yet of a return of being, arising out of this distorting emphasis on the now of presen-
tation. For both, different historical epochs present different possibilities for philoso-
phy. This sets up a difference between history as a sequence of events of history,
ordinarily understood, and history as transcendental condition for the occurrence or
non-occurrence of philosophy. A focus on Heidegger’s notion of historicality then
permits the differences between these two responses to the history of philosophy to
emerge and permits a thinking of the differences between them on the no longer of
hope and the not yet of its retrieval. Adorno’s allegiance to Marxism indicates his rec-
ognition of a relation between historical process and its role in forming what can be
thought. Heidegger’s notions of authenticity and historicality provide a challenge to
the apparently dehistoricised notions of politics and aesthetics, which are in fact bur-
dened with an unthought-through reception of the Greek notions of order and com-
munity. The notions of aesthetics and of politics in their Greek origins contain
implicitly a presumption concerning a continuity between divine and human facul-
ties, and a hierarchy of human competencies, with some included and some excluded
both from the processes of deliberation about collective goals and from engagement
in artistic activity. This continuity and hierarchy is broken by Heidegger in his insis-
tence on an analytic of finitude, and, less directly, in Adorno’s identification of the
negativity of dialectics.
Heidegger displaces the temporally unrestricted notions of aesthetics and politics
in favour of the temporal relation set out between authenticity and historicality. This
temporal relation describes the situation of determinately existing being, Dasein, in
its relation to history. Dasein is Heidegger’s technical term for an analysis of the
human situation, whereby a human determinacy in space and time, its Da, and its
relation to being, Sein, can be held out for analysis.13 Authenticity and historicality
then pick out what is distinctive about one and the same structure of Dasein, as where
it happens to find itself, but viewed from two radically distinct stances. Historicality
is the condition viewed from the outside, in advance of any determinate existence
actually acquiring an understanding of itself as historical. Once this abstractly viewed
historicality is appropriated as true for an actual existence, it becomes authentic,
viewed from within, as following on from that actual existence. Thus Dasein is first
of all abstractly historical, inheriting a condition, but it is then able to take up a rela-
tion to that condition and make it its own. These determinations of Dasein bear in
them temporal indices of a before and an after, as lived processes of growing self-
understanding, in conflict with and as challenges to the inherited philosophically
established notions of the a priori and the a posteriori, that which comes before expe-
rience and that which comes after experience. For the notion of experience has been
displaced by Heidegger in favour of an analysis of Dasein as being in the world and
as being in time. This structure marks a definitive break, cutting the finitude of human
reasoning free from the idealisation of a divine wisdom. The key contrast here for
Heidegger is that between the supposed timelessness of a concept of eternity and the
temporality concealed in any human thinking of time.14
For Adorno, time and history pose the problem of the continuing availability and
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adequacy of inherited notions of categories and concepts for the task of philosophy.
It is this problem which poses for him the necessity of rewriting Hegel’s dialectics as
negative, as no longer providing their own completion in real lived relations.
Emphasising Heidegger’s innovation in his analytic of finitude and analysis of histor-
icality as authenticity focuses discussion between them. It makes room for the thought
that there is a more subtle critique of Heidegger available to Adorno than the empha-
sis on authenticity in Jargon of Authenticity. This critique concerns the relation
between concept formation and a thinking of time. Heidegger introduces a notion of
existentials through which what is distinctive about Dasein is articulated. These exis-
tentials are not neutrally ascribable to entities from the outside, but must be owned
and lived through as the structure of an actual existence. Thus they undercut any dis-
tinction between concept formation and thinking about time, since the concept for-
mation concerning existentials takes place in the time of an actual living being,
Dasein, stretched out between a quite specific date of birth and a quite specific time
of death. For Adorno this renders the meaning of existentials irreducibly contami-
nated by contingency and by arbitrary determination of meaning, not least by their
inventor, Martin Heidegger. Adorno by contrast supposes there to be an all-important
break between the possibilities of thinking and the constraints imposed by actual his-
torical and political context, which are traced out by the notion of negative dialectics,
the non-matching between thought and its context.15
Both Adorno and Heidegger pose a challenge to the analysis given by Kant in the
transcendental aesthetic of the first critique about time, space and the place of
thought.16 Kant’s transcendental aesthetic appears to give a single universally appli-
cable account of the relation between time and space in human reasoning and expe-
rience, whereas Adorno and Heidegger give historically, temporally and spatially
specific accounts of the structuring of human experience by space and time, respond-
ing to the specific conditions in which human beings find themselves: Adorno in terms
of dialectics, Heidegger in terms of a developing relation between technology and
nihilism. Adorno and Heidegger in developing further the relations between time,
temporality, philosophy and history continue a line of discussion suggested by Kant,
while displacing some of his key concepts. For Adorno, the nineteenth-century
emphasis on historical progress and cumulative human emancipation is a delusion,
and a political thinking of time and history, in relation to a less problematic notion of
space, must give way to an aesthetic thinking of a more highly problematised notion
of space in relation to a notion of time, as no longer the arena of change. This permits
a critique of the idea of progress, in the name of which philosophy is not realised in a
just society but abolished in favour of positivity.17 For Heidegger the sendings of being
are in each epoch distinct, but have culminated in the twentieth century in a triumph
of technicity in which thinking and being have been almost entirely erased.
The discussion between these two is here held in place not only by reference to a
reception by Benjamin of the Kantian notion of antinomy of reason but with respect
to Kant’s analyses of imagination, time and judgement in the first and third critiques.
Adorno repeatedly returns to the critical philosophy of Kant and especially the analy-
ses of the third critique, reading the division between aesthetic judgement of artworks
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and teleological judgement of natural processes as concealing the possibility of a think-
ing of the processes of history as an elided combination and subversion of the differ-
ence between these two. Heidegger, in his study, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
(1928), concentrates on the first edition of the first critique, where imagination is to
be shown to be the condition of possibility for the inauguration of new orders of expe-
rience and community, not just as a condition for historical change but as the struc-
ture of temporality itself.18 The contrast between the directions of these readings could
not be more extreme and yet the concerns are similar: the question of the place of a
thinking of time and history.
This essay has two further sections. The second part is called ‘Aesthetics and poli-
tics: beyond and behind’. The third part is called ‘Once more a question of transla-
tion’. They seek to retrieve Heidegger’s thinking of authenticity as a thinking of
historicality from Adorno’s attempted demolition. This opens the possibility of
rethinking history as neither linear, held in place by chronology, nor catastrophic, held
in place by irretrievable break points. It proposes a notion of elliptical history. This
rethinking takes the form of a movement of ellipsis, a destabilised oscillation around
the two points, variously Adorno and Heidegger, aesthetics and politics, and artworks
and political history.19 An ellipsis in time traces a movement where what is left out at
an earlier point in a sequence returns to disrupt the linearity of that sequence at a later
stage; and whereby the appearance of standstill turns out to be not an irretrievable
break but rather a turning point. This third movement, neither linear nor catas-
trophic, is held in place by the structures of antinomial reasoning, concerning aesthet-
ics and politics, and concerning the temporalties of the no longer and the not yet. The
paper thus presents a thought experiment under the titles ‘antinomy ‘ and ‘ellipsis’.20
Aesthetics and politics: beyond and behind
It is possible then to read the enquiries of Adorno and Heidegger as cumulatively
moving beyond Kant. Instead of the Kantian project of determining the scope of con-
cepts and categories, irrespective of historical and linguistic conditions and con-
straints, they affirm the possibility of a historically and politically determinate context
of conceptual determination. This then poses the problem of historicism. By reading
Kant, Adorno and Heidegger explicitly in terms of the historical and temporal condi-
tions of possibility, making their thought comprehensible, it becomes possible to
develop an account of the historicality of thought, of concepts and of categories. This
sets up an oscillating move between conceptual determinacy and historical specificity,
between occasion for thought and conditions of possibility, understood as historical
conditions. This oscillation becomes a movement of ellipsis since the thinking of both
Adorno and Heidegger is pulled off course by the gravitational force exerted by the
Kantian system on the one side and by its disaggregation in the writings of Benjamin
on the other.The Kantian system is no less important to Benjamin than it is to Adorno,
and Benjamin develops three quite specific challenges to it: a challenge to the modal
notions of possibility, actuality and necessity presented in the first critique, a challenge
to the notions of virtue and happiness in the second critique, and a challenge to the
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distinction between art and nature in the third critique, affirming instead the notions
of ruination, destruction and technique, which are simultaneously modal and critical.
This permits Benjamin to recast conceptual determination as always marked by an his-
torical index and as temporally unstable, thus radically displacing the neutralisation of
history and time in philosophy.
Benjamin’s relation to Adorno is highly contested. His critique of Heidegger is
severe, and he would see the attempt to separate the judgements of the man from the
philosophical task as spurious, since there is one and only one sensorium, which in
failing to think the specificity of its situation fails to perform politically, and fails to
do justice to the twin claims of time and truth. Important here is a transformation at
work in Benjamin’s analyses, from a notion of a logical contingency, subordinate to a
notion of necessity, completabilty and perfectibility, placed within the hierarchy of
Kant’s categories of modality, into a notion of a necessity subordinated rather to a
principle of radical non-identity. The temporalities of anachronism, delay and
destruction take over from those of Kant’s analogies of experience, permanence, suc-
cession and coexistence, and completed works are to be thought of as death masks,
not as fulfilments of their conception. This is alluded to in the thirteenth thesis on
the technique of the writer, in One Way Street and Other Writings: ‘The work is the
death mask of its conception.’21 From an innovation in the order of things, the
artwork through its reception becomes domesticated and subordinated to generalis-
ing accounts of the relation between time and art, from which it has to be again
wrenched free, to reactivate its moment of disruption. By contrast to a limited notion
of the contingent, which could be otherwise, could be corrected and completed, there
is here a radical contingency, which is necessarily incomplete in the form in which it
is, as a matter of fact, found. This is the ruination brought to our attention by
Benjamin’s preference for the irresolutions of Renaissance and Baroque mourning
plays over Greek tragic resolution, as discussed in The Origins of German Tragic Drama
(1928).22 This notion of ruination, like the notion of ellipsis, is also remarked by
Heidegger in his lectures on Aristotle from 1921–2 and is subsequently developed in
Being and Time into the notion of Dasein’s condition as Verfallen, the movement of
absorption in everydayness.
A link between this notion of contingency and a recasting of the notion of con-
temporaneity has implications for the relation of theorists to their own context: ‘if the
perspectives of the philosophy of history should prove to be an essential part of a
theory of tragedy, then it is clear that the latter can only be expected from research
which shows some understanding of its own age’, Benjamin wrote in 1925.23 The
challenge is to construct a philosophy of history, of politics and of historicality, which
resists the banalisations of relativism, scepticism, historicism by affirming a notion of
necessity which is not reappropriable into the historical neutrality of its insertion into
the Kantian system under the sign of completability and perfectibility. The three levels
of Benjaminian disaggregation consist in an affirmation of a relation to contemporan-
eity as the basic historical determination; a recasting of any philosophy of history in
such a way as to respect this priority; and a rethinking of modality as radical contin-
gency, not to be subverted by a presumption that all the same there is a City of God,
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by contrast with which human imperfection and fallibility may be measured.
Through these moves Benjamin’s notion of antinomy can be set apart from those of
both Adorno and Kant. Even antinomy is not generalisable, and is to be performed
on each occasion in relation to a reading of specific texts in terms of discrete, deter-
minable topics and topologies. This is Benjamin’s innovation in aesthetics.
While Adorno seeks systematically to set out a separateness of aesthetic experience,
Heidegger tears up the customary subdivisions of philosophy and indeed discards the
protective shield of universalism and abstraction, plunging the philosophical inheri-
tance into the maelstrom of political culpability. For Adorno, the separability of aes-
thetics from the accommodations of epistemology and metaphysics, which substitute
exchange value for use value, permits aesthetics still to trace out the registration of an
experience not yet appropriated by that which it experiences: ‘Kant shall have the last
word on aesthetic hedonism.’ Adorno writes at the end of the first section of Aesthetic
Theory: ‘In his analysis of the sublime, which is set apart from art, Kant wrote that
happiness in relation to works of art is the feeling they instil of holding one’s own, of
resisting.’24 Aesthetics may for Adorno have become the necrology of art; neverthe-
less, it is the only living aspect of philosophy. For Heidegger, by contrast, the destruc-
tion of these internal divisions between philosophical specialisms is the only route to
retrieving the initial and sole source of philosophical energy: an uncontaminated,
uncoerced wonder in response to what there is. He makes this clear in the Letter on
Humanism (1946), but the thought is already in evidence in Being and Time (1927)
where the customary division between epistemology and metaphysics, between ethics
and aesthetics, is not to be found.25 Where Adorno resists the question of origin and
genesis, of art, of sensibility, indeed of what there is, for fear of some coerced com-
plicity in an inhuman totalisation, for Heidegger there is one question, and one ques-
tion only, in pursuit of which all and everything may and must be sacrificed: why is
there something rather than nothing?
In his essay ‘The origin of the artwork’, Heidegger pursues this ontogenetic ques-
tion through the inflection ‘how is there something rather than nothing?’26 Not only
is the question of the origin of the artwork thereby to be resolved but also that of the
origin of there being a world in which human being can question itself and its rela-
tion to being as destiny. Heidegger makes three moves. ‘Art is truth setting itself to
work’, he says; ‘To be a work means to set up a world’; and then:
World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever non-
objective to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and
curse keep us transported into being. Wherever those decisions of our history that relate
to our very being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognised and are
rediscovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds.27
He goes on: ‘A stone is worldless. Plant and animal likewise have no world; but they
belong to the covert throng of a surrounding into which they are linked.’ This pro-
vides the background for Heidegger’s claim that the happening of truth is historical,
in the double sense, both as calling history into existence and as grounded in histori-
cal specificity.There is then an internal consistency to his insistence that art culminates
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in poetic composition and the imposition in poetry of linguistic specificity. For lin-
guistic specificity, the languages of human beings, by contrast to language as such, is
inseparable from the occurrence of history and from historical specificity.28 This line
of thought puts in question the presumption that what is at stake in aesthetics and in
philosophy more generally is the status of universalising judgement. For universalis-
ing judgement presumes the availability of a single theory of judgement true for all
times, whereas Heidegger supposes that judgement arrives differentially in different
specific human contexts, in accordance with current understandings and misunder-
standings of their positioning in time and history. As Heidegger puts it, even a refusal
of time and of history is a relation to history, if of a deficient kind.
Heidegger links the analysis in ‘The origin of the artwork’ back to that of Being
and Time by citing the notion of resolution, Entschlossenheit, and by replaying the dis-
junction, thrown projection, discussed at length in Being and Time, in the following
manner: ‘Truth is never gathered from objects that are present and ordinary. Rather,
the opening up of the Open and the clearing of what is, happens only as the open-
ness is projected, sketched out, that makes its advent in thrownness.’29 There is no
determinacy of truth given in advance of thinking and time, but rather truth takes
shape and arrives as a result of specific efforts to think and to understand the relation
between thinking and the passage of time. Heidegger draws his reflections together in
the last pages of the essay thus: ‘The origin of the work of art, that is the origin of
both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a people’s historical existence,
is art. This is so because art is by nature an origin: a distinctive way in which truth
comes into being, that is, becomes historical.’ When art happens, according to
Heidegger, there is a beginning in history, a departure for history, an emergence in
history of what is historical, which can then be preserved or abandoned. The crucial
sentences are:
Whenever art happens, that is, whenever there is a beginning, a thrust enters history,
history either begins or starts again. History means here not a sequence in time of events
of whatever sort, however important. History is the transporting of a people into its
appointed task as entrance into that people’s endowment.30
The double challenge here is: how to think this endowment, inflected as it must be
through the implicit hope for a German collectivity under the sign of brown shirts.
This endowment (the German is ein Mitgegebenes), is also challengingly a transposi-
tion of the Kantian task of reason, die Aufgabe der Vernunft, as Aufgegebenes. The task
of reason takes thinking away from this historical specificity, whereas the happening
of art takes place nowhere but in specific historical conditions and contexts, and is
responded to or ignored by the people who are exposed to it. Despite the specificity
of the linguistic connection, however, it would be a mistake to think that each, the
collectivity of brown shirts and the task of reason, can be thought to be specifically
German destinies. For Heidegger, it is art, not Germanness which, as founding, is
essentially historical and grounds history; and this notion of the essentially historical
takes up from Being and Time the theme of historicality, as a translinguistic category,
or as Heidegger there calls it an existential.
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For Adorno the notions of resolution, of thrown projection, of endowment and of
essential historicality are empty abstractions, and in Jargon of Authenticity he empha-
sises his differences from Heidegger on the use of the language. They are thus in battle
not just for the inheritance of the philosophical tradition but also for its articulation
in German. There is a remarkable asymmetry between the registers and range of ref-
erence for Heidegger and for Adorno. Heidegger in ‘The origin of the artwork’ seems
quite deliberately to constitute a series of works with the hallmark of simplicity, with
no irony and no gesture of delimiting critique. The series, the temple, the thing poem,
‘The Roman Fountain’ by Meyer, and the Van Gogh painting, could be linked
together under the title unsophisticated primitivism. By contrast, Adorno prefaces
Jargon of Authenticity with the following epigraph from Samuel Beckett: ‘It is easier to
raise a temple than to compel the object of the cult to descend into it.’ This, with its
resonance of Voltaire, and its obvious edge against exactly Heidegger’s invocation of
the temple in the artwork essay, has the effect diagnosed by Benjamin: ‘Quotations
are the muggers of literary work, leaping out armed to relieve the unwary of their con-
victions.’31 For Adorno the exemplary artworks are Berg’s Wozzeck; the writings of
Samuel Beckett, abstract minimalism, and he has no time for a theorising of art irre-
spective of historical context. Thus for Adorno it makes no sense to align a continu-
ity and contrast between the absence of the gods in the Greek temple and Hoelderlin’s
diagnoses of the departure of the Greek gods in his hymns on the German reception
of Greek thought; and to contrast this then to the enigmatic presentation of a pair of
shoes in Van Gogh’s paintings.
The figure against whom Adorno and Heidegger turn, with shared venom, is
Lukács. Adorno, in his essay ‘Reconciliation under duress’, wrote witheringly of
Lukács’s theory of a necessary reconciliation to the order of what there is, when Lukács
took on the role of apologist for the State Socialism of Hungary.32 Heidegger impli-
citly denounces Lukács in the Letter on Humanism, in the critique of deployments of
the categories of rationalism and irrationalism. There are no consolations of philoso-
phy for Adorno and Heidegger: Adorno regrets the moment of the failure to realise
philosophy in Marxist revolution. Heidegger, similarly regretful but addressing the
lost hopes of Hoelderlin and Nietzsche, rather than Marx and Engels, observes in
1962: ‘Only a new god can save us now.’33 While for Adorno philosophy has moved
from the possibility of political engagement back into an autonomous articulation,
for Heidegger the movement goes the other way, from a long history of separateness
into a political alignment made necessary by the globalisation of technical mastery of
natural processes and the concomitant nihilism with respect to values higher than
those of mastery and calculation. The notion of an elliptical history then is one in
which there is an oscillation both between the orientations of Adorno and Heidegger
with respect to politics and to aesthetics and between a supposedly irretrievable past
possibility and an undesirable because still not emancipatory future.
Lacoue-Labarthe argues in Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political
(1990) that Heidegger’s political affirmation fictionalises politics, under the aegis of
Hoelderlin.34 It is a fiction, in the sense of composing, Dichten, in which there are no
longer external standards of good and bad, human flourishing and human evil: in a
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moment of caesura, a break in the linear development of the line, of meaning and
value, and of time, a term borrowed from the technical performance of Hoelderlin’s
poetry, a standstill makes way for the invention or arrival of order. As Lacoue-Labarthe
puts it, concerning holocaust: ‘That is why this event – Extermination – is for the
West the terrible revelation of its essence.’35 However, there are no controls over what
may arrive in the moment of standstill, with its implied condition of destitution. Thus
for Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger’s much disputed silence after Auschwitz is required
by the nature of that event, and is not to be read as the inadequacy specifically of
Heidegger’s political judgements.36 Adorno too, perhaps no less inadequately,
announced in 1949: ‘Cultural criticism finds itself up against the last level of a dialec-
tic between culture and barbarism: to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric and this
also eats up the cognition which expresses why it became impossible to write poetry
today.’37 He subsequently came to modify the claim in his Aesthetic Theory, for which
aesthetic activity seemed the only possible form of insurrection or indeed self-
protection against the impact of a controlled controlling world. Each stance, that of
Adorno and that of Heidegger, is open to trivialisation and misrepresentation; for each
the extremity of disaster brings poetry and writing, and thinking and philosophising,
to a standstill, in a realisation of Hoelderlin’s caesura.38 According to Lacoue-Labarthe
this ‘counter-rhythmic suspense’ leads to a turn into a better understanding of the ‘law
of finitude’, first set out by Heidegger in the 1920s. In the writings of philosophy, this
must lead into an affirmation of the radical contingency of philosophical order, which
would appear to suggest that there is no philosophical inheritance for Adorno and
Heidegger to contest. Adorno accepts and Heidegger rejects Kafka’s diagnosis: an
infinity of hope, but not for us. Adorno is willing to wait for another turn in the
awkward asynchrony between historical time and human fulfilment. Heidegger
affirms the more distant Nietzschean, Hoelderlinian hope for a new god. Thus
Heidegger accepts and Adorno rejects Nietzsche’s affirmation of Heraclitus: that if a
human being has character, there is an experience which constantly recurs. Their
responses to the twentieth-century political and aesthetic exigencies are quite distinct,
one affirming Nietzsche’s eternal return and the other Kafka’s surrender, but there is
demonstrably in the conjunction of their writings a shared moment of inarticulacy in
response to Auschwitz.
Once more a question of translation
The strategy here, then, is to take Heidegger’s notions from Being and Time,
Geschichtlichkeit, variously translated as historicity and as historicality, and
Eigentlichkeit, usually translated as authenticity, and to retranslate them, in order first
to reveal their interconnection in delineating the move from fallenness, as absorption
in everydayness, into a self-transparent historically given human existence. It is then
possible to show how as a pair they make available a distinctive construal of the rela-
tion between human sensibility, the present, the opening of the future and the retrieval
of the past. This opens out a question to the self-evidence both of the meaning of these
two terms and of the meaning of the notions of aesthetics and politics. Each set of
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terms then is to be deployed in order to unsettle the sense of obviousness and meaning
of all three conjunctions: Adorno and Heidegger, aesthetics and politics, authenticity
and historicality. By translating Eigentlichkeit as appropriation, it is possible to under-
line the manner in which Eigentlichkeit sets up the challenge of coming to terms with
an occasion for thought, in excess of a capacity for thought. This involves thinking in
a context determined by forces above and beyond the compass of any given cognitive
ability, presentation or evidence. The cognitive ability develops or not as the case may
be only as a response to the challenge. This is a thinking, which must almost neces-
sarily impose distortions on what is thought, but in such a way as to constitute the
identities of the thinkers themselves. This, then, is no idle distortion but one constit-
utive of human identities and future possibilities.
In authenticity or appropriation, there is a projection of an identity and a future as
a horizon for meaning and activity. This is framed by what it responds to, and this is
the play of Geschichtlichkeit, which in parallel with thrownness predisposes a certain
way of appropriating what arrives. It is tempting, then, to translate Geschichtlichkeit as
aptitude, playing up the connection to the cognate notion, Geschicklichkeit, ability,
facility or fatality, for it was one of Benjamin’s self-deprecatory complaints that he was
ill-equipped, or indeed not fated, ungeschickt, to deal with twentieth-century condi-
tions. However, more promising for an understanding of Heidegger’s text is the trans-
lation of Geschichtlichkeit as the conditions of possibility for appropriating history,
given on each occasion differently to Dasein in its pre-theoretical understanding of
both time and being. This displaces any alignment of Geschichtlichkeit, as straightfor-
wardly historical or political category, rendering it rather a question of aesthetic sen-
sibility and attunement. There is then the correlative possibility of relocating
Eigentlichkeit as nothing like an ethical category of moral worth nor yet an aesthetic
category concerning a refinement of self-awareness, but much more as the condition
of being human, as constrained by specific historical and political contingencies. It is
the manner in which human beings come to terms with circumstance, as a result of
which certain individual and collective trajectories might or indeed might not be set
out. It is the occasionality of this condition that goes missing in Adorno’s reception of
it, as does the specificity of Heidegger’s question to the continuing relevance of the dis-
tinction between, and indeed the validity of the very categories, politics and aesthetics.
In 1964 Adorno published his Jargon der Eigentlichkeit, separately from and in
advance of Negative Dialectics, as a response to the emergence in the pre-Nazi and Nazi
years of the strand of philosophising called existential philosophy, in the writings of
amongst others Heidegger and Jaspers. The language of care and concern (Sorge and
Besorgen), commission (Auftrag), resolution (Entschlossenheit), ambiguity and of
course authenticity comes in for derisive critique. There is a brief mention, almost in
passing, of Heidegger’s notion of history, as cited in the Letter on Humanism. Adorno
quotes Heidegger and then provides a devastating brief critical comment about the
magical immediacy of the arrival of the human in its community with being. What
for Adorno might result from an unceasing political and intellectual labour appears
with Heidegger to occur simply by fiat: thus the human is. This, then, is the quota-
tion from Heidegger, cited by Adorno:
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Human being is not the lord of existence. Human being is the shepherd of being. In this
‘less’ human being loses nothing, but rather wins by reaching the truth of Being. He
wins the essential power of the shepherd, whose worth consists in being called, by Being
itself, into the trueness of its truth. This call comes as the throwing from which the
thrownness of existence stems. In its essence, as being historical (seinsgeschichtlichen
Wesen) human being is the existent whose being as ek-sistence consists in his living in
the neighbourhood of Being. Human being is the neighbour of being.39
And this the comment by Adorno: ‘Philosophical banality is generated when that
magical participation in the absolute is ascribed to the general concept – a participa-
tion which puts the lie to that concept’s conceivability.’40 For Adorno the generality
and simplicity of the claim renders it vacuous. If the absolute is to be thought it is,
for Adorno, to be thought in conflict with and against the grain of any given simplic-
ities or natural contours of language, whether everyday or sophisticated. The contrast
of registers is of course deliberately startling.
For Heidegger, the Nachbar, the neighbour, is the nearby farmer, the Bauer who is
nah. The combination of homely etymologies with a desanctified deployment of the
Christian language of shepherds and keepers is hardly likely to recommend itself to
Adorno’s more sophisticated concern with the conceivability of the concept in current
conditions. These notions of neighbourhood and shepherding for Adorno offer
neither the insights of poetry nor the conceptuality of philosophy, but solely banality.
The polemical verve of Adorno’s critique is indisputable; its focus would be sharper,
however, if the attention paid to the notion of authenticity were counter-balanced by
an equal attention to Heidegger’s notion of historicality, as here transformed into a
notion about the history of being. The history of being for Heidegger is the arrival of
a deepening crisis of destitution through the neglect of presentation in favour of what
is presented. The history of being sets out the process in which there is or is not an
arrival of an understanding and an appropriation of human historicality. Adorno does
not here develop a discussion of this aspect of Heidegger’s thinking and after this
passing observation, the thinking of history fades back into the background. Even
within the limits set out by the task of a critique of authenticity, Adorno misses the
power of his own arguments. The antipathy between Heidegger’s manner of descrip-
tive imperatives and a retrieval of conceptuality could be sharpened. Heidegger is sus-
picious of a conceptuality which sets itself up in opposition to an already given order,
and rather supposes that what there is must be conjured into revealing itself to an
attentive composing thinking.41 The virtue of Husserl’s phenomenology as far as
Heidegger is concerned is that it offers this possibility of revealing what is not already
given, instead extracting what there is from its concealment in everyday taken-for-
granted relations. Heidegger and Adorno thus share a suspicion about the adequacies
of everyday understanding and what is given in uncritical or unreduced perception.
The standoff between Adorno and Heidegger will be all the more marked once their
contrasting responses to a limited availability of a diagnostic language and a lack of
adequate conceptuality are set out.
Authenticity, Eigentlichkeit, is for the Heidegger of Being and Time an existential,
a category distinctive of the kind of existence, which has given to it an understanding
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of being. It is thus never simply an experiential structure but one with cognitive and
ontological preconditions and consequences, out of which understanding is pro-
jected. It is a question of appropriating and understanding this structure of precondi-
tions given in advance of any particular experience and always in excess of the
cognitive capacities of the bearer of that understanding. This is the structure of
thrownness and throwing to which Heidegger refers in these lines from the Letter on
Humanism and which elicits Adorno’s mockery. However, it is also the structure of
hyperbole, excess, and elleipsis, deficiency, discussed in the early Aristotle lectures,
giving rise to the analysis first of ruination, Ruinanz, and then of fallenness, Verfallen,
as necessary and not contingent features of the existence of human beings, modalities
of existence no longer thought in accordance with Christianised notions of perfect-
ibility. The caesura of the Hoelderlinian line can then be located within this structure
of the thrown throwing, as its condition, when a third movement, a counter-
movement, ‘counter-rhythmic suspension’, Gegenwurf, is added to the thrownness,
Geworfenheit, and projection, Entwurf, of Being and Time.42 These movements are to
be understood not as some children’s game but as a description of the spatio-temporal
dimensions within which human being responds or fails to respond to the question
of being, and something more like the Heraclitean image of children dicing with
destiny begins to emerge.
This is a further challenge to the account in Kant’s transcendental aesthetic of the
basic structures of time and space, now thought in terms not of separable forms of
time and spaces but of distinctive movements, combining time and space, in an arrival
in the present as thrownness, projection out of a present, and contrary movement, in
the present, in the counter-movement of the caesura. This provides a way into think-
ing different presentations of what is present. In Being and Time Heidegger theorises
a retrieval of the past and the arrival of the future in a present, as conjoined condi-
tions for a standstill, in a transformatory moment of insight into the nature of the
movements of time and human understanding. Once these movements are high-
lighted, it becomes less obvious that Adorno can deploy the objection that Heidegger
erases the movements of mediation and sublation at work in dialectical philosophy.
Rather, Heidegger has taken up these movements and thought them differently, in
response to the suspicion that dialectics were always at a standstill, always only capable
of thinking what they had already resynthesised. At this point Adorno’s and
Heidegger’s rather different responses to Kant’s diagnoses of dialectical movement
come into view. Adorno, by discussing Heidegger in the context of Jaspers’s notions
of existential philosophy and of limit conditions, aligns Heidegger’s thinking more
closely to a politics of individual self-affirmation than is quite accurate. For Heidegger,
much of the point of his insistence on analysing Dasein is that it is not and cannot be
immediately aligned to individual human existence. For Heidegger, human individ-
uality emerges out of its interconnections with others, which may in some circum-
stances never permit the release of an individual into its own self-appropriated destiny.
Dasein is thus a significant technical device which permits Heidegger to point out
how unfamiliar humanity is to human beings, both collectively and individually.
There is also an important dimension to Heidegger’s class position, which disconnects
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him from the liberal politics of self-assertive individualism taken for granted in intel-
lectual circles. For Heidegger, the question of community is much more: how does
someone emerge from their communal background such as to be able to take up a
relation to being, and accede to a decisiveness of thinking? It is not how to think com-
munity from conjoined individuals. Adorno thus aligns Heidegger too closely both
with Jaspers and with Sartre, whom Adorno so memorably denounces in his essay
‘Commitment’.43 Heidegger’s differences with Sartre are of course equally well
known, and he sets them out in some detail in Letter on Humanism. More significant
here are Heidegger’s differences with Jaspers.
Already in a review of Jaspers in 1919, Heidegger is taking issue with Jaspers’
theory of worldviews, although with respect:
Though Jaspers has only gathered up and depicted what ‘is there’, he has nonetheless
gone beyond mere classification by bringing together in a new way what has already been
available to us, and this must be evaluated positively as a real advance. However if it is
to be capable of effectively stimulating and challenging contemporary philosophy, his
method of mere observation must evolve into an ‘infinite process’ of radical questioning
that always includes itself in its questions and preserves itself in them.44
These differences emerge more clearly in the course of the 1920s, but as with
Heidegger’s differences with Husserl, they become enmeshed in Heidegger’s political
adventure of the 1930s. Jaspers’s critique of the third withheld section of division one
of Being and Time, ‘time and being’, persuaded Heidegger to keep it back on publi-
cation in 1927.45 Jaspers also wrote the reference on Heidegger in 1947, declaring that
Heidegger’s non-interactive mode of lecturing and teaching was unsuitable in a
context seeking to develop a new style of philosophising, free from any Nazi connec-
tion. The question is: how might Adorno’s critique of authenticity and Jaspers’s cri-
tique of the third section of part one of Being and Time be brought together to show
how for Heidegger but not for Jaspers there is a questioning of a collective destiny,
Mitgegebenes, Geschichtlichkeit, Mitdasein, in which the questions of politics, how to
think collectivities, and questions of aesthetics, how to think receptivity, how to think
local universals, how to think affectivity, might be recast.
The notion of authenticity, as deployed by Sartre and depicted by Adorno, is one
which attaches to a romantic individualism and to individual identities. The one
deployed by Heidegger in Being and Time attaches to Dasein not as an individual
Selbstsein but as a generational and intergenerational transmission, one which is situ-
ated between predecessors and descendants, ancestors and successors. Thus the gen-
erational dimension of Dasein’s authenticity goes missing in Adorno’s account. This
is especially odd since this notion of generational identity grounds the fatal decision
to choose a hero as an intimation of another possible future. The notion of genera-
tional being provides a location for thinking a relation between history and histori-
cality and the moment of Dasein as Mitsein, being with, as Mitdasein, determinate
existence alongside and coming into contact with other such existence, and a projec-
tion into a survivable future. It is here that we can tie together the notions of histor-
icality, Geschichtlichkeit, to be understood as condition of possibility for appropriating
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history; destiny, Geschicklichkeit; and aptitude, Geschick.46 On this account, the
manner in which to understand the notions of historicality and of authenticity is to
think them together, to think them as replicating the movement of thrownness and
projection; to locate them as displacing the concerns of aesthetics, with affectivity and
receptivity on one side, and politics, as concerned with collectively constituted con-
straints on human understanding, on the other; to think instead in terms of trajecto-
ries of collective transformation. Such a thinking acquires a bad name when it is
locked into the kind of transformations at work in Nazism, and the thought of tra-
jectory, beyond good and evil as it is, requires some other thinking of normativity and
of human flourishing in order to prevent it bringing with it the death of all human
flourishing. For such a thinking, the value of human life and flourishing is to be
argued, not taken for granted, and is to be hoped for, and worked for, not assumed as
a necessary outcome of a preconstituted historical process. For the development of
this thinking Benjamin’s writings provide some significant cues and clues. These cues
and clues, however, can be followed up only once the divided inheritance of Kant’s
thinking of imagination and art, of nature and the concept, as handed down through
Heidegger’s and Adorno’s writings, is brought together again and relocated as a
response to the new conditions of the coming century.
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